Willis Fletcher Johnson

The Turning of Rocky Face—Resaca—General Howard's Narrative—Adairsville—Crossing the Etowah—Sherman on Familiar Ground—Dealing with Breaches of Discipline—Allatoona Pass—The Siege and Turning of Kenesaw—Smyrna and Peach Tree—Hood succeeds Johnston—Death of McPherson—Howard in Command of the army of the Tennessee—Ezra Church—Operations around Atlanta—The Rush to Jonesboro—Capture of Atlanta.

Sherman moved forward on May 6th toward Dalton, where lay the enemy. A direct attack on this position, however, was impossible. Dalton lay behind a precipitous mountain ridge, called Rocky Face, which it was impracticable to scale. The only passage way was through a narrow gap called Buzzard's Roost, through which ran a railroad and a small stream known as Mill Creek. The enemy had strongly fortified the place, and Sherman quickly decided that it would be folly to try to force his way through. He therefore gave orders to McPherson to move rapidly southward to Snake Creek Gap, at the southern extremity of the Rocky Face Ridge, where there was an easy passage through to Resaca, at the railroad crossing over Oostanaula River, eighteen miles south of Dalton. Thomas, on May 7th, took up a strong position on Tunnel Hill, almost directly facing the Buzzard's Roost Gap, while Schofield steadily approached Dalton from the north. Two days later, to keep Johnston occupied, Thomas made a feigned attack upon the Gap, driving the enemy's cavalry and skirmishers through it. The day was very stormy, but the troops rushed on in high spirits and with enthusiastic determination. A division of Howard's troops under Newton actually surrounded the narrow ridge and carried a part north of the Gap, but the crest was too strait for them to make much progress there. South of the Roost some of Hooker's men also made a rush for the summit, but found the enemy's works too strong to take and hold.

The gallant McPherson had, meanwhile, reached Snake Creep Gap, and surprised the Confederate cavalry brigade that had been posted there. He marched practically without opposition to within a mile of Resaca, but then found that Johnston had defended that place with fortifications which he deemed too strong for direct assault; so, he fell back to Snake Creek Gap and waited for reinforcements.

Next, Sherman directed Howard to remain on guard at Buzzard's Roost with the Fourth Corps and Stoneman's Cavalry, and sent forward Schofield and Thomas, with Cox's, Hooker's, and Palmer's Corps, to aid McPherson. Nearly the whole army was thus assembled on May 12th before Resaca, so that Johnston, seeing his flank turned, that night abandoned Dalton and concentrated at Resaca. Howard following close with his horse and foot, pressed through Buzzard's Roost Gap, entered Dalton, and pursued Johnston till he joined Sherman at Resaca.

MAP N^o 1.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

Sherman now undertook to drive Johnston out of Resaca by attacking him in front with his main army, while a detachment crossed over the Oostanaula and threatened his communications. The latter movement was effected by the way of Lay's Ferry and Calhoun. Early in the afternoon of May 14th the grand attack upon Resaca began. Sherman's left centre made a gallant assault, carried a work, captured some guns, but was then checked. Then the famous Hood made a furious attack upon Sherman's left flank and at first gained some advantage, which Howard, aided by a division of Hooker's, repulsed with great loss to the enemy. McPherson also gained a position from which he could pour an enfilading fire into Johnston's intrenchments. Johnston tried to dislodge him, but in vain, though the fighting was continued until nearly midnight. Next morning while a detachment crossed the river to the south, the battle was renewed, and by one o'clock the Union troops had captured a portion of the Rebel lines, and were within gunshot of Johnston's communications. That night he abandoned Resaca and fled to the south, burning the railroad bridge behind him. But Sherman entered the town in time to save the wagon bridge over the Oostanaula. In these operations at Resaca, Sherman's total losses were between 4,000 and 5,000. Johnston's were less, probably not over 2,500, since his men fought in this roughest of country chiefly from behind fortifications. A general pursuit of Johnston by Sherman's entire army was immediately ordered.

