I had been well acquainted since my youth with Herr von Bethmann Hollweg. When I was in active service for the first time in 1877, as Lieutenant in the Sixth Company of the First Infantry Guard Regiment, it was quartered once at Hohenfinow, the home of old Herr von Bethmann, father of the Chancellor. I was attracted by the pleasant family circle there, which was presided over by Frau von Bethmann, a most worthy lady, born of Swiss nationality, amiable and refined.

Often, as Prince and later as Emperor, I went to Hohenfinow to visit the old gentleman, and I was received on every occasion by the young head of the rural district administration; at that time neither of us imagined that he would become Imperial Chancellor under me.

From these visits an intimate relationship sprang up little by little, which served to increase steadily my esteem for the diligence, ability, and noble character of Bethmann, which were much to my liking. These qualities clung to him throughout his career.

As Chief President and as Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior Bethmann gave a good account of himself, and, while occupying the last-named post, made his appearance successfully before the Reichstag.

Co-operation with the Chancellor was easy for me. With Bethmann I kept up my custom of daily visits whenever possible, and of discussing fully with him, while walking in the garden of the Chancellor's palace, on politics, events of the day, special bills, and occurrences and of hearing reports from him. It was also a pleasure for me to visit the Chancellor's home, since Bethmann's spouse was the very model of a genuine German wife, one whose simple distinction earned the esteem of every visitor, while her winning kindness of heart spread around her an atmosphere of cordiality. During the Bethmann rÉgime the custom of holding small evening receptions, instituted by Prince BÜlow and most enjoyable to me, was continued, and this enabled me to keep on associating informally with men of all circles and walks of life.

In the journeys which the Chancellor had to make in order to introduce himself, he won esteem everywhere by his distinguished calm and sincere methods of expression. Such foreign countries as were not hostile to us considered him a factor making for political stability and peace, to the maintenance and strengthening of which he devoted his most zealous efforts. This was entirely to my liking.

In foreign politics he busied himself from the start with the position of England in relation to Germany and with the "policy of encirclement" of King Edward VII, which had made itself felt more and more since Reval, and was a source of worry to Bethmann. This was likewise true of the growing desire for revenge and enmity of France, and the unreliability of Russia. During his rÉgime as Chancellor it became clear that Italy was no longer to be reckoned with militarily; the work of BarrÈre in that country made "extra tours" chronic.

Upon assuming office, Herr von Bethmann found the situation with regard to France cleared up to such an extent that the German-French Morocco Agreement had been signed on February 9, 1909. By recognizing thereby the political predominance of France in Morocco Prince BÜlow had put the finishing touch to the German political retreat from Morocco. The standpoint which had determined the trip to Tangier and, in addition, the Algeciras Conference, was thereby definitely abandoned. The great satisfaction of the French Government over this victory was expressed in a manner unwelcome to us by the conferring of the cross of the Legion of Honor upon Prince Radolin and Herr von Schoen.

RECEIVES BRITISH ROYALTY

On the same day King Edward VII, with Queen Alexandra, made his first official visit to the German Emperor and his wife at their capital city of Berlin—eight years after his accession to the throne! Berlin received the exalted gentleman with rejoicing (!!) and showed no signs of dissatisfaction at his unfriendly policy.

The King did not look well; he was tired and aged, and suffered, moreover, from a severe attack of catarrh. Nevertheless, he accepted the invitation of the municipal authorities of Berlin to informal tea at the City Hall. From his description, which was corroborated by Berlin gentlemen, the function must have been satisfactory to both parties.

I informed my uncle of the signing of the German-French Morocco Agreement and the news seemed to please him. When I added, "I hope this agreement will be a stepping stone to a better understanding between the two countries," the King nodded his head approvingly and said, "May that be so!" If the King had co-operated toward this, my project would probably not have failed. Nevertheless, the visit of Their English Majesties engendered a more friendly atmosphere for the time being, which greeted Herr von Bethmann upon his assuming office.

During his term of office Herr von Bethmann had plenty of foreign matters to handle, connected with the well-known events of 1909-14. Concerning this period a mass of material has been published in different quarters, for instance, in the book, Causes of the World War, by Secretary of State von Jagow. In the Belgian Documents the attitude of the German Government in the various complications is described from a neutral standpoint. I had based this attitude on the following:

Caution on the one hand, on the other, support of our Austro-Hungarian allies whenever there is a plain threat against their position as a world power, combined with counsels of moderation in action. Efforts in the rÔle of "honest broker" everywhere, activity as a go-between wherever peace seems endangered. Firm assertion of our own interests.

In view of the "encirclement" ambitions of our opponents, we were in duty bound, for the sake of self-preservation, to work steadily at the same time toward building up our army and navy for purposes of defense, because of the central location of Germany and her open, unprotected frontiers. This period of history is also well described in Stegemann's book, and Helfferich and Friedjung also depict the prewar days interestingly.

"EDWARD THE ENCIRCLER"

The death of the "encircler," Edward VII—of whom it was said once, in a report of the Belgian Embassy at Berlin, that "the peace of Europe was never in such danger as when the King of England concerned himself with maintaining it"—called me to London, where I shared with my close relations, the members of the English royal family, the mourning into which the passing of the King had thrown the dynasty and the nation. The entire royal family received me at the railway station as a token of their gratitude for the deference to family ties shown by my coming.

King George drove with me to Westminster Hall, where the gorgeously decorated coffin reposed upon a towering catafalque, guarded by household troops, troops of the line, and detachments from the Indian and Colonial contingents, all in the traditional attitude of mourning—heads bowed, hands crossed over the butts and hilts of their reversed arms. The old, gray hall, covered by its great Gothic wooden ceiling, towered imposingly over the catafalque, lighted merely by a few rays of the sun filtering through narrow windows. One ray flooded the magnificent coffin of the King, surmounted by the English crown, and made marvelous play with the colors of the precious stones adorning it.

Past the catafalque countless throngs of men, women, and children of all classes and strata in the nation passed in silence, many with hands folded to bid a reverent farewell to him who had been so popular as a ruler. A most impressive picture, in its marvelous mediÆval setting.

I went up to the catafalque, with King George, placed a cross upon it, and spoke a silent prayer, after which my right hand and that of my royal cousin found each other, quite unconsciously on our part, and met in a firm clasp. This made a deep impression on those who witnessed it, to such an extent that, in the evening, one of my relations said to me: "Your handshake with our King is all over London: the people are deeply impressed by it, and take it as a good omen for the future."

"That is the sincerest wish of my heart," I replied.

