JAPAN’S ASIATIC POLICY

Colonel Theodore Roosevelt once remarked to one of the authors of this book, with his accustomed emphasis and gesture: “The United States’ proper sphere is in this hemisphere; Japan’s proper sphere is in Asia.” With this text the great statesman was propounding an idea of deep political significance. What is suggested by the text is, of course, not that either of the two nations should resume its traditional policy of isolation or confine its activities within the specified zones, but rather it is to the effect that each should know its bounds and play the part which destiny and geography have assigned to it.

In further elucidating the same idea, in his book entitled Fear God and Take Your Own Part, Roosevelt says:

Japan’s whole sea front, and her entire home maritime interest, bear on the Pacific; and of the other great nations of the earth the United States has the greatest proportion of her sea front on, and the greatest proportion of her interest in, the Pacific. But there is not the slightest real or necessary conflict of interests between Japan and the United States in the Pacific. When compared with each other, the interest of Japan is overwhelmingly Asiatic, that of the United States overwhelmingly American. Relatively to each other, one is dominant in Asia, the other in North America. Neither has any desire, nor any excuse for desiring, to acquire territory on the other’s continent.

President Roosevelt had a unique opportunity of making himself thoroughly conversant with the situation in the Far East without even setting foot on the soil. The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907, the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, negotiated on behalf of America by the able Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and the American recognition of the amalgamation of Korea into the Japanese Empire in 1910, are the outstanding acts of the Roosevelt administration wherein the foregoing idea has been translated into deeds. These acts have proceeded from a thorough appreciation of the history and development of modern Japan. Nor did Colonel Roosevelt cease on his return to private life to follow closely the march of events in Asia. He wrote many articles on Far Eastern affairs which showed his remarkable grasp of the situation. No wonder, then, that the Japanese people reciprocate this generous appreciation by paying the highest respect to, and entertaining a genuine admiration for, the late American statesman.

Korean Situation.

Recently Japan has been made the target of attack from many quarters with reference to her Asiatic policy. The Shantung settlement, the Korean administration, and Japan’s activities in East Siberia have been severely assailed by her critics. Patriotism imposes upon a citizen no obligation to condone any mistakes and wrongs which his country has committed. We deplore the gross diplomatic blunder which Japan made in 1915 in her dealings with China, which, although perfectly justifiable in the main proposals presented,[2] had the appearance of browbeating her to submission by brandishing the sword. We deplore the atrocities perpetrated in the attempt to crush the Korean uprisings. Whatever may have been the advisability of adopting drastic measures to nip the Korean revolt in the bud, a revolt which, if leniently dealt with, might have resulted in far greater sufferings of the people, it can never be proffered as a plea for the committing of inhuman deeds. Fortunately, a change of heart has come to the Mikado’s Government, which, by uprooting the militaristic rÉgime, is now resolutely introducing liberal measures and reforms in Korea. The most significant of the measures is the system of local self-government which has just been inaugurated. It creates in the provinces, municipalities, and villages of Chosen (Korea) consultative or advisory Councils whose functions are to deliberate on the finances and other matters of public importance to the respective local bodies. The members are partly elective and partly appointive. Besides these deliberative Councils, there will be established in each municipality, county, and island a School Council to discuss matters relating to education. This is the sure road to complete self-government in Chosen. The same process of evolution, which brought local autonomy and a constitutional rÉgime to Japan proper, which took thirty years to perfect, is now being applied to the newly joined integral part of the Mikado’s Empire. The step may be slow, but the goal is sure. Korea’s union with Japan was consummated after the bitter experience of two sanguinary wars and the mature deliberation of the best minds of the two peoples. Its revocation is out of the question, unless it is demanded in the future for most cogent reasons. The privilege of taking a hand in the government of the empire, however, should be extended as speedily as possible to its subjects in the peninsula.

Policy of Self-Preservation.

