Willis Fletcher Johnson

AT the time of the beginning of the Cuban insurrection the United States was undergoing one of its quadrennial political campaigns, and March 4, 1869, saw General Ulysses S. Grant inducted to the Presidency—the man who had led the nation to victory in the Civil War and had thus maintained the union of the United States of America; a soldier of the highest character, and one whose sympathies were keenly enlisted in behalf of the Cuban revolution. When this news reached the Cuban leaders they at once addressed to him an appeal for recognition, which ran as follows:

"To his Excellency, the President of the United States:

"Sir:

"The people of Cuba, by their Grand Supreme Civil Junta, and through their General-in-Chief, SeÑor Cespedes, desire to submit to your Excellency, the following among other reasons, why your Excellency, as President of the United States, should accord to them the belligerent rights and a recognition of their independence.

"Because from the hearts of nineteen-twentieths of the inhabitants of the island go up prayers for the success of the armies of the republic; and from the sole and only want of arms and ammunition these patient people are kept under the tyrannical yoke of Spain.

"Because the republic has armies numbering over 70,000 men, actually in the field and doing duty. These men are organized and governed on the principles of civilized warfare. The prisoners whom they take—and so far they have taken three times as many as their enemies have taken from them—are treated in every respect as the prisoners of war are used and treated by the most civilized nations of the earth. In the hope of recognition by the United States, they have never yet in a single instance retaliated death for death, even in cases of the most provoking nature.

"Because the Spanish authorities have almost invariably brutally murdered the soldiers of the armies of the republic who have surrendered to them, and have recently issued an official order requiring their military forces hereafter instantly to kill and murder any prisoner of the republic who surrenders. This is due, the order cheerfully tells us, to save trouble and vexation to the Spanish civil authorities. This is an outrage the civilized nations of the earth ought not to allow.

"Because the United States is the nearest civilized nation to Cuba, whose political institutions strike a responsive chord in the hearts of all Cubans. The commercial and financial interests of the two peoples being largely identical and reciprocal in their natures, Cuba earnestly appeals for the unquestionable right of recognition.

"Because the arms and authority of the Republic of Cuba now extend over two-thirds of the entire geographical area of the island, embracing a very great majority of the population in every part of the island.

"Because she has a navy in course of construction which will excel in point of numbers and efficiency that heretofore maintained by the Spanish authorities in these waters.

"Because these facts plainly show to the world that this is not a movement of a few discontents, but the grand and sublime uprising of a people thirsty for liberty and determined with this last effort to secure to themselves and their posterity those unquestioned rights—liberty of conscience and freedom of the individual.

"Finally, because she is following but in the footsteps of Spain herself in endeavoring to banish tyrannical rulers, and in their stead place rulers of her own choice, the people of Cuba having a tenfold more absolute and potent right than Spain had, because Cuba's rulers are sent without her voice or consent by a foreign country, accompanied by and with swarms of officials to fill the various offices created only for their individual comfort, drawing their maintenance and support from the hard earnings of the natives of the soil.

"Allow us to add, with the greatest diffidence and sensitiveness, that the difference between the rebellion in the United States and the present revolution in Cuba is simply that in the former a small minority rebelled against laws which they had a voice in making, and the privilege of repealing; while in the case of Cuba, we are resisting a foreign power in crushing us to the earth, as they have done for centuries, with no appeal but that of arms open to us, and appointing without knowledge, voice, advice or consent, tyrannical citizens of their own country to rule us and eat our substance.

"Patria y Libertad!
"Approved by the Supreme Junta and ordered approved
By SEÑOR GENERAL CESPEDES,
Commander in Chief Republican Forces in Cuba.
Headquarters in the Field, March 1, 1869."

