The Gloomy Winter of 1861–2—Exultation over Donelson—The Advance up the Tennessee—Responsibility for the Encampment at Pittsburgh Landing—Controversies over the Battle—Varying Accounts—Sherman's Personal Heroism—Number of Troops Engaged on Both Sides—Services of the Army of the Ohio—Losses of the two Armies.

The winter of 1861–62 was a time of gloom and depression to the Union. Vast armies were in the field, and the wealth of the Government was being poured out most lavishly for their support. Yet they remained chiefly inert, while the active and energetic Southern leaders strengthened the position of the Rebel hosts and promoted the claims of the Rebel cause upon the sympathetic interest of the world. A few small bodies of Union troops encountered the enemy here and there, with results not cheering to the Nation. And there was throughout the North such a feeling of discouragement and gloom as only those who personally experienced it can fully realize.

The eyes of the Government and of the Nation were chiefly fixed upon McClellan, the "Young Napoleon," from whom great things were expected. But they were to be gladdened not by the glory of his achievements, but by a sunburst of victory from another quarter, from that very central western region which, according to Sherman's bitter complaints, had hitherto been so much neglected. The news of the triumphs of Grant and Foote at Forts Donelson and Henry, in February, 1862, literally thrilled the heart of the Nation. For the first time Northern valor was grandly vindicated, and for the first time since Bull Run, a cheerful confidence in the victory of the Union cause prevailed. "Unconditional Surrender" Grant became the hero of the hour, and his terse message to Buckner, "I propose to move immediately upon your works," was exultingly re-echoed from Maine to California. Even the stern War Secretary, Stanton, who had succeeded Cameron, was moved to enthusiastic expressions of joy.

This campaign on the Tennessee, for the conception and direction of which Sherman should doubtless be largely credited, was, however, merely the beginning of incomparably greater operations, in which Sherman himself played a most important part. After the fall of Donelson, Grant incurred the displeasure of Halleck and was removed from the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and General Charles F. Smith, who had distinguished himself greatly at Donelson, was appointed to take his place. Smith accordingly directed the forward movement of the victorious army, southward, up the Tennessee River, but presently fell sick, at Savannah, Tennessee, and a few weeks later died. Thus Grant was restored to his command, and thenceforth was responsible for the conduct of the campaign.

Who was responsible for the encampment of the army at Pittsburgh Landing, however, has been a matter of dispute. To place the army there, instead of on the other side of the river, has been criticised as a serious error. Grant's friends have sought to free him from blame by saying that the choice was made by Smith, while Grant was in disgrace and practically under arrest. As Smith was dead when this statement was made, he could not reply to it. Grant himself made no effort to exculpate himself at Smith's expense. He has left it on record that when he was restored to his command, on March 13th, he found his army partly at Savannah, on the northeast bank, and partly at Pittsburgh Landing, on the southwest bank, nine miles apart. He at once moved them all to the latter place, but personally remained at Savannah, awaiting the arrival of Buell, who was to join him there with his Army of the Ohio. Lew. Wallace was with his division at Crump's Landing, on the southwest bank, five miles below Pittsburgh Landing, where he had been placed by Smith and where Grant was well satisfied to let him remain. By this acceptance of the place selected by Smith, Grant practically approved it; and by remaining there for three weeks, until the battle was fought, he made himself entirely responsible for the whole situation, a responsibility which he never sought to evade.

Concerning the arrangement and management of the Federal army during the three weeks before the battle, there have been voluminous and bitter controversies. Sherman was in a measure responsible for whatever was done, or left undone, since he was at Pittsburgh Landing all the time, while Grant spent half of his time at Savannah; and Sherman was the adviser of McClernand, who was the actual senior. The Rebels were known to be massed in force at Corinth, only a score of miles away, under their ablest and bravest commanders. Sherman himself had been, before the rendezvous was made at Pittsburgh Landing, sent out to cut the communication between the two points, to prevent a sudden advance of the enemy. In this he had not been successful. The errand was then accomplished by W.H.L. Wallace, but the damage done was quickly repaired by the Rebels and the line of approach restored. With such danger of attack staring them in the face, the troops made no elaborate preparations for defence. General Buell and other critics have charged them with the most astounding and culpable negligence. The army, according to Buell, had no line or order of battle, although it was on the enemy's ground and the enemy was confronting it in force; it had no defensive works of any sort; no outposts, properly speaking, to give warning of or to check the advance of an enemy; and no recognized head in the absence of its Commander, who spent half his time nine miles away. And so, continues this drastic critic, the enemy advanced upon it and formed in line of battle only a mile and a half away without being checked or even observed; and the actual attack was a complete and overwhelming surprise to the Union army. In this view the Rebel commander, General Beauregard, coincides, characterizing the attack as "one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved."

Grant made no detailed reply to these charges, merely saying, as to the lack of fortifications, that at that time the pick and spade were little used in the Western armies, and that he considered drill and discipline of more value than mere earthworks. Sherman himself thought very highly of the Pittsburgh Landing site, as of great strategic importance and as easy of defence. At a later period of the war, he says, the place might in one night have been rendered impregnable. That it was not fortified, he freely admits; and he adds that it was probably well that it was not thus fortified. It was next to impossible to move raw troops from fortified lines in such offensive work as that contemplated by Grant and Sherman. The story of a surprise, he indignantly repudiates, from first to last.