As I rode through London behind the coffin of my uncle I was a witness of the tremendous and impressive demonstration of grief on the part of the vast multitude—estimated at several millions—on streets, balconies, and roofs, every one of whom was clad in black, every man of whom stood with bared head, among all of whom reigned perfect order and absolute stillness. Upon this somber, solemn background the files of British soldiers stood out all the more gorgeously. In splendid array marched the battalions of the English Guards: Grenadiers, Scots Guards, Coldstreams, Irish Guards—in their perfectly-fitting coats, white leather facings, and heavy bearskin headgear; all picked troops of superb appearance and admirable martial bearing, a joy to any man with the heart of a soldier. And all the troops lining the path of the funeral cortÈge stood in the attitude of mourning already described.

During my stay I resided, at the special desire of King George, in Buckingham Palace. The widow of the dead King, Queen Alexandra, received me with moving and charming kindness, and talked much with me about bygone days; my recollections stretched back to my childhood, since I, while still a little boy, had been present at the wedding of my dead uncle.

THE PICHON CONVERSATION

The King gave a banquet to the many princely guests and their suites, as well as for the representatives of foreign nations, at which M. Pichon was also present. He was introduced to me and, in conversation with him, I told him of the wishes which the Imperial Chancellor had communicated to me regarding our interests in Morocco and some other political matters, which M. Pichon readily agreed to carry out. All other combinations connected in various quarters with this talk, belong in the domain of fancy.

Although the period between 1909 and 1914 demanded extraordinary attention to foreign events, interior development was, nevertheless, promoted zealously, and efforts made to meet the demands of commerce, transportation, agriculture, and industry, which were growing rapidly. Unfortunately endeavors in this direction were made much more difficult by the discord among political parties.

The Chancellor wished to accomplish everything possible of accomplishment. But his inclination to get to the bottom of problems and his desire to deal only with what was, from his meticulous critical standpoint, thoroughly matured, tended, in the course of time, to hamper progress. It was difficult to bring him to make decisions before he was thoroughly convinced of their being absolutely free from objection. This made working with him tiresome and aroused in those not close to him the impression of vacillation, whereas, in reality, it was merely overconscientiousness carried too far.

In addition, the Chancellor eventually developed a strong and growing inclination toward domination; in discussions this tended to make him obstinate and caused him to lay down the law to those thinking otherwise as dogmatically as a school teacher. This brought him many enemies and often made things hard for me. A boyhood friend of the Chancellor, to whom I spoke once about this, replied, with a smile, that it had been so with him even in school; there Herr von Bethmann had constantly taught and school-mastered his fellow students, of whom my informant was one, so that finally his classmates had nicknamed him "the governess." He added that this trait was a misfortune for Bethmann, but that it had so grown into his very being that he would never be able to get rid of it.

An example of this is Bethmann's relationship to Herr von Kiderlen, whom he desired to have as Secretary of State, despite my emphatic objections. Herr von Kiderlen was an able worker and a man of strong character, who always sought to assert his independence. He had been about one year in office when Herr von Bethmann came to me one day, complained of Kiderlen's obstinacy and insubordination, and asked me to appeal to his conscience. I declined, with the observation that the Chancellor had chosen Kiderlen against my wishes and must now manage to get along with him; that the maintenance of discipline at the Foreign Office was a duty devolving upon the Chancellor, in which I had no desire to interfere.

FINDS FAULT WITH BETHMANN

Meanwhile, Bethmann's inadequacy to the post of Chancellor became evident. Deep down in his heart he was a pacifist and was obsessed with the aberration of coming to an understanding with England. I can perfectly well understand that a man of pacifist inclinations should act thus in the hope of avoiding a war thereby. His object was entirely in accord with my policy. The ways and means whereby Bethmann sought to achieve it were, in my opinion, unsuitable. Nevertheless, I backed his endeavors. But I certainly did not believe that real success would result. It became ever more apparent, while he was Chancellor, that he was remote from political realities. Yet he always knew everything better than anybody else. Owing to this overestimation of his own powers he stuck unswervingly to his ideas, even when things all turned out differently from what he had expected.

His reports were always admirably prepared, brilliant in form, and, hence, impressive and attractive. And in this there was an element of danger. In his opinion there was always but one solution, the one which he proposed! The apparent solidity and thoroughness of his reports and suggestions, the illuminating treatment of the matters reported upon from every angle, the references to experts, to foreign and native statesmen and diplomats, etc., easily led to the impression that solely the Bethmann solution was worthy of consideration. In spite of these thorough preparations, he made mistake after mistake.

Thus he had an actual share in our misfortune. When I returned from my Norwegian trip in 1914 he did not place his resignation in my hands, to be sure, but he admitted that his political calculations had gone wrong. Nevertheless, I left him in office, even after his Reichstag speech and the English declaration of war of August 4, 1914, because I considered it most serious to change the highest official in the Empire at the most critical moment in German history. The unanimous attitude of the nation in the face of the challenge from the Entente might have been impaired by such action.

Moreover, both the Chancellor and the chief of the Civil Cabinet maintained that they had the working classes behind them. I was loath to deprive the working classes, which behaved in an exemplary manner in 1914, of the statesman whom, I had been told, they trusted.

The theory, constantly repeated to me in 1914 by the chief of the Civil Cabinet and the representative of the Foreign Office, that only Bethmann had the support of the working classes, was finally supplemented further by reports to me that the Chancellor enjoyed the confidence in foreign countries which was necessary to the conclusion of peace. Thus it came about that Bethmann always stayed in office, until, finally, the Crown Prince made the well-known investigation among the party leaders which showed that the above-mentioned theory was mistaken. This mistake was made all the clearer to me when I read, at the time of Bethmann's dismissal—to which other factors also contributed—the most unfavorable opinions of him, especially in the Social Democratic and Democratic press.

I do not wish to blame Bethmann with these frank remarks, nor to exonerate others; but, when such important matters are discussed, personal considerations must be ignored. I never doubted the nobility of Bethmann's sentiments.

May I be allowed to say a few words here concerning the reform in the Prussian franchise, since the handling of this by Herr von Bethmann is characteristic of his policy of vacillation. During the winter of 1914-15, when, following the brilliant summer campaign, the hard, severe winter trench-fighting had brought military movements to a standstill, the extraordinary achievements of all the troops and the spirit which I had found among officers and men, both at the front and in the hospitals, made such a profound impression on me that I resolved to provide, for the tried, magnificent "Nation in Arms," something in the political domain, when it returned home, which should prove that I recognized what it had done and wished to give the nation joy.

