47. The Purposes of Trades-Unions. Working-men commonly think that the best way to raise their earnings is to form trades-unions, and oblige their employers to pay better wages. A trades-union is a society of men belonging to any one kind of trade, who agree to act together as they are directed by their elected council, and who subscribe money to pay the expenses. Some trades-unions are very different from others, and they are not all well conducted nor all badly conducted, any more than people are all well behaved or all badly behaved. Moreover, the same trades-union often does different kinds of business. Usually they act as benefit or friendly societies, that is to say, if a member of a trades-union pays his subscription of say one shilling weekly, together with an entrance-fee and other small payments, he has a right, after a little time, to receive say twelve shillings a week in case of illness; he gets back the value of his tools if they should happen to be burnt or lost; when thrown out of work he will enjoy say ten shillings a week for a certain length of time; if he is so unfortunate as to be disabled by accident, he receives a good sum of money as an accident benefit; and when he dies he is buried at the expense of the union. All these arrangements are very good, for they insure a man against events which are not usually under his own control, and they prevent workmen from becoming paupers. So far as trades-unions occupy themselves in this way, it is impossible not to approve of them very warmly.

Then, again, trades-unions are able to take care of their members by insisting that employers shall make their factories wholesome and safe. If a single workman were to complain that the workshops were too hot, or that a machine was dangerous, or a mine not properly ventilated, he would probably not be listened to, or would be told to go about his business. But if all the workmen complain at once, and let it be known that they do not intend to go on working unless things are made better, the employer will think about the matter seriously, and will do anything that is reasonable to avoid disputes and trouble. Everybody is justified in taking good care of his own life and health, and in making things as convenient to himself as possible. Therefore we cannot find fault with workmen for discussing such matters among themselves, and agreeing upon the improvements they think right to demand. It is quite proper that they should do so.

But nobody is perfectly wise, and those who have not much time to get knowledge, and learn science and political economy, will often not see the effects of what they demand. They may ask for something which is impossible, or would cost so much as to stop the trade altogether. In all such matters, therefore, working-men should proceed cautiously, hearing what their employers have to say, and taking note especially of what the public opinion is, because it is the opinion of many who have nothing to lose or gain in the matter.

48. The Regulation of Hours. One of the principal subjects of dispute is usually the number of hours in the day that a workman should work. In some trades a man is paid by the hour or by the work done, so that each man can labour a longer or shorter time as he prefers. When this is the case, each man is the best judge of what suits him, and no trades-union ought to interfere. But in factories, generally speaking, it would not do to let the men come and go when they liked; they must work while the engines and machines are moving, and while other men need their assistance. Accordingly, somebody must settle whether the factory is to work for twelve, or ten, or nine, or eight hours a day. The employer would generally prefer long hours, because he would get more work and profit out of his buildings and machines, and he need not usually be on the spot all the time himself. It seems reasonable, then, that the workmen should have their opinion, and have a voice in deciding how long they will work.

But workmen are likely to be mistaken, and imagine that they may get as much wages for nine hours' work as for ten. They think that the employer can raise the price of his goods, or that he can well afford to pay the difference out of his own great profits. But if political economy is to be believed, the wages of workmen are really the value of the goods produced, after the necessary rent of land and interest of capital have been paid. If factories, then, produce less goods in nine hours than in ten, as is usually the case, there cannot, in the long run, be so much wages to receive. On the other hand, as machinery is improved, labour becomes more productive, and it is quite right that those who are sufficiently well paid should prefer, within reasonable limits, to lessen their hours of work rather than increase their earnings. This is a matter which depends upon many considerations, and it cannot be settled in this Primer. What I should conclude is, that when workmen want to lessen their hours of work, they ought not to ask the same wages for the day's work as before. It is one thing to lessen the hours of work; it is another thing to increase the rate of wages per hour, and though both of these things may be rightly claimed in some circumstances, they should not be confused together.

49. The Raising of Wages. The principal object of trades-unions, however, is to increase the rate of wages. Working men seem to believe that, if they do not take care, their employers will carry off the main part of the produce, and pay very low wages. They think that capitalists have it all their own way unless they are constantly watched, and obliged to pay by fear of strikes. Employers are regarded as tyrants who can do just as they like. But this is altogether a mistake. No capitalists can for more than a year or two make unusual profits, because, if they do, other capitalists are sure to hear of it, and try to do likewise. The result will be that the demand for labourers in that kind of trade will increase; the capitalists will bid against each other for workmen, and they will not, generally speaking, be able to get enough without raising the rate of wages.

