Imagine 200 babies born to parents of native stock in the United States. On the average, 103 of them will be boys and 97 girls. By the time the girls reach a marriageable age (say 20 years), at least 19 will have died, leaving 78 possible wives, on whom the duty of perpetuating that section of the race depends.

We said "Possible" wives, not probable; for not all will marry. It is difficult to say just how many will become wives, but Robert J. Sprague has reported on several investigations that illuminate the point.

In a selected New England village in 1890, he says, "there were forty marriageable girls between the ages of 20 and 35. To-day thirty-two of these are married, 20 per cent. are spinsters.

"An investigation of 260 families of the Massachusetts Agricultural College students shows that out of 832 women over 40 years of age 755 or 91 per cent. have married, leaving only 9 per cent. spinsters. This and other observations indicate that the daughters of farmers marry more generally than those of some other classes.

"In sixty-nine (reporting) families represented by the freshman class of Amherst College (1914) there are 229 mothers and aunts over 40 years of age, of whom 186 or 81 per cent. have already married.

"It would seem safe to conclude that about 15 per cent. of native women in general American society do not marry during the child-bearing period." Deducting 15 per cent. from the 78 possible wives leaves sixty-six probable wives. Now among the native wives of Massachusetts 20 per cent. do not produce children, and deducting these thirteen childless ones from the sixty-six probable wives leaves fifty-three probable, married, child-bearing women, who must be depended on to reproduce the original 200 individuals with whom we began this chapter. That means that each woman who demonstrates ability to bear offspring must bear 3.7 children. This it must be noted, is a minimum number, for no account has been taken of those who, through some defect or disease developed late in life, become unmarriageable. In general, unless every married woman brings three children to maturity, the race will not even hold its own in numbers. And this means that each woman must bear four children, since not all the children born will live. If the married women of the country bear fewer than nearly four children each, the race is in danger of losing ground.

Such a statement ought to strike the reader as one of grave importance; but we labor under no delusion that it will do so. For we are painfully aware that the bugaboo of the declining birth-rate of superior people has been raised so often in late years, that it has become stale by repetition. It no longer causes any alarm. The country is filled with sincere but mentally short-sighted individuals, who are constantly ready to vociferate that numbers are no very desirable thing in a birth-rate; that quality is wanted, not quantity; that a few children given ideal care are of much more value to the state and the race than are many children, who can not receive this attention.

And this attitude toward the subject, we venture to assert, is a graver peril to the race than is the declining birth-rate itself. For there is enough truth in it to make it plausible, and to separate the truth from the dangerous untruth it contains, and to make the bulk of the population see the distinction, is a task which will tax every energy of the eugenist.

Unfortunately, this is not a case of mere difference of opinion between men; it is a case of antagonism between men and nature. If a race hypnotize itself into thinking that its views about race suicide are superior to nature's views, it may make its own end a little less painful; but it will not postpone that end for a single minute. The contest is to the strong, and although numbers are not the most important element in strength, it is very certain that a race made up of families containing one child each will not be the survivor in the struggle for existence.

The idea, therefore, that race suicide and general limitation of births to the irreducible minimum, can be effectively justified by any conceivable appeal to economic or sociological factors, is a mistake which will eventually bring about the extinction of the people making it.

This statement must not be interpreted wrongly. Certainly we would not argue that a high birth-rate in itself is necessarily a desirable thing. It is not the object of eugenics to achieve as big a population as possible, regardless of quality. But in the last analysis, the only wealth of a nation is its people; moreover some people, are as national assets, worth more than others. The goal, then, might be said to be: a population adjusted in respect to its numbers to the resources of the country, and that number of the very best quality possible. Great diversity of people is required in modern society, but of each desirable kind the best obtainable representatives are to be desired.

It is at once evident that a decline, rather than an increase, in the birth-rate of some sections of the population, is wanted. There are some strata at the bottom that are a source of weakness rather than of strength to the race, and a source of unhappiness rather than of happiness to themselves and those around them. These should be reduced in number, as we have shown at some length earlier in this book.

