THE material of which this textbook is composed must be so new to the vast majority of both teachers and students of Spanish in this country, that the need of an introduction has been deemed imperative by the editors.

Americans have of late been growing more and more alive to the urgent necessity of gaining a better knowledge of the vast continent and the peoples to the south of them. Argentina, as the most prosperous of the South American republics, has claimed no small share of this newly awakened interest. It is hoped that this book will aid in promoting and strengthening this interest, and that this introduction, in its turn, will be of aid in elucidating and furnishing a proper background for the material herein presented.

If we wish to understand Argentina, we must begin first of all by familiarizing ourselves with one pivotal sentiment that has permeated and controlled every aspect of Argentine life and development since colonial days. This sentiment is an exalted and haughty patriotism, so intense, indeed, that the tone with which an Argentine says “Soy argentino”, is no whit less assertive and proud than that in which citizens of ancient Rome were wont to say “Civis Romanus sum”.

Whatever the origin of this sentiment, the evidences of it are irrefutable. Argentina has to-day about nine million inhabitants: of these, fully two thirds are of recent foreign origin, mainly Italian and Spanish, and to a much smaller extent, English, French, and German. Argentina, in other words, has relatively a much larger population of recent foreign extraction than the United States. Nevertheless, the hyphen does not exist in Argentina; and the terms Italo-Argentine, Hispano-Argentine, Franco-Argentine, etc., are entirely unknown. The jealous and uncompromising patriotism of the Argentine makes hyphenated national designations impossible. If we turn from the evidence of purely popular sentiment to the more sober and more controlled evidence of literature, we find the same thing. Take away from the literature of Argentina the theme of patriotism, and you have taken away its most distinctive and its greatest life-giving element. It has been said, and justly, that the Italian literature of the nineteenth century centered entirely about the theme of Italian unification, voicing during the first half of the century the aspirations of her great men for a united Italy, and during the second half intoning the pÆan of joy at the accomplishment of those aspirations. The same may be said of Argentine literature. The names of the great leaders of her immortal Revolution, both against the mother country and later against the internal caudillo tyrants—the most important of whom was Rosas—and the deeds that they performed, recur again and again through the pages of her men of letters, whatever be the form of literature they engage in, narrative, dramatic, or poetic.

It is for this reason that for the proper understanding of the Argentine temperament, as evidenced by her literature as well as by her popular ideals, the knowledge of her political history, beginning with the time of the English invasions in 1806 (when the latent nationalism of the then Viceroyalty of the Plata first manifested itself in action), is a requisite of prime importance.

Until the year 1776, Argentina had been but a negligible part of the Spanish possessions in South America, being a dependency of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Despite, however, the short-sighted commercial policy of Spain, which forbade the colonies from trading with any European country, save the mother country, and then by restricted routes and through specific Spanish ports, Buenos Aires, towards the end of the eighteenth century, had far outstripped all other colonial cities with the exception of Lima. By royal decree, therefore, on the 8th of August, 1776, the Viceroyalty of the Plata River was established with Buenos Aires as its capital. It included what is to-day Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and the province of Rio Grande, belonging now to Brazil.

The first Viceroy was Don Pedro de Ceballos, a soldier of ability and an administrator of unusual talent. As a result of the war he waged against the Portuguese, who had taken possession of northern Uruguay and the harbor of La Colonia, this port was won back to the Viceroyalty of the Plata. It may be said that the driving out of the Portuguese from La Colonia marks the first of a series of events that finally led to the independence of Argentina; for, if Buenos Aires had been able to grow commercially, it had been due, in no small measure, to the clandestine trade that was carried on through the port of La Colonia. Its capture forced the Viceroy to assume a very grave responsibility; namely, to change on his own authority the trade regulations then in force. His permission to allow certain foreign merchandise to come into Buenos Aires, an act which was later approved by the Crown, was the first recognition of the needs of the new Viceroyalty, as well as of the pressure that the colonists could bring to bear upon the mother country.

Of the Viceroys that followed Ceballos till the period of the English invasions, there is but one that deserves to be recalled here. He was Don Juan JosÉ de VÉrtiz, under whose administration still greater commercial freedom was granted to Buenos Aires. To take the place of the schools of the Jesuits, who were at this time expelled from Spain and the colonies, VÉrtiz founded in Buenos Aires the Colegio de San Carlos. It was also during his administration that the famous brothers Biedma explored Patagonia, and that the settlement of this immense region was begun, forestalling thus the plans contemplated by the English as a result of the voyages of Thomas Falkner.