There is no reason whatever to think that trades-unions have had any permanent effect in raising wages in the majority of trades. No doubt wages are now much higher than they were thirty or forty years ago; but to a certain extent this is only a rise of money wages, due to the abundance of gold discovered in California and Australia. The rest of the increase can be easily accounted for by the great improvements in machinery, and the general prosperity of the country. It is certain, too, that the increase of wages is not confined to those trades which have unions; even common labourers who have no unions receive considerably more money wages than they did, and domestic servants, who never strike in a body, but simply leave one place when they can get a better, have raised their own wages quite as much as any union could have done it for them.

50. Strikes and Lockouts. Workmen are said to strike, that is, to strike work, when a number of them agree together to cease working on a certain day for certain employers, in order to oblige these employers to pay better wages, or in some way to yield to their demands. When one or more employers suddenly dismiss their workpeople altogether, in order to oblige them to take lower wages, or agree to some alteration of work, it is called a lockout, and a lockout is nearly the same as a strike of the employers. Strikes sometimes last for many months, the workmen living on what savings they have, and on contributions sent to them by workmen or unions in the same or other trades. The employers at the same time lose much money by their factories standing still, and they sometimes receive aid from other employers.

There is nothing legally or morally wrong in a strike or lockout when properly conducted. A man, when free from promises or contracts, has a right to work or not to work, as he thinks best, that is to say, the law regards it as beneficial to the country, on the whole, that people should be free to do so. Similarly, employers are free to work their mills or not as they like. Neither employers nor employed, indeed, must break engagements; men who have promised to work to the end of the week must of course do so; they are not free till their promise is performed. Again, nobody should be allowed suddenly to stop work in a way endangering other people. Enginedrivers and guards in America sometimes strike when a train is halfway on its journey, and leave the passengers to get to the next town as they best can. This is little better than manslaughter. Neither the owners nor the workmen in gasworks, waterworks, or any other establishment on which the public depends for necessaries of life, should be allowed suddenly to stop work without notice. The safety of the public is the first consideration. The law ought therefore to punish those who make such strikes.

51. The General Effect of Strikes. There is not space in this little work to argue the matter out in detail, but I have not the least doubt that strikes, on the whole, produce a dead loss of wages to those who strike, and to many others. I believe that if there had not been a strike during the last thirty years, wages would now be higher in general than they are, and an immense amount of loss and privation would also have been saved. It has, in fact, been shown by Dr. John Watts of Manchester, in his "Catechism of Wages and Capital," that even a successful strike usually occasions loss. He has said, "Allowing for accidental stoppages, there will not be in the most regular trades above fifty working weeks in the year, and one week will therefore represent two per cent. of the year. If a strike for four per cent. rise on wages succeeds in a fortnight, it will take twelve months' work at the improved rate to make up for the lost fortnight; and if a strike for eight per cent. lasts four weeks, the workmen will be none the richer at the end of twelve months; so that it frequently happens that, even when a strike succeeds, another revision of wages takes place before the last loss is made up; a successful strike is, therefore, like a successful lawsuit—only less ruinous than an unsuccessful one." If we remember that a large proportion of strikes are unsuccessful, in which case of course there is simple loss to every one concerned; that when successful, the rise of wages might probably have been gradually obtained without a strike; that the loss by strikes is not restricted to the simple loss of wages, but that there is also injury to the employers' business and capital, which is sure to injure the men also in the end; it is impossible to doubt that the nett result of strikes is a dead loss. The conclusion to which I come is that, as a general rule, to strike is an act of folly.

52. Intimidation in Strikes. Those who strike work have no right to prevent other workmen from coming and taking their places. If there are unemployed people, able and willing to work at the lower wages, it is for the benefit of everybody, excepting the strikers, that they should be employed. It is a question of supply and demand. The employer, generally speaking, is right in getting work done at the lowest possible cost; and, if there is a supply of labour forthcoming at lower rates of wages, it would not be wise of him to pay higher rates.

But it is unfortunately common for those who strike to endeavour to persuade or even frighten workmen from coming to take their places. This is as much as to claim a right to the trade of a particular place, which no law and no principle gives to them. A strike is only proper and legal as long as it is entirely voluntary on the part of all concerned in refusing to work. When a striker begins to threaten or in any way prevent other people from working as they like, he commits a crime, by interfering with their proper liberty, and at the same time injuring the public. Men are free to refuse to labour, but it is absolutely necessary to maintain at the same time the freedom of other men to labour if they like. The same considerations, of course, apply to lockouts; no employer who locks out his workmen has any right to intimidate, or in any way to oblige other employers to do the same. No doubt voluntary agreements are made between employers, and lockouts are jointly arranged, just as extensive strikes are arranged beforehand. If any employers were to go beyond this and threaten to injure other employers if they did not join in the lockout, they should be severely punished. But such a case seldom or never occurs. Thus, strikes and lockouts are proper only as mere trials, to ascertain whether labour will be forthcoming at a certain rate of wages, or under certain conditions.

