Changes in Command—Restoring Order at Memphis—Sherman's Views of the Situation—Grant's Critical Position—Moving Against Pemberton—Meeting with Porter—The Expedition Against Vicksburg—Why it did not Succeed—The Surrender at Holly Springs—Sherman Removed from Command—The Capture of Arkansas Post—General McClernand.

The meagre honors of the Corinth campaign belonged to Sherman. This fact was recognized at the time by Grant, who wrote: "His services as Division Commander in the advance on Corinth, I will venture to say, were appreciated by General Halleck beyond those of any other division commander." The War Department appreciated them, too, for on May 26th gave him a commission, dated May 1st, as Major-General of Volunteers. It has been said, probably with justice, that had Halleck remained at St. Louis and let Grant conduct the campaign against Corinth, Beauregard and his whole army would have shared the fate of Buckner and his forces at Fort Donelson. But Halleck's over-cautiousness in approaching fortifications that were armed chiefly with "Quaker guns," allowed his prey to escape. And even after the flight of Beauregard from Corinth, Halleck made no important effort to pursue and capture him. Sherman was sent through the town, and a few miles beyond, to see if he could find anybody to fight, and then, finding none, went into camp at Chewalla, where he busied himself for a time with putting railroad rolling stock in order for the use of the army.

And now Halleck dispersed the great army he had gathered. He sent Buell and his troops toward Chattanooga, and Pope to Missouri; while Grant with a fragment was to remain in command in Western Tennessee and Northern Mississippi. Halleck himself had intended doubtless to pursue his march southward to the Gulf of Mexico, hoping to free the Mississippi as he went, for Farragut had already opened the mouth of that river. This was a magnificent programme, but the energy of the Rebel government had materially disarranged it. Jefferson Davis became furiously angry with Beauregard for his defeats at Shiloh and Corinth, and removed him from command, putting Bragg in his place. At the same time conscription enormously swelled the Rebel ranks. McClellan's movements in Virginia did not seem to secure Washington. He, moreover, was soon removed and Halleck was called from the West to take his place. This left Grant in command in Tennessee. Buell as ordered, hurried toward Chattanooga. But Bragg was there before him, and fortified. Not only that, but he gathered such an army as was a menace to Kentucky and Ohio. Buell retreated, and more troops had to be taken from Grant's army to support him. This depletion of his forces made it impossible for Grant to continue the southward march. But his stern tenacity of purpose held him where he was, keeping an unyielding grip, though against great odds, on all that had thus far been gained.

On June 9th, Sherman set out for Grand Junction, an important railroad centre and strategic point, fifty-two miles west of Memphis. He took his own division and Hurlbut's, and on the 13th occupied Grand Junction. The enemy were at Tupelo, Miss., forty-nine miles below Corinth. Sherman remained at or near Grand Junction for some weeks, engaged in repairing and protecting the railroads and in similar work. His experience there was one long wrangle with the planters, who were trying to cultivate the soil, and were constantly complaining of the damage done by the moving armies.

Halleck reached Washington early in July, and on the 15th of that month Grant directed Sherman to proceed to Memphis and take command of that important place. Memphis was in a bad plight. Nearly all the men had left the city to enter the Rebel army or to avoid the Union troops, and the place had fallen into the hands of a horde of speculators. Sherman undertook to establish order and govern the place as a military post. His instructions were few; he was to act upon his own discretion. He assumed command at Memphis on July 21st, and immediately in his vigorous way set about the construction of defenses and the evolution of law and order from the prevailing anarchy. Wherever the head of the family had joined the Rebel army, the family was compelled to go South. All buildings belonging to Rebels were at once seized and rented. The mayor and other civil officers were allowed to continue their functions. No oath of allegiance was enacted from the residents who remained in the city, Sherman regarding the fact of their remaining as a profession of loyalty; but if they aided the Rebel cause in any way, they were treated as spies. Trade in cotton, except on contracts to be paid at the end of the war, was entirely prohibited. The slave question then caused not a little trouble. The Government had not yet fully decided to free them. But Sherman kept careful account of all the work done for him by negroes, so that the Government might pay for their services at the end of the war, if it so decided. Guerrillas he suppressed remorselessly, hunting them down like so many wild beasts. And he enforced the lex talionis. If a loyal family was harassed by Rebels, he visited wrath upon the nearest secessionists. If the property of a loyal man was destroyed, he destroyed an equal amount of enemy's property. For every steamboat attacked by guerrillas, he drove ten secessionist families into exile. These stern measures, which he justified by the laws of war, soon restored order to Memphis.

A capital idea of the situation in that part of the country in the summer of 1862, may be obtained from the following characteristic letter, which Sherman wrote to his brother John under date of Memphis, August 13th:

"My Dear Brother:—I have not written to you for so long that I suppose you think I have dropped the correspondence. For six weeks I was marching along the road from Corinth to Memphis, mending roads, building bridges and all sorts of work. At last I got here and found the city contributing gold, arms, powder, salt and everything the enemy wanted. It was a smart trick on their part, thus to give up Memphis, that the desire of gain to our Northern merchants should supply them with the things needed in war. I stopped this at once, and declared gold, silver, Treasury notes and salt as much contraband of war as powder. I have one man under sentence of death for smuggling arms across the lines, and hope Mr. Lincoln will approve it. But the mercenary spirit of our people is too much, and my orders are reversed and I am ordered to encourage the trade in cotton, and all orders prohibiting gold, silver and notes to be paid for it are annulled by orders from Washington.

"Grant promptly ratified my order, and all military men here saw at once that gold spent for cotton went to the purchase of arms and munitions of war. But what are the lives of our soldiers to the profits of the merchants?

"After a whole year of bungling the country has at last discovered that we want more men. All knew it last fall as well as now; but it was not popular. Now 13,000,000 (the General evidently intended only 1,300,000) men are required when 700,000 was deemed absurd before. It will take time to work up these raw recruits and they will reach us in October, when we should be in Jackson, Meridian and Vicksburg. Still I must not growl. I have purposely put back and have no right to criticise, save that I am glad the papers have at last found out we are at war and have a formidable enemy to combat.

"Of course I approve the Confiscation Act, and would be willing to revolutionize the Government so as to amend that article of the Constitution which forbids the forfeiture of land to the heirs. My full belief is we must colonize the country de novo, beginning with Kentucky and Tennessee, and should remove four million of our people at once south of the Ohio River, taking the farms and plantations of the Rebels. I deplore the war as much as ever, but if the thing has to be done, let the means be adequate. Don't expect to overrun such a country or subdue such a people in one, two or five years. It is the task of half a century.

"Although our army is thus far South, it cannot stir from our garrisons. Our men are killed or captured within sight of our lines. I have two divisions here—mine and Hurlbut's—about 13,000 men; am building a strong fort, and think this is to be one of the depots and bases of operations for future movements.

"The loss of Halleck is almost fatal. We have no one to replace him. Instead of having one head, we have five or six, all independent of each other. I expect our enemies will mass their troops and fall upon our detachments before new reinforcements come. I cannot learn that there are any large bodies of men near us here. There are detachments at Holly Springs near Senatobia, the present termini of the railroads from the South; and all the people of the country are armed as guerrillas. Curtis is at Helena, eighty miles south, and Grant at Corinth. Bragg's army from Tripoli has moved to Chattanooga and proposes to march on Nashville, Lexington and Cincinnati. They will have about 75,000 men. Buell is near Huntsville with about 30,000, and I suppose detachments of the new levies can be put in Kentucky from Ohio and Indiana in time. The weather is very hot, and Bragg cannot move his forces very fast; but I fear he will give trouble. My own opinion is, we ought not to venture too much into the interior until the river is safely in our possession, when we could land at any point and strike inland. To attempt to hold all the South would demand an army too large even to think of. We must colonize and settle as we go South, for in Missouri there is as much strife as ever. Enemies must be killed or transported to some other country.

"Your affectionate brother,
"W.T. Sherman."

Near the end of August, Sherman wrote to Grant as follows:

"The guerrillas have destroyed several bridges over Wolf Creek; one at Raleigh, on the road by which I had prescribed trade and travel to and from the city. I have a strong guard at the lower bridge over Wolf River, by which we can reach the country to the north of that stream; but, as the Confederates have burned their own bridges, I will hold them to my order, and allow no trade over any other road than the one prescribed, using the lower or Randolph road for our own convenience. I am still satisfied there is no large force of Rebels anywhere in the neighborhood. All the navy gunboats are below, except the St. Louis, which lies off the city. When Commodore Davis passes down from Cairo, I will try to see him, and get him to exchange the St. Louis for a fleeter boat, not iron-clad; one that can move up and down the river. Of course, in spite of all our efforts, smuggling is carried on. We occasionally make hauls of clothing, gold-lace, buttons, etc., but I am satisfied that salt and arms are got to the interior somehow. I have addressed the Board of Trade a letter on this point, which will enable us to control it better.

"You may have been troubled at hearing reports of drunkenness here. There was some after pay-day, but generally all is as quiet and orderly as possible. I traverse the city every day and night, and assert that Memphis is and has been as orderly a city as St. Louis, Cincinnati, or New York.

"Before the city authorities undertook to license saloons there was as much whisky here as now, and it would take all my command as custom-house inspectors to break open all the parcels and packages containing liquor. I can destroy all groggeries and shops where soldiers get liquor, just as we would in St. Louis.

"The newspapers are accusing me of cruelty to the sick; as base a charge as was ever made. I would not let the Sanitary Committee carry off a boat-load of sick, because I have no right to. We have good hospitals here, and plenty of them. Our regimental hospitals are in the camps of the men, and the sick do much better there than in the general hospitals; so say my division surgeon and the regimental surgeons. The civilian doctors would, if permitted, take away our entire command. General Curtis sends his sick up here, but usually no nurses; and it is not right that nurses should be taken from my command for his sick. I think that when we are endeavoring to raise soldiers and to instruct them, it is bad policy to keep them at hospitals as attendants and nurses."

Early in September the Rebels, under Van Dorn, seriously menaced the line held by Grant's depleted army, and Grant had to call upon Sherman for aid. All through that month Sherman held Memphis with a mere handful of troops, and sent the rest of his forces out to make raids and draw Van Dorn's attention away from Grant. But at the opening of October the Rebels struck the blow they had so long threatened. Van Dorn made a furious attack upon Corinth. Rosecrans defended the place with equal vigor, and the Rebels were repulsed with dreadful slaughter. Unfortunately this Union victory was not followed up with sufficient celerity, and Van Dorn managed to retire to Holly Springs and there reorganize his shattered forces. But the victory at Corinth changed the condition of affairs throughout all that region. In Memphis the Secessionists admitted that their cause was lost. The Union army, so long on the defensive, resumed the offensive. Both sides were reinforced, and preparations were made for another act in the great drama. Of the Union reinforcements, two brigades were sent to Sherman, at Memphis, and he began drilling them for more serious work. At the middle of November, Grant sent for Sherman to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky, bringing with him a good map of the country to the southward. At that meeting Grant explained his plans for the winter's campaign. His army now occupied the line from Memphis to Corinth, and he proposed to move at once against Pemberton, who was with the Rebel army near Holly Springs, behind the Tallahatchie River. He would personally move on Holly Springs, and McPherson would meet him there with the forces now at Corinth. Sherman was to leave a small garrison at Memphis, and lead the rest of his forces to meet Grant and McPherson. This movement against Pemberton was preliminary to the greater work of taking Vicksburg. The plan was carefully carried out. The three forces moved simultaneously against Pemberton, and at the same time General C.C. Washburne, under Sherman's orders, crossed the Mississippi with five thousand cavalry, from Helena, Arkansas, and marched toward Grenada, in the rear of Pemberton's army. This movement alarmed Pemberton, and he hastily abandoned his works and retreated to Grenada. Sherman joined Grant at Oxford, Miss., early in December, and then a dispatch came from Halleck, who was at Washington, urging Grant to proceed with the campaign against Vicksburg, with the aid of Porter's fleet and any other available assistance.

Grant and Sherman discussed the proposed movement fully, and finally agreed upon a plan. Sherman was to be heavily reinforced at Memphis, and would have the co-operation of Porter's gunboats. He was to make a swift movement on the Yazoo, and take Vicksburg from the rear, while Grant, at Oxford, held Pemberton in check. Banks was then supposed to be moving up the river from New Orleans, and everything bade fair for the opening of the whole Mississippi. Sherman would have about forty thousand men, and would conduct the campaign almost entirely according to his own discretion, Grant's instructions to him being of the most rudimentary description. So he returned to Memphis and prepared for the work before him.

Sherman and Porter met at Memphis. Porter has left on record his impressions of Sherman, and the latter's appearance and conduct at their first interview there. Porter expected to find Sherman in a full-dress uniform, and accordingly arrayed himself in all the splendor of the Navy. But Sherman, having heard that Porter disliked fuss and feathers, and generally dressed in working clothes, decided to do likewise himself. The result was that when they met Porter was sumptuously arrayed in blue and gold, and Sherman had on an old and much worn suit of flannel, and each was much surprised at the appearance of the other. Sherman's first words were: "Hello, Porter, I'm glad to see you. You got here sooner than I expected, but I guess we can get off to-night. Mighty cold, isn't it? Sit down and get warm." Then he turned to a servant and told him to put some shirts and underclothes in a gripsack, and "don't bother me with a trunk and traps enough for a regiment."

It was intended to set out on December 18th, but the lack of steamboat transportation delayed them until December 20th, when the start was actually made. Before embarking Sherman issued the following unique orders:

"I. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military character, and the interests involved are of too important a character to be mixed up with personal and private business. No citizen, male or female, will be allowed to accompany it, unless employed as part of a crew, or as servants to the transports. Female chambermaids to the boats, and nurses to the sick alone, will be allowed, unless the wives of captains and pilots actually belonging to the boats. No laundress, officer's or soldier's wife must pass below Helena.

"II. No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, will, on any consideration, buy or deal in cotton, or other produce of the country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any transport, going or returning, the brigade quartermaster, of which the boat forms a part, will take possession of it and invoice it to Captain A.R. Eddy, Chief Quartermaster at Memphis.

"III. Should any cotton or other produce be brought back to Memphis by any chartered boat, Captain Eddy will take possession of the same, and sell it for the benefit of the United States. If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or factor, the quartermaster will furnish him a receipt for the same, to be settled for on proof of his loyalty at the close of the war.

"IV. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the shore for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on the arrival at Memphis it must be turned over to the quartermaster, with a statement of the time, place and name of its owner. The trade in cotton must await a more peaceful state of affairs.

"V. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below Helena, in violation of those orders, any colonel of a regiment, or captain of a battery, will conscript him into the service of the United States for the unexpired term of his command. If he shows a refractory spirit, unfitting him for a soldier, the commanding officer present will turn him over to the captain of the boat as a deck-hand, and compel him to work in that capacity, without wages, until the boat returns to Memphis.

"VI. Any person whatever, whether in the service of the United States or transports, found making reports for publication which might reach the enemy, giving them information, aid and comfort, will be arrested and treated as spies."

Sherman had full command of this expedition, which was organized in three divisions. He appointed A.J. Smith commander of the First Division, Morgan L. Smith of the Second Division, and G.W. Morgan of the Third Division. These forces comprised thirty thousand and sixty-eight officers and men, and at Helena they were joined by Frederick Steele's Division, with twelve thousand three hundred and ten more. On Christmas eve they reached Milliken's Bend, and on Christmas day a portion of the First Division landed and broke up the Vicksburg and Texas Railroad for a long distance near the crossing of the Texas. Sherman meanwhile pushed on and landed the second division opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, to break up the same road at another point, only eight miles from Vicksburg. The next day the remainder of the army, escorted by Porter's gunboats, went up the Yazoo about twelve miles. At noon of December 27th, Sherman's entire command was landed on the south bank of the Yazoo, near the mouth of the Chikasaw Bayou. They were really on an island, densely wooded, and surrounded by swamps and quicksand. They drove the enemy's pickets toward Vicksburg and then began to explore the country, which they found to be the worst piece of land they had ever been on. Nature seemed to have done her utmost to prevent their further movement forward, and the art of the enemy had greatly increased the difficulties of the situation. Several futile attempts were made to advance to a more advantageous position, and then, on the morning of December 29th, Sherman ordered a general show of attack all along the line, while an actual advance across the bayou was to be made at two points.

The movement was as well planned as was possible under the circumstances, and was executed with almost superhuman valor. Sherman's men rushed at the bluffs which were crowned with Rebel batteries, and fought their way up the steep front with desperate valor. They actually with their fingers scooped out hollow caves in which to be sheltered from the fire of the enemy, and all along the line performed prodigies of heroism. But the Rebel works were impregnable, and they had at last to fall back to their old position. Two other attacks were planned, but were abandoned because of the inability of the gunboats to co-operate. Meantime nothing was heard from Grant, who was to have come up before this. So, on January 2d, Sherman reluctantly re-embarked his troops, and returned to Milliken's Bend where, on January 4th, 1863, he relinquished his command to McClernand who had been sent to relieve him. Sherman took leave of his troops through the following farewell order:

"Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the Army of the Mississippi, composed of two 'army corps,' one to be commanded by General G.W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and restricting my authority to my own 'corps,' I desire to express to all commanders, to the soldiers and officers recently operating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. We failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement, the capturing of Vicksburg, but we were part of a whole. Ours was but part of a combined movement in which others were to assist. We were on time. Unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the others.

"We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked the defences of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as prudence would justify; and having found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conflict, purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity."

It should be explained that Grant had not come up to join in the demonstration against Vicksburg because, on December 20th one of his subordinates had in a most disgraceful manner surrendered Holly Springs, with its immense store of supplies, to the Rebels. The failure of Sherman's expedition caused a great outcry against him throughout the country, and he was charged with incapacity, how unjustly the simple narrative fully demonstrates. Long afterward, when Vicksburg had finally been taken, Grant officially declared: "General Sherman's arrangement, as commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs, was admirable. Seeing the ground from the opposite side of the attack afterwards, I saw the impossibility of making it successful." Sherman's losses in the attack were 175 killed, 930 wounded, and 743 prisoners. The Rebel losses were 63 killed, 134 wounded, and 10 prisoners. As a result of this miscarriage, and of the miserable surrender at Holly Springs, Pemberton was left free, with his powerful army, to fall back and occupy Vicksburg, and thus to hold it for a long time against the combined attacks of the Union Army and Navy. Sherman's own estimate of his work, in his farewell orders to his troops, must be regarded as entirely just, and it is amply corroborated by the testimony of Grant and Porter.

"The expedition failed," says General Grant, "more from want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to remove forces to effectually checkmate further progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo."

Admiral Porter also, in his official report, speaks of the want of means of moving the troops through the bayous, as the chief difficulty; "for," he remarks, "there were never yet any two men who would labor harder than Generals Grant and Sherman to forward an expedition for the overthrow of Vicksburg." He continues: "The army officers worked like horses to enable them to accomplish what was desired.... No other general could have done better, or as well as Sherman, but he had not the means for this peculiar kind of transportation."

Under orders brought by McClernand the Army of the Tennessee was divided in four corps, known as the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth, commanded respectively by McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut and McPherson, Grant remaining commander of the whole. Sherman's corps formed the right wing, and consisted of the First Division, under General Steele, and the Second Division under General David Stuart, in the absence of Morgan L. Smith. Immediately upon arriving at Milliken's Bend, on January 4th, the expedition was sent on in the same boats, escorted by Porter's gunboats, to attack Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman, an old settlement on the north bank of the Arkansas River, fifty miles from its mouth. This Fort was a very strong work, situated on a high bluff at the head of a horseshoe bend in the river. It was strongly armed and garrisoned by five thousand men under General Churchill, who had been directed to hold the place till his last man was dead. Sherman himself suggested the movement against this place, considering the capture of it necessary to the reduction of Vicksburg and freeing of the Mississippi.

On the night of January 4th Sherman and McClernand went into Porter's cabin on the Black Hawk, and discussed the expedition, asking Porter for his co-operation. Porter sat up in his bed and told them that he was short of coal and could not use wood for fuel. He addressed McClernand with a curtness amounting almost to discourtesy and Sherman watched his opportunity to get him to go into another room, and there asked him what he meant by it. Porter replied that he did not like McClernand, that he had long had a strong prejudice against him. Thereupon Sherman begged him, for the sake of the Union cause, to sink all personal feeling and do his best to work in harmony with McClernand. Porter promised to do so, and the discussion with McClernand was resumed. It was finally agreed that both McClernand and Porter were to go along with the expedition.

They proceeded up the White River and through the cut-off to the Arkansas, and thus reached Notrib's farm, three miles from Fort Hindman. There, on the evening of January 9th, they disembarked, and on the next day moved forward to invest the fort. Sherman's men took the advance and Sherman himself during the night crept forward to behind a stump so close to the Rebel lines that he could hear them at work, preparing for defence. He was thus listening to them, when, early in the morning, a Rebel bugler sounded "as pretty a reveille as I ever heard." Early on January 11th Sherman got his forces into position for attack, and told McClernand that he was ready for the assault as soon as the gunboats would open fire. At one P.M. the gunboats began and so did the field batteries. The enemy did not reply, and in about fifteen minutes Sherman ordered his columns forward. The infantry rushed forward with a cheer, dashed across a hundred yards of open ground, and then reached a strip about three hundred yards wide, covered with timber, underbrush and logs, and much cut up with gulleys. Here they encountered a fierce fire from the enemy, and their advance was checked. But by three o'clock they were within a hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchment, and could now see Porter's gunboats close to the fort. For an hour the fight raged furiously, and then, at four o'clock, the enemy raised white flags all along his line. Sherman instantly ordered his men to stop firing, and at the same time sent General Steele with a brigade down the bayou at the right to prevent the enemy from retreating in that direction. He then sent an officer forward to the enemy's lines and followed in person with his staff. He found that the fire of his troops had destroyed the enemy's intrenchments and that they could resist no longer. Meeting Colonel Garland, Sherman asked him who commanded the fort. Garland replied that General Churchill did. "Where is he?" asked Sherman. "Inside the fort," said Garland. So Sherman rode into the fort, which, he observed, was well built and capable of much further defence. He found it, however, full of soldiers and sailors from Porter's gunboats, and the boats themselves were anchored at the river bank close by.

Sherman found Churchill in conversation with Porter and A.J. Smith. But he had hardly greeted them before a report came in that General Deshler, who commanded a brigade of Rebel forces, had refused to surrender because he had received no orders from Churchill to that effect, and the fighting was therefore likely to be resumed at once. Accordingly Sherman and Churchill personally hurried to the scene. On their way they met Colonel Garland, who had first displayed the white flag, and Churchill angrily asked him why he had done so. Garland replied that one of Churchill's own staff had ordered him to. Churchill denied having authorized any such order, and a quarrel arose between the two men, which Sherman ended by curtly remarking that it made no difference whether Churchill had ordered the surrender or not, for they and their troops were now all his prisoners. Then they went on to where Deshler and his men were still holding out. Sherman rode straight up to Deshler and asked him what he meant by his conduct, telling him that he ought to know better. Deshler replied curtly, that he had not been ordered by his superior officer to surrender. Thereupon Churchill told him that he was in Sherman's power and might as well give in. This ended the episode. Deshler told his men to stack arms, and the capture of Arkansas Post was complete.

The Union loss in this engagement was 129 killed, 831 wounded and 17 missing, the majority being in Sherman's own corps. General Churchill reported the Rebel loss at 75 or 80 wounded and an unknown number killed, but these figures were grossly inaccurate; the Rebel loss was much heavier than that of the Union army. By this surrender there fell into the hands of the Union army five thousand men, seventeen cannon, three thousand small arms in good condition, and forty-six thousand rounds of ammunition. The prisoners were sent to St. Louis, the fortifications were destroyed, and on January 15th the troops re-embarked and returned to Milliken's Bend. Sherman was now anxious to move directly toward Little Rock and drive the scattered Rebel forces south of the river, but McClernand would not agree to this.

McClernand was greatly elated over the result of this expedition, and took the credit practically all to himself. "It is glorious, glorious!" he exclaimed to Sherman, "my star is in the ascendant." He praised the conduct of the troops highly, but almost ignored the Navy, being exceedingly jealous of Porter. Indeed in his official report of the capture, he scarcely mentioned the action of the fleet. This was unjust, for the gunboats rendered highly important services and Porter led the attack in person. McClernand, however, condescended to speak pleasantly of his subordinate officers, saying: "General Sherman exhibited his usual activity and enterprise; General Morgan proved his tactical skill and strategic talent; while Generals Steele, Smith, Osterhaus and Stuart, and the several brigade commanders, displayed the fitting qualities o£ brave and successful officers."