The other parts of the population should be perpetuated by the best, rather than the worst. In no other way can the necessary leaders be secured, without whom, in commerce, industry, politics, science, the nation is at a great disadvantage. The task of eugenics is by no means what it is sometimes supposed to be: to breed a superior caste. But a very important part of its task is certainly to increase the number of leaders in the race. And it is this part of its task, in particular, which is menaced by the declining birth-rate in the United States.

As every one knows, race suicide is proceeding more rapidly among the native whites than among any other large section of the population; and it is exactly this part of the population which has in the past furnished most of the eminent men of the country.

It has been shown in previous chapters that eminent men do not appear wholly by chance in the population. The production of eminence is largely a family affair; and in America, "the land of opportunity" as well as in older countries, people of eminence are much more interrelated than chance would allow. It has been shown, indeed, that in America it is at least a 500 to 1 bet that an eminent person will be rather closely related to some other eminent person, and will not be a sporadic appearance in the population.[118]

Taken with other considerations advanced in earlier chapters, this means that a falling off in the reproduction of the old American best strains means a falling off in the number of eminent men which the United States will produce. No improvement in education can prevent a serious loss, for the strong minds get more from education.

The old American stock has produced a vastly greater proportion of eminence, has accomplished a great deal more proportionately, in modern times, than has other any stock whose representatives have been coming in large numbers as immigrants to these shores during the last generation. It is, therefore, likely to continue to surpass them, unless it declines too greatly in numbers. For this reason, we feel justified in concluding that the decline of the birth-rate in the old American stock represents a decline in the birth-rate of a superior element.

There is another way of looking at this point. The stock under discussion has been, on the whole, economically ahead of such stocks as are now immigrating. In competition with them under equal conditions, it appears to remain pretty consistently ahead, economically. Now, although we would not insist on this point too strongly, it can hardly be questioned that eugenic value is to some extent correlated with economic success in life, as all desirable qualities tend to be correlated together. Within reasonable limits, it is justifiable to treat the economically superior sections of the nation as the eugenically superior. And it is among these economically superior sections of the nation that the birth-rate has most rapidly and dangerously fallen.

The constant influx of highly fecund immigrant women tends to obscure the fact that the birth-rate of the older residents is falling below par, and analysis of the birth-rate in various sections of the community is necessary to give an understanding of what is actually taking place.

In Rhode Island, F. L. Hoffmann found the average number of children for each foreign-born woman to be 3.35, and for each native-born woman to be 2.06. There were wide racial differences among the foreign born; the various elements were represented by the following average number of children per wife:

In short, the native-born whites in this investigation fell below every one of the foreign nationalities.

The Massachusetts censuses for 1875 and 1884 showed similar results: the foreign-born women had 4.5 children each, and the native-born women 2.7 each.

Frederick S. Crum's careful investigation[119] of New England genealogies, including 12,722 wives, has thrown a great deal of light on the steady decline in their birth-rate. He found the average number of children to be:

There, in four lines, is the story of the decline of the old American stock. At present, it is barely reproducing itself, probably not even that, for there is reason to believe that 1879 does not mark the lowest point reached. Before 1700, less than 2% of the wives in this investigation had only one child, now 20% of them have only one. With the emigration of old New England families to the west, and the constant immigration of foreign-born people to take their places, it is no cause for surprise that New England no longer exercises the intellectual leadership that she once held.

For Massachusetts as a whole, the birth-rate among the native-born population was 12.7 per 1,000 in 1890, 14.9 in 1910, while in the foreign-born population it was 38.6 in 1890 and 49.1 in 1910. After excluding all old women and young women, the birth-rate of the foreign-born women in Massachusetts is still found to be ¾ greater than that of the native-born.[120]

In short, the birth-rate of the old American stock is now so low that that stock is dying out and being supplanted by immigrants. In order that the stock might even hold its own, we have shown that each married woman should bear three to four children. At present the married women of the old white American race in New England appear to be bringing two or less to maturity.