If the workmen in a trade are persuaded that their wages are too low, then a strike will show whether it is the case or not; if their employers find themselves unable to get equally good workmen at the same wages, they will have to offer more; but if equally good can be got at the old rate, then it is a proof that the strikers made a mistake. Their wages were as good as the state of trade warranted. It is all a matter of bargain, and of supply and demand. Those who strike work are in the position of those who, having a stock of goods, refuse to sell it, hoping to get a better price. If they make a mistake, they must suffer for it, and those who choose to sell their goods in the meantime will have the benefit. But it is plain that it would never do to allow one holder of goods to intimidate and prevent other holders from selling to the public. It is worthy of consideration whether even voluntary combinations of dealers should not be prohibited, because they are often little better than conspiracies to rob the public. The good of consumers, that is, of the whole people, is what we must always look to, and this is best secured when men act freely and compete with each other to sell things at the cheapest rates.

53. Trades-Union Monopolies. It cannot be denied that, in certain trades, the men may succeed to some extent in keeping their wages above the natural level by union. Wages, like the prices of goods, are governed by the laws of supply and demand. Accordingly, if the number of hat-makers can be kept down it reduces the number of hats that can be made, raises their prices, and enables the hat-makers to demand higher wages than they otherwise could do. Many unions try thus to limit production by refusing to admit more than a fixed number of apprentices, and by declining to work with any man who has not been brought up to the trade. It is probable that, where a trade is a small one, and the union powerful, there may be some success. The trade becomes a monopoly, and gets higher wages by making other people pay dearer for the goods they produce. They raise a tax from the rest of the nation, including all the workmen of other trades. This is a thoroughly selfish and injurious thing, and the laws ought by all reasonable means to discourage such monopolies. Moreover, monopoly is extremely hurtful in the long run to the working classes, because all the trades try to imitate those which are successful. Finding that the hatters have a strong union, the shoemakers, the tailors, and the seamstresses try to make similar unions, and to restrict the numbers employed. If they could succeed in doing so, the result would be absurd; they would all be trying to grow richer by beggaring each other. As I have pointed out in the Logic Primer (section 177, p. 117), this is a logical fallacy, arising from the confusion between a general and a collective term. Because any trade separately considered may grow richer by taxing other trades, it does not follow that all trades taken together, and doing the same thing, can grow richer.

No doubt, working men think that, when their wages are raised, the increase comes out of the pockets of their employers. But this is usually a complete mistake; their employers would not carry on business unless they could raise the prices of their goods, and thus get back from purchasers the increased sum which they pay in wages. They will even want a little more to recompense them for the risk of dealing with workmen who strike at intervals, and thus interrupt business. It is the consumers of goods who ultimately pay the increased wages, and though wealthy people no doubt pay a part of the cost, it is mainly the working people who contribute to the higher wages of some of their own class.

The general result of trades-union monopolies to the working people themselves is altogether disastrous. If one in a hundred, or one in a thousand is benefited, the remainder are grievously injured. The restrictions upon work which they set up tend to keep men from doing that which they are ready and willing to do. The lucky fatten at the cost of those whom they shut out in want of work, and the strikes and interruptions of trade, occasioned by efforts to keep up monopolies, diminish the produce distributed as wages.

54. Professional Trades-Unions. We often hear the proceedings of trades-unions upheld on the ground that lawyers, doctors, and other professional men have their societies, Inns of Court, or other unions, which are no better than trades-unions. This is what may be called a tu quoque (thou also) argument. "We may form unions because you form unions." It is a poor kind of argument at best; one man acting unwisely is no excuse for another doing so likewise. I am quite willing to allow that many of the rules of barristers and solicitors are no better than those of trades-unions. That a barrister must begin to be a barrister by eating certain dinners; that he must never take a fee under a certain amount; that he must never communicate with a client except through a solicitor; that a senior counsel must always have a junior; and most of the rules of the so-called etiquette are clearly intended to raise the profits of the legal profession. Many things of this kind want reform. But, on the other hand, these unions avoid many of the faults of trades-unions. There is no limit to the number of persons who may enter them; all men of good character and sufficient knowledge can become barristers and solicitors. Moreover, the entrance to the legal, medical, and several other professions is being more and more regulated by examinations, which are intended purely to secure able men for the service of the public. Nor is any attempt made in these professional trades-unions to prevent men from exerting themselves as much as they can, so as to serve the public to the utmost of their ability. These professional trades-unions are thus free from some of the evils which other unions produce.