Many as are the pitfalls into which Japan has fallen in pursuance of her Asiatic policy, it may confidently be asserted that the road she has trodden has, on the whole, been straight. She can face with a clean conscience the verdict of history. When Far Eastern history, from the China-Japan War to the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty, is carefully examined and rightly understood, it will be conceded that the course which Japan has adopted, so far as its general principles are concerned, is the one which any nation of self-respect and right motive would pursue. Fundamentally Japan’s Asiatic policy is the policy of self-preservation, the policy of defense, and never of aggression. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was and still remains the cornerstone of Japan’s Asiatic policy, was formed for purely defensive purposes, in order to maintain peace in Asia and safeguard mutual interests vested therein of the two Powers. Only the “inexorable march of events” has brought Japan into Korea, Manchuria, and East Siberia. None of the statesmen who took part in the Meiji Restoration could ever have dreamed that their country would in the course of time be driven through sheer force of circumstances to plant its flag on the Asiatic mainland. It was solely in self-defense that Japan took up arms against China and Russia. Once enmeshed in continental politics, however, it became imperative for her to take such measures as would ensure and consolidate the position and gains that were won through enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure. Herein, in short, is the genesis of Japan’s present status in Korea and Manchuria.

Even at the present time, the heavy arming of Japan is a case of necessity, so long as the Far East remains in such an unstable condition as exists there to-day, and is not free from the menace of the Bolsheviki, who, professing pacifism, are not slow to emulate the military machine of Imperial Russia. Nothing could be more welcome to the Japanese people than to see the curtailment of their naval and military equipments, for the maintenance of which they have to bear the burden of crushing taxes, and to behold the day when they can, without fear of interference by force of arms, win their spurs in the Far East by engaging in the peaceful enterprises of farming, trade, and industry.

Precisely as the position of Japan on the Asiatic mainland was the result of arbitrament by the sword, drawn in response to a challenge made by others, and is now upheld by the prestige of arms, her Asiatic policy, although conceived in self-defense, came to assume in the eyes of the outside world a semblance of military aggrandizement. As a consequence, Japan is looked upon as a militaristic nation, bent upon conquest. Suspicion and fear are thereby engendered. This is, to say the least, extremely unfortunate. No stone should be left unturned to smooth the sharp edges cut by this historical retrospect and to obliterate the unpleasant memories of the past. No effort would be too great for Japan to convince the world of her genuine faith that her future lies “not in territorial and military conquest, but on the water in the carrying trade and on land in her commercial and industrial expansion abroad.” Her erstwhile failure to dispel the suspicion of the world about her intentions and to take it into her confidence is the root of many ills with which she has been afflicted for the past few years.

Shantung Settlement.

The storm of criticism we have witnessed in America about the Shantung settlement is a good illustration. Whatever part party politics in the United States may have played in raising the furor, had Japan secured the complete confidence of the American people, all the eloquence expended for the denunciation of the Shantung clause in the Versailles Treaty would surely have fallen on deaf ears. That our judgment is not wrong is sustained by the fact that the Portsmouth Treaty evoked not a word of protest in America. We need not remind our readers that the Treaty concluded through the good offices of President Roosevelt and the settlement made at Versailles are not only based upon the same principles but are exactly identical in many respects, with this most important exception—namely, that the former Treaty transferred to Japan the lease of the Kwantung territory, and she still holds it, while in the latter case she pledges herself to relinquish the leasehold of Kiaochow, thereby restoring the complete sovereignty of China over Shantung, which had been infringed upon by Germany. The Shantung settlement is, consequently, of a far greater advantage to China. What Japan secures in that province is only the same economic rights and privileges which are enjoyed by other Powers in other parts of China. There is, therefore, no justifiable ground for singling out Japan for attack with regard to the international arrangement now in vogue in China. Were the complete reconstruction of China, the re-writing of her history, to be attempted, international justice would demand that the parties interested should all share equal responsibilities and sacrifices. Discrimination against Japan alone is unjust, unfair. The would-be builders of the new heaven and the new earth can ill afford to lay the cornerstone of their edifice on such an unsafe and unlevel ground. Manifestly, the dawn of the millennium is still far away. We have to make the best of the world as it is. To ignore this fact is to make the confusion in the world worse confounded. As a result of this misapprehension of history, the Shantung question still remains in abeyance, because of China’s refusal to enter into negotiations with Japan for the restoration of Kiaochow, thus delaying perfect accord between the two Oriental neighbors whom destiny has called to be on the best of terms. The foregoing interpretation of the Shantung question could not in ordinary circumstances have failed to convince the practical American people of the appropriateness of the Versailles settlement, were they not tempted to indulge suspicions of Japan and, hence, ready to be easily misled by false stories, misrepresentations, and slanders concocted by her enemies.