Speaking of the battle of Resaca, General Howard says:

"One scene at Resaca might be painted. Two rivers come together, one, the Oostanaula flowing west, and its tributary, the Connassauga, south. Confederate Johnston, after fleeing from Dalton, placed his army in the northwest angle of the streams, resting Polk's Corps against the Oostanaula, facing west, put Hardee's next above, running up a creek, and then bore Hood back in a convex curve till his men touched the Connassauga. Sherman made McPherson breast Polk; Schofield face Hardee's intended lines, and Thomas take care of Hood. Thus we were holding the outer or enveloping lines, all in the midst of forest land exceedingly rough and wild. Thomas had not men enough to fill his line and cover half of Hood's front. Stanley, of Howard's Corps, held the left. He put much cannon on convenient knolls and had as large reserves as he could spare; but either the indomitable Hood or the wary Johnston had discovered the weakness of our left, so that about 3 P.M. the masses of Hood came pouring, like mountain torrents, upon Stanley and far beyond the reach of his rifles and the staying force of his artillery. Word came, "Stanley's left is turned." And so instantly Howard rode to a group of mounted officers. Here were Hooker, Thomas and Sherman together. "What is it, Howard?" asked Thomas anxiously. "I want a division at once for my left." "General Hooker will give you one." "Yes," said Hooker, "Williams' Division is right there." Colonel Morgan, of Howard's staff, in less than five minutes was guiding Williams' brave men in quick time, to the threatened flank. In less than fifteen minutes Hood's masses were running back for cover to his fortified ground. This was the crisis. Prompt action and fearless men saved the left from impending disaster."

The Union armies pressed forward as rapidly as possible, along roads on which the dust lay a foot deep. The heat was intense and the men suffered greatly. On the afternoon of the 17th the advance guards struck the rear guard of the enemy at Adairsville, and had a sharp skirmish. Here, between 4 and 5 P.M., Howard and Newton with their respective staffs, all mounted, were watching from elevated ground, Newton's skirmish line, as it joined fire with Johnston's rear guard. "Musketry was lively," says Howard, "and a few cannon were sounding. It was something like a lion's interrupted roar, or the thunder of an approaching storm. Sherman and other officers rode up and began to take observations. Suddenly, from a new place, from the edge of a wood, a hostile four-gun battery took us for a practice-target. Shell after shell cut the air and burst beside and behind us, and over our heads. It was probably the fourth shot which exploded high up, skyward, but at just the point to scatter its fragments among the men and animals of our company; Colonel Morgan's horse was injured; Lieutenant-Colonel Fullerton's was put hors du combat and several others of the orderlies and escort lamed or slain. Captain Bliss, of Newton's staff, by a flying fragment lost his shoulder-strap, and he himself was painfully hurt. Of course, that social crowd instantly altered the shape of the practice-target and changed its location."

That night the enemy hastened the flight, different divisions of the army going in different directions, but on the next day Sherman came up with Johnston again at Kingston. The two armies faced each other in a rolling, wooded region, on to and beyond Cassville, and Sherman hoped to bring on a decisive battle. But Johnston again retreated, and that night, across the Etowah River, "a step," says Johnston, "which I have regretted ever since." This step was taken, it was said, on the advice of Polk and Hood, who regarded their position to be already turned and untenable. By this retreat across the Etowah a valuable region was given up to Sherman.

The army now rested for three days, while supplies were brought forward. Rome had been captured with its important foundries and stores. The two bridges across the Etowah were secured, and all was made ready for the next stage of the campaign. About this time a remarkable thing began to be observed. Sherman displayed a knowledge of the country through which they were marching that was most amazing to his comrades, to whom it was an unknown land. He seemed to know by intuition that this road ran so and that one so, that beyond this hill was a pleasant valley, and beyond that an impassable swamp. The whole topography of the country was at his command. But the explanation was simple. They were now in the region that Sherman had travelled through on horseback and afoot many years before.

And it was one of Sherman's most notable traits of intellect to see everything that was to be seen and to remember everything that he saw, so that his mind became a perfect encyclopÆdia of useful information. If he went through a cotton mill, or a salt work, or an iron foundry, he was so observant, and his memory so retentive, that always thereafter he appeared an expert on that industry. This knowledge of the geography and topography of Georgia was of incalculable service to him during the march to Atlanta.

And at the same time many other interesting traits of Sherman's personality began to show themselves. He was at times a strict disciplinarian, and yet often so kindly and sympathetic that he inclined to be lenient with offenders. At Resaca for instance, he had been working all night, while the army slept, and in the morning he fell asleep sitting on the ground, his head and shoulders resting against a fallen tree. There he sat as some of the troops marched by, and awoke just in time to hear a grumbling private remark, "That's a pretty commander for an army." Instead of ordering the man's arrest, Sherman simply remarked, "My man, I was working all night while you were asleep. Now, don't you think I have a right to take a nap while you are marching to your work?"