55. The Fallacy of Making Work. One of the commonest and worst fallacies into which people fall in political economy is to imagine that wages may be increased by doing work slowly, so that more hands shall be wanted. Workmen think they see plainly that the more men a job requires, the more wages must be paid by their employers, and the more money comes from the capitalists to the labourers. It seems, therefore, that any machine, invention, or new arrangement which gets through the work more quickly than before, tends to decrease their earnings. With this idea, bricklayers' labourers refuse (or did lately refuse) to raise bricks to the upper parts of a building by a rope and winch; they preferred the old, laborious, and dangerous mode of carrying the bricks up ladders in hods, because the work then required more hands. Similarly, brickmakers refused to use any machinery; masons totally declined to set stones shaped and dressed by machinery; some compositors still object to work in offices where type-composing machines are introduced. They are all afraid that if the work is done too easily and rapidly, they will not be wanted to do it; they think that there will be more men than there are berths for, and so wages will fall. In almost every case this is an absurd and most unfortunate mistake.

No doubt, if men insist on sticking to a worse way of doing work after a better one has been invented, they may get bad wages, and perhaps go to the workhouse in old age. Thus, the hand-weavers in Spitalfields would continue weaving by hand, instead of learning to weave by steam power, and the case is somewhat the same with the hand-nailers of South Staffordshire. But when the younger workmen of a trade are wise and foreseeing enough to adopt a new invention as soon as it is successful, they are never injured, and usually much benefited by it. Seamstresses in England received wretchedly poor wages before the introduction of the American sewing machine, and they thought they would be starved altogether when the same work could be done twenty times as fast by machine as by hand. The effect, however, has been just of the opposite kind. Those who were not young, skilful or wise enough to learn machine-sewing, receive better wages for hand-sewing than they would formerly have done. The machine sewers earn still more, as much in many cases as 20s. a week. The explanation of this is that, when work is cheapened, people want much more of it. When sewing can be done so easily, more sewing is put into garments, and the garments being cheapened, more are bought. At the same time a good deal of the sewing, and finishing, and fitting, cannot be done by machinery, and this furnishes plenty of employment for those who cannot work machines.

If masons were to employ machines for cutting stone, they would be benefited like the seamstresses, instead of being injured. The cost of cutting stone by hand is now so great that people cannot build many stone buildings, nor use stone to decorate brick buildings, unless they are wealthy people. Were the dressing of stone much cheapened by the aid of machinery, a great deal more stone would be used, and the masons, instead of labouring at the dull work of cutting flat surfaces, would find plenty of employment in finishing, and carving, and setting the machine-shaped stones. I have not the least doubt that, in addition to those engaged in working the machines, there would in the end be more masons wanted after the general introduction of machines than before. With type-setters the same thing will happen, if they take betimes to the new type-composing machines. It is true that a man with the aid of a good machine can set types several times as fast as without. But though the wages paid for setting a certain number of types might thus be reduced, so many more books, pamphlets, newspapers, and documents of various kinds would be printed, that no want of employment could be felt. Much of the work, too, such as the justifying, correcting, making into pages, &c., cannot be done by machinery, or not profitably, so that there would be plenty of work even for those who would not consent to work machines.

The fact is that wages are increased by increasing the produce of labour, not by decreasing the produce. The wages of the whole working population consist of the total produce remaining after the subtraction of rent, interest, and taxes. People get high wages in Lancashire because they use spinning machinery, which can do an immense quantity of work compared with the number of hands employed. If they refused to use machinery, they would have to spin cotton by hand like the poor inhabitants of Cashmere. Were there no machinery of any kind in England we should, nearly all of us, be as poor as the agricultural labourers of Wiltshire lately were.

People lose sight of the fact that we do not work for the sake of working, but for the sake of what we produce by working. The work itself is the disagreeable price paid for the wages earned, and these wages consist of the greater part of the value of the goods produced. It is absurd to suppose that people can become richer by having less riches. To become richer we must make more riches, and the object of every workman should be not to make work, but to make goods as rapidly and abundantly as possible.