The decay into which Spain had fallen towards the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the rule of the seas that England gained as a result of the battle of Trafalgar (1805), led the English to attempt the conquest of the Viceroyalty of the Plata, of whose great possibilities Falkner, upon his return to England, had given a glowing account. Sir Home Popham, therefore, who had coÖperated with Sir David Baird in the occupation of the Cape, put 1635 men under the orders of General W. Beresford for the purpose of capturing Buenos Aires. The English expedition landed at Quilmes, not far from Buenos Aires, the 25th of June, 1806. The Viceroy at that time was Don Rafael de Sobremonte, one of the weakest men who had occupied that important office since the establishment of the Viceroyalty of the Plata. Instead of leading the colonies against the invader, he fled to the interior with whatever moneys he was able to gather from the treasury. Under these circumstances the English force, small as it was, easily took possession of Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, the people under the leadership of Don Santiago de Liniers and Don Juan MartÍn PueyrredÓn, prepared to drive out the invader, and it was not long before Liniers, with the aid of forces from Montevideo, and PueyrredÓn, with forces hastily raised in the province, forced Beresford to surrender unconditionally. In recognition of the valor and ability displayed by Liniers, the people chose him as their leader, forcing Sobremonte to surrender his power. This was the second time that the colonists imposed their will; the time was not distant when they should do so forever.

In July, 1807, another British expedition, composed of 12,000 soldiers, under General Whitelock, attempted to reconquer Buenos Aires. But Liniers was fully prepared to meet the new and increased forces sent to take possession of the colony. In less than a year he had been able to reorganize the scanty and demoralized forces that protected the capital. Whitelock, having effected a landing, marched upon Buenos Aires; but after much fierce street fighting, in which women and children took part, he was forced to capitulate with the loss of over 3000 of his effectives. The heroism of the people of Buenos Aires on this occasion is well attested by the testimony of Whitelock himself, who said: “Each home was a castle, and each soldier a hero.”

These signal victories, which the colonists were able to obtain without any aid from the home government, coupled with their ancient dissatisfaction over the trade restrictions forced upon Buenos Aires, had a double effect: first, they inspired the colonists with a new sense of self-reliance and confidence; secondly, they heightened the old discontent, and gave rise to thoughts of independence. When, therefore, Napoleon, in 1810, dethroned Ferdinand VII, and crowned his own brother Joseph King of Spain, the occasion presented itself for the colonists to translate those sentiments of dissatisfaction into actual revolt.

Liniers was at this time Viceroy, the choice of the people having received the official sanction of the royal government. As a Frenchman, however, he was distrusted, and in his place Don Baltasar Cisneros was appointed in July, 1809. One of his first acts, the throwing open of the commerce of the Viceroyalty to all nations, quieted for a while the general discontent, and gained for the new Viceroy a certain measure of popularity. But his harshness in repressing an outbreak that took place in La Paz (Bolivia), in February of 1810, lost him at once the prestige he had at first won.

The minds of the multitude were irrevocably bent on separation; men like Belgrano, Castelli, Chiclana, Paso, RodrÍguez PeÑa, were secretly working for the independence of the provinces. On the 25th of May, 1810, after news had been received of the complete subjugation of Spain, the people en masse demanded the deposition of Cisneros, and a committee presided over by Cornelio Saavedra was appointed to take the reins of government. Castelli, Belgrano, AzcuÉnaga, Alberti, Matheu y Larra, were the other members of this Junta, and Paso and Moreno were its secretaries. Thus the change in government was carried out, in form at least, by a mass meeting of the population of Buenos Aires.

The task of the newly established government was indeed an arduous one; for, not only did it have to defend its authority against Spain, but also to make its power felt and obeyed by the provinces of the interior. The first task was accomplished when the Spaniards were finally driven from South America; the carrying out of the second task brought on a second revolution, a fratricidal strife, which came very near establishing in Argentina a number of petty and insignificant states instead of a united, strong nation. In this second struggle, though in principle the battle was lost for Buenos Aires (since the federal form of government is the one that obtains to-day in Argentina), the leadership of the capital remained unquestionably established so far as initiative and spiritual ascendancy are concerned.

Buenos Aires set out, as Rome had done, to expand politically from a city-state into a vast republican state. She partly failed in this, as is evidenced by the withdrawal of Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia from the old Viceroyalty of the Plata, but, as we have said, she succeeded in establishing, if not the political hegemony of the Plata, the undisputed spiritual leadership, and the proud claim of being the second largest and wealthiest Latin city in the world, and the greatest in all the Southern Hemisphere.

We shall attempt to trace briefly: first, the steps by which the Spaniards were expelled from the South American countries; second, the steps by which the provinces of the Plata emerged from the chaos of civil strife, and came, after the battle of PavÓn, to enjoy the sweet fruits of peace.

