SARATOGA.On June 11, 1776, Howe sailed from Halifax with his army of 9,000 men, and on July 3 occupied Staten Island without opposition. There he was joined by the reinforcements from England, conveyed by Lord Howe, and by Clinton and his troops, so that in August he had with him some 25,000 men, English and German. Washington's army at New York numbered about 19,000 effectives.[112] Mindful of his commission to restore tranquillity, Lord Howe wrote to him enclosing a copy of the king's offers. Washington would not receive the letter because the address did not acknowledge his military rank, and observed that the powers of the commissioners extended only to granting pardons, and that his people had done nothing for which they needed pardon. The pacific mission of the Howes having so far failed, the general on August 22-25 landed an army on Long Island, which is separated from New York by the East river. Brooklyn heights on Long Island, opposite New York, were strongly fortified and held by the Americans. Washington, believing that a larger British force was left in Staten Island than was really the case, thought it necessary to keep a numerous garrison in New York to meet a direct attack on the place, and detached only some 9,000 men under Putnam to Long Island. They were for the most part posted so as to hold a belt of wooded hills lying between their lines and the royal army. During the night of the 26th Howe outflanked them and brought his main body to a position on their rear. The next day an attack was made on their front; they were caught between two divisions of the king's troops and were defeated. Howe put their loss at 3,300, which is certainly an overestimate, though he made nearly 1,100 prisoners, among them the generals Sullivan and Lord Stirling, as the Americans called him, an unsuccessful claimant of that earldom.[113] The British casualties were 377. The Americans retreated within their inner lines. If Howe had allowed his troops to storm their entrenchments he would probably have destroyed or taken the whole force on the island. He considered, however, that the lines could in a few days be taken "at a very cheap rate" by regular approaches, and decided not to risk the loss of any more men.[114] He let his opportunity slip, and on the night of the 29th Washington, helped by a fog, cleverly withdrew his troops across the river.

Lord Howe took advantage of the American defeat to invite congress to send some of its members to confer with him unofficially as to possible terms of peace. Congress, though it refused to sanction any unofficial negotiations, sent commissioners from its own body to confer with him. Nothing came of the conference, for the American commissioners would not treat except on the basis of independence. On September 15 the British army descended on Manhattan Island, on which New York stands, and the American militia fled in disorder. The British took possession of New York and of sixty-six of the enemy's guns. If Howe's movements had been more prompt he might have cut off a large number of the enemy; he is said to have wasted time by lingering over luncheon at the house of the mother of Lindley Murray, the grammar-writer, who detained him by her crafty hospitality. Washington drew off his troops to Haarlem heights, in the northern part of the island. The next day there was some skirmishing in which the Americans held their ground. The loyalists of New York had been shamefully treated by the dominant faction, and the British were received with joy.[115] A few days later a large part of the city was destroyed by fires evidently kindled by incendiaries. Washington and other generals had wished for military reasons to burn the place. They were prevented by congress, but the idea was taken up by some violent revolutionists. The Americans were disheartened by their ill-success; Washington's troops deserted in large numbers, and the greatest disorder prevailed in his army. In England the news of Howe's victory and his occupation of New York was received with delight, and the king rewarded him with the Order of the Bath.The acquisition of New York gave the army an excellent base for operations either in the northern or southern provinces; it was easily accessible by sea, and lay in the midst of a district where loyalism was strong. According to the ministerial plan, Howe should have been joined by Carleton's army, which was to have taken Crown Point and Ticonderoga, gained possession of the upper Hudson, and invaded the province of New York from the north. After the Americans were chased out of Canada, Carleton's operations were stopped by the lack of a fleet to wrest the command of Lake Champlain from the rebels. During the summer he devoted himself with extraordinary energy to collecting and building vessels. Ships sent out from England were taken to pieces, carried overland to St. John's and put together again, little gunboats and transports were built, and by the beginning of October a larger and better fleet than that of the Americans was afloat on the lake. It engaged the enemy's fleet, under Arnold, off Valcour island, on the 11th and again on the 13th, and utterly destroyed it; only three of their vessels escaped.[116] Carleton occupied Crown Point, but as the season was so far advanced did not attack Ticonderoga, or stay long enough to put Crown Point in a defensible condition; he placed his army in winter quarters and returned to Quebec. He might have done more. His decision disappointed the king, and was represented to him in an unfavourable light, for Germain had a personal grudge against Carleton, and had already, in August, sent an order, which failed to reach him, that beyond his province the command was to be taken by Burgoyne. George, conscious of Carleton's signal services, at first declared himself satisfied that he had good reason for his decision; but Germain had the royal ear, and when the news came that Carleton had actually closed the campaign, the king accused him of slackness.

An example of real slackness was being given by Howe at New York. He should with the aid of the fleet have made a prompt effort to prevent Washington from retreating from Manhattan island, and to cut off his communications with Connecticut whence he was drawing supplies. Even before occupying New York he might have conveyed his army by water to a point from which White Plains, where the land begins to broaden out rapidly, might have been reached with ease. He wasted four weeks of precious time at New York, and did not embark his troops till October 12. Washington left his narrow position on Haarlem heights, gained White Plains before him, and fortified his camp. Howe attacked him on the 28th with the object of outflanking him. Although part of his army by a frontal attack drove the American right from a strong position, this success was fruitless as well as costly. The insurgents' centre was weak, and if he had attacked it in force he might have crushed them completely. He made no further attempt in that direction, and Washington retreated to a good position behind Croton river. Howe returned to New York. There, however, he dealt the Americans a serious blow. Fort Washington, on Manhattan island, and Fort Lee, opposite to it on the Jersey shore, were intended to bar the Hudson and so secure communications with the country to the west of it. Congress, which often interfered in military matters, ordered that Fort Washington should be held, though in fact the forts did not prevent our ships from passing up the river. On November 16 a well-planned attack was made upon the fort; it was forced to surrender, and 2,858 prisoners, forty-three cannon, and a large quantity of small arms were taken by the British.