Again, during the rest before crossing the Etowah, an incident occurred which General Howard relates. It was Sunday morning, and E.P. Smith, a member of the Christian Commission, mounted to the belfry floor, and tried to ring the bell of the church at Kingston for service. He slipped against a nail, and had his clothes badly torn. The noise of the bell disturbed Sherman, and, not knowing who the ringer was, he sent a guard to the church, and had Smith arrested. In spite of his protests, Smith was marched to headquarters and kept in confinement for an hour. Then, with his rent clothing, he was led into Sherman's presence. The General, scarcely looking up from his writing, to see who it was, and supposing it to be one of the army "bummers," demanded abruptly, "What did you ring that bell for?" "For service, General; it is Sunday," replied Smith. "Oh, is it Sunday?" said Sherman. "I didn't know 'twas Sunday. Let him go."

Johnston was now intrenched at Allatoona Pass, and Sherman knew that the position was too strong to be carried by direct assault. He therefore determined to make a circuit to the right, and marched toward Dallas. Johnston detected this movement, and prepared to meet it. On May 25th, the armies met again at New Hope Church, just north of Dallas. Hooker led Sherman's advance, and ran against one of Hood's brigades in a forest. A sharp conflict followed, while a terrific thunder storm was raging. Hooker's men made repeated attacks upon the enemy's position, but were hurled back from the log breastworks with much loss. Heavy rain continued all that night, but Sherman's men worked steadily constructing fortifications of earthwork and logs. The next morning the engagement was continued, and for several days thereafter there was almost continual skirmishing. On the 28th the Rebels made a strong attack far to the right of Hooker, upon McPherson, at Dallas, but were repulsed. Then the army began pushing to the left, and by June 1st Allatoona Pass was completely within the national lines.

"The picture of the field of New Hope Church," says General Howard, "crowds memory like the painting of a young artist who has put too much upon his canvas. There was Hooker just at evening in an open wood—there were glimpses of log breastworks beyond him, from which came fierce firing against his lines stretched out—there were numberless maimed and many dead among the trees—and a little back was a church with many wounded, and many surgeons doing bloody work. It was dreadfully dark that night. Schofield's horse stumbled and disabled him, and General Cox took his place. We had numerous torches, weird in effect among the trees, as our men bravely worked into place and intrenched the batteries, and covered their front. But the torches seemed to make the darkness darker, and our hopes that night beat low. Johnston had stopped us rudely at New Hope Church. But afterwards Dallas and McPherson, off to our right, gave us the reverse side, and so hopes which had drooped revived, when Confederates, and not Yankees, were there several times driven back.

"Another night scene, though not quite so gloomy as that of New Hope Church, pictured itself the 27th of May at Pickett's Mill. Our enemy thus describes its cause. He says: 'The fighting rose above the grade of skirmishing, especially in the afternoon, when, at half-past 5, the Fourth Corps (Howard's) and a division of the Fourteenth (Palmer) attempted to turn our (Confederate) right, but the movement, after being impeded by the cavalry, was met by two regiments of our right division (Cleburn's) and two brigades of his Second brought up on the first. The Federal formation was so deep that its front did not equal that of our two brigades; consequently those troops were greatly exposed to our musketry—all but the leading troops being on a hillside facing us. They advanced until their first line was within twenty-five or thirty paces of ours and fell back only after at least seven hundred men had fallen dead in their places. When the leading Federal troops paused in their advance, a color bearer came on and planted his colors eight or ten feet in front of his regiment, but was killed in the act. A soldier who sprang forward to hold up or bear off the colors was shot dead as he seized the staff. Two others who followed successively fell like him, but the fourth bore back the noble emblem. Some time after nightfall, we (the Confederates) captured above two hundred prisoners in the hollow before them.'

"It was of that sad night that this was written: 'We worked our men all that weary night in fortifying. The Confederate commander was ready at daylight to take the offensive against us there at Pickett's Mill, but he did not do so, because he found our position too strong to warrant the attempt. With a foot bruised by a fragment of a shell, General Howard sat that night among the wounded in the midst of a forest glade, while Major Howard of his staff led regiments and brigades into the new positions chosen for them. General R.W. Johnson, (Palmer's Division Commander) had been wounded and Captain Stinson of Howard's staff had been shot through the lungs, and a large number lay there on a sliding slope by a faint camp fire, with broken limbs or disfigured faces.' Actually but one division, and not a corps, made that unsuccessful assault, and its conduct has received a brave enemy's high praise. The fighting and the night work secured the object of the movement, causing Johnston to swing back his whole army from Sherman's post to a new position."