President Grant was strongly inclined to grant this petition, and in this he was upheld by his most trusted friend and advisor, General Rawlins. In consequence, he prepared on August 19, 1869, a proclamation by which he recognized the insurgents as belligerents, the result of which would have been to legalize the shipment of arms to them. Unfortunately for the Cuban cause, though doubtless fortunately for the United States, there was at the head of the State Department of the United States a man of cooler judgment than General Grant, and one whose emotions of pity were not so easily moved. This was the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish. Before Grant's proclamation could become effective, it was necessary for the Secretary of State to sign, seal and publish it, and this Mr. Fish refused to do. He felt that to do so would constitute a grave error in diplomacy, and one which might have far-reaching detrimental effects for the United States. It was his judgment that the President had been betrayed by his sympathies, and he felt it incumbent upon himself, as chief of the Department of State, to restrain him from making a bad mistake. There was to be taken into consideration the fact that the United States, in the war so recently fought for the maintenance of the Union, had made vigorous protests against the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign powers, and Secretary Fish felt that the proclamation in favor of the Cuban revolutionary government would stultify the course of the United States government in that matter. Indeed, in sound judgment, it was impossible to deny that the Confederates of the South were more justly entitled to recognition, under all the circumstances of both cases, than were the Cuban revolutionists. Fish felt that the condition in Cuba, at that time, at any rate, did not merit the official recognition of the United States government, and he was not backward in conveying his conviction to General Grant. Then he simply pigeon-holed the proclamation and let it die a natural death in musty obscurity. Upon second thought, General Grant saw the soundness of Fish's conclusions, and not only did not register a protest, but took occasion some months later to thank Fish for his intervention, and the suppression of the proclamation.

Meanwhile, reports of the cruelties of Spanish soldiers began to penetrate the ears of American citizens. It was reported, and pretty well authenticated, that disgusting atrocities were the order of the day, when the Spanish troops found in their path anyone, male or female, who was not in a position to resist them. There were stories of the raping of little children before the eyes of their mothers, and of mothers in the presence of their children, of the crucifixion, and hanging by the thumbs of old men, and even of able bodied persons, who happened to fall defenseless into the hands of the Spaniards. Tales of barbarity to prisoners, even to the extent of roasting them alive, fired the rage of justice-loving American citizens, and again touched the kind heart of their President. To these reports were added others, less revolting, but touching the commercial sense of the nation. American property in Cuba was being destroyed, and American citizens were being molested and restrained from the peaceful pursuit of their business. American commerce was impeded and losses were suffered. It was recalled that Spain had been prompt to recognize the Confederacy as a belligerent power, and it seemed but the irony of justice, and a fair sort of retaliation, that now the United States should give recognition to those who were rebelling against Spain's misrule. But Fish was deaf to all pleas in behalf of the Cubans, and resolutely blocked all attempts to secure recognition for them. He argued and pleaded with the President with such eloquence that presently he seemed to have him convinced that the cause of freedom in Cuba was not yet worthy of the recognition of the United States. In consequence, in his annual message, in December, 1869, President Grant, less than four months after his unpublished proclamation of recognition, declared that "the contest has at no time assumed the conditions which amount to a war in the sense of international war, or which would show the existence of a political organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency." He added that "the principle is to be maintained, however, that this nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of belligerency either to a people struggling to free themselves from a government they believed to be oppressive, or to independent nations at war with each other."

It is needless to say that this position was a great disappointment to the Cubans, and seemed to them utterly at variance with what they might have expected from a nation so lately torn by Civil War, and which had shown such keen individual sympathies with the cause of the freedom of Cuba. However, from that time on, the United States, officially, at least, showed the greatest patience—a patience which seemed almost unbelievably enduring—toward the hardships which the Spanish authorities put upon innocent Americans, and was indefatigably zealous in its efforts to prevent violations of neutrality on the part of sympathetic United States citizens. That there was some bitterness in the hearts of the Cuban leaders, who felt they had a right to expect the support of their sister republic, and a country which had against such odds won her own independence, it is easy to believe, and there were many who felt that this was a righteous indignation.

But during the months in which the Secretary of State and the somewhat unwilling President of the United States were shaping this policy, the war in Cuba was continuously waged. On March 7, 1869, a few days after the Cubans addressed their petition to the United States government, the Spanish attacked a strong Cuban position at Macaca, and were successful in ousting the revolutionists. This disheartening occurrence was followed by defeats for the Cubans, first at Mayari, where Spanish forces under General Valcosta were victorious over a small army of which General Cespedes was in command—General Cespedes, however, effecting a withdrawal with safety to his own person and a part of his supporters—and again at Jiguani, where it was the Cubans who made the attack upon a Spanish force under General Valmaseda, only to meet defeat at the hands of the Spaniards, and to be forced to flee in disorder to their mountain fastnesses.