I often touched upon this theme in conversations and suggested reforms in the Prussian franchise; the man, said I, who returned home, after a struggle like this, with the Iron Cross—perhaps of both classes—must no longer be "classified" at the polls.

At this juncture a memorial was submitted to me by Herr von Loebell which proposed a reform in the Prussian franchise on similar grounds. The concise, clear, and convincing treatment of the subject pleased me so much that I had a number of gentlemen read the memorial, which took up, in its original form, only general points of view, without going into detail, and I was pleased to see that it found approval with all whom I questioned concerning it.

I had my thanks expressed to Herr von Loebell through the chief of the Cabinet, von Valentini, and caused Loebell to work out the matter in detail and make suggestions. This was done in the spring of 1915. The memorial was very thorough and dealt with a number of possibilities for the franchise, without advising any one system. It was approved by me, and sent by the chief of the Cabinet to the Chancellor, with the command that it be discussed, in the course of the year, by the Ministers, and that their vote on it—possibly, also, some suggestions from them—be laid before me. The franchise law, of course, was not to be proposed until after the conclusion of peace.

Immediately after that I went to Pless. The battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, with its smashing victory over the enemy, brought on the Galician-Polish campaign, leading to the reconquest of Lemberg, Przemysl and the capture of Warsaw, Ivangorod, Modlin, Brest-Litovsk, etc., and completely engaged my attention.

The Lusitania case, too, cast its shadow over events, and Italy severed her alliance with us. So it is not to be wondered at if the franchise memorial was pushed into the background.

The next winter, and the summer of 1916, likewise, with their fighting on all fronts, the terrible battle of the Somme, and the brilliant Rumanian autumn and winter campaign, took me to all sorts of places on the western and eastern fronts, even as far as Nisch—where the first memorable meeting with the Bulgarian Tsar took place—and to Orsova, so that I had no opportunity to take up the matter of franchise reform with the care that its importance demanded.

In the spring of 1917 I asked the Chancellor to draw up an announcement of the reform, to be made to the nation at Easter, since I assumed that the Ministers had long since discussed it. The Chancellor drew up the text of the proclamation at Hamburg, in agreement with the chief of the Cabinet and myself; he proposed that the method of voting be left open for the time being, since he was not yet quite sure about this. The Easter proclamation appeared; it was based, like previous treatments of the matter, on the idea that the reform was not to be introduced until after the conclusion of peace, because most of the voters were away facing the enemy.

Party and press did what they could to postpone the accomplishment of my purpose by recriminations and strife, by bringing up the question of the Prussian Reichstag franchise, and by the demand for the introduction of the franchise bill while the war was still in progress. Thus the question embarked upon its well-known and not very pleasant course, which dragged itself out on account of the interminable negotiations in the Landtag. It was not until after the retirement of Herr von Bethmann that I learned through Loebell that the memorial of 1915 had never been submitted to the Ministers, but had lain untouched for a year and a half in a desk drawer; that the Chancellor, influenced by the desires expressed in the country, had dropped the various systems proposed and concentrated upon the general (Reichstag) franchise, of the eventual introduction of which he was, doubtless, inwardly convinced.

In any event, the original basic idea was thoroughly bungled by Bethmann's dilatoriness and the strife among the parties. What I wanted was to present a gift of honor, of my own free will, on its triumphal return home, to my victorious army, to my "Nation in Arms," my brave Prussians, with whom I had stood before the enemy.

CHANCELLOR'S DIPLOMATIC POWER

One of the results of Bethmann's marked inclination toward control was that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was, under him, a mere helper, so much so that the Foreign Office was almost affiliated with the office of the Chancellor, a state of affairs that made itself felt most especially in the use made of the press department. Bethmann likewise asserted his independence decidedly in his relations with me. Basing himself upon the fact that, constitutionally, the Chancellor alone is responsible for foreign policy, he ruled as he pleased. The Foreign Office was allowed to tell me only what the Chancellor wished, so that it happened sometimes that I was not informed concerning important occurrences.

The fact that this was possible is to be laid at the door of the Constitution of the Empire. And this is the right place for saying a word concerning the relations between the Emperor and the Chancellor. In what follows I do not refer to my relationship to Herr von Bethmann, but, quite impersonally, to the difficulties in the relationship of the German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellors, which are caused by the Imperial Constitution.

I wish to call attention to the following points:

1. According to the Constitution of the Empire, the Chancellor is the director and representative of the foreign policy of the Empire, for which he assumes full responsibility; he has this policy carried out by the Foreign Office, which is subordinated to him, after he has reported on it to the Emperor.

2. The Emperor has influence on foreign policy only in so far as the Chancellor grants it to him.

3. The Emperor can bring his influence to bear through discussions, information, suggestion, proposals, reports, and impressions received by him on his travels, which then take rank as a supplement to the political reports of the ambassadors or ministers to the countries which he has personally visited.

4. The Chancellor may act pursuant to such action by the Emperor, and may make it the basis of his decisions, whenever he is in agreement with the Emperor's point of view. Otherwise he is supposed to maintain his own point of view and carry it out (Kruger dispatch).

5. According to the Constitution, the Emperor has no means of compelling the Chancellor or the Foreign Office to accept his views. He cannot cause the Chancellor to adopt a policy for which the latter feels that he cannot assume responsibility. Should the Emperor stick to his view, the Chancellor can offer his resignation or demand that he be relieved of his post.

6. On the other hand, the Emperor has no constitutional means of hindering the Chancellor or the Foreign Office from carrying out a policy which he thinks doubtful or mistaken. All he can do, if the Chancellor insists, is to make a change in the Chancellorship.

7. Every change of Chancellors, however, is a serious matter, deeply affecting the life of the nation, and hence, at a time of political complications and high tension, an extremely serious step, an ultima ratio (last resort) which is all the more daring in that the number of men qualified to fill this abnormally difficult post is very small.

The position of the Imperial Chancellor, which was based on the towering personality of Prince Bismarck, had assumed a serious preponderance through the constantly growing number of posts under the Empire, over all of which the Chancellor was placed as chief and responsible head.

DISCLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY

If this is borne in mind, it is absolutely impossible that anybody should still hold the Emperor alone responsible for everything, as was done formerly, especially toward the end of the war and after the war, by critical know-it-alls and carping revolutionists, both at home and in the Entente countries. That, quite apart from everything personal, is a proof of complete ignorance of the earlier Constitution of the German Empire.