Thus Johnson abandoned his lines at New Hope Church and retreated to Marietta, taking up almost impregnable positions on Kenesaw, Pine and Lost Mountains. Sherman marched to Ackworth, between Marietta and Allatoona Pass, and fortified the Pass. He was here reinforced by two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps and some other bodies of troops, which nearly compensated him for the losses in the battles he had fought. He had now driven Johnston before him nearly one hundred miles, had forced him to abandon four strong positions, had fought him six times, had captured over two thousand prisoners, twelve guns and three colors, had weakened the Rebel army by about fifteen thousand men, and had captured or destroyed many important factories, mills and other works of a public character.

DEATH OF GEN. J.B. McPHERSON.

JULY 22D, 1864.

From Painting by J.E. Taylor.

The line held by Johnston at Kenesaw and Pine Top was a strong one. But it was twelve miles long, and he had scarcely enough men to hold it at all points. To attack him on the crest of Kenesaw Mountain would be a hopeless task. But Sherman thought he could break through his lines on the gentler southern slope. On June 11th the advance began. Hooker was at the right front and Howard at the left front, and they pressed forward with great vigor. During their cannonading, on June 14th, they inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy, killing General Polk. Next day the Rebels abandoned Pine Mountain and retired to Muddy Creek, holding the rugged range of hills between Kenesaw and Lost Mountains. Again Sherman pressed the centre and turning to Johnston's flank on the 17th captured Lost Mountain and all the hills except Kenesaw. For three weeks thereafter the Union army vainly sought to dislodge Johnston from the heights of Kenesaw. It seemed an impossible task. The whole mountain was a fortress. There were miles of strong intrenchments. All the time the rain fell in torrents and the low lands were flooded. The roads were almost impassable. Sherman's soldiers at times worked knee deep in mud. But they kept on working.

The army was not content with besieging Kenesaw, but kept trying to work its way around that mountain. Disquieted by these events, the enemy sought to check them on June 22d, by a sharp attack upon Hooker at Kulp's farm, which was repulsed with heavy losses. Five days later, the 27th of June, Sherman ordered an attack to be made just South of the mountain, by Thomas, and a supporting movement by McPherson northward. They were both repulsed with heavy losses, and Sherman then decided to waste no more lives in direct attacks, but to turn the enemy's position, as he had done several times before. So on July 1st, McPherson marched toward Turner's Ferry, there to cross the Chattahoochee. The movement was effective. Johnston immediately abandoned Kenesaw, and retreated five miles, to Smyrna Camp Ground.

That Fourth of July Sherman was exultant. He did not believe the enemy would make another stand that side of the Chattahoochee. But Howard thought otherwise, and soon proved, by sending out a double line of skirmishers, that he was right. Johnston had intrenched himself strongly, and threatened to dispute Sherman's further progress toward Atlanta. Schofield made a strong demonstration across a neighboring ferry, however, and Johnston soon fell back to the Chattahoochee bridge, Thomas following closely. The river was deep and swift, but Sherman determined to cross it. Schofield went over first, near the mouth of South Creek; then McPherson further up at Roswell; Thomas built a bridge at Power's Ferry and crossed over, nearest of all to the Rebel lines; and thus, by July 9th, they had crossed the river at three points and commanded three good roads to Atlanta. And the Rebel position was once more turned. Forthwith Johnston hurried across the river, burning the bridges behind him.