Rather unfortunate, one is sometimes tempted to think, has been the heading of the clause in the Versailles Treaty, that has readjusted the German-China Treaty of 1898 and its sequel, and disposed of the rights and privileges Germany had secured thereby in the province of Shantung. Like “the three R’s” and other catchwords that have in American history often proved so powerful in misleading the people, so this curt phrase “Shantung clause,” which was seized on and skillfully utilized by Japan’s critics, has been a cause of mountains of misunderstanding that have crept into the heads of the American people, who, as a rule, take neither time nor pains to examine the subject carefully and thoroughly. As a result, they imagine that the whole province of Shantung was ceded to Japan by the Peace Treaty. Great, indeed, as is this mistake, it would be extremely difficult to correct it, as the mischief has already been done, except by the actual restoration of Kiaochow. Japan cannot, of course, be held responsible for the misinterpretations of other people, but at the same time it would be well for her to spare no effort to convince China of the wisdom of entering into negotiations for the recovery of the leased territory, and, consequently, of her complete sovereignty over the province of Shantung. Until this pledge is redeemed, Japan’s credit will suffer, and all her pronouncements on justice and humanity fall flat on the ears of the world.

CoÖperation with China.

While Japan’s Asiatic policy was, of course, primarily formulated to further her own interests, it has also been inspired with the laudable ambition of rendering a good record of stewardship over the people who have come within the orbit of its influence. No one who knows the work undertaken in Korea and South Manchuria will grudge a word of praise for the record. It has bestowed untold benefits on the inhabitants. Theodore Roosevelt, in reviewing the enterprise of Japan in Korea, grew enthusiastic over it. The same story is repeated in South Manchuria, where the South Manchurian Railroad Company, acting as a civilizing agent, has wrought marvels. We should like to dwell here with patriotic pride on these reforms and undertakings in some detail, were they not out of place in this book.

Commendable as are these civilizing measures adopted by Japan, the fact remains that she has signally failed in one great essential, namely, in winning the good will and friendship of her neighbors. This is the weakest spot in the armor of her Asiatic policy. She is thereby jeopardizing her future. The sentiment of good will is as much a fact, though imponderable, as any other fact, and is a force of immense consequence. How vital this moral asset is to Japan can easily be gauged when we consider that in her neighboring lands are found the indispensable materials for her industrial expansion and the best market for her commerce. Japanese leaders are thoroughly aware of the importance of this moral asset, and have done all that they could to secure it.

The failure to win it is partly due to the pettiness of Japanese officialdom, so bitterly complained of by Lafcadio Hearn with his fine poetical irony—the pettiness which tries to bring everything within its prescribed order and does not allow free play to the idiosyncrasies and peculiar characteristics of other peoples. No less responsible are the shortsightedness of Japanese nationals, their too great eagerness to accomplish things within a short time, their haughtiness and overbearing manners, which are decidedly offensive to their neighbors. The fault, however, is not Japan’s alone. There are tremendous difficulties which confront her in the way of winning the friendship of her neighbors. The first to reckon with are their weak and unstable qualities, which have so sadly but too clearly been shown by their incapacity to organize a strong nation or to put their house in order. To deal with these neighbors is no easy task. It requires the highest statesmanship. The task is made difficult a hundredfold by the counteracting influences exerted on Japan’s neighbors, as they are in the vortex of international rivalry. And not all foreigners are the friends of Japan. There is a considerable number of those who entertain, for one reason or another, a dislike of the Island Empire, and ceaselessly labor to defeat its purpose. They paint, either wittingly or unwittingly, every act of Japan so maliciously that it instills fear and hatred of her among her neighbors. Undiscriminating and unfair attacks of Japan’s critics play into the hands of the jingoistic elements in the countries concerned and make the task of the liberals extremely difficult. Whatever the obstacles, however, they must be surmounted, for the future road to tread is clear. Japan’s salvation, together with that of her neighbors, lies in their genuine friendship and coÖperation.