The visit of the Tsar to Potsdam in November, 1910, went off to the satisfaction of all concerned, and was utilized by the Chancellor and Herr von Kiderlen to get into touch with the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, whom the Tsar had brought with him. Apparently, the Russian ruler enjoyed himself among us, and he took an active part in the hunt arranged in his honor, at which he proved himself an enthusiastic huntsman. The result of the conferences between the two statesmen seemed to promise well for the future; both, after they had felt each other out, harbored the hope of favorable relations between the two countries.

During my spring visit to Corfu, the Melissori troubles began, which riveted Greek attention upon themselves. Corfu was well informed of the constant smuggling of arms from Italy by way of Valona into Albania, and there was a feeling in Greek circles that machinations from across the Adriatic, as well as from Montenegro, were not without responsibility for what was happening. It was also felt that the new Turkish Government had not been wise in its handling of the Albanians, who were very sensitive and suspicious; the former Sultan Abdul-Hamid had realized this very well and understood admirably how to get along with the Albanians and to keep them quiet. Nevertheless, there was no fear that more serious complications would ensue.

At the beginning of 1911 I received a most cordial invitation from King George of England to be present at the unveiling of the statue of Queen Victoria, the grandmother of both of us. Therefore I went in the middle of May to London with the Empress and our daughter. The reception on the part of the English royal family and the people of London was cordial.

The unveiling festivities were well arranged and very magnificent. The big, round space in front of Buckingham Palace was surrounded by grandstands, which were filled to overflowing by invited guests. In front of them were files of soldiers of all arms and all regiments of the British army, in full parade uniform, the cavalry and artillery being on foot. All the banners of the troops were arrayed at the foot of the statue.

The royal family, with their guests and their suites, was grouped around the statue. King George made a dedication speech which had a good effect, in which he made mention also of the German Imperial couple.

Then, amid salutes and greetings, the statue was unveiled; the Queen, in marble, seated upon a throne, became visible, surmounted by a golden figure of victory. It was an impressive moment. Afterward the troops marched past, the Guards in the van, then the Highlanders—who, with their gayly colored, becoming costume, gave an especially picturesque touch to the military spectacle—then the rest of the soldiers. The march past was carried out on the circular space, with all the troops constantly wheeling: the outer wings had to step out, the inner to hold back—a most difficult task for troops. The evolution was carried out brilliantly; not one man made a mistake. The Duke of Connaught, who had made all the military arrangements, deservedly won unanimous applause.

FESTIVITIES IN ENGLAND

The remainder of our stay in England was devoted to excursions; we also enjoyed the hospitality of noble English families, at whose homes there was an opportunity to hold intercourse with many members of English nobility.

Special enjoyment in the domain of art was provided by the King to his guests by a theatrical performance at Drury Lane Theater. A well-known English play, "Money," was performed, by a company especially assembled for the occasion, consisting of the leading actors and actresses of London. As a surprise, a curtain fell between the acts, painted especially for the occasion by a lady, which depicted King George and me, life size, on horseback, riding toward each other and saluting militarily. The picture was executed with much dash and was enthusiastically acclaimed by the audience.

The performance of the actors and actresses in "Money" was veritably masterly, since all concerned played their rÔles, even the smallest, to perfection. In fact, it was a classic performance.

Another day I attended, at the Olympia track, the sports of the British army and navy, which included admirable individual feats on foot and horseback, as well as evolutions by bodies of troops in close formation.

In describing the unveiling of the statue, as well as the funeral of King Edward VII, I have concerned myself purposely with the externals and pomp that are characteristic of such occasions in England. They show that, in a land under parliamentary rule, a so-called democratic land, more importance is attached to well-nigh mediÆval magnificence than in the young German Empire.

The French actions in Morocco, which were no longer such as could be reconciled with the Algeciras Agreement, had once more engaged the attention of the diplomats. For this reason the Chancellor had requested me to find out, as soon as opportunity should arise, what King George thought about the situation.

I asked him if he thought that the French methods were still in accordance with the Algeciras Agreement. The King remarked that the agreement, to tell the truth, no longer was in force, and that the best thing to do would be to forget it; that the French, fundamentally, were doing nothing different in Morocco from what the English had previously done in Egypt; that, therefore, England would place no obstacles in the path of the French, but would let them alone; that the thing to do was to recognize the "fait accompli" of the occupation of Morocco and make arrangements, for commercial protection, with France.

To the very end the visit went off well, and the inhabitants of London, of all social strata, expressed their good will every time the guests of their King showed themselves.

Thus the German Imperial couple was enabled to return home with the best of impressions. When I informed the Chancellor of these, he expressed great satisfaction. From the remarks of King George he drew the inference that England considered the Algeciras Agreement no longer valid and would not place any obstacles in the way of the French occupation of Morocco.

From this the policy followed by him and the Foreign Office arose which led to the Agadir case, the last and equally unsuccessful attempt to maintain our influence in Morocco. The situation became more serious during the Kiel regatta week. The Foreign Office informed me of its intention to send the Panther to Agadir. I gave expression to strong misgivings as to this step, but had to drop them in view of the urgent representations of the Foreign Office.

In the first half of 1912 came the sending of Sir Ernest Cassel with a verbal note in which England offered to remain neutral in case of an "unprovoked" attack upon Germany, provided Germany agreed to limit her naval construction program and to drop her new Naval bill, the latter being darkly hinted at. Owing to our favorable answer to this Lord Haldane was intrusted with the negotiations and sent to Berlin. The negotiations finally fell through, owing to the constantly more uncompromising attitude of England (Sir E. Grey), who finally disavowed Lord Haldane and withdrew his own verbal note, because Grey was afraid to offend the French by a German-English agreement and jeopardize the Anglo-French-Russian understanding.

Here are the details of the case:

On the morning of January 29, 1912, Herr Ballin had himself announced to me at the palace in Berlin and asked for an audience. I assumed that it was a case of a belated birthday greeting, therefore I was not a little astonished when Ballin, after a short speech of congratulation, said that he had come as an emissary of Sir Ernest Cassel, who had just arrived in Berlin on a special mission and wished to be received.

I asked whether it was a political matter, and why, if so, the meeting had not been arranged through the English ambassador. Ballin's answer was to the effect that, from hints dropped by Cassel, he knew the matter to be of great importance, and the explanation for Cassel's acting without the intervention of the ambassador was because the earnest desire had been expressed in London that the official diplomatic representatives, both the English and the German, should not be apprised of the affair.

I declared that I was ready to receive Cassel at once, but added that, should his mission have to do with political questions, I should immediately summon the Chancellor, since I was a constitutional monarch and not in a position to deal with the representative of a foreign power alone without the Chancellor.