Meanwhile reinforcements came from Spain; this time as before, not a large number, being only about twelve hundred men, but enough materially to aid the governmental army, and to strengthen its morale. The Captain-General also endeavored to win the hearts of the timid by issuing a proclamation which declared important concessions in tax regulations. A fifty per cent reduction was made in the direct taxation on plantations, on cattle and on country real estate, as well as in those taxes only recently levied on merchants and tradesmen. As a crowning concession the taxes due for the last quarter of the year 1868-1869 were nullified. But it was apparently impossible for Spain to make concessions without accompanying them with demands of some sort to offset her seeming generosity. Therefore the Captain-General took occasion to levy some new duties: On muscovado sugar, if shipped under the flag of Spain, a tax of 16¢ a hundred weight, while shipment under a foreign flag called for an additional 4¢ duty; on boxed sugar shipped under the Spanish flag, a tax of 75¢ a box, while if under a foreign flag, 12¢ additional; on every hogshead of sugar shipped under the flag of Spain a tax of $1, and if under a foreign flag, 75¢ additional; a tax on molasses of 50¢ a hogshead, and on rum of $1 for an equal quantity.

It will be recalled that the Cuban patriots had by their proclamation of December 27, 1868, granted freedom to all slaves on the island. They now began a campaign to enforce this decree by removing, from all plantations of which their armies were able to take possession, the slaves for service in the Cuban army, and to make their liberation doubly sure, burning the buildings, and laying waste to the crops. In the districts around Sagua and Remedios there were nine thousand insurgents engaged in this work. This action it would be hard to excuse, if there were not taken into consideration the fact that the Cubans had endured such grievous wrongs at the hands of the Spaniards that they would have been much less than human if they had not had some desire to retaliate; and, after all, the retaliation which spoke most forcefully to the Spaniard was that which attacked his worldly goods and his pocketbook.

But to offset these actions, the Spanish at the same time proved themselves victorious in several engagements. On March 18, at Alvarez, they defeated the Cuban forces; at about the same time, at Guaracabuya, they won another victory, with Cuban losses numbering one hundred and thirty-six killed outright; and two thousand Cubans, under Generals Morales and Villamil, were routed by the Spaniards at Potrerillo. In this last affair the patriots suffered severe losses; three hundred wounded, two hundred and five killed, and twenty-one taken prisoners, together with many horses killed or captured. They were also obliged to retreat in such haste that they had to abandon a considerable quantity of ammunition, which was seized by the enemy. It is only necessary to add that the Spanish lost but one officer, one private and one of their number taken prisoner, to demonstrate the disheartening nature of the encounter. But the Cubans were, as has been stated, drafting large quantities of slaves into their army, and this victory for the Spaniards was a signal proof that the slaves were not good material for soldiers. Besides this, the patriots who took part in this engagement suffered severely a lack of proper equipment.

The tide seemed to be turning against the Cubans, and in the days that followed they were to face still further losses. The quality of the recruits which were being added to the patriot army did not increase its valor, skill or morale. They lacked guns, and those which they had were of antiquated pattern; there was a woeful scarcity of larger arms and ammunition, and the troops were weary and poorly fed. Against that portion of the Cuban army stationed in the Villa Clara district the Spanish now began to concentrate a large army, pouring troops into that district until they were ten thousand strong. The Cubans were outnumbered, and lacked the weapons of warfare, they had been outmanoeuvred, and suffered tremendous losses, and yet another crushing defeat lay before them, for on March 20, two thousand Cubans who were, as they fondly believed, strongly entrenched at Placitas, were put to flight by a small body of Spanish troops, highly skilled and well armed it is true, but numbering only three hundred regulars and a small company of the much feared Volunteers.