Understanding with America.

A brief review of Japan’s Asiatic policy was deemed advisable in connection with the discussion of the Japanese-California problem in order to see how Japan proposes to solve the question of human congestion at home and to meet her other urgent needs. The succeeding chapters will show what an unparalleled predicament Japan is facing. Circumscribed within a narrowly limited area, only 16 per cent. of which is fit for cultivation, and crowded with two thirds as many people as the entire population of the United States, with an annual increase at the rate of seven hundred thousand, Japan must perforce find a way whereby her people may live contentedly and develop robustly. Emigration and industrial expansion are manifestly the exits from the dilemma of slow strangulation. Emigration, however, is found a difficult exit, for the Japanese find themselves barred from the most favorably placed lands of the earth. Australia, Canada, and the United States, with their vast lands yet sparsely peopled, and their immense resources left unexploited, while welcoming every race and creed of Europe, shut their doors against the Japanese.

Japan has acquiesced without much ado in the restrictive immigration measures adopted by America and by British colonies from the higher consideration of international comity. She saw that there lies at the bottom of these measures the delicate question of race difference, which requires a long period for its proper adjustment. To ignore this fact and force the race issue, however just in principle, would be to court disaster. It might result in the loss of friendship of her best associates in international affairs and of the vital interests involved in that friendship. At the same time, the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” which Japan has entered into is evidence of her sincere solicitude to avoid embarrassment of her friends by the influx of an alien race. It is then but just that they reciprocate the courtesy by a sympathetic understanding of Japan’s difficulties.

Barred in the east and south, it is natural for Japan to strive to find room and employment for the surplus of her population in her neighboring lands—the sparsely peopled Manchuria, Mongolia, and East Siberia. Climate, cheap and efficient native labor, and the unfavorable economic conditions, however, preclude the immigration in large numbers of Japanese laborers into these regions. Only by building up large plants and inaugurating big agricultural enterprises, in coÖperation with the natives, could Japan hope to transplant in these lands some portion of her skilled laborers and traders. During the stay of a decade and a half in South Manchuria, limited as it was until the conclusion of the China-Japan Treaties of 1915 to the Kwantung territory and the railway zones, Japan can count therein as colonists only a little over 150,000 of her sons and daughters.[3]

The only alternative which remains and which is the most feasible proposition to absorb the energies of her crowded population is found in her commercial and industrial expansion. Here again, however, she is terribly handicapped, as we shall see in the next chapter, by the conspicuous absence and scarcity of raw materials indispensable for industrial development. Fortunately, in the territories of her neighbors—China and East Siberia—there are vast stores of these materials untouched and unused, the unfolding of which will not only meet her wants, but will equally benefit her neighbors. The supreme importance of winning their good will thereby becomes accentuated a thousandfold, for without their willing coÖperation nothing can be accomplished. In the participation of the benefits accruing from the development of her neighbors’ natural resources Japan need not ask for special privileges. The faithful and effective execution of the “open door” policy is all she requires. Here she stands on common ground with Occidental Powers. She entertains no fear of the outcome of the “open door” policy, for she is in a position to secure every advantage accruing from its operation.

Japan’s Proper Sphere of Activity.

As Colonel Roosevelt pointed out, “Japan’s proper sphere is in Asia,” and it is but proper that her activities therein develop in intensity and vigor. She is entitled to use every peaceful and legitimate means that is open to her for the extension of her influence in the Far East, for it is there that she can assure herself of her right to live. America and Great Britain, while reserving to themselves the right of opening or closing their own doors to the Japanese, will not be playing a fair and even game if they grudge to recognize this fact. In the strict adherence on the part of Japan to the spirit which gave birth to the “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” and in the just appreciation on the part of America of Japan’s difficulties at home and abroad, lies one of the fundamentals of an equitable solution of the Japanese-California problem.