Ballin fetched Cassel, who handed me a document which, he stated, had been prepared with the "approval and knowledge of the English Government." I read the short note through and was not a little surprised to see that I was holding in my hand a formal offer of neutrality in case Germany became involved in future warlike complications, conditioned upon certain limitations in the carrying out of our program of naval construction, which were to be the subject of mutual conferences and agreements. Walking with Ballin into the next room, I handed over the document for him to read. After he had done so both of us exclaimed in the same breath: "A verbal note!"

It was plainly apparent that this "verbal note" was aimed at the forthcoming addition to our Naval law and designed in some way to delay or frustrate it. No matter how the matter was interpreted, I found myself confronted with a peculiar situation, which also amazed Ballin. It reminded me of the situation at Cronberg-Friedrichshof in 1905, when I was obliged to decline the demand, made to me personally by the English Under Secretary, Hardinge, that we should forego our naval construction.

SURPRISE AT BRITISH NOTE

Now, an intimate business friend of Edward VII appears, without previous announcement through official diplomatic channels, before the German Emperor with a "verbal note" inspired by the English Government, with explicit instructions to evade all the diplomatic officials of both countries. He hands over an offer from the English Government to maintain neutrality in future warlike complications provided certain agreements regarding limitation of naval construction are made. And this is done by England, the mother of "Constitutionalism"! When I pointed this out to Ballin, he exclaimed: "Holy Constitutionalism! What has become of you? That is 'personal politics' with a vengeance!"

I agreed with Ballin to send at once for Herr von Bethmann, in order that he might learn what was transpiring and decide what to do in this peculiar situation.

Bethmann was called up on the telephone and soon appeared. At first the situation aroused in him likewise a certain degree of astonishment; it was interesting to watch the play of expression on his face as he was told about the matter. The Chancellor suggested that Grand Admiral von Tirpitz also be summoned, for the proper dispatching of the business, and recommended that an answer be drawn up in English, in the same manner and form as the note delivered by Cassel, and that it be handed to Sir Ernest, who wished to return home that night. (English was chosen because there was fear of obscurity and misunderstanding if the note were translated in London.) The Chancellor asked me to draw up the note, since I knew English best. After some objection I had to make up my mind to be myself the writer of the answer.

And now the following scene took place:

I sat at the writing table in the adjutant's room; the other gentlemen stood around me. I would read a sentence from the note aloud and sketch out an answer, which was, in turn, read aloud. Then criticisms were made from right and left: one thought the sentence too complaisant, another too abrupt; it was thereupon remodeled, recast, improved, and polished. The Chancellor particularly subjected my grammar and style to much torture, owing to his habit of probing things philosophically, to his methods of profound thoroughness, which caused him to be most particular with every word, in order that it, having been studied from every angle, should later on afford nobody cause for criticism.

After hours of work the note was finally finished and, having been passed a couple of times from hand to hand and then read aloud by me half a dozen times more, it was signed.

When our group broke up, the Chancellor asked Sir Ernest who was to be expected from England to conduct the negotiations. Cassel replied that it would certainly be a Minister, which one he did not know—perhaps Mr. Winston Churchill, Minister of the Navy, since the question was a naval one. Then the Chancellor arranged further with him that the unofficial method should be retained and that Ballin should undertake to transmit all the news regarding the matter which should emanate from England.

Sir Ernest expressed his lively gratitude for his cordial reception and his satisfaction at the tenor of our reply. Later Ballin informed me from his hotel that Cassel had expressed himself as completely satisfied over the successful outcome of his mission, and that he would report to his Government the good impression made upon him.

When I thereupon conferred on the matter with Admiral von Tirpitz we both agreed that the Naval bill was in danger and, therefore, that we must be very careful.

DIPLOMATIC PREPAREDNESS

In perfect secrecy the material was collected which Admiral von Tirpitz was to present at the negotiations; it consisted of a short historical sketch of the development of the fleet and of the increasingly difficult tasks devolving upon it; the Naval law and its aims, nature, enactment, and extension; finally, the contemplated Naval bill, its meaning and the method of putting it through.

The Chancellor asked that the main negotiations should be conducted at the palace in my presence. In addition, I agreed with Admiral von Tirpitz that he should speak English, as far as possible, and that I, in case of difficult technical expressions, would interpret.

Until England made known the name of the negotiator, our time was spent in suppositions, and Ballin informed us of combinations in connection with which a number of names, even that of Grey, came up.

At last the news arrived, through Ballin, that Haldane—the Minister of War, previously a lawyer—had been intrusted with the conduct of the negotiations and would soon arrive. General amazement! Just imagine, "mutatis mutandis," that Germany had sent her Minister of War (at that time von Heeringen) to London, instead of Admiral von Tirpitz, for the discussion of a naval matter!

When this point was discussed with Bethmann and Tirpitz a number of suppositions were advanced; the Chancellor said that Haldane was known in England as a student of Goethe and as a man versed in German philosophy and knowing the German language, so that his choice was a piece of politeness toward us. Tirpitz observed that Haldane had formerly spent some time in Berlin and worked with General von Einem at the War Ministry, and hence knew the state of affairs in Germany. I suggested that all that was very well, but that the choice of Haldane showed that England looked upon the question as purely political, since he knew only superficially about naval affairs; that the whole thing was probably directed against Germany's naval policy in general and the new Naval bill in particular; that it would be well, therefore, not to forget this, in order that the whole thing might not develop into a foreign assault upon our right of self-determination as to the strength of our defensive measures.

Haldane arrived and was received as an Imperial guest. Ballin, who accompanied him, solved the riddle of Haldane's choice on the basis of information received by him from England.

He said that when Cassel had got back to London, reported on his reception, and handed over the German reply, the impression made was so favorable that no further doubt was entertained there as to the satisfactory course of the negotiations and their conclusion in the form of an agreement; that, thereupon a keen dispute had arisen among the Ministers, especially between Churchill and Grey, as to who should go to Berlin and affix his name to this great historical document, in case the object should be achieved of making Germany completely give up the further development of her fleet; that Churchill thought himself the right man for the job, since he was at the head of the navy. But Grey and Asquith would not let their colleague reap the glory, and, for this reason, Grey stood for a while in the foreground—another proof that it was politics rather than the number of ships which was to play the leading rÔle.

SELECTION OF CHURCHILL

After a while, however, it was decided that it was more fitting to Grey's personal and official importance to appear only at the termination of the negotiations, to affix his name to the agreement, and—as it was put in the information transmitted from England to Ballin—"to get his dinner from the Emperor and to come in for his part of the festivities and fireworks"—which, in good German, means to enjoy the "Bengal light illumination."