Emboldened by these successes, the Captain-General again shifted his position, and issued an order, to be made the excuse for an outrage against American shipping, which was severely to tax the friendliness of international relations. The Spanish government was ever haunted by the bugbear of American intervention, and doubtless the decree in question was issued as a preventive against such action, for the Spanish well knew that should such intervention once take place their cause would be irrevocably lost, and with it their dominion over Cuba. The decree provided for the confiscation on the high seas of any and all vessels carrying either men, arms or ammunition or all three, or indeed anything which might be construed as intended for material aid to the revolutionists, and further provided that "all persons captured on such vessels without regard to their number will be immediately executed." Viewed in the calm light of history this decree would seem bound, if enforced, to be almost suicidal to the Spanish interests, being in opposition to law and justice, and in express violation of existing treaty obligations between Spain and the United States, and thus bound to bring a storm of protest from the United States government.

As if this were not enough, Dulce followed this action by another decree, promulgated on April 1, which prohibited the transfer of property, except by the direct consent of the government, and this prohibition included the sale of produce of all sorts, stocks, shares in mercantile projects, and real estate, together with many minor provisions; while by a third decree, which shortly followed, he ordered the confiscation of the estates of American citizens who were suspected of sympathy or complicity with the revolutionists. Naturally, the United States government made a strong protest against such summary action, rightly declaring it to be in violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1795.

The Cuban troops now began a more or less concentrated attack on Trinidad, and to relieve the pressure at this point, the Spanish sent a large force toward Puerto Principe, hoping to weaken the Cuban army at the former place, because of the necessity of withdrawing men to combat the Spanish army at the latter. The Spanish government also sought to offset the damage and destruction done by the insurgents to property of loyalists by issuing a decree proclaiming their intention to confiscate the property of all individuals who were absent from home without a governmental excuse—which would of course include all landowners who were fighting in the Cuban army—and providing for a detail of men to protect against the revolutionists every estate thus taken.

On April 17 battle was again joined by the Cubans under Colonel Francisco Rubalcava and a Spanish force under the combined leadership of Generals Letona, Escalante and Lesca. The fighting which ensued taxed the Cuban resources to the utmost. All day long the battle raged, and when both sides were worn out with combat, the result was not decisive for either army, while one hundred and eighty Spanish troops and two hundred Cubans lay dead under the stars.

For nearly two weeks thereafter there was a period of quiet and recuperation on the part of the Cubans, with the exception of a number of minor skirmishes, but on May 3 the belligerents again met in battle at Las Minas, when twelve hundred Spaniards, under the command of General Lesca, and a large Cuban force under General Quesada, fought in the most violent of hand to hand conflicts. Frightful butchery ensued, for this time victory again returned to the Cuban standards, and the Spanish were forced to retreat in disorder, leaving behind them one hundred and sixty killed and three hundred wounded, while the Cuban losses were two hundred killed and an equal number wounded.

To add to the rejoicing over this victory, small as it was, a few days previous the Cubans had had a practical demonstration of the sympathy of United States citizens for their cause, and of the ability of those citizens to evade the drastic provisions of the government against any display of that feeling. On May 1 there arrived at Mayari a body of three hundred Americans, under the leadership of General Thomas Jordan, a tried veteran of the Civil War, in which he had been an officer in the Confederate Army. He was an experienced soldier, who had had a fine military training and had been graduated from West Point. This in itself might have been quite enough to put new heart into the Cuban leaders, but General Jordan had brought with him not only reinforcements but arms, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies and food. A detailed list of this material included four thousand long range rifles, three hundred new pattern Remington rifles, five hundred revolvers, twelve pieces of artillery of various sizes including twelve, twenty-four and thirty-two pound cannon, and a large supply of ammunition for these arms. And the relief did not stop here, for there were a thousand pairs of shoes, and clothing for one thousand persons, two printing-presses, medical supplies, and quantities of rice, tinned biscuits, salt meat, flour and salt. This meant food and arms for at least six thousand men, and there is no wonder that there seemed to be occasion for the wildest rejoicing on the part of those who were so manfully and against such great odds engaged in upholding the cause of freedom in Cuba. Now the patriots might oppose the Spanish with at least six thousand well equipped men, and they had also acquired in the person of General Jordan an officer whose aid in drilling raw recruits could not be overestimated.