"At Smyrna," says General Howard, "Atlanta was in plain sight. Johnston had bothered us long. He had repelled direct assaults with success except, perhaps, at Muddy Creek where Baird and Harker had ditched and covered their men, in the open, at one of his angles, and then had run squarely over his barricades. But Sherman, by that unceasing flanking operation of his, persistently undertaken and accomplished, while Hooker, Palmer, and Howard were hammering away at the centre motes, which had no approaches and no drawbridges, and now at last pressed Johnston back, back across the Etowah and across the Chattahoochee. Johnston had planned a final terrible blow for him at Peach Tree, when, fortunately for Sherman and his army, Jefferson Davis, favoring, as he claimed, the indications of Providence, relieved the able Johnston from command, and put in charge the hardy but rash Hood. He at once, as was expected, took the offensive. He came on, as at Gettysburg, from the close wood into the valley, to welcome us in his charming way, several miles out from Atlanta. His blows were so sudden and his onslaught so swift, that at first it disturbed Hooker's breathing, made Williams talk fast, and Geary suspend his favorite Kansas stories and tales of the Mexican war. In the language of the football men, the Unions for a few hours, 'had a hard tussle.' They lost heavily, but managed to keep on the Atlanta side of the Peach Tree. Newton planted his big cross, made of soldiers, at the east end of Thomas's line, and Newton, though no doubt badly terrified, was as always, too obstinate to go back. Thomas's modesty put in additional reserve batteries and kept pieces of iron rattling among the chaparral and alders of those low-land intervales. So Thomas and Newton preserved that weak left flank from capture. Hood had put forth his tremendous energy, but was baffled and turned back to his cover within the fortified lines of Atlanta."

By this time the people of Georgia were fully roused from their old feeling of false security. They had seen the Union Army march triumphantly over the mountain barrier at the northwest. They had seen their favorite commander, Johnston, and his great army, driven from point to point and forced to surrender positions which had been deemed impregnable. And now Sherman's conquering hosts, flushed with success, had crossed the Chattahoochee and lay only eight miles from Atlanta. Consternation prevailed throughout the State, and the people of Atlanta itself were panic-stricken. Nor were they allowed to gain new courage by a respite. Sherman's advance upon the city suffered no delay. A strong cavalry force was pushed forward from Decatur, Alabama, to Opelika, and thence to Marietta, completely cutting off Johnston's army from all sources of supply and reinforcement in that direction. Sherman also brought up fresh stores from Chattanooga. July 17th a general advance was made. On this very day the Rebel government at Richmond committed an act that was worth three victories to the Union Army. There had long been antagonism between Joe Johnston and J.P. Benjamin, the Rebel Secretary of War, and Jefferson Davis had sympathized with the latter. Benjamin had now been removed from office, but his successor, Seddon, had inherited the antagonism to Johnston. So now, on July 17th, a dispatch came to Johnston from Richmond, saying that since he had failed to check Sherman's advance the government had no confidence in his ability to do so, and ordering him immediately to surrender his command to General Hood. This did great injustice to Johnston, but it also did greater injury to Rebel cause. Hood was a brave general, but rash and not competent to direct the operations of a great army in an important campaign. Indeed he himself felt most deeply his unfitness to continue Johnston's work, although he of course resolved to do his best.

In response to the harsh criticisms made upon him for not fighting a decisive battle with Sherman, Johnston said:

"Defeat would have been our ruin. Our troops, always fighting under cover, had trifling losses when compared with the enemy, whose numerical superiority was thus reduced daily and rapidly. We could, therefore, reasonably expect to cope with him on equal terms by the time that the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on our side of that river would have been his destruction. We, if beaten, had a refuge in Atlanta too strong to be assaulted, too extensive to be invested. I also hoped, by breaking the railroad in his rear, that he might be compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or to a retreat easily converted into a rout. After we crossed the Etowah, five detachments of cavalry were successively sent with instructions to destroy as much as they could of the railroad between Dalton and the Etowah; all failed, because too weak. We could never spare a sufficient body of cavalry for this service, as its assistance was absolutely necessary in the defence of every position we occupied. Early in the campaign the statements of the strength of cavalry in the Departments of Mississippi and East Louisiana given me by Lieutenant-General Polk, just from that command, and my telegraphic correspondence with his successor, led me to hope that a competent force could be sent from Mississippi and Alabama to prevent the use of the railroad by the United States army."

The Rebel army was now about 51,000 strong, and was strongly posted at Peach Tree Creek, four miles northwest of Atlanta. The place had been selected by Johnston for a decisive battle, and he had expected that the Union Army, in spreading out to flank him, would weaken its centre so that he could make an effective attack. Exactly this thing occurred, and on the afternoon of July 20th, the Rebel blow was struck. Hood's troops came rushing down the hillside against the Union lines with just such fury as Stonewall Jackson's columns used to display. But they were met by strong resistance, and after a bloody conflict, were driven to their intrenchments. Thus the first of Johnston's plans which Hood tried to execute, failed. The second plan and effort was to withdraw the main army from Peach Tree Creek far to the right, leaving Atlanta almost undefended, and then fall upon Sherman's left flank as his army advanced upon the city.