As it had been decided that Churchill was not to get this in any event, it was necessary to choose somebody for the negotiations who was close to Asquith and Grey and who, possessing their complete confidence, was willing to conduct the negotiations as far as the beginning of the "fireworks"; one who, moreover, was already known at Berlin and not a stranger in Germany. Churchill, to be sure, qualified in this, for he had been present a few times at the Imperial maneuvers in Silesia and WÜrttemberg as a guest of the Emperor. Ballin guaranteed the reliability of his London source of information.

Before the negotiations began I once more pointed out to Secretary of State von Tirpitz that Haldane, in spite of being just then Minister of War, probably had prepared himself for his task, and had surely received careful instructions from the English Admiralty, in which the spirit of Fisher was paramount. In his Handbook for English Naval Officers, Fisher had stated, among other precepts well worthy of being remembered, one which is characteristic of the Admiral, his department and its spirit, which runs, word for word, as follows: "If you tell a lie, stick to it."

Moreover, I said to Tirpitz, we must not forget what an amazing adaptability the Anglo-Saxons had, which fitted them for occupying positions which had no relation to their previous life and training. Furthermore, the interest in England in the navy was generally so intense that almost every educated man was an expert up to a certain point on naval questions.

In the course of the negotiations Haldane proved himself admirably well informed and a skillful, tenacious debater, and his brilliant qualities as a lawyer came to the fore. The conversation lasted several hours, and brought about a general clarifying, as well as a preliminary agreement as to postponement of time limits of ship construction, etc. The details concerning it are deposited in documents at the Imperial Naval Office. Tirpitz was splendid.

After some more conferences—at which, likewise, Ballin was present—Haldane returned to England. Ballin informed me that Haldane had expressed himself to him as entirely satisfied with the outcome of his mission, and had stated that in about a week or two the first draft of the agreement could be sent to us.

Time passed—the date set for the introduction of the Naval bill approached. Tirpitz suggested, in case the agreement were concluded previously, that the Naval bill be altered accordingly; otherwise, that it be introduced without alteration.

SUSPECTS ENGLISH PURPOSES

At last we received, not the draft of the agreement, but a document asking all sorts of questions and expressing a desire for all sorts of data, a reply to which required many consultations and much reflection. Little by little the suspicion grew in me that the English were not in earnest with regard to the agreement, since question followed question and details were sought which had nothing directly to do with the agreement. England withdrew more and more from her promises, and no draft of the agreement came to hand.

In Berlin a big agitation set in against the Naval bill, Tirpitz and myself on the part of the Foreign Office, and from other quarters, both qualified and unqualified. The Chancellor also, who hoped to achieve the agreement and affix his name to a document which would free Germany from "encirclement" and bring her into a regular and better relationship with England, came out in favor of dropping the Naval bill. But that would simply have meant allowing a foreign power enormous influence in matters of German national defense and jeopardizing thereby the national right of self-determination and our readiness for battle in case of a war being forced upon us. Had we allowed this it would have amounted to our consenting to permit England, Germany's principal foe, to grant us whatever she wished, after consulting her own interests, without receiving ourselves the guaranty of any equivalent concession.

In this confused state of affairs differences of opinion and violent disputes arose, which, especially in those circles which really knew little about the navy, were conducted with much violence and not always in a practical manner. Admiral von Tirpitz, all through that winter, which was so hard a one for him and me, fought his fight like a genuine, patriotic officer, realizing the situation and seeing through his opponents with clear vision and supporting me with complete conviction to the limit of his ability. All the Government officials agreed that no foreign country could be allowed any voice in helping decide what we had or had not to do toward insuring our protection.

The hope of bringing about the agreement grew ever fainter; England continually showed lessening interest and kept eliminating important parts of her original verbal note. And so it came about that Admiral von Tirpitz and I realized that the whole proposal was merely a "maneuver."

The fight over the German Naval bill grew steadily hotter. I happened at this time to meet at Cuxhaven Doctor von Burchard, President of the Hamburg Senate, whom I respected greatly, as he was the very model of an aristocratic citizen of a Hanseatic city, and who had often been consulted by me in political matters. I described to him the entire course of the affair and the disputes in Berlin as to the introduction or nonintroduction of the bill, and asked him then to tell me, with his usual complete frankness, what he thought the right thing to do in the interest of the national welfare, since I greatly desired to hear an objective opinion, uninfluenced by the rival camps of Berlin.

Doctor Burchard replied in his clear, keen, pointed, convincing manner that it was my duty toward the people and the fatherland to stick to the bill; that whosoever spoke against its introduction was committing a sin against them; that whatever we thought necessary to our defense must be unconditionally brought into being; that, above all else, we must never permit a foreign country to have the presumption to interfere with us; that the English offer was a feint to make us drop the Naval bill; that this must, in no circumstances, be allowed; that the German nation would not understand why its right of self-determination had been sacrificed; that the bill must unquestionably be introduced; that he would work in its favor in the Federal Council (as indeed he did in a brilliant, compelling speech) and also otherwise press its acceptance in Berlin; that the English would naturally resort to abuse, but that this made no difference, since they had been doing so for a long time; that they certainly would not get into a war for such a cause; that Admiral von Tirpitz was merely doing his duty and fulfilling his obligations, and that I should support him in every way; that the Chancellor must give up opposing the measure, otherwise he would run the risk of finally forfeiting public esteem on account of being "pro-English."

Thus spoke the representative of the great commercial city, which was threatened before all others in case of war with England. The genuine Hanseatic spirit inspired his words.

Strangely enough, this opinion of Doctor Burchard concerning the English offer has recently been corroborated to me in Holland by a Dutchman who heard from Englishmen at that time the English point of view. I and Tirpitz guessed right—the offer of neutrality, in case naval expansion was curbed, was a political maneuver.

COUNTERCHARGES OF CHEATING

Soon news also came from Ballin that the matter was not going well in England: that, according to information received, a dispute had arisen about the agreement; that there was dissatisfaction with Haldane, who, it was said, had let himself be cheated by Tirpitz! This was plain evidence of the indignation felt because Tirpitz had not walked into the trap and simply let the bill drop, and that Haldane had been unable to serve up the bill to the English Cabinet on a platter at tea time. It is useless to say that there was any "cheating" on Germany's part, but the reproach leveled at Haldane justifies the suspicion that his instructions were that he should seek to "cheat" the Germans. Since his fellow countrymen thought that the reverse was true, one can but thank Admiral von Tirpitz most sincerely for having correctly asserted the German standpoint to the benefit of our fatherland.