The Cubans did not get their booty to headquarters without some opposition from the Spaniards. That was hardly to be hoped, since their every movement was reported to the government by Spanish spies, and it would have been impossible for an expedition like the one in question to land without detection. But they were able to resist all attempts to wrest their supplies from them.

Around Trinidad and Cienfuegos fighting was constant. Each day saw its skirmishes, and there were some violent engagements, all of which left matters pretty much as they had been so far as any victory of a decisive character for either side was concerned. The Cubans were, however, able to disperse a body of Spanish troops which were advancing toward Las Tunas in the hope of relieving the citizens of that place, which was also in a state of siege. The Spaniards were bearing a quantity of provisions for the city, and in their flight these were abandoned and fell into the hands of the Cubans.

When matters were succeeding in a manner more or less favorable to the Spanish cause, the Volunteers were quiet and inclined to discontinue temporarily their opposition to Dulce, but when things took a turn for the worse he was always made the scapegoat. Hence the Volunteers were renewing their attacks on his policies, although for the time being he had been suffering one of his periodic reversions to severity. This time, the Volunteers were successful in obtaining the recall of Dulce as Captain-General. They simply drove him out by mob force, on June 4, and put into his place one SeÑor Espinar. This appointment was an arbitrary act, which the Spanish government refused to confirm, and therefore Espinar's political life was cut short almost at its inception, and General Caballero de Rodas became Captain-General of the island. Now Rodas should have been a man entirely to the liking of the Volunteers. He had won for himself a reputation for cruelty toward the republican insurgents in Spain while he was stationed at Cadiz, which had caused him to be called "the butcher of Cadiz." He evidently felt it incumbent to live up to his title, for now the Spanish troops were incited to unspeakable cruelties.

Promptly on taking office, Rodas began his career with the decree of July 7, 1869, which he fondly hoped would prevent further aid from reaching the revolutionists from the United States or from any other country. The proclamation was as follows:

"The custody and guardianship of the coasts of this island, of the keys adjacent, and the waters appertaining to the territory, being of the greatest importance, in order to suppress the insurgent bands that have hitherto maintained themselves by outside assistance, and determined as I am to give a vigorous impulse to the pursuit of them, and with a view of settling the doubts entertained by our own cruisers as to the proper interpretation of the decree promulgated by this superior political government under dates of November 9, 1868, and February 18 and 26 and March 24 last, I have decided to amplify and unite the aforesaid orders and substitute for them the following, which, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the nation, I decree:

"Article I.—All parts situated between Cayo Bahia de Cadiz and Point Maysi on the north side, and from Point Maysi to Cienfuegos on the south, with the exception of Sagua La Grande, Caibarien, Nuevitas, Gibara, Baracoa, Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, Santa Cruz, Zaza, Trinidad and Cienfuegos, where there are custom houses, will continue closed to the import and export trade, both by foreign and coasting vessels. Those who may attempt the entry of any closed ports, or to open communications with their coasts, will be pursued, and, on being captured, are to be tried as violators of the law.

"Article II.—Vessels carrying gunpowder, arms and warlike stores, will likewise be judged in accordance with the law.

"Article III.—The transportation of individuals in the service of the insurrection is by far more serious than that of contraband of war, and will be deemed an act of decided hostility, and the vessel and crew regarded as enemies to the state.

"Article IV.—Should the individuals referred to in the foregoing article come armed, this will be regarded, de facto, as proof of their intentions, and they will be regarded as pirates, as will also be the case with the crew of the vessel.

"Article V.—In accordance with the law, vessels captured under an unknown flag, whether armed or unarmed, will also be regarded as pirates.

"Article VI.—In free seas adjacent to those of this island, the cruisers will limit themselves to their treatment of denounced vessels, or those who render themselves suspicious, to the rights given in the treaties between Spain and the United States in 1795, Great Britain in 1835, and with other nations subsequently; and if, in the exercise of these rights, they should encounter any vessels recognized as enemies of the integrity of the territory, they will carry them into port for legal investigation and judgment accordingly.

"Caballero de Rodas."