It will be profitable to digress for a moment to consider farther what this disappearance of the ancient population of Massachusetts means to the country. When all the distinguished men of the United States are graded, in accordance with their distinction, it is regularly found, as Frederick Adams Woods says, that "Some states in the union, some sections of the country, have produced more eminence than others, far beyond the expectation from their respective white populations. In this regard Massachusetts always leads, and Connecticut is always second, and certain southern states are always behind and fail to render their expected quota." The accurate methods used by Dr. Woods in this investigation leave no room for doubt that in almost every way Massachusetts has regularly produced twice as many eminent men as its population would lead one to expect, and has for some ranks and types of achievement produced about four times the expectation.

Scott Nearing's studies[121] confirm those of Dr. Woods. Taking the most distinguished men and women America has produced, he found that the number produced in New England, per 100,000 population, was much larger than that produced by any other part of the country. Rhode Island, the poorest New England state in this respect, was yet 30% above New York, the best state outside New England.

The advantage of New England, however, he found to be rapidly decreasing. Of the eminent persons born before 1850, 30% were New Englanders although the population of New England in 1850 was only 11.8% of that of the whole country. But of the eminent younger men,—those born between 1880 and 1889, New England, with 7.5% of the country's population, could claim only 12% of the genius. Cambridge, Mass., has produced more eminent younger men of the present time than any other city, he discovered, but the cities which come next in order are Nashville, Tenn., Columbus, Ohio, Lynn, Mass., Washington, D. C., Portland, Ore., Hartford, Conn., Boston, Mass., New Haven, Conn., Kansas City, Mo., and Chicago, Ill.

There is reason to believe that some of the old New England stock, which emigrated to the West, retains a higher fecundity than does that part of the stock which remains on the Atlantic seaboard. This fact, while a gratifying one, of course does not compensate for the low fertility of the families which still live in New England.

Within this section of the population, the decline is undoubtedly taking place faster in some parts than in others. Statistical evidence is not available, to tell a great deal about this, but the birth-rate for the graduates of some of the leading women's colleges is known, and their student bodies are made up largely of girls of superior stork. At Wellesley, the graph in Fig. 36 shows at a glance just what is happening. Briefly, the graduates of that college contribute less than one child apiece to the race. The classes do not even reproduce their own numbers. Instead of the 3.7 children which, according to Sprague's calculation, they ought to bear, they are bearing .86 of a child.

The foregoing study is one of the few to carefully distinguish between families which were complete at the time of study and those families where additional children may yet be born. In the studies to follow this distinction may in some cases be made by the reader in interpreting the data while in other cases families having some years of possible productiveness ahead are included with others and the relative proportion of the types is not indicated. The error in these cases is therefore important and the reader is warned to accept them only with a mental allowance for this factor.

The best students make an even worse showing in this respect. The Wellesley alumnÆ who are members of Phi Beta Kappa,—that is, the superior scholars—have not .86 of a child each, but only .65 of a child; while the holders of the Durant and Wellesley scholarships, awarded for intellectual superiority,[122] make the following pathetic showing in comparison with the whole class.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE

Graduates of '01, '02, '03, '04, Status of Fall of 1912

It must not be thought that Wellesley's record is an exception, for most of the large women's colleges furnish deplorable figures. Mount Holyoke's record is:

Nor can graduation from Bryn Mawr College be said to favor motherhood. By the 376 alumnÆ graduated there between 1888 and 1900, only 138 children had been produced up to Jan. 1, 1913. This makes .84 of a child per married alumna, or .37 of a child per graduate, since less than half of the graduates marry. These are the figures published by the college administration.