When Sherman came up and found the works on Peach Tree Creek abandoned, he thought Atlanta also had been evacuated, and he marched right up to within two miles of that city. Then after an all night circuit the Rebel attack was made upon his left and rear. For four hours the battle raged furiously. The Union lines were broken and some guns captured. Sherman watched the struggle from a point between Schofield and McPherson, John A. Logan and other officers performed prodigies of valor, and finally the Rebels were checked and driven back, leaving more than three thousand dead upon the field, together with other thousands of wounded and about one thousand prisoners. Their total loss must have been at least eight thousand, while Sherman's entire loss, in killed, wounded and prisoners, was 3,722. But in this battle almost in the outset the Union Army suffered an irreparable loss in the death of the gallant and accomplished McPherson, who was shot by Rebel skirmishers as he was hastening from Dodge's Corps to Blair's through the woods, i.e., the left flank of the army, to meet there the Rebel attack which first struck his rear.

Who should succeed McPherson in command was a question that caused some perplexity. Logan succeeding to McPherson in the battle had done well, but was junior to several corps commanders, and had, as Sherman thought, some other disabilities, as a rivalry between him and Blair, and political aspirations. At last Sherman and Thomas agreed upon the appointment of General O.O. Howard, a choice which was promptly approved by the Government at Washington. This offended Hooker, Howard's senior in rank. He had aspired to succeed McPherson, and so at once asked to be relieved of the command of the Twentieth Corps. His wish, as before Gettysburg, was granted, and General Slocum came from Vicksburg to take his place.

The 26th of July Sherman's army lay before Atlanta in this position: the Army of the Tennessee was at the left, the Army of the Ohio, under Schofield, came next; the Army of the Cumberland, under Thomas, completed the line at the right. This line was about five miles long, and strongly fortified. The cavalry and other minor detachments of the army were posted at the rear and at the flank.

The 27th, General Howard took command and marched around beyond Thomas. At Ezra Church, due west from Atlanta, the next battle was fought on July 28th. Howard, putting in his last corps, had led the way thither, believing that at this point the Rebel attack would be made. Hood's men came on with a rush, and some of them forced their way for a space beyond the Union right. But Howard's troops, particularly the Fifteenth Corps, under Logan, aided by detachments from Dodge and Blair, stood like an iron wall, and repulsed the enemy with a coolness and steadiness that has seldom been equalled. Artillery and repeating rifles threw back the enemy's flanks. Attack after attack was made by the Rebels, with the same result, and the engagement finally ended in an unqualified victory for the Union army. "As this," says General Howard, "was Hood's third attempt, anger and energy were engendered in his heart and transfused into his charging lines; it showed itself in the scream, the yell, the run, the brisk, unceasing musket-fire, and the cannon roar. We who were there cannot forget them. But at last our enemy was effectually repulsed and the sad field at night was ours. The baffled Confederates again returned to the shelter of their protecting batteries."

This was Howard's first engagement after his appointment to succeed McPherson, and both he and Sherman were deeply gratified at its result. When the conflict was at its height, a straggler of some rank hurried to Sherman with the report that Howard was proving incompetent and that his army was going to pieces. Sherman asked him if Howard himself was at the scene of action. He replied, "Yes, I suppose so." "Well," said Sherman, "I will wait till I hear from him."

During the early days of August Sherman kept extending his lines to the right, with frequent demonstrations against the enemy at all points. He brought down from Chattanooga some heavy rifled guns with which to bombard the enemy's works. Many of the shells fell beyond the enemy's fortifications in the city itself, and did much damage. At the middle of the month it was decided to execute a grand flank movement around the city. The advance was made toward the right or southward. At the same time Hood sent a force of cavalry, from 6,000 to 10,000 strong, to pass around Sherman's rear and cut off his communications and lines of supply. Sherman was glad to learn this, for he knew that the absence of these troops from the Rebel army would be a more serious loss to Hood than they could possibly inflict upon the Union army. He at once halted his flanking movement, and sent Kilpatrick with 5,000 cavalry to break the West Point Railroad near Fairburn, and then go on and break the Macon Railroad, cutting off Atlanta from the Southern counties. Kilpatrick was not able to accomplish this work as completely as Sherman desired, and the flanking movement was soon resumed. On the night of August 26th, the Army of the Tennessee moved to the South, followed by the Army of the Cumberland, while the Army of the Ohio remained substantially in its position. The armies thoroughly accomplished the destructive work which Kilpatrick had tried to do, and then faced eastward. Howard encountered the enemy's cavalry at several points, and drove it before him. "From the 25th to the 30th of August," says General Howard, "Sherman's forces made a curious manoeuvre. If you should face a line of cavalry, infantry and artillery to the rear, and then make a little more than a half wheel about its new left as a pivot, you would get some idea of the manner in which we fell upon Hood's communications. Yet the line, like an Indian rubber string, was stretched out till the Army of the Tennessee, rapidly marching, reached Renfro Place, twenty-five miles from Atlanta. Schofield kept near the pivot, and Thomas was between.

"The evening of the thirtieth, after a weary day during which our cavalry and infantry had been forcing a succession of log barricades and repairing culverts and bridges, we came to a tract of barren sand-banks, intending to camp there for the night. After a short halt, I called Kilpatrick to me and said: 'It is but six miles to Flint River, where a bridge crosses, and but a few more miles to Jonesboro, the railway station. Can you send me an officer who can take a squadron of cavalry and keep Wheeler's rear guard in motion?' 'Yes, here is Captain Estes. He can do it if anybody can.' 'All right, go ahead, Estes; I will follow you with infantry.' Wheeler's men, thinking we had stopped for the night, had already dismounted and were preparing to bivouac at a respectful distance, when suddenly they beheld Captain Estes with his indomitable squadron charging down the road. The Confederates sprang to their saddles and nobody tarried, neither pursuer or pursued, till the Flint River bridge had been reached. Our men extinguished the flames already kindled, saved the bridge, and soon were crossing in force, just as the twilight was darkening into the night. One corps, Logan's, was quickly marched over and along the farther bank of the river and began to ascend the wooded hill beyond. Hardee's Confederate Corps, hastily brought hither by rail from Atlanta, now gave in the darkness only a feeble skirmish line resistance. We charged the hill, cleared the way to the crest, and the men, though exceedingly weary with a long march of twenty-five miles or more, worked the whole night, so strong were they then to cover their front with the habitual intrenchments.

"The next day, the thirty-first of August, Logan's and Ransom's men supported by Blair, received Hardee's renewal of the conflict. The charges were not as vigorous as at Atlanta. They were, all along the line, repulsed. Before the next day Thomas had closed in on my left; had a combat, and the two together made a vigorous push for Jonesboro. By this movement Hardee's half of Hood's army was dislodged. The instant the situation was known Hood, still 25 miles back at Atlanta, he abandoned the city and succeeded by a wonderful night march in forming a junction with Hardee below us at Lovejoy station.

"Slocum, who with the Twentieth Corps being left behind, had intrenched himself in a strong fortified place across Sherman's northern communications, soon had positive evidence by the city fires and explosions, that Hood had left. He put his columns in motion at dawn of September second and marched joyously into the lately beleaguered city.

"General Sherman, who was near us at Jonesboro, gives a graphic picture: that night, he says, he was so restless and impatient that he could not sleep. About midnight there arose, toward Atlanta, sounds of shells exploding and other sounds like that of musketry. He walked to the house of a farmer close by his bivouac, and called him out to listen. The farmer said, that these sounds were just like those of a battle. An interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 A.M., arose another similar explosion. Sherman remained in doubt whether the enemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether General Slocum had not felt forward and become engaged in a real battle. Finally a note from Slocum himself assured the anxious General of the facts. Then, as he turned back to take possession, Sherman sent Mr. Lincoln that memorable despatch: 'Atlanta is ours and fairly won.'

"Probably no words uttered at this date could give to our children an idea of the joy and the assurance of hope that penetrated all classes of society when the proclamation was made at Washington and echoed through the North and West, 'Atlanta is won.' It meant that our glorious cause had prevailed. Rebellion, it is said, cannot last much longer. It spoke of the end of war, of the beginning of peace, glimpses of which were already seen from the hilltops of Georgia. It meant speedy emancipation to white men as well as to black. It spoke of happy homes soon to be visited, of lovely women and precious children who had long waited for such good news, and whose eyes were already sparkling with delight to welcome us home.

"Yes, yes, 'Atlanta won' was indeed a bow of promise set in the clouds, though yet heavy; a bow of promise to America and to the world, that right and justice should prevail, and God's will be done sooner or later upon the earth."