Toward the end of March the fight about the bill took on such violence that finally the Chancellor, on the 22d, asked me for his dismissal as I stepped out of the vault in the Charlottenburg Park. After long consultation and after I had told him Doctor Burchard's view, the Chancellor withdrew his request.

When, some time afterward, I paid a visit to Herr von Bethmann in his garden, I found him quite overcome and holding in his hand a message from London. It contained the entire disavowal of the verbal note delivered by Cassel, the withdrawal of the offer of neutrality, as well as of every other offer, and at the end the advice that I dismiss Herr von Bethmann from the Imperial Chancellorship, since he enjoyed to a marked degree the confidence of the British Government! Tears of anger shone in the eyes of the Chancellor, thus badly deceived in his hopes; the praise accorded to him by a foreign government with which Germany and he had just had such painful experiences hurt him deeply. For the second time he offered me his resignation; I did not accept it, but sought to console him. I then ordered that the ambassador in London be asked how he could have accepted and forwarded such a message under any conditions.

Now the Chancellor was in favor of the bill, but it was honorably proposed with the limitation which it had been decided to impose upon it in case of the conclusion of the agreement. In England, on the other hand, the full naval construction program was carried out.

This "Haldane episode" is characteristic of England's policy. This whole maneuver, conceived on a large scale, was engineered for the sole purpose of hampering the development of the German fleet, while, simultaneously, in America, which had an almost negligible merchant fleet; in France, whose navy was superior in numbers to the German; in Italy, in Russia, which also had ships built abroad—vast construction programs were carried out without eliciting one word of protest from England. And Germany, wedged in between France and Russia, certainly had to be at least prepared to defend herself on the water against those nations.

DEFENDS NAVAL PROGRAM

For this our naval construction program was absolutely necessary; it was never aimed against the English fleet, four or five times as strong as ours, and assuring England's superiority and security, to equal the strength of which no sensible man in Germany ever dreamed. We needed our fleet for coast defense and the protection of our commerce; for this purpose the lesser means of defense, like U-boats, torpedo boats, and mines, were not sufficient. In addition the coast batteries on the Baltic were so antiquated and miserably equipped that they would have been razed within forty-eight hours by the massed fire of the heavy guns of modern battleships. Thus, our Baltic coast was practically defenseless. To protect it the fleet was necessary.

The Skagerrak (Jutland) battle has proved what the fleet meant and what it was worth. That battle would have meant annihilation for England if the Reichstag had not refused up to 1900 all proposals for strengthening the navy. Those twelve lost years were destined never to be retrieved.

Before we take our leave of Haldane I wish to touch upon another episode in his activities. In 1906 he came, with the permission of the German Government, to Berlin, to inform himself concerning the Prussian defense conditions, recruiting, General Staff, etc. He busied himself at the Ministry of War, where the Minister, General von Einem, personally gave him information. After about two or three weeks' work there he returned, well satisfied, to England.

When, after the outbreak of the World War, the "pro-German" Haldane, the friend of Goethe, was boycotted and treated with such hostility that he could no longer show himself in public, he had a defense written of his term of office as Minister of War by the well-known littÉrateur and journalist, Mr. Begbie, entitled Vindication of Great Britain. Therein his services toward forming a regular General Staff and preparing the British army for the World War are placed in a bright light and emphasis is laid on the skill with which he utilized the permission obtained from the Prussian War Ministry in order to learn in Germany about military matters and to reorganize the British army and General Staff, to the minutest detail and on the German model, for the coming war against the erstwhile German hosts.

Here we see the sly, adroit lawyer, who, sheltered under the hospitality of a foreign country, studies its military arrangements in order to forge weapons against it out of the material and knowledge thus acquired. Quite characteristically the book is dedicated to King Edward VII, whose intimate, emissary, and tool Haldane was. In those days Berlin saw in Haldane's mission a "rapprochement" with England, toward which Germans were always bending their efforts; in reality, however, it was a "reconnoitering expedition" under the very roof of the German cousin. England showed her gratitude by the World War, which Haldane helped to prepare; in this case Haldane "cheated" the Germans!

That is the history of the Haldane mission. Later it was summarily maintained by all sorts of ignorant dabblers in politics, belonging to the press and the general public, that the promising "rapprochement" with England through Haldane had been wrecked by the obstinacy of the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz and by their clinging to the Naval bill against the wishes of all "sensible counselors!"

KINGSHIP OF ALBANIA

At that time [in 1912] the question of the establishment of an independent Albanian state and the choice by the Powers of a head for it, was brought to my attention also. A number of candidates lusting for a crown had already presented themselves before the tribunal of the Powers, without getting themselves accepted; a number of candidates, considered by the Powers, were declined by the Albanians. I looked upon the matter in itself with indifference, and was of the opinion that—as in the case of every "creation of a nation"—the greatest possible attention should be paid to historical development, also to geographical peculiarities and the customs of the inhabitants.

In this peculiar land there has never been any united nation under one ruler and one dynasty. In valleys, encircled and cut off by high mountain ranges, the Albanian tribes live separated to a considerable degree from one another. Their political system is not unlike the clan system of the Scotch. Christians and Mohammedans are represented in equal numbers.

The custom of "vendetta" is an ancient one, sanctified by tradition, which is no less true of robbery and cattle stealing. Agriculture is still in a backward stage of development, farming is in its infancy, the implements used therein date from before the flood.

The head man of the clan dispenses justice in the open, under the village tree, as it used to be done once upon a time among the ancient Germans. Every man is armed and most are excellent shots. Whenever the head man of the clan turns up while on a horseback tour through his territory in some hamlet, the inhabitants expect a blessing from him in the form of jingling coins, which sometimes are scattered about by him from the saddle. This, of course, is particularly customary at the outset of a new Government's term, and great is the dissatisfaction when it does not happen.

Up to the time of the Balkan War many Albanians entered the Turkish service, where they rose to high importance, being greatly prized on account of their diligence and keen intelligence, as well as their tenacious energy. They supplied the Turkish administration with a large number of officials, also with a certain percentage in the diplomatic corps and the army. The young Albanian nobles were proud to serve in a splendid company of palace guards of the Sultan, which scarcely had an equal for size, martial appearance, and manly beauty. These were partly relatives of the Sultan, since the latter used to have noble Albanian women of the principal clans in his harem in order that he—protected by blood brotherhood—might be safe from the "vendettas" of the clans, and, also, that he might find out everything that might serve to influence the feelings of the Albanian chieftains. The desires of the Albanians which reached him by this road—for instance, as to supplies of arms and ammunition, school houses, building of highways, etc.—were thereupon granted in an inconspicuous manner. Thus the Sultan was enabled to keep the usually turbulent Albanians quiet and loyal by means of "family ties."