After the deposition of Cisneros, the provisional Junta sent out circulars to the provinces, asking for their recognition of its authority. The provinces, save Uruguay and Paraguay, signified their support of the new government. From the very beginning, then, these two provinces showed a tendency not to accept the leadership of Buenos Aires. Furthermore, not long thereafter, when it became known that the Junta aimed at separation, the province of CÓrdoba and those of Alto PerÚ (Bolivia) joined with Uruguay and Paraguay in their opposition to the provisional government. The “Tory” reaction was thus not long in manifesting itself.

Montevideo, led by the newly appointed Viceroy, Javier de ElÍo, made ready a fleet to attack Buenos Aires; GutiÉrrez de la Concha, Governor of CÓrdoba, appointed Liniers to lead its forces against the Junta; and in Alto PerÚ, General Goyeneche, appointed president of Cuzco by the Viceroy of Peru, took charge of the resistance to the Revolution. The gravity of the reaction that set in, the increasing number of forces that were being arrayed against the new government, demanded firm and instant action. Happily for the independence of Argentina, there was in the Junta a leader of force and vision. He was Mariano Moreno, the secretary of the Junta; he was the soul of the revolutionary movement in its early stages; he was the pilot that steered it safely through the perilous shoals of the dawn of independence. It is in recognition of these great services that Argentina acclaims him to-day as one of her greatest champions, ranking with San MartÍn, Belgrano, and Rivadavia.

To meet these dangers, two expeditions were sent out: one against CÓrdoba and Alto PerÚ, under the orders of Ortiz de Ocampo; and another against Paraguay, under the orders of General Belgrano.

Liniers and Concha were taken prisoners, and by order of the Junta were put to death. Thus died Santiago de Liniers, defender of Buenos Aires during the English invasions. Many historians and writers have denounced this act of the Junta as ruthless and unnecessarily severe; practically as many others have defended it in view of the inexorable need for sternness demanded by the conditions of the times. We mention it as the first instance of internecine struggle, and as typical of the unrelenting character of the Revolution that came later. The expedition continued its northward march, under the orders of Balcarce, and defeating the Royalists at Suipacha, soon had control of the north as far as the Desaguadero, the boundary between the Viceroyalties of Peru and of the Plata. Here we shall leave it for a while in order to follow the campaign against Paraguay.

Heartened by the successes of Balcarce, the Junta decided to hasten the expedition against Paraguay under the orders of Belgrano. But, whereas the expeditionary force of Alto PerÚ had met until then with remarkable success, Belgrano, after having his communications impeded by the control of the ParanÁ, which the Royalists held, and taking part in two unsuccessful engagements, was glad to sign an agreement whereby he was allowed to withdraw unmolested from Paraguay with all his forces. Though this expedition failed of its purpose to bring Paraguay under the control of the Junta, it helped in no small degree to create a separatist movement in Paraguay which led in a few years to the defeat of the Spaniards and the establishment of an independent government.

By this time also the situation in Uruguay called for the attention of the Junta. The people of the country, despite the pro-Spanish sentiment prevalent in Montevideo, were manifesting signs of revolt against the Spaniards, and when Artigas, the Uruguayan leader, came to Buenos Aires to enlist the aid of the provisional government, the forces of Belgrano that had returned from Paraguay were intrusted to Rondeau to coÖperate with Artigas in Uruguay. With the aid of these troops from Buenos Aires, Artigas obtained a signal victory against the Spaniards at Las Piedras, which enabled him to lay siege to Montevideo.

With the exception of Belgrano’s expedition to Paraguay, which, though unsuccessful in its attempt to bring that province under the control of the Junta, had nevertheless caused no serious military loss, the forces of the Revolution were everywhere successful. Unfortunately, the stinging defeat of HuaquÍ that the army of Alto PerÚ met at the hands of Goyeneche in 1811, on the boundary between Bolivia and Peru, threatened for a moment to reËstablish the power of Spain. Had the Argentine forces been successful, Bolivia and Uruguay would never have become separate republics. The complete independence of South America would have been attained ten years before the battle of Ayacucho (1824), and, very likely, with its victorious armies, Buenos Aires would have been able to avoid the terrible civil struggle that, through the lack of a wise and strong central government, lasted till the downfall of Rosas. As it was, the siege of Montevideo had to be abandoned at a time when its garrison was on the point of surrendering; and it was only through the energetic and skillful leadership of PueyrredÓn, who was put in command after HuaquÍ, that of the 23,000 men who composed the original Army of the North, one thousand succeeded in reaching TucumÁn. From a purely military point of view, the disaster of HuaquÍ meant the passing of the initiative from the revolutionary Army to the forces of Spain. In fact, not until 1817, when San MartÍn crossed the Andes and defeated the Royalists in Chile, were the provinces once more on the offensive. It meant also that the way for a decisive blow at the Spaniards through the north was forever barred; that the attack had to be carried through the west to Chile, first, and then by sea to the heart of Spanish power in Lima; that while troops were being prepared slowly and patiently for this purpose, the constant pressure of the victorious Spanish armies from the north had to be withstood; and last, but by no means least, it emphasized the need for the presence of a strong man to bolster up the provisional government in Buenos Aires itself, which, after the death of Mariano Moreno, was left without a leader of ability and strength commensurate with the magnitude of the task to be accomplished.

Fortunately for the independence of the provinces of the Plata, there arose, at this critical juncture, men like Belgrano, who by his victories of TucumÁn and Salta, stemmed the flood of Spanish invasion after HuaquÍ; San MartÍn, who by his conquest of Chile and Lima, was to force the Spaniards into the fastnesses of the mountains of Peru, where his veteran troops, delivered by one of the greatest acts of self-denial in the record of history into the hands of BolÍvar, sounded the knell of Spanish dominion on the battlefields of JunÍn and Ayacucho; GÜemes, who after the battle of Sipe-Sipe, a disaster comparable only to HuaquÍ, was able, with the aid of his intrepid gauchos, to protect the communications of the army that was being prepared by San MartÍn in Mendoza; Rivadavia and PueyrredÓn, without the stimulus of whose leadership the provisional government would have succumbed under the weight of the responsibilities it had assumed.

Navarro y Lamarca, Historia general de AmÉrica Fortuny Belgrano en TucumÁn
Belgrano en TucumÁn (Navarro y Lamarca, Historia general de AmÉrica
Fortuny)

Immediately after the victory of TucumÁn, obtained by Belgrano against the Spanish forces that invaded northern Argentina after the defeat of HuaquÍ, the siege of Montevideo was begun once more, both as a result of that victory and of negotiations with Brazil, whereby the troops of that empire, which had come to the aid of the Spaniards, were to withdraw from Uruguay. The patriots were soon able, in spite of the friction that arose between Artigas and the Argentine troops, to pin the Spanish forces within the inner circle of the defenses of Montevideo. It was in connection with this campaign against Montevideo that San MartÍn in 1813 won his first victory against the Spaniards, at San Lorenzo, on the shores of the ParanÁ. By this victory an end was put to the foraging expeditions that the beleaguered garrison of Montevideo sent to the province of Entre RÍos. Thus the only immediate avenue for the supplying of provisions was closed. The desertion, however, of Artigas, and the harassing by his Uruguayan bands of the besieging forces, threatened once more to bring about the abandonment of the siege. The defeat of the naval forces of Spain in the Plata River by Admiral Brown, an Irish sailor in the service of the government of Buenos Aires, came at this time most opportunely to close all avenues of replenishing, and the garrison was forced to capitulate. The taking of Montevideo was an event of the utmost importance for the Revolution, since it made possible the concentrating of all forces for an attack upon Peru, the heart of Spanish power in South America.

Undeterred by the disastrous results of the first Army of the North at HuaquÍ, the provisional government decided upon a second expedition to Alto PerÚ. In addition to the strategic difficulties of this plan, new obstacles arose from the jealousies and ill-feeling caused by the ambition of General Alvear. He has truly been called the Alcibiades of Argentina. Handsome, young, accomplished, and erratically brilliant in the conception of his military plans, he was consumed by a disproportionate ambition to be the leading military hero of the Revolution. It was in order to satisfy this inordinate craving for glory that he had himself appointed general-in-chief of the besieging forces of Montevideo, at a moment when that city was doomed to fall, thus depriving Rondeau of a victory which in reality was his. As in the case of the campaign of Montevideo, Rondeau was first selected to command the second Army of the North, but Alvear intended to keep him in command only until the time should come for decisive action, when he himself, aided by the ascendancy he had gained with the provisional government, would assume command and reap the fruits of victory. In accordance with this plan, he attempted to supplant Rondeau towards the end of the year 1814. This time, however, Rondeau refused to deliver his command to Alvear, and, as his troops supported him, Alvear was forced to return to Buenos Aires. The great popularity that he enjoyed in the capital raised him to the supreme honor of Director of the United Provinces, but his harshness in dealing with opposing political parties, and his weakness in meeting the rebellion of Artigas, combined with the opposition of both the Army of the North and the army that San MartÍn was quietly getting together in Mendoza for the invasion of Chile, made his tenure of office very short-lived, and he was forced to surrender the reins of government and flee to RÍo Janeiro. This was the first serious defection among the makers of the Revolution, if we except the work of the Uruguayan leader, Artigas, who by his constant opposition to the provisional government of Buenos Aires delayed and prevented the unification of forces necessary to bring about the fall of Spanish power, but who at least worked for the independence of Uruguay, whereas Alvear sought primarily to aggrandize himself. It was not surprising therefore that the Army of the North, its discipline shaken by the recent rebellion caused by Alvear’s ambition, and confronted, as it was, by the naturally difficult task of attacking Peru by a road which had been marked by the previous defeat of HuaquÍ, met a second disastrous defeat at Sipe-Sipe. So complete was this defeat that the Army of the North ceased to exist entirely, never to be reorganized again as it had been after HuaquÍ. What Belgrano did for the defense of the provinces after the defeat of the first Army of the North, the caudillo GÜemes accomplished after Sipe-Sipe. With his swift band of gauchos he conducted such an effective guerrilla warfare against the victorious Spanish army, that they were unable to derive the full benefit of their great victory.

Navarro y Lamarca, Historia general de America La BahÍa de Montevideo en 1825
La BahÍa de Montevideo en 1825
(Navarro y Lamarca, Historia general de America)

The fortunes of the Revolution had never sunk so low as after the battle of Sipe-Sipe. Yet, it was immediately after this disaster that the Congress of TucumÁn, on the 9th of July, 1816, proclaimed officially the independence of the United Provinces of the Plata. This was an artificial way of reviving the hopes of the Revolution, for what was wanted then was action, not words. Withal it did serve to rouse the failing enthusiasm of the people. Moreover, to substantiate the rhetorical enthusiasm of the Declaration of Independence, there soon came from an unexpected quarter deeds of such magnitude as to destroy for all time the power of Spain in America.

A few months after the meeting of the Congress of TucumÁn, San MartÍn started on his great liberating campaign of Chile, after more than two years of patient preparation. Left to his own resources in the province of Cuyo (to-day, Mendoza, San Luis, and San Juan), unaided for a long time by the central government, who saw in him only a mediocre soldier (mistaking his modesty, his stoic disregard for the glamour of popularity, and above all his stanch insistence on systematic and careful preparation, for lack of military genius and dash), San MartÍn never lost heart, but bided his time till the rise to power in Buenos Aires of PueyrredÓn assured him of support. On the 17th of January, 1817, the Army of the Andes set out by the now historic passes of Los Patos and Uspallata on the expedition which was to win for democracy half a continent.

El Paso de los Andes Navarro y Lamarca, Historia general de AmÉrica Fortuny
El Paso de los Andes
(Navarro y Lamarca, Historia general de AmÉrica Fortuny)

The crossing of the snow-capped Andes was rapidly and successfully accomplished, and on the 12th of February, 1817, the Spanish Army, commanded by General Maroto, was completely defeated on the slopes of Chacabuco, not far from Santiago. Maroto himself was captured, and San MartÍn entered Santiago de Chile with his army on the 14th of February. Meantime, the remaining Spanish forces fled to Talcahuano, where, having been reËnforced by 3000 fresh troops from Peru, they attacked the detachment under Las Heras that San MartÍn had sent in their pursuit. The siege of Talcahuano had to be raised, and Las Heras withdrew in 1818 to join the corps of the main army. On the 19th of March, San MartÍn was again closely pressing the enemy, and after a cavalry skirmish the Spaniards sought the protection of the city of Talca. The Argentine forces encamped outside of the city, and the Spaniards, surprising the patriots at night, charged their bivouac, dispersing and killing many of the patriot troops. This night attack is known as the battle of Cancha Rayada. It came very close to wrecking the long-prepared and carefully thought-out plans of San MartÍn. His coolness and the indomitable courage of his generals, particularly Las Heras, saved the day, and hardly two weeks later, on the 5th of April, he was able to meet the Spaniards on the shores of the River MaipÚ or Maipo, defeating them decisively, and sealing forever the independence of Chile.

Now, San MartÍn was able to carry out his long-cherished plan of attacking Peru from the Chilean side, transporting his army by water to Pisco. With the aid of Lord Thomas Cochrane, an English sailor in the service of Chile, he was able to clear the seas of Spanish ships, and on the 7th of September, 1820, he landed his forces in the Bay of Paracas. San MartÍn drove the Spaniards before him, and Lima and Callao were captured in quick succession. The former was evacuated by La Serna, Spanish viceroy of Peru, the 19th of July, 1821, and Callao was surrendered on the 21st of September of the same year. Once in Lima, the first thing that San MartÍn did was to call together an assembly to find out the wishes of the people of Peru. The Junta met and notified the Protector, the title given to San MartÍn by the Peruvians, that the unanimous wish of all was the independence of Peru. At a great demonstration, held in the Plaza Mayor of Lima, San MartÍn rose before the assembled multitude and unfolding for the first time the national flag of Peru, created by San MartÍn himself, he exclaimed amid the thunderous applause of the people: “Peru is from this moment free and independent, by the will of its people and the justness of its cause, which God defends.”

San MartÍn had insured the independence of Argentina, which then included Bolivia, had driven the Spaniards from Chile, and now declared the independence of Peru. But the last remnants of the Spanish forces that had fled to the mountains of northern Peru had still to be vanquished before his task could be said to be fully accomplished. As the Argentine historian Mitre says, San MartÍn might have attempted this task with the forces at his command, unaided by either Chile or Argentina, which were then in the throes of civil discord, but he had too much at heart the independence of those lands in whose cause he had been fighting for over ten years. He preferred to take no chances. He invoked the coÖperation of SimÓn BolÍvar, who had done for Colombia and Venezuela what he himself had done for Argentina, Chile, and Peru. On the 26th of July, 1822, therefore, there took place at Guayaquil, Ecuador, a famous interview between the two greatest generals of South America. What took place at that meeting has been wrapped in mystery, though the results are known full well. San MartÍn delivered his armies into BolÍvar’s hands, so that he might strike the last blow in behalf of the independence of South America. The combined forces of Colombia and Argentina under the command of General Sucre, BolÍvar’s lieutenant, won a brilliant victory at Ayacucho in 1824, which crowned once for all the efforts of the peoples of South America to obtain their independence.

Thus, first by the military prowess of her greatest son, San MartÍn, and later by his greatness of soul and self-denial, worthy of the best traditions of Rome, Argentina insured the independence of South America. Though the words exchanged between BolÍvar and San MartÍn at Guayaquil are not known, acquainted as we are with the natures of both, we can easily surmise what took place. BolÍvar was a brilliant military genius, but like Alvear, was consumed by an unquenchable thirst for power, save that he surpassed Alvear in ambition in the same ratio that his military ability was superior to that of the Argentine Alcibiades. San MartÍn was a thorough military leader, leaving nothing to chance, a great disciplinarian, and once his plans were completed, as powerful in their execution as he had been patient in their preparation; but above all, San MartÍn was preËminently a man of lofty ideals and high moral worth. He may not have been endowed with the keen intuitive military genius of BolÍvar; he was averse to all dramatic appeal and display, and hence never became popular in the sense that BolÍvar and Alvear were popular; but in the unselfish qualities of devotion to a cause, even to the point of self-effacement, he stands the equal of the greatest men in history, a worthy peer of Cincinnatus and Regulus.

After the conference with BolÍvar in Guayaquil, San MartÍn returned to Peru to find that the people whose independence he had declared were hostile to him. He immediately called a meeting of the constitutional congress, and, on the 20th of September, 1822, resigned his title of Protector.

Coming to Chile, he met with equal, if not greater, hostility. He retired to the province of Mendoza in Argentina, where for a while he devoted himself to farming, and then made a voyage to Buenos Aires, then torn by contending factions, to meet there, in his own country, with indifference and disregard. San MartÍn clearly saw that despite his devotion to the cause of independence, despite his mighty accomplishments in behalf of his country, his presence, if anything, would only lead to greater strife. Stoically, therefore, and without a murmur, he betook himself to voluntary exile in France, where he died in poverty, in 1850, forgotten by his countrymen, attended only by his daughter, who faithfully remained by his side throughout the long years of his exile. Once only, in 1829, he returned to Buenos Aires; but the newspapers of the times published this insulting paragraph: “Ambiguities—General San MartÍn has returned to his country after an absence of five years, but only after knowing that peace has been signed with the Emperor of Brazil.” Even after this crowning insult San MartÍn uttered no plaint, but quietly returned to France to devote his time to the cultivation of flowers of his native land. His was not the Marian temperament; no messenger was ever sent by him to his fellow-countrymen to tell them that their liberator had been seen in France eating the bitter bread of exile.

“A truly great man...”, Shakespeare has said of CÆsar. Much more aptly could that apply to San MartÍn in point of pure manhood. Argentina, to-day, has made reparation for the oblivion with which she requited her greatest man during his lifetime, by erecting imposing monuments to his memory; but, above all, by enshrining his name in the heart of every one of her sons.

But to return to Argentina herself: thanks to San MartÍn, the Revolution was successful, both at home and abroad. Even as early as 1820, however, the discordant elements that were to delay her progress almost half a century were clearly patent, not only in thought, but also in action. Each province had its caudillo, who was fiercely jealous of any limitations upon his power. Thus, RamÍrez in Entre RÍos, GÜemes in Salta, Facundo Quiroga (known for his cruelty as “El Tigre de los Llanos”) in La Rioja, LÓpez in Santa FÉ, Ibarra in Santiago, were practically overlords of independent provinces, ready to make common cause against Spain, but just as ready to quarrel with each other. The situation was similar to that of the colonies in North America, which, though willing to unite against England, resented any attempt at interference in their internal affairs by a central government. Buenos Aires, the city, as the center of Argentine wealth, culture, and civilization, was the exponent of a unitarian form of government, that is, a strong, centralized government with Buenos Aires at the head. Naturally, the caudillos resented any interference on the part of Buenos Aires. In 1820, the first important battle between these two antagonistic elements took place at Cepeda, on the borders of Santa FÉ and Buenos Aires. Here Rondeau, representing Buenos Aires and the unitarian principle, suffered defeat at the hands of RamÍrez, known as “El Supremo Entrerriano.”

Varying fortunes attended the civil strife which went on between these two factions. In 1822, a pact was entered upon by Buenos Aires and the caudillos of Entre RÍos, Santa FÉ, and Corrientes, by the terms of which common cause was to be made against an expected Spanish invasion, which never materialized, and the other provinces were to be urged to join the Confederation.

Rivadavia now appears on the scene in Buenos Aires as Minister of Education, and later, as President of the Confederation in 1826. He introduced many noteworthy reforms, founded libraries and universities, and attempted to establish the government on a firm unitarian basis with Buenos Aires as the capital. He resigned in 1827, following the treaty which his envoy signed with Brazil in the same year, after the battle of ItuzaingÓ. Despite the victory of Argentine arms, Uruguay had been ceded to Brazil.

Los Treinta y Tres Orientales Navarro y Lamarca, Historia general de AmÉrica Fortuny
Los Treinta y Tres Orientales
(Navarro y Lamarca, Historia general de AmÉrica Fortuny)

As far back as 1680, Uruguay had been a bone of contention between Portugal and Spain, but at the outbreak of the Revolution in 1810, the country was Spanish and was an integral part of the Viceroyalty of the Plata. Montevideo became, as we have seen, the center of Spanish resistance to the movement of independence, and following Artigas’ victory at Las Piedras, was besieged by his troops and the Argentine forces under Rondeau. The city would have fallen, but news of the defeat at HuaquÍ reached Buenos Aires, and the besiegers were recalled to protect the Argentine soil. Civil strife between Buenos Aires and Artigas ensued because the latter stood for a federal republic, while Buenos Aires, of course, was unitarian, and wished to retain her supremacy over the provinces. In 1817, Artigas became embroiled with the Portuguese, who routed him and captured Montevideo. Rivera, Oribe, and Lavalleja, lieutenants of Artigas, and later famous in the history of Uruguay, had to take refuge in the interior. Artigas himself retired to Paraguay and died there of old age in 1850. By 1821 all resistance to Brazil was at an end. Rivera and many of the other caudillos had accepted commissions in the Brazilian army of occupation. Uruguay itself had become the cisplatine province of Brazil, and so matters stood until the 19th of April, 1825, when Lavalleja gathered the famous “Treinta y Tres”, a band of thirty-three Uruguayan patriots, and landed in Uruguay from the Argentine province of Entre RÍos. So great was their success that by May of that year, the whole country was in revolt against the Brazilians, and the forces of the Empire were confined within Montevideo and La Colonia. The patriot victory at SarandÍ under Lavalleja and Rivera caused Argentina to declare formally that Uruguay was again a part of the Argentine Confederation. War between Argentina and Brazil was declared and at ItuzaingÓ, far within the Brazilian territory, the Brazilians suffered a terrible defeat in 1827. This, as we saw above, happened during Rivadavia’s presidency, and led to his resignation because of the peace signed by his envoy. The upshot of the whole matter was that both Brazil and Argentina gave up all claims to Uruguay and guaranteed its independence as a separate republic for five years. Argentina was being torn by federalist and unitarian dissensions, and could not press her claim. In Uruguay itself there were rival factions led by Rivera and Lavalleja, who held the presidency in turn, Rivera becoming the first official head of the nation in 1830.

In Argentina, after Rivadavia’s resignation, Dorrego, leader of the federalists in Buenos Aires, became Director. The chief names until 1829, date of the advent of Rosas, are La Paz and Lavalle, as unitarians; Dorrego and the caudillos from the various provinces, as federalists. Lavalle, who had been the hero of ItuzaingÓ, put himself at the head of the unitarians and forced Dorrego to flee, capturing him later and putting him to death. It is now that Rosas comes to the fore, although Quiroga and the other caudillos all joined forces to help defeat Lavalle, who retired to Uruguay. La Paz, however, more than managed to hold his own in the provinces of the interior, defeating Quiroga twice with terrific slaughter. But he, too, was finally defeated and taken prisoner in 1831. Since 1829, Rosas had become the provisional governor of Buenos Aires, that is, the head, in so far as there was any head, of the Argentine government. One of his first acts as governor of Buenos Aires was to carry on an expedition against the Indians to the south of Buenos Aires, and extend the frontiers of the whites down to the RÍo Negro.

And now for a few words on Rosas himself. He is referred to as the Argentine tyrant and has been compared to Nero for his wanton cruelty. True it is that he committed many deeds of cruelty, yet the times and conditions in which he lived were such that stern measures were necessary. He was of noble family and one of the wealthiest men in Argentina. From his own estancias he could raise a cavalry corps of gauchos and keep it in the field. He made it a point to afford shelter to outlaw gauchos, and gathered about him a band of adventurous spirits ready to dare anything. His victories against the Indians increased his prestige, and in 1835 he was given supreme power by the Legislature in Buenos Aires. His control of the supreme power lasted until 1852. Immediately upon his assuming command, federalists were put in office everywhere instead of unitarians, who were forced to flee into exile. In the course of his long career, Rosas waged war for the re-annexation of Uruguay, which had become independent in 1827, after the battle of ItuzaingÓ. He incurred the enmity of France and England, and had to put down many revolts against his power. Lavalle played an important part in one of these and met his death at the hands of Oribe, who had aligned himself with Rosas. Throughout Rosas’ reign, for such was his administration, Argentine exiles kept alive the hope of overthrowing the tyrant. Sarmiento founded a newspaper, El Progreso, in CopiapÓ, Chile, which had for its object a campaign against Rosas. In it Sarmiento published for the first time in serial form his Facundo, selections from which are given in this book.

Rosas’ attempt to re-annex Uruguay deserves special mention. The five-year period of Uruguayan independence agreed upon by Argentina and Brazil had come to an end when Rosas came into power. Argentina was free to solicit the incorporation of Uruguay into the Argentine Confederation. Oribe, whom we remember as one of Artigas’ lieutenants, had become president of Uruguay after Rivera, and allied himself to Rosas against the Rivera faction, which had the support of the Argentine unitarian exiles. Oribe had to abandon Montevideo, which fell into Rivera’s hands only to be besieged by Rosas and Oribe. The war that ensued has been called the Great War. It lasted for eight years, from 1843 to 1851, and the entire burden of the struggle centered around the siege of Montevideo, one of the longest in history. During this long eight-year siege, Montevideo received the help of many adventurers and lovers of liberty, as Rosas and Oribe were regarded as oppressors who sought to dominate a weaker country. Garibaldi, famous in Italian history, played a prominent part in the defense of the beleaguered city as leader of a famous foreign legion composed of Italians and Frenchmen.

Eventually Rosas brought about his own downfall. Although a federalist, he slowly centralized all power in himself, thereby gaining the distrust of the other caudillos. Urquiza, the caudillo from Entre RÍos, led the revolt against Rosas, and at the battle of Caseros, in 1851, completely routed the forces of the tyrant. Flight was Rosas’ only resource, and he took refuge, with his daughter Manuela, on board the English frigate Centaur. He ended his days in England.

But not yet were discords at an end. The victor of Caseros convened a constituent congress at Santa FÉ, to which Buenos Aires failed to send delegates, remaining a sovereign state in the same manner that Rhode Island did when she refused to become a party to the Constitution of the United States. Naturally, Urquiza became president, and the provinces prospered under his administration. Such a situation, however, could not endure for long.

Buenos Aires chafed under certain customs restrictions on her exports to the rest of the nation, and in 1859, under the leadership of Mitre, Buenos Aires attacked the confederation of provinces established by the congress at Santa FÉ. As in 1820, Cepeda again marked the defeat of Buenos Aires at the hands of the federalists, although Mitre managed to save the army of Buenos Aires. With the mediation of Paraguay, a peace was patched up between the warring elements. Buenos Aires became a member of the Confederation, and her customs houses were put in the control of the federal government, and in 1860, Derqui succeeded Urquiza as president. In the meanwhile, troubles in the province of San Luis led to friction once more between Buenos Aires and the federalists. The rupture became open when Buenos Aires sent deputies elected according to local law and not according to the Constitution, and sent them to the congress convened by Derqui. Buenos Aires was declared in state of siege, and at PavÓn, in 1861, Mitre led the forces of the capital to victory. The many wars had tired the nation, and all the provinces willingly gave Mitre the power to convoke a congress to settle all differences. This congress met on the 2d of May, 1862, and it was agreed that the city of Buenos Aires should be the seat of the federal government, as well as of the province of Buenos Aires itself. The election of Mitre to the presidency marked the beginning of a period of prosperity and solidarity for the country.