Professor Sprague's tabulation of the careers of Vassar college graduates, made from official records of the college, is worth quoting in full, for the light it throws on the histories of college girls, after they leave college:

If the women's colleges were fulfilling what the writers consider to be their duty toward their students, their graduates would have a higher marriage and birth-rate than that of their sisters, cousins and friends who do not go to college. But the reverse is the case. M. R. Smith's investigation showed the comparison between college girls and girls of equivalent social position and of the same or similar families, as follows:

Now if education is tending toward race suicide, then the writers believe there is something wrong with modern educational methods. And certainly all statistics available point to the fact that girls who have been in such an atmosphere as that of some colleges for four years, are, from a eugenic point of view, of diminished value to the race. This is not an argument against higher education for women, but it is a potent argument for a different kind of higher education than many of the colleges of America are now giving them.

This is one of the causes for the decline of the birth-rate in the old American stock. But of course it is only one. A very large number of causes are unquestionably at work to the same end, and the result can be adequately changed only if it is analyzed into as many of its component parts as possible, and each one of these dealt with separately. The writers have emphasized the shortcoming of women's colleges, because it is easily demonstrated and, they believe, relatively easily mitigated. But the record of men's colleges is not beyond criticism.

Miss Smith found that among the college graduates of the 18th century in New England, only 2% remained unmarried, while in the Yale classes of 1861-1879, 21% never married, and of the Harvard graduates from 1870-1879 26% remained single. The average number of children per Harvard graduate of the earlier period was found to be 3.44, for the latest period studied 1.92. Among the Yale graduates it was found that the number of children per father had declined from 5.16 to 2.55.

Figures were obtained from some other colleges, which are incomplete and should be taken with reservation. Their incompleteness probably led the number of children to be considerably underestimated. At Amherst, 1872-1879, it was found that 44 of the 440 graduates of the period remained unmarried. The average number of children per married man was 1.72. At Wesleyan it was found that 20 of the 208 graduates, from 1863 to 1870, remained single; the average number of children per married man was 2.31.

The only satisfactory study of the birth-rate of graduates of men's colleges is that recently made by John C. Phillips from the class lists of Harvard and Yale, 1850-1890, summarized in the accompanying graph (Fig. 37). In discussing his findings, Dr. Phillips writes:

"Roughly, the number of children born per capita per married graduate has fallen from about 3.25 in the first decade to 2.50 in the last decade. The per cent of graduates marrying has remained about the same for forty years, and is a trifle higher for Yale; but the low figure, 68% for the first decade of Harvard, is probably due to faulty records, and must not be taken as significant.

"The next most interesting figure is the 'Children Surviving per Capita per Graduate.' This has fallen from over 2.50 to about 1.9. The per cent of childless marriages increased very markedly during the first two decades and held nearly level for the last two decades. For the last decade at Yale it has even dropped slightly, an encouraging sign. It is worthy of note that the number of children born to Yale graduates is almost constantly a trifle higher than that for Harvard, while the number of childless marriages is slightly less." This is probably owing to the larger proportion of Harvard students living in a large city.

If the birth-rate of graduates both of separate men's colleges and of separate women's colleges is alarmingly low, that of graduates of coeducational institutions is not always satisfactory, either. To some extent the low birth-rate is a characteristic of educated people, without regard to the precise nature of their education. In a study of the graduates of Syracuse University, one of the oldest coeducational colleges of the eastern United States, H. J. Banker found[123] that the number of children declined with each decade. Thus married women graduates prior to the Civil War had 2 surviving children each; in the last decade of the nineteenth century they had only one. For married men graduates, the number of surviving children had fallen in the same length of time from 2.62 to 1.38. When all graduates, married or not, are counted in the decade 1892-1901, it is found that the men of Syracuse have contributed to the next generation one surviving child each, the women only half a child apiece.

Dr. Cattell's investigation of the families of 1,000 contemporary American men of science all of which were probably not complete however, shows that they leave, on the average, less than two surviving children. Only one family in 75 is larger than six, and 22% of them are childless. Obviously, as far as those families are concerned, there will be fewer men of inherent scientific eminence in the next generation than in this.

The decline in the birth-rate is sometimes attributed to the fact that people as a whole are marrying later than they used to; we have already shown that this idea is, on the whole, false. The idea that people as a whole are marrying less than they used to is also, as we have shown, mistaken. The decline in the general birth-rate can be attributed to only one fact, and that is that married people are having fewer children.

The percentage of childless wives in the American stock is steadily increasing. Dr. Crum's figures show the following percentage of childless wives, in the New England genealogies with which he worked:

J. A. Hill[124] found, from the 1910 census figures, that one in eight of the native-born wives is childless, as compared with one in five among the Negroes, one in nineteen among the foreign born. Childlessness of American wives is therefore a considerable, although not a preponderant factor, in this decline of the birth rate.

Dr. Hill further found that from 10 marriages, in various stocks, the following numbers of children could be expected:

The women of the old American stock are on the whole more sterile or, if not sterile, less fecund, than other women in the United States. Why?

In answer, various physiological causes are often alleged. It is said that the dissemination of venereal diseases has caused an increase of sterility; that luxurious living lowers fecundity, and so on. It is impossible to take the time to analyze the many explanations of this sort which have been offered, and which are familiar to the reader; we must content ourselves with saying that evidence of a great many kinds, largely statistical and, in our opinion, reliable, indicates that physiological causes play a minor part in the decrease of the birth-rate.[125]

Or, plainly, women no longer bear as many children, because they don't want to.

This accords with Dr. Cattel's inquiry of 461 American men of science; in 285 cases it was stated that the family was voluntarily limited, the cause being given as health in 133 cases, expense in 98 cases, and various in 54 cases. Sidney Webb's investigation among "intellectuals" in London showed an even greater proportion of voluntary limitation. The exhaustive investigation of the Galton Laboratory of National Eugenics leaves little room for doubt that in England the decline in the birth-rate began about 1876-78, when the trial of Charles Bradlaugh and the Theosophist leader, Mrs. Annie Besant, on the charge of circulating "neo-Malthusian" literature, focused public attention on the possibility of birth control, and gradually brought a knowledge of the means of contraception within reach of many. In the United States statistics are lacking, but medical men and others in a position to form opinions generally agree that the limitation of births has been steadily increasing for the last few decades; and with the propaganda at present going on, it is pretty sure to increase much more rapidly during the next decade or two.

Some instructive results can be drawn, in this connection, from a study of the families of Methodist clergymen in the United States.[126] Although 98 out of every hundred of them marry, and they marry early, the birth-rate is not high. Its distribution is presented in the accompanying graph (Fig. 38). It is evident that they have tended to standardize the two-child family which is so much in evidence among college professors and educated classes generally, all over the world. The presence of a considerable number of large families raises the average number of surviving children of prominent Methodists to 3.12.

And in so explaining the cause of the declining birth-rate among native-born Americans, we have also found the principal reason for the differential nature of the decline in the nation at large, which is the feature that alarms the eugenist. The more intelligent and well-to-do part of the population has been able to get and use the needed information, and limit its birth-rate; the poor and ignorant has been less able to do so, and their rate of increase has therefore been more natural in a large percentage of cases.

It is not surprising, therefore, that many eugenists should have advocated wider dissemination of the knowledge of means of limiting births, with the idea that if this practice were extended to the lower classes, their birth-rate would decrease just the same as has that of the upper classes, and the alarming differential rate would therefore be abolished.

Fig. 38.—The heavy line shows the distribution of families of prominent Methodists (mostly clergymen) who married only once. Eleven percent had no surviving children and nearly half of the families consisted of two children or less. The dotted line shows the families of those who were twice married. It would naturally be expected that two women would bear considerably more children than one woman, but as an average fact it appears that a second wife means the addition of only half a child to the minister's family. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the birth-rate in these families is determined more by the desire of the parents (based on economic grounds) than on the natural fecundity of the women. In other words, the number of children is limited to the number whom the minister can afford to bring up on his inadequate salary.