As this volume is not written for purposes of controversy, no discussion of these points will be indulged in here. The two sides of the case will be presented to the reader, and he may draw his own conclusions, if he has not already done so. Whatever that verdict may be, it cannot seriously affect the transcendent fame of Sherman.

Grant was superseded, as we have seen, by C.F. Smith, on March 4th, 1862. At this time Sherman was busy at Paducah, sending out boats and organizing troops, which he hoped soon to be allowed to lead in the field. The movement up the river was now begun, and on March 10th, Sherman, to his great satisfaction, was ordered to join it. He at once embarked with his four brigades, and proceeded to Fort Henry, where he reported to Smith, and was ordered to wait near by for the remainder of the army. A day or two later, he was sent on, escorted by two gunboats, to cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad between Tuscumbia and Corinth. On his way up the river he was impressed with the importance of Pittsburgh Landing, and sent back word to Smith that it ought to be occupied. He landed at the mouth of the Yellow River, and tried to reach the railroad and destroy it. But the country was flooded, and an advance was impossible; so he returned. Smith sent him back to take possession of Pittsburgh Landing, along with General Hurlbut, and told him to make room there for the whole army.

Sherman occupied Pittsburgh Landing on March 16th, and immediately marched inland about ten miles to a cross-road hamlet called Monterey, or Pea Ridge, where he learned that the enemy were gathering in force at Corinth. His idea was to take the offensive. To throw up fortifications would, he thought, make the raw recruits more timid. Presently other divisions came up, until the bulk of the army was at the landing.

Pittsburgh Landing, then, was an insignificant settlement of two or three cabins on the Tennessee River, near the mouth of Snake Creek. The country there is rolling, almost hilly. The table-land comes boldly up to the river, forming abrupt bluffs along the water-edge. At that time the country was well wooded and thinly populated. A couple of miles back from the Landing was a little log meeting-house, called Shiloh Church, and from this the place has become popularly known as the battleground of Shiloh. It was at such a place as this that the Union army of 32,000 or 33,000 men lay, awaiting the enemy's attack, although Sherman was anxious to attack the enemy instead.

About the first of April, the Rebel cavalry began skirmishing and raiding along the front of the Union camp, and on April 4th actually captured a number of pickets. That was Friday. On Saturday nothing of importance occurred, though skirmishing was continued, and the sounds of battle were heard at Savannah, where Grant lay abed, injured by the fall of his horse. The weather was wet, the roads miry. Sunday morning there was more skirmishing, then the whole Rebel army came through the woods with a rush, and one of the greatest battles of the war had begun.

Accounts of this tremendous conflict vary greatly. In the succeeding chapters will be found Sherman's own official report, giving his version, and also that of The Cincinnati Gazette's correspondent, which presents most forcibly the other view—that of the surprise. But upon one point all the numerous narratives are agreed, and that is, Sherman's personal valor in the battle, and his consummate ability in rallying and leading his men in action. Grant was on the field on Sunday, going from division to division, to encourage the commanders; but he "never deemed it important to stay long with Sherman." Sherman held the most critical position, and his troops had never been under fire before. But his constant presence inspired them with such courage that the most of them stood and fought like veterans of a long campaign. Sherman was shot twice, once in the hand and once in the shoulder, and a third bullet passed through his hat; and several horses were shot under him. But nothing made him waver for a moment. To him, the post of danger was the post of honor.

The severest critic of Sherman's management at Shiloh, was General Buell. Yet he frankly says of Sherman that, when he met him on that very field, he appeared a frank, brave soldier, ready without affectation or bravado to do anything that duty required of him.

When the battle began on Sunday morning there were about 33,000 Federal troops at Pittsburgh Landing, and on the evening of that day General Lew. Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing with some 5,000 more. But as many men fled from the field, panic-stricken, without firing a shot, it is not likely that on that day there were at any time more that 25,000 men in line. This is Grant's estimate. The next day, Buell came up with the Army of the Ohio, 20,000 strong. And then, there were the two gunboats, the Tyler and Lexington, which rendered valuable service.

Reports of the strength of the Rebel force vary. According to General Beauregard, it contained more than 40,000 men on the first day of the battle, although, he says, he was not able to get more than 20,000 into action on the morning of the second day. Official records state that the effective Rebel forces, at the beginning of the battle, included 35,953 infantry and artillery and 4,382 cavalry, a total of 40,335. From these figures it is apparent that the two armies were, on the first day, by no means equally matched, the Rebels having a preponderance of about 7,000 men, while on the second day the Union army was numerically by far the stronger.

The Union loss in the two days' fighting was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 captured or missing; total, 13,047. Of these, Buell's Army of the Ohio lost 241 killed, 1,807 wounded and 55 captured or missing; total, 2,103. The official report of Rebel losses was 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing; total, 10,699. This, Grant says, cannot be correct, for the Union troops after the battle buried, by actual count, more Rebel dead than thus reported in front of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions alone. The estimate of the Union burial parties was that fully 4,000 Rebel dead lay on the whole field.