| | PAGE |
| Editor’s Introduction | xi |
| Preface | 1 |
| Introduction | 7 |
| I. | Of the division of Philosophy | 7 |
| II. | Of the realm of Philosophy in general | 11 |
| III. | Of the Critique of Judgement as a means of combining the two parts of Philosophy into a whole | 14 |
| IV. | Of Judgement as a faculty legislating a priori | 17 |
| V. | The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of Judgement | 20 |
| VI. | Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature | 27 |
| VII. | Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of nature | 30 |
| VIII. | Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature | 35 |
| IX. | Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with that of Reason by means of the Judgement | 39 |
| First Part.—Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement | 43 |
| First Division.—Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement | 45 |
| First Book.—Analytic of the Beautiful | 45 |
| First Moment of the judgement of taste, according to quality | 45 |
| §?1. | The judgement of taste is aesthetical | 45 |
| §?2. | The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested | 46 |
| §?3. | The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest | 48 |
| §?4. | The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest | 50 |
| §?5. | Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction | 53 |
| Second Moment of the judgement of taste, viz. according to quantity | 55 |
| §?6. | The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction | 55 |
| §?7. | Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic | 57 |
| §?8. | The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of Taste only as subjective | 59 |
| §?9. | Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object | 63 |
| Third Moment of judgements of taste according to the relation of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein | 67 |
| §10. | Of purposiveness in general | 67 |
| §11. | The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation) | 69 |
| §12. | The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds | 70 |
| §13. | The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion | 72 |
| §14. | Elucidation by means of examples | 73 |
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