NOTE.

This was the position of the French army at the famous battle of Leipzig, which terminated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for Napoleon; for the battle of Hanau was of no consequence, comparatively, in the desperate situation of that army.

It strikes me that, in a situation like that of the French army previous to the battle of Leipzig, a general should never calculate upon any of those lucky chances which may arise out of a return to the offensive, but that he should rather adopt every possible means to secure his retreat. With this view, he should immediately cover himself with good entrenchments, to enable him to repel with inferior numbers the attack of the enemy, while his own equipments are crossing the river. As fast as the troops reach the other side, they should occupy positions to protect the passage of the rear guard, and this last should be covered by a tÊte de pont as soon as the army breaks up its camp. During the wars of the Revolution, too little regard was paid to entrenchments; and it is for this reason we have seen large armies dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate of nations compromised by the issue of one battle.