Against this it might be argued that the desired result will never be wholly attained, because the most effective means of birth control involve some expense, and because their effective use presupposes a certain amount of foresight and self-control which is not always found among the lower strata of society.

Despite certain dangers accompanying a widespread dissemination of the knowledge of how to limit births, it seems to be the opinion of most eugenists that if free access to such information be not permitted that at least such knowledge ought to be given in many families, where it would be to the advantage of society that fewer children be produced. Such a step, of course, must be taken on the individual responsibility of a doctor, nurse or other social worker. A propaganda has arisen during recent years, in the United States, for the repeal of all laws which prohibit giving knowledge about and selling contraceptives. Whether or not it succeeds in changing the law it will, like the Bradlaugh-Besant episode, spread contraception widely. This propaganda is based largely on social and economic grounds, and is sometimes unscientific in its methods and avowed aims. But whatever its nature may be, there seems little reason (judging from analogy in European countries) to believe that it can be stopped.

The "infant mortality movement" also has an effect here which is rarely recognized. It is a stock argument of birth control propagandists that a high birth-rate means a high rate of infant mortality; but A. O. Powys has demonstrated that cause and effect are to some extent reversed in this statement, and that it is equally true that a high rate of infant mortality means a high birth-rate, in a section of the population where birth control is not practiced. The explanation is the familiar fact that conception takes place less often in nursing mothers. But if a child dies early or is bottle-fed, a new conception is likely to occur much sooner than would otherwise be the case. By reducing infant mortality and teaching mothers to feed their babies naturally, the infant mortality movement is thereby reducing the birth-rate in the poorer part of the population, a eugenic service which to some extent offsets the dysgenic results that, as we shall show in the last chapter, follow the "Save the Babies" propaganda.

With the spread of the birth control and infant mortality movements one may therefore look forward to some diminution of the differential element in the birth-rate, together with a further decline in that birth-rate as a whole.

Such a situation, which seems to us almost a certainty within the next decade or two, will not change the duty of eugenics, on which we have been insisting in this chapter and, to a large extent, throughout the present book. It will be just as necessary as ever that the families which are, and have been in the past, of the greatest benefit and value to the country, have a higher birth-rate. The greatest task of eugenics, as we see it, will still be to find means by which the birth-rate among such families can be increased. This increase in the birth-rate among superior people must depend largely on a change in public sentiment. Such a change may be brought about in many ways. The authority of religion may be invoked, as it is by the Roman Catholic and Mormon churches[127] whose communicants are constantly taught that fecundity is a virtue and voluntary sterility a sin. Unfortunately their appeal fails to make proper discriminations. Whatever may be the theological reasons for such an attitude on the part of the churches, its practical eugenic significance is clear enough.

Nothing can be more certain than that, if present conditions continue, Roman Catholics will soon be in an overwhelming preponderance in the eastern United States, because of the differential birth-rate, if for no other reason; and that the Mormon population will steadily gain ground in the west. Similarly, it is alleged that the population of France is gradually assuming the characteristics of the Breton race, because that race is the notably fecund section of the population, while nearly all the other components of the nation are committing race suicide (although not so rapidly as is the old white stock in New England). Again, the rÔle of religion in eugenics is shown in China, where ancestor worship leads to a desire for children, and makes it a disgrace to be childless. A process analogous to natural selection applies to religions much as it does to races; and if the Chinese religion, with its requirement of a high birth-rate, and the present-day American Protestant form of the Christian religion, with its lack of eugenic teaching, should come into direct competition, under equal conditions of environment, it is obvious that the Chinese form would be the eventual survivor, just because its adherents would steadily increase and those of its rival would as steadily decrease. Such a situation may seem fanciful; yet the leaders of every church may well consider whether the religion which they preach is calculated to fill all the needs of its adherents, if it is silent on the subject of eugenics.

The influence of economic factors on the birth-rate is marked. The child, under modern urban conditions, is not an economic asset, as he was on the farm in earlier days. He is an economic liability instead. And with the constant rise of the standard of living, with the increase of taxation, the child steadily becomes more of a liability. Many married people desire children, or more children, but feel that they can not have them without sacrificing something that they are unwilling to sacrifice.