56. Piece-Work. Some trades unions endeavour to prevent their members from earning wages by piece work, that is, by payment for the quantity of work done, instead of payment for the time spent in doing it. If a man is paid tenpence an hour, whether he work quickly or slowly, it is evidently for his interest to work slowly rather than quickly, provided that he be not so lazy as to run a risk of being discharged. It is a well known fact that men employed on piece-work do much more work in the same time than those employed on time jobs, and it is altogether better that they should be paid by the piece when the work done can be exactly measured and paid for. The men earn better wages because they are incited to do so much more, and they earn it more fairly, as a general rule. Trades-unions, however, sometimes object to piece-work, the reason given being that it makes the men work too hard, and thus injures their health. But this is an absurd reason; for men must generally be supposed capable of taking care of their own health. There are many trades and professions in which people are practically paid by the piece, but it is not found necessary to have trades-unions to keep them from killing themselves. There is more fear that people will work too little rather than too much.

The real objection which trades-unionists feel to piece-work is that it gets the work done quickly, and thus tends, as they think, to take employment away from other men. But, as I have already explained, men do not work for the sake of working, but for the sake of what they produce, and the more men in general produce, the higher wages in general will be. Trades-unionists put forward their views on the ground of unselfishness. They would say that it is selfish of Tom to work so as to take away employment from Dick and Harry; but they overlook the thousands of Toms, Dicks, and Harrys in other employments who get small wages indeed, and who are perhaps prevented by their rules from earning more. If the nation as a whole is to be wealthy and happy, we must each of us work to the best of our powers, producing the wealth which we can best produce, and not grudging others a greater success, if Providence has given them superior powers. People can seldom produce wealth for themselves without spreading a greater benefit over society in general, by cheapening commodities and lightening toil.

57. The Fallacy of Equality. Workmen often show a dislike to allowing one man to earn more than another in the same shop, and at the same kind of work. This feeling is partly due to the mistaken notion that in doing more work than others he takes employment from them. It partly, however, arises from a dislike to see one man better off than his mates. This feeling is not confined to workmen. Any one who reflects upon the state of society must regret that the few are so rich, and the many so poor. It might seem that the laws must be wrong which allow such differences to exist. It is needful to reflect, therefore, that such differences of wealth are not for the most part produced by the laws. All men, it has been said, are born free and equal; it is difficult to see how they can be born free, when, for many years after birth, they are helpless and dependent on their parents, and are properly under their governance. No doubt they ought to become free when grown up, but then they are seldom equal. One youth is stout, healthy and energetic; another puny and weak; one bright and intelligent; another dull and slow. Over these differences of body and mind the laws have no power. An Act of Parliament cannot make a weak frame strong. It follows that in after life some men must be capable of earning more than others. Out of every thousand men and women, too, there will be a few who are distinguished by remarkable talents or inventive genius. One man by patient labour and great sagacity invents a sewing machine, a telegraph, or a telephone, and he thus confers the greatest possible advantage upon other men for centuries after.

It is obviously to the advantage of everybody that those who are capable of benefiting society should be encouraged to do so by giving them all the reward possible, by patents, copyright, and the laws of property generally. To prevent or discourage a clever man in doing the best work he can, is certainly no benefit to other men. It tends to level all down to a low standard, and to retard progress altogether. Every man, on the contrary, who is incited to work, and study, and invent to the utmost of his powers, not only earns welfare for himself, but confers welfare upon other people. He shows how wealth may be created abundantly, and how toil may be lessened. What is true of great ability and great inventions is true, also, of the smallest differences of power or the slightest improvements. If one bricklayer's labourer can carry up more bricks than another, why should he be prevented from doing it? The ability is his property, and it is for the benefit of all that he should be allowed to use it. If he finds a better way of carrying bricks, of course it should be adopted in preference to worse ways. The purpose of carrying bricks is to get them carried and benefit those who want houses. Everything which makes it difficult and expensive to build houses, causes people to be lodged worse than they otherwise would be. We can only get things made well and cheaply if every man does his best, and is incited to do so by gaining the reward of his excellence.

Every man then should not only be allowed, but should be encouraged to do and to earn all that he can; we must then allow the greatest inequalities of wealth; for a man who has once begun to grow rich, acquires capital, and experience, and means which enable him to earn more and more. Moreover, it is altogether false to suppose that, as a general rule, he does this by taking wealth from other people. On the contrary, by accumulating capital, by building, mills, warehouses, railways, docks, and by skilfully organising trades, he often enables thousands of men to produce wealth, and to earn wages to an extent before impossible. The profits of a capitalist are usually but a small fraction of what he pays in wages, and he cannot become rich without assisting many workmen to increase the value of their labour and to earn a comfortable subsistence.