Of course this action was incited and backed by the Volunteers, and met with their heartiest approval, but if either they or their mouthpiece, Rodas, had any real idea that such a decree would act as a deterrent against aid being sent to the Cubans, they misjudged the temper of the friends of the revolution in America. It simply made them aware of the necessity of increased secrecy and caution, but did not one whit curtail their enterprises.

To reinforce his action, Rodas promptly issued another decree against the insurgents in the following contemptuous terms:

"The insurrection, in its impotency, being reduced to detached bands, perverted to the watchword of desolation and daily perpetrating crimes that have no precedent in civilized countries, personal security and the rights of justice, the foremost guarantees of person and property, imperiously demand that said insurrection be hastened to its end, and without consideration toward those who have placed themselves beyond the pale of the law. The culprit will not be deprived of the guarantee of just impartiality in the evidence of his crime, but without delay admissible in normal periods, which would procrastinate or paralyze the verdict of the law and its inexorable fulfilment.

"As the guardians of the national integrity, the protection of the upright and pacific citizen, fulfilling the duties of my office, and in virtue of the authority conceded to me by the Government of the nation, I hereby decree:

"Article I.—The decrees promulgated by this superior political government under date of the 12th and 13th of February last shall be carried out with vigor.

"Article II.—The crimes of premeditated incendiarism, assassination and robbery, by armed force and contraband, shall be tried by a council of war.

"Article III.—The courts of justice will continue in the exercise of their attributes, without prejudice, however, of having submitted to me such cases as special circumstances may require.

"Caballero de Rodas."

Thus, in high-sounding phrases and treacherous hypocrisy, did the "butcher of Cadiz" proclaim himself the guardian of persons and property. If his pronouncements had not had too grim a significance, they might have filled the Cuban patriots with the spirit of ironical laughter, such a divergence was there between his character and his past record, and the new rÔle which he now announced himself as about to play.

Naturally this action did not pass unnoticed by the United States government. On July 16, the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, informed the Spanish minister at Washington that Rodas's decree of July 7 interfered with the commerce of the United States in a manner which could only be tolerated in times of war; that the United States would maintain her right to carry contraband in times of peace, and would permit no interference with her vessels on the high seas, except in time of war; that if Spain was in a state of war with Cuba it was incumbent on her to proclaim the fact; and further adding that the United States would regard any attempt to enforce Rodas's decree as a recognition by Spain of the existence of a state of war in Cuba, and would govern itself accordingly. Spain was in no position and had no desire to declare Cuba in a state of war. Such action would wrest from her certain advantages which in her present ambiguous position she was prepared to enjoy to the utmost. She at once recognized that Rodas's action was entirely too arbitrary, and might be productive of a most embarrassing situation, and therefore acting under instructions from the Spanish government, he at once receded from his arrogant position and his decree was materially modified.

American commerce with Cuba had been exceedingly profitable to those engaged in it, and, under the disturbed condition of affairs in the island, not only did it suffer, but the commercial interests of American residents in Cuba were badly jeopardized. General Grant still nursed his secret good will toward the cause of the revolutionists, although the advice of his Secretary of State had put a temporary restraint on it. It may be that this new indignity which Spain had sought to impose not only on the insurgents but also on American interests spurred him to action. However, that may be, when Daniel E. Sickles was appointed United States Minister to Spain, on June 29th, 1869, he was instructed at once on his arrival in Madrid to offer to the Spanish government the good offices of the United States in an effort to bring about an understanding and adjustment between the revolutionists and the governmental party and to effect a cessation of the hostilities which were rapidly ruining both the Creoles and the Spanish landowners alike. Sickles received the most careful instructions to proceed in a conciliatory fashion, and in no manner to imply any recognition by the United States of the belligerency of Cuba. To guide him in his work, terms were drafted as a basis for the negotiations and they embodied the following points:

1. The acknowledgment by Spain of the independence of Cuba.

2. Cuba to pay Spain an indemnity under conditions to be thereafter agreed upon. In case such sum could not immediately be paid in full, the unpaid portion to be secured by the pledge of export and import duties, in a manner to be agreed upon.