Analysis of this increase in the cost of children, reveals not less than five main elements which deserve attention from eugenists.

1. It costs more to clothe children than it used to. Not only does clothing of a given quality cost more now than it did a decade or two ago, but there are more fabrics and designs available, and many of these, while attractive, are costly and not durable. Compliance to fashion has increasingly made itself felt in the clothing of the child.

2. It costs more to feed them than it used to. Not only has food for everyone increased in price, but the standards for feeding children have been raised. Once children were expected to be content with plain fare; now it is more frequently the custom to give them just what the rest of the family eats.

3. The cost of medical attention has increased. All demand more of the doctors now than they did in the last generation. The doctors are able to do more than they formerly could, and particularly for his children, every man wants the best that he can possibly afford. Hence medical attendance for a child is constantly becoming more costly, because more frequent; and further, the amount of money which parents spend on medical attendance for their children usually increases with any increase in their income.

4. The cost of domestic labor is greater. Most kinds of domestic service have more than doubled in price within the memory of relatively young people. Moreover, it is gradually being realized that a high standard is desirable in selecting a nurse for children. As a fact, a children's nurse ought to have much greater qualifications than the nurse whose duty is to care for sick adults. If a mother is obliged to delegate part of the work of bringing up her children to some other woman, she is beginning to recognize that this substitute mother should have superior ability; and the teachers of subconscious psychology have emphasized the importance of giving a child only the best possible intellectual surroundings. Ignorant nursemaids are unwillingly tolerated, and as the number of competent assistants for mothers is very small, the cost is correspondingly high. An increase in the number of persons trained for such work is to be anticipated, but it is likely that the demand for them will grow even more rapidly; hence there is no reason to expect that competent domestic help will become any less costly than it is now.

5. The standards of education have risen steadily. There is perhaps no other feature which has tended more to limit families. Conscientious parents have often determined to have no more children than they could afford to educate in the best possible way. This meant at least a college education, and frequently has led to one and two-child families. It is a motive of birth control which calls for condemnation. The old idea of valuable mental discipline for all kinds of mental work to be gained from protracted difficult formal education is now rejected by educational psychologists, but its prevalence in the popular mind serves to make "higher education" still something of a fetish, from which marvelous results, not capable of precise comprehension, are anticipated. We do not disparage the value of a college education, in saying that parents should not attach such importance to it as to lead them to limit their family to the number to whom they can give 20 years of education without pecuniary compensation.

The effect of these various factors in the increasing cost of children is to decrease fecundity not so much on the basis of income of parents, as on the basis of their standards. The prudent, conscientious parent is therefore the one most affected, and the reduction in births is greatest in that class, where eugenics is most loth to see it.

The remedy appears to be a change in public opinion which will result in a truer idea of values. Some readjustments in family budgets are called for, which will discriminate more clearly between expenditure that is worth while, and that which is not. Without depriving his children of the best medical attention and education, one may eliminate those invidious sources of expense which benefit neither the children nor anyone else,—overdressing, for instance. A simplification of life would not only enable superior people to have larger families, but would often be an advantage to the children already born.

On the other hand, the fact that higher standards in a population lead to fewer children suggests a valuable means of reducing the birth-rate of the inferior. Raise their low standards of living and they will reduce their own fertility voluntarily (the birth control movement furnishing them with the possibility). All educational work in the slums therefore is likely to have a valuable though indirect eugenic outcome. The poor foreign-speaking areas in large cities, where immigrants live huddled together in squalor, should be broken up. As these people are given new ideas of comfort, and as their children are educated in American ways of living, there is every reason to expect a decline in their birth-rate, similar to that which has taken place among the native-born during the past generation.

This elevation of standards in the lower classes will be accomplished without any particular exertion from eugenists; there are many agencies at work in this field, although they rarely realize the result of their work which we have just pointed out.