Two days later Cornwallis took possession of Fort Lee, together with 140 cannon and stores of various kinds. He rapidly overran New Jersey. Washington had been drawn down thither, and Lee, whom he left at the Croton, failed to support him. He retreated hastily through New Jersey with a force daily diminished by desertion. Cornwallis pressed upon him, but was detained by Howe's orders for a week at Brunswick; and Washington, who left Princeton only an hour before Cornwallis entered it, had just time to convey his army, then reduced to some 3,300 men,[117] across the Delaware on December 8 before the British came up. They were unable to follow him at once for no boats were left on the eastern bank. Howe, who had joined Cornwallis, decided that no more could be done and placed the army in winter quarters. He divided it into small detachments, and for the sake of protecting and encouraging the loyalists, extended his line of communication for eighty miles. The fortunes of the insurgents were at low ebb. Not only were the loyalists strong in New Jersey, but crowds of the rebel party, many of them men of high standing, took advantage of the amnesty which Howe was empowered to offer. The Delaware would soon be frozen over, and, if the British crossed it, Washington had not a sufficient force to hinder them from marching on Philadelphia. The town was panic-stricken, and congress removed to Baltimore. Washington's army dwindled. The period for which his regular troops were enlisted would end on January 1, and as for the militia, that "destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob" as he called them, they came and went as they pleased. "The game," he thought, "was pretty well played out."[118] The Americans' distress was heightened by the capture of Lee, who was on his way to join Washington. They reckoned him their ablest general, though his insubordination and self-seeking rendered the loss of him an actual gain. About the same time Clinton sailed to Rhode Island with Sir Peter Parker, and occupied Newport without opposition.Washington's only chance lay in immediate action. The foolish disposition of the British army gave him an opportunity. Their central cantonments, nearest to the enemy, were weak. Trenton was held by only 1,200 Hessians; their discipline was relaxed, they were hindered by difference of language from gaining intelligence, and they lived in careless security. Washington was reinforced by Lee's troops and by three regiments from Ticonderoga, which Carleton's inaction had rendered available for service in the south. On the night of December 25 he crossed the Delaware, and before daybreak took Trenton by surprise. The startled garrison could make no resistance; about 200 escaped and 918 were taken prisoners. Of the Americans only two were killed and six wounded. Cornwallis, who was on the point of embarking for England, hastened back to the Jersey army. Washington avoided a general engagement, defeated two regiments employed in an operation for the defence of Princeton, and before the middle of January, 1777, compelled the British by a series of well-conducted movements to evacuate West Jersey and withdraw to Brunswick and Amboy, where they went into quarters. The king's troops, British and German, committed many excesses, plundering friends and foes alike; and the inhabitants, indignant at their conduct, took advantage of Washington's success and turned against them. Many joined Washington's army. The British were in the midst of a hostile population, and though they had communication with New York by water, were almost besieged by land, for their supplies were constantly intercepted. The Jersey loyalists were left to the vengeance of their neighbours and were mercilessly plundered. Many of them fled to New York where several thousand provincial troops were embodied. Howe remained inactive at New York until the spring, and Washington also stayed quietly at his headquarters at Morristown.

Parliament was opened on October 31, 1776. An amendment to the address referring to American affairs was defeated in the lords by 91 to 26 and in the commons by 242 to 87. The news of the victory at Brooklyn—"the terrible news," as Fox indecently called it—and of the occupation of New York strengthened the ministers; and on a motion to revise the acts by which the Americans considered themselves aggrieved, the minority in the commons sank to 47. Depressed by the exhibition of their weakness, the Rockingham section ceased to attend parliament except on the occasion of private bills in which they were interested. Petulance and a false notion of dignity led them to neglect their duty to their country and their party. Their conduct was blamed by other whigs, and their secession, though it occasioned discord in the opposition, did not paralyse its efforts. Fox, by that time its most effective orator, went off to Paris, and the king advised North to proceed with as much business as possible in his absence.

The split in the opposition was specially manifested on the introduction of a government bill in February, 1777, for a partial suspension of the habeas corpus act, in order to secure the detention of persons charged with high treason in America or on the high seas; Rockingham, Burke, and others adhered to their secession, while Dunning and Fox headed the minority in the commons. Fox warned the house not to be deceived by the amicable professions of the French ministers, who, he said, were holding conferences with delegates from congress while he was in Paris, and were only delaying to take part against England until the French navy was in good order. He declared that our losses were far greater and our successes far smaller than they were represented by government, and inveighed against the inhumanity with which he asserted the war was conducted on our side. He attacked the solicitor-general, who in answering him pointed out that if, as he asserted, France was secretly intriguing against us the bill was specially necessary. In a personal encounter Wedderburn was a dangerous antagonist, and Fox met more than his match. Dunning urged an amendment to prevent any abuse of the act; and North, always averse from violent measures, accepted his proposal. The bill was carried by 112 to 33. Public feeling had lately been excited on the subject of treason by incendiary fires which did much damage in the Portsmouth dockyard and destroyed some buildings on Bristol quay. They were found to have been the work of one James Aitken, commonly called John the painter, who had lately returned from America, and who stated in his confession that he had acted at the instigation of Silas Deane, one of the emissaries of congress in Paris.[119] He was hanged at Portsmouth on March 10.The expenses of the war were growing. For 1777 parliament voted 45,000 seamen, including 1,000 marines. The difficulty was to get them. A seaman's service was not continuous; when his ship was paid off he could go whither he would. The peace establishment of the navy was ridