"On to Richmond!"—Sherman's Brigade at Bull Run—Features of Battle—Sherman's Official Report—The Stampede back to the Potomac—How Sherman Dealt with Mutineers—A Threat that the President Thought he would Execute—Re-organization and Promotion—General McClellan Assumes Command—Sherman's Frank Criticisms and Uncomfortable Truth-Telling and Consequent Unpopularity.

When Sherman was at last assigned to active army duty at Washington, on June 20th, 1861, Lieutenant-General Scott was Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brigadier-General J.K. Mansfield commanded the troops in and about Washington, and Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell commanded the Federal troops south of the Potomac. The North had come to a realization of the fact that actual war was at hand, and the cry "On to Richmond!" was being vigorously uttered. There was an idea that an immediate and vigorous forward movement would crush the rebellion at a blow. Sherman found that this view was generally held by the army officers, among whom he moved a great deal in company with his brother John, and his old friend and classmate, George H. Thomas.

A considerable volunteer army under General Patterson moved down from Pennsylvania and crossed the Potomac at the beginning of July, and there were now plenty of troops at Washington to render that city secure from attack. The appearance of the troops in and about Washington was good, but they were evidently altogether unused to war. Scarcely two regiments wore the same uniform, and their arms were of all sorts and patterns. Sherman talked much with General Scott about the plans for the war, and was taken deeply into his confidence. The gallant old General fretted much at the clamors of the newspapers for an immediate advance on Richmond, and at the frequent interference of the President and Secretary of War with his plans. It was his idea to organize a "Grand Army of Invasion," which he would lead in person, although at that time he was very old and physically incapacitated for service in the field.

Congress met on July 4th, and Lincoln sent it a vigorous message, announcing that war had begun, that there could be no more thought of compromise, and that he wanted four hundred thousand men and four hundred million dollars to suppress the rebellion and save the Union. The Southern members of Congress had now left Washington, and the general atmosphere of that Capitol was more wholesome and patriotic. Indeed, Congress seemed fully in sympathy with the popular zeal and daily re-echoed the cry "On to Richmond!" And the same cry was taken up by the three months' volunteers; who were the first to be panic-stricken, when actual fighting was begun.

The Rebels now had two armies in front of Washington; one at Manassas Junction, under General Beauregard, and the other at Winchester, under General Joe Johnston. Goaded on by the popular clamor, General Scott hurried his preparations for an advance, and about the middle of July ordered his armies forward. McDowell was to attack Beauregard, and Patterson was to move against Johnston. Sherman was put in command of a brigade of five regiments at Fort Corcoran. This was the Third Brigade of the First Division of McDowell's army, the division being commanded by General Tyler, who was a West Point man, but had as yet seen no real fighting.

Sherman took command of these troops at the beginning of July, and at once set about preparing four of the five regiments for service in the field. These were the Thirteenth New York, the Sixty-ninth New York, the Seventy-ninth New York, and the Second Wisconsin; all volunteer regiments, strong and in good condition; and Sherman congratulated himself on having the best brigade in the army. He had some difficulty with the New York Sixty-ninth, an Irish regiment, which had volunteered early in April for ninety days, but had not been mustered in for a month thereafter. Many of the men wanted to go home at the end of ninety days from the date of enlistment, but Sherman referred the matter to the War Department, and obtained an authoritative decision that the men must serve for ninety days from the date of mustering in.

About the middle of July the division moved forward, and on July 18th had a skirmish at Centreville, in which four or five of Sherman's men were killed. This engagement assured the Federal commanders of the fact that the Rebels were in strong force just beyond Bull Run, and that a serious battle was imminent. That battle occurred on July 21st, but there is no need here to rehearse its confused story in detail. It was, in Sherman's judgment, afterward frankly expressed, one of the best-planned battles of the war, but one of the worst fought. The Federal army was composed of good troops, well organized; but they had no real knowledge of war and had not yet learned the lesson of military obedience. Moreover, they had the false idea that at their first volley and charge the enemy would be routed. There have been volumes of controversy about the battle in after years, mostly productive of little good. Perhaps it need now only be said that the conflict was little creditable to either side.

Sherman personally led his brigade in the battle. It was his first serious fighting, and he was of a nervous and excitable temperament; yet he displayed remarkable coolness and steadiness. He entered the action early in the afternoon, and pursued the retreating enemy for more than a mile. Then he had to assume the defensive, and, after a determined struggle, his brigade was beaten, regiment by regiment, and driven back in disorder. When the panic set in his men joined in it, and their retreat was, in his own words, "disorderly in the extreme." The total loss of his brigade was 111 killed, 205 wounded and 293 missing. His own conduct, however, was such as to impress favorably his friends at Washington, and, on the request of the Ohio members of Congress, he was, on August 3d, appointed Brigadier-General of Volunteers. His commission was dated May 17th, and was accepted on August 16th.

Following is Sherman's official report of the operations of his brigade at Bull Run, made to Captain Baird, Assistant Adjutant-General of the First Division:

"The brigade was composed of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel Quimby; Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; Seventy-ninth New York, Colonel Cameron; Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, and Company E, Third Artillery, under command of Captain R. B Ayres, Fifth Artillery. We left our camp near Centreville, pursuant to orders, at 2.30 A.M., taking place in your column next to the brigade of General Schenck, and proceeded as far as the halt before the enemy's position, near the stone bridge at Bull Run. Here the brigade was deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and remained quietly in position till after 10 A.M. The enemy remained very quiet, but about that time we saw a regiment leave its cover in our front, and proceed in double-quick time on the road toward Sudley Springs, by which we knew the columns of Colonels Hunter and Heintzelman was approaching. About the same time, we observed in motion a large force of the enemy below the stone bridge. I directed Captain Ayres to take position with his battery near our right, and opened fire on this mass, but you had previously directed the two guns belonging to this battery; and, finding the smooth bore guns did not reach the enemy's position, we ceased firing, and I sent a request that you should send to me the thirty-pounder rifled gun attached to Captain Carlisle's Battery, at the same time I shifted the New York Sixty-ninth to the extreme right of the brigade. There we remained till we heard the musketry fire across Bull Run, showing that the head of Colonel Hunter's column was engaged. This firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was driving before him the enemy, till about noon when it became certain that the enemy had come to a stand, and that our force on the other side of Bull Run was all engaged, artillery and infantry.

"Here you sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade to the assistance of Colonel Hunter. Early in the day, when reconnoitering the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from a bluff to a point, cross the stream and show himself in the open field. And, inferring we should cross over at the same point, I sent forward a company as skirmishers, and followed with the whole brigade, the New York Sixty-ninth leading. We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met no opposition in ascending the steep bluff opposite with our infantry, but it was impassable to the artillery; and I sent word back to Captain Ayres to follow, if possible, otherwise to use his discretion. Captain Ayres did not cross Bull Run, but remained with the remainder of your division. His report herewith described his operations during the remainder of the day. Advancing slowly and continuously with the head of the column, to give time for the regiments in succession to close up their ranks, we first encountered a party of the enemy retreating along a cluster of pines. Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty of the Sixty-ninth Regiment, without orders, rode over and endeavored to intercept their retreat. One of the enemy, in full view and short range, shot Haggerty, and he fell dead from his horse. The Sixty-ninth opened fire on this party, which was returned; but, determined to effect our junction with Hunter's Division, I ordered this fire to cease, and we proceeded with caution toward the field, when we then plainly saw our forces engaged. Displaying our colors conspicuously at the head of our column, we succeeded in attracting the attention of our friends, and soon formed the brigade in rear of Colonel Porter's. Here I learned that Colonel Hunter was disabled by a severe wound, and that General McDowell was on the field. I sought him out and received his orders to join in the pursuit of the enemy, who were falling back to the left of the road by which the army had approached from Sudley Springs. Placing Colonel Quimby's Regiment of Rifles in front, in column by division, I directed the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the Wisconsin Second, New York Seventy-ninth, and New York Sixty-ninth.

"Quimby's Regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on ground very favorable to him, and the regiment continued advancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of the column reached the point near which Rickett's Battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonading, and the ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy's artillery, they changed directions by the right flank and followed the road before mentioned. At the point where this road crossed the bridge to our left, the ground was swept by a most severe fire by artillery, rifle, and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from it, among them the Zouaves and battalion of marines. Before reaching the crest of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering its fire. This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in confusion and retreated toward the road, there was a universal cry that they were being fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in disorder.

"By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its Colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and for a short time the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke and gained the cover of the hill. This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and had in full open view the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles, incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder.

"At this time Quimby's Regiment occupied another ridge to our left, overlooking the same field of action, and similarly engaged. Here (about 3.30 P.M.) began the scene of disorder and confusion that characterized the remainder of the day. Up to that time, all had kept their places, and seemed perfectly cool, and used to the shell and shot that fell comparatively harmless. Crossing Bull Run, I sought it at its last position before the Brigadier crossed, but it was not there; then passing through the wood, where, in the morning we had first formed line, we approached the blacksmith's shop, but there found a detachment of Rebel cavalry; then made a circuit, avoiding Cub Run bridge, into Centreville, where I found General McDowell. From him I understood that it was his purpose to rally the forces and make a stand at Centreville. "But about 9 o'clock at night I received from General Tyler, in person, the order to continue the retreat to the Potomac. This retreat was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of different regiments mingled together, and some reached the river at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to their former camps at or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this point at noon next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped. This soon produced its effect. Men sought their proper companies and regiments, comparative order was restored, and all now posted to the best advantage.

"Our loss was heavy, all around us; but the short exposure to an intense fire of small-arms, at close range, had killed many, wounded more, and had produced disorder in all the battalions that had attempted to destroy it. Men fell away talking, and in great confusion. Colonel Cameron had been mortally wounded, carried to an ambulance, and reported dying. Many other officers were reported dead or missing, and many of the wounded were making their way, with more or less assistance, to the buildings or hospitals. On the ridge to the west we succeeded in partially re-forming the regiments, but it was manifest they would not stand, and I directed Colonel Corcoran to move along the ridge to the rear, near the position where we had first formed the brigade. General McDowell was there in person, and used all possible efforts to reassure the men. By the active exertions of Colonel Corcoran, we formed an irregular square against the cavalry, which was then seen to issue from the position from which we had been driven, and we began our retreat towards that ford of Bull Run by which we had approached the field of battle. There was no possible order to retreat, although for an hour it had been going on by the operations of the men themselves. The ranks were thin and irregular, and we found a stream of people stirring from the hospital across Bull Run, and far toward Centreville.

"After putting in motion the irregular square, I pushed forward to find Captain Ayres's Battery, occupied chiefly at the point where Rickett's Battery was destroyed. Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty was killed about noon, before we effected a junction with Colonel Hunter's Division. Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded leading the regiment in charge, and Colonel Corcoran has been missing since the cavalry charge near the building used as a hospital."

After the battle, Sherman made his way back to Centreville, where he saw General McDowell, and reorganized as far as possible his disordered regiments. During the night they marched back to Fort Corcoran, and expecting the Rebels to pursue them, placed themselves in a state of defence. By July 25th many of his men, especially the New York Sixty-ninth Regiment, became sick of war, and wanted to go home. One captain of the Sixty-ninth grew mutinous, and in the presence of a number of the soldiers declared that he was going home at once, with or without permission. Sherman turned upon him sharply and said: "If you attempt to leave without orders I will shoot you like a dog!" The man weakened and went back to his place in the fort, and no more such talk was heard.

That same day, Lincoln and Seward came down to the camp in an open carriage. "We heard," said Lincoln, "that you had got over the big scare, and we thought we would come over and see the boys." Sherman escorted them about the camp, and then called out his troops on parade. Lincoln stood up in the carriage and made a most effective address to them. When the soldiers tried to cheer him he stopped them, saying: "Don't cheer, boys. I rather like it myself, but Colonel Sherman says it is not military, and we had better defer to his opinion." Lincoln praised the condition of the troops highly, and the effect of his speech and visit was excellent.

When the President entered Fort Corcoran, Sherman in the carriage with him, the mutinous captain of the Sixty-ninth New York, whom Sherman had threatened to shoot, came forward and said: "Mr. President, this morning I went to speak to Colonel Sherman, and he threatened to shoot me." "Threatened to shoot you?" echoed Lincoln. "Yes, sir; he threatened to shoot me." Lincoln looked at the officer, then at Sherman, and then, stooping over, said to the Captain, in a whisper loud enough to be heard by others: "Well, if I were you, and he threatened to shoot, I would be mighty careful, for he looks like a man who would do just what he says." The officer sneaked away amid the laughter of the by-standers, and the President afterward remarked to Sherman: "Of course, I didn't know anything about it, but I thought you knew your own business best."

General McDowell now had his headquarters at the Arlington House, and was busily reorganizing his army. All the subordinate officers were in great trepidation, lest they should be held responsible for the disaster of the battle. General McClellan had been sent for, and changes in command were occurring daily. One evening, as a number of the officers were gathered in the Adjutant-General's office, a list of newly-appointed Brigadiers was announced. The list comprised the names of Sherman, Heintzelman and several other Colonels, all of whom had shared in the panic at Bull Run. None of them could believe that they had actually been promoted, and Heintzelman exclaimed, with an oath: "It's all a lie! Every mother's son of you will be cashiered." The appointments, however, were actually made; and when McClellan assumed command, he confirmed the organization made by McDowell. Sherman received several new regiments, built two new forts, and organized an elaborate system of drills. He was now convinced that there was a long, hard war ahead, and he made up his mind to prepare for it as thoroughly as possible.

During the month of August, troops kept pouring in. McClellan talked about organizing an army of one hundred thousand men, with one hundred field batteries. Sherman was anxious for him to come to the south of the Potomac and prepare for real work in the field, but McClellan tarried at his comfortable house in Washington. Sherman then thought, and frankly declared that he thought, it a mistake, and this opinion he always retained. On account of this and other expressions, Sherman became unpopular both with McClellan and his favorites. His frank truth-telling about the panic at Bull Run, both in his own command and in the commands of others, gave great offense. He was never at all backward in expressing his opinions, and at this time he enjoyed unusual freedom of utterance. His nature was nervous, outspoken and arbitrary, and his experience as Principal of the Military Seminary in Louisiana had enhanced his mandatory air.