3. The abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba.

4. The declaration of an armistice pending negotiations for a final settlement.

And, furthermore, Sickles was empowered, if necessary, to suggest that the United States would guarantee the payment by Cuba of the indemnity.

Sickles took up the negotiations with the Spanish government at Madrid in accordance with his instructions, and after much consideration the Spanish government agreed to accept the good offices of the United States government, provided it was not required to treat with the revolutionists on a basis of equality—that would be too galling to the sensitive Spanish dignity—but that it would be allowed to take the position of making concessions to a rebellious people, such concessions of course to be couched in legal terms, and carried out in accordance with constitutional forms and with all due solemnity. Above all, the result of the negotiations was not to be regarded as a treaty between armed powers on an equal footing. In support of her position, Spain made the following demands, as constituting the basis of settlement to which she would agree:

1. The revolutionists to lay down their arms and return to their homes.

2. Whereupon, Spain would grant a full and complete amnesty.

3. The question of the independence of Cuba to be submitted to vote by their own vote whether they desired independence or not.

4. Provided a majority vote was cast for independence Spain would grant it, the Cortes consenting, upon the payment of a satisfactory sum by Cuba, or the partial payment and guarantee by the United States of the remainder.

When Sickles submitted the result of his efforts to the government of his own country, that government, well knowing that the Cubans would never consent to the first two stipulations laid down by Spain, promptly rejected them. Sickles again took up the matter with the Spanish government, but they stood firm, and since there seemed no hope of an agreement on any terms which would be acceptable to the revolutionists, the matter was finally dropped.

Meanwhile Spain had been sending considerable reinforcements to Cuba, and commenced an active campaign against the force under the command of the American General Jordan. These were probably the best equipped and best trained troops which the Cuban army had at its command, and they were well fitted to administer a rebuff to the Spaniards, which they did. The attacks of the Spaniards were all unsuccessful, and the Cubans were elated by the certainty that in bravery and resources they were more than a match for the Spanish army, and that, when they were properly equipped they seemed to have the advantage. In these different battles—none of them of very large scope—the Spanish lost four hundred killed, wounded and taken prisoners. Meanwhile the Cubans attacked the Spanish forces near Baja, a small town on the bay in the vicinity of Nuevitas, and defeated three hundred marines under General Puello, killing eighty of the enemy.

But the rainy season was approaching and soon caused a halt in hostilities, while both armies were strengthening their positions looking forward to the time when weather would permit a resumption of the warfare. If the Spanish were obtaining reinforcements, the Cubans also were, in spite of the Spanish blockade and the decrees of the Captain-General, as well as the activities of the United States officials, constantly receiving aid from the United States. This mainly took the form of small expeditions from the southern states. However, at the close of July there arrived a company of two hundred and seventy-five recruits from the states of Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky, bringing with them large stores of food, clothing, arms and ammunitions. So it appeared that faith in the righteousness of the Cuban cause was not confined to what were known as the southern states.

These men were placed under the direct command of General Quesada, and thus reinforced he decided to make an effort to subdue and capture the besieged Las Tunas. He set out to go thither with twelve hundred men. All night long the fight raged on the outskirts of the town, and just as the morning was breaking the Cubans made a triumphal entry. By two o'clock the next afternoon the town was completely under their control. When news of this victory reached the Spanish headquarters, a large force was immediately dispatched to dislodge the Cubans, and spies reporting to General Quesada that the Spanish troops sent against him not only largely outnumbered his own, but also were bringing large quantities of heavy artillery with them, he decided that to hold the town would not be of sufficient importance—if indeed he could do so against such odds—to risk an engagement. He, therefore, again retired. He had been welcomed as a deliverer by the inhabitants of Las Tunas, for they had suffered gross indignities under Spanish occupation, and now many of them enlisted in the Cuban army, and accompanied General Quesada on his retreat.

It may have been that the attempted intervention of the United States government at Madrid led the Spanish government to believe that the time had again arrived to temporize; at any rate, several concessions were made in an attempt to pacify the insurgents, but without any perceptible effect.

Not every attempt to bring aid from the United States to Cuba was productive of results, and during the summer there had been a number of efforts which were abortive, or which failed of execution. But just as hope of a successful relief expedition was dying in the hearts of the Cubans, a party of six hundred men with a quantity of rifles and a large amount of ammunition arrived from that stronghold of Cuban sympathizers, New Orleans. Meanwhile General Jordan communicated a request for aid to his compatriots who composed the Cuban Junta in the City of New York. He reported that the Cuban army was composed of twenty six thousand eight hundred men, besides whom there were at least forty thousand freed slaves, who were armed merely with machetes. He requested that seventy five thousand stands of arms be in some manner dispatched to the Cubans, and expressed the opinion that if this could be accomplished, in ninety days the war would be determined in favor of the patriots.

Small bodies of Cubans were still carrying on guerrilla warfare wherever it seemed most effective, and the plantations belonging to Spanish sympathizers were suffering in consequence. The idea of this action was not wanton destruction. The Cubans argued that it was from such sources as the rich Spanish planters that Spain, by taxation, obtained revenues which were enabling her to continue the war, and thus their own country was being used to supply funds for her own destruction; and therefore when they destroyed Spanish holdings, they were not only wreaking vengeance on their tormentors, but they were also reducing the resources which made the prosecution of the war possible. To offset these actions, the Spanish commanders were countenancing the most scandalous conditions, and allowing most wholesale torture and butchery of such luckless patriots as fell into their hands, in which they could have had no motive except to terrorize the Cubans, and to enjoy that peculiar pleasure which they seemed to take in cruelty and murder. However, in the month of November alone, the patriots were able to burn the buildings on and destroy the productiveness of over a hundred and fifty sugar plantations, which the Spanish government had confiscated under the order which Dulce had promulgated. These were plantations which belonged to soldiers in the Cuban army, and which had been seized by the Spaniards in the absence of their owners, and the revenues of which had been flowing into the Spanish treasury.

This work of destruction had the approval of General Cespedes, for he felt that it was necessary to cut off every possible source of revenue for Spain from the island, and so, in December, he issued a proclamation calling on all loyal patriots to see that it was made impossible for Spain to collect revenue from sugar and tobacco plantations on the island, when by any action of patriots this could be avoided.

The revolutionists had been encouraged, not only by their friends in the United States, but also by the sympathetic expressions of former Spanish colonies in South America, who were now enjoying their own freedom. As early as May 15, 1869, the President of the Republic of Peru expressed to General Cespedes his good wishes, in a letter couched in the following terms:

"The President of Peru sympathizes deeply with the noble cause of which your Excellency constitutes himself the worthy champion, and he will do his utmost to mark the interest that island, so worthy of taking its place with the civilized nations of the world, inspires him with. The Peruvian Government recognizes as belligerents the party which is fighting for the independence of Cuba, and will strive its utmost to secure their recognition as such by other nations; and likewise that the war should be properly regulated in conformity with international usages and laws."

This action on the part of Peru was followed by recognition of the revolutionists on the part of other South American states of Spanish origin. Action was taken on this subject in Colombia, in June, 1870, when a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives proposing that all the Spanish-American republics form a combination for the active promotion of aid to Cuba, material and political, in her struggle for independence. This bill was reported out of Committee, with the following comments:

"1. The cause for which Cuban patriots fight is the same for which Colombia fought incessantly from 1810 to 1824.

"2. The interests of self-preservation, and our duty as a civilized and Christian nation, justify in the most complete manner Colombian intervention.

"3. The aggressions of monarchial Europe against the liberty and independence of America always have had and will have for a base Spanish dominion in Cuba.

"4. The policy of the United States cannot serve as a guide to Colombia on this occasion.

"5. The resources we may need for this war are not beyond our means.

"6. The time has arrived when Colombia should assume in the politics of South America the position to which she is called by her topographical situation, her historical traditions, her population, and her political conquests."

In spite of this favorable report, and the fact that the bill passed the House, the Senate rejected it.

Thus the struggle went on, the patriots fighting almost with the courage of desperation, gaining a little here, and losing there, but always holding before them the justice of their cause, and resolutely refusing to admit the possibility of failure.