With this knowledge of the state of affairs as a foundation, I sought to bring my influence to bear toward having a Mohammedan Prince chosen, if possible—perhaps an Egyptian Prince—not forgetting that he should have a well-lined purse, which is an absolute necessity in Albania. My advice was not heeded by the "Areopagus of the Powers," whose members were not bothering themselves with the interests of the Albanians, but seeking, first of all, for pretexts and opportunities for fishing in the troubled Albanian waters in such a way as to benefit their own countries.

OPPOSED CHOICE OF GERMAN

Therefore, I was not at all pleased when the choice fell upon Prince William of Wied. I esteemed him as a distinguished, knightly man of lofty sentiments, but considered him unfitted for the post. The Prince knew altogether too little about Balkan affairs to be able to undertake this thorny task with hope of success. It was particularly unpleasant to me that a German Prince should make a fool of himself there, since it was apparent from the start that the Entente would place all sorts of obstacles in his path. Upon being questioned by the Prince, I told my cousin all my doubts, laying stress upon the difficulties awaiting him, and advised him urgently to decline. I could not command him, since the Prince of Wied, as head of the family, had the final word in the matter.

After the Prince's acceptance of the candidacy offered him by the Powers, I received him in the presence of the Chancellor. A certain irresolution in the bearing of the Prince, who contemplated his new task with anything but enthusiasm, strengthened the resolve in me and the Chancellor to try hard once more to dissuade the young candidate from ascending the recently invented Albanian "throne." But in vain. The ambitious, mystically excited wife of the Prince saw in Albania the fulfillment of her wishes. And "ce que femme veut, Dieu le veut" ("what woman wishes, God wishes").

Carmen Sylva [the Queen of Rumania] also worked toward having him accept; she went so far, in fact, as to publish an article in the newspapers beginning "Fairyland Wants Its Prince."

So even the best meant warnings were useless. I had also strongly advised the Prince not to go to Albania before the settlement of the financial question, since the reasons which had led me to suggest the selection of a rich ruler now came to the fore. The Prince was not very wealthy and the Powers had to supply him with a "donation," concerning the amount of which, and the method of paying it by installments, an unpleasant quarrel arose. At last a part payment was made.

Danger lurked for the Prince and his eventual Government in the person of Essad Pasha, an unreliable, intriguing, greedy soldier of fortune, who himself had designs on the Albanian throne and held sway over a certain number of armed adherents. From the start he was an opponent of the new Prince and he plotted secretly with Italy, which was not favorably inclined toward the Prince of Wied. Now, it would have been quite natural and a matter of course if the new ruler had taken with him in his suite men from Germany whom he knew and who were faithful to him. But he did not. An Englishman and an Italian were attached to his person as "secretaries" and they had nothing better to do than to work against his interests, to give him bad advice and to intrigue against him.

REQUIREMENTS OF A RULER

During the time that the Prince of Wied was making his preparations the excellently written pamphlet of an Austrian General Staff officer, dealing with his travels in Albania, appeared. The officer described, in a lively and clear style, the geographical and climatic drawbacks, the population and customs, the general poverty and backwardness of the land.

He pointed out that a future ruler of the land must in no circumstances reside on the coast, but must show himself to the inhabitants and travel about in the country. Owing to the primitive means of transportation, he went on, the lord of the land must sit all day on horseback and ride through his domain, having at his saddle bow the famous "bag of sequins" mentioned in all Oriental tales and legends, in order to sway public opinion in his favor in the places visited by the expected shower of gold. The ruler must be sure, the author continued, to bind some of the clans of the region closely to himself, so as to have at his beck and call an armed force for asserting his will and overcoming any opponents wishing to rebel, since this was the only way to maintain his power, in view of the utter lack of "troops" or an "army" in the European sense of the word.

This meant that the ruler of Albania must lead at first a nomadic, horseback life, and, in addition, provide himself with a wandering camp, with tents and other accessories and the necessary horses. Plenty of men adapted to this sort of life might have been found in his squadron of the Third Guard Uhlan Regiment, since many of his Uhlans, who were very fond of the Prince, had declared that they were ready to accompany him as volunteers. Surely, they would have served him better and been more useful to him than what he did in preparing to take over the overlordship of Albania, without knowledge of the country.

I advised my cousin urgently to study this pamphlet and to follow its recommendations, especially with regard to his residence, which should be fixed at some point as far as possible from the warships of the Powers, in order that he might not be forced to act under their pressure and arouse suspicion among the Albanians that their ruler needed these ships for protection against his subjects. Did the Prince ever read the pamphlet? In any event, the course adopted by him subsequently was contrary to its advice and the advice given him by me.

The Prince and his wife journeyed to Albania, and things turned out as I had foreseen. According to reports describing the arrival of the sovereign couple, the Princess, although she was a German, addressed the assembled Albanians from her balcony in French, since they understood no German! The "court" remained at Durazzo under the guns of the foreign ships. The Prince did not travel on horseback through the land, nor did he scatter gold sequins about—not even from his balcony on the day of his arrival—nor did he push Essad out of the way. So the adventure ended as one might imagine.

I have gone into some detail in describing my opinion and attitude toward the question of the choice of the ruler of Albania because, from every possible quarter, false rumors have been circulated for the purpose of imputing to me motives which were utterly foreign to me. In this matter, also, I gave honest advice when questioned, based on sound knowledge of mankind.

The year 1912 also witnessed the meeting with the Tsar at Baltisch-Port, whither I repaired on board my yacht at the invitation of Nicholas II. Our two yachts anchored side by side, so that visiting from ship to ship was easy. The Tsar, his children, and his entire entourage vied with one another in evidences of good will and hospitality. The Russian and German escorting squadrons were inspected, turn and turn about, by the Tsar and myself together, and we took our meals either at the Tsar's table or mine.

We spent one morning on land near Baltisch-Port. The Eighty-fifth "Viborg" Infantry Regiment, whose commander I was, had been drawn up in a field and was inspected first in parade formation, then in company and battalion exercises, which were carried out in as satisfactory a manner as was the parade with which the evolutions were brought to a close.

The regiment, composed of four battalions, made an excellent impression. It was in field equipment—brown-gray blouses and caps—and the latter, worn jauntily cocked over one ear by all, gave to the sun-browned, martial faces of the strong young soldiers a bold air which brought joy to the heart of every soldier who gazed upon them.

In the course of the brilliant and uncommonly amiable reception which I met with on this occasion I received no hint of the Balkan alliance, concluded a short time before.

It was my last visit in Russia before the outbreak of the war.

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