But to effect a discriminating change in the standards of the more intelligent and better educated classes calls for a real effort on the part of all those who have the welfare of society at heart. The difficulties are great enough and the obstacles are evident enough; it is more encouraging to look at the other side, and to see evidences that the public is awakening. The events of every month show that the ideals of eugenics are filtering through the public mind more rapidly than some of us, a decade ago, felt justified in expecting. There is a growing recognition of the danger of bad breeding; a growing recognition in some quarters at least of the need for more children from the superior part of the population; a growing outcry against the excessive standards of luxury that are making children themselves luxuries. The number of those who call themselves eugenists, or who are in sympathy with the aims of eugenics, is increasing every year, as is evidenced by the growth of such an organization as the American Genetic Association. Legislators show an eager desire to pass measures that as they (too often wrongly) believe will have a eugenic result. Most colleges and universities are teaching the principles of heredity, and a great many of them add definite instruction in the principles of eugenics. Although the ultimate aim of eugenics—to raise the level of the whole human race—is perhaps as great an undertaking as the human mind can conceive, the American nation shows distinct signs of a willingness to grapple with it. And this book will have failed in its purpose, if it has not convinced the reader that means are available for attacking the problem at many points, and that immediate progress is not a mere dream.

One of the first necessary steps is a change in educational methods to give greater emphasis to parenthood. And this change, it is a great pleasure to be able to say, is being made in many places. The public schools are gradually beginning to teach mothercraft, under various guises, in many cities and the School of Practical Arts, Columbia Univ., gives a course in the "Physical Care of the Infant." Public and private institutions are beginning to recognize, what has long been ignored, that parenthood is one of the functions of men and women, toward which their education should be directed. Every such step will tend, we believe, to increase the birth-rate among the superior classes of the community; every such step is therefore, indirectly if not directly, a gain for eugenics; for, as we have emphasized time and again, a change in public opinion, to recognize parenthood as a beautiful and desirable thing, is one of the first desiderata of the eugenics program.

The introduction of domestic science and its rapid spread are very gratifying, yet there are serious shortcomings, as rather too vigorously set forth by A. E. Hamilton:

"There are rows of little gas stoves over which prospective wives conduct culinary chemical experiments. There are courses in biology, something of physiology and hygiene, the art of interior decoration and the science of washing clothes. There is text-book sociology and sometimes lectures on heredity or eugenics. But the smile of incredulity as to my seriousness when I asked a Professor in the Margaret Morrison Carnegie School [a college of Practical Arts for Women], 'Where are the babies?' is typical. Babies were impossible. They would interfere with the curriculum, there was no time for practice with babies, and besides, where could they be got, and how could they be taken care of? The students were altogether too busy with calories, balanced rations, and the history of medieval art."

Perhaps the time is not so far distant when babies will be considered an integral part of a girl's curriculum. If educators begin systematically to educate the emotions as well as the intellect, they will have taken a long step toward increasing the birth-rate of the superior. The next step will be to correlate income more truly with ability in such a way as to make it possible for superior young parents to afford children earlier. The child ought, if eugenically desirable, to be made an asset rather than a liability; if this can not be done, the parents should at least not be penalized for having children. In this chapter, emphasis has been laid on the need for a change in public opinion; in future chapters some economic and social reforms will be suggested, which it is believed would tend to make superior parents feel willing to have more children.

The education of public opinion which, acting through the many agencies named, will gradually bring about an increase in the birth-rate of superior people, will not be speedy; but it has begun. The writers, therefore, feel justified in thinking, not solely as a matter of optimistic affirmation, but because of the evidence available, that the race suicide now taking place in the old American stock will soon reach its lowest limit, and that thereafter the birth-rate in that particular stock will slowly rise. If it does, and if, as seems probable, the birth-rate in some inferior sections of the American population at the same time falls from its present level, a change in the racial composition of the nation will take place, which, judged by past history, is bound to be of great eugenic value.