There is a certain parallel between the circumstances which have brought the commanders-in-chief of the British and German battle fleets into the positions they respectively hold to-day. Just as Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was long since “ear-marked” for the supreme command of the Home Fleets, so was Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl selected for the control of the German High Seas Fleet years before his appointment was actually gazetted.

The German commander-in-chief, whose flag now flies in the Dreadnought, Friedrich der Grosse, is without doubt one of Europe’s most distinguished naval officers. In a navy where more than elsewhere, a premium is placed upon scientific leadership, this officer early attracted the attention of his superiors by reason of the skill and resourcefulness he displayed during manoeuvres. He is said to have specialised in cruiser tactics, and to have been one of the first officers to urge upon the Navy Department the wisdom of adopting the battle-cruiser design when that novel conception materialised in the British “Invincible.” He is also known as the leading advocate of that system of tactics which is known in Germany as the “rÜcksichtslose Offensive,” and which in homely idiom may be translated as “going for” the enemy hammer and tongs.

In a word, Admiral von Ingenohl is the embodiment of the strikingly progressive spirit which pervades the modern German navy. It is by no means a spirit of mere reckless dash, which reckons on gaining a victory solely by impetuous onslaught. Under modern conditions, tactics such as these might well be fatal to those who employed them, owing to the deadly precision of heavy guns and the development of the torpedo. The German school of naval thought favours, instead, a preliminary period of “mosquito warfare,” seeking thus to reduce both the material and the moral strength of an enemy before the actual clash of armoured squadrons takes place. That this idea is faithfully to be adhered to is clear from the opening incidents of the present campaign at sea, which have already shown that reliance is placed on the torpedo and the mine as a preliminary means of diminishing our preponderance in big ships. So far, indeed, the German plan of campaign has been singularly true to the principles advocated by the leading German authorities who have written of naval warfare. They lead us to anticipate a good deal of this “Kleinkrieg” before the High Seas Fleet emerges from cover. On the other hand, it were unwise to suppose that the German Fleet will continue to act strictly by the book, especially in view of the character of its commander-in-chief.

In German naval circles Admiral von Ingenohl is known as one of the first German flag officers who completely freed themselves from the military traditions in which the fleet was cradled and has been reared. The German navy, as is well known, was founded as a branch of the army, and its early development proceeded on distinctly military lines. Until the present Emperor came to the Throne the head of the Admiralty was always an army officer, and it followed that, in so far as the different conditions permitted, the strategy and tactics of the fleet were brought into line with those of the land forces. Ships were regarded primarily as units for coast defence, in the most limited sense of the word. This held true far into the nineties, and it is actually less than two decades since Germany first undertook the construction of ships which were specially designed to meet and defeat the foe in open sea. It seems probable that Admiral von Ingenohl owes something of his broader views on naval strategy to the large amount of foreign service he has seen.

Born in 1857 of comparatively humble parents, he entered the navy at the age of 17. The service in those days enjoyed nothing like its present prestige. It offered no attractions to the sons of the upper classes, and was completely overshadowed by the army, then in the zenith of its brilliance and popularity, after the successful war against France. The navy drew a large majority of its officers from a class whose social status was considered scarcely high enough to give its sons the entrÉe to the army. Proof of this will be seen in the conspicuous absence of naval officers who are hereditary nobles. Admiral von Ingenohl, in common with Grand-Admirals von Tirpitz, von Koester, and several other flag officers, received his patent of nobility as a mark of Imperial favour.

While on his maiden cruise in foreign waters the young officer was privileged to see some fighting. His ship, the old “Vineta,” was one of a small German squadron which was assembled to teach the Chinese pirates a lesson. Nineteen years later he was again in action in the same quarter of the globe, and against the same opponents, when the gunboat “Iltis,” which he commanded, shelled a battery at Tamsui, which had fired on a German steamer. In the intervals of command afloat he was engaged at the Navy Department, where he put in one spell of nearly three and a half years as divisional chief of the ordnance board, and subsequently directed a department of the Admiral Staff. His first important independent command was the battleship “WÖrth,” in her day one of the best ships in the navy. He was next appointed to the cruiser “Kaiserin Augusta,” and shortly after to the “Hertha,” a more powerful ship of the same class. After another short interval of shore work he was appointed to command the Imperial yacht “Hohenzollern,” where, of course, he came under the direct eye of the Kaiser, who was quick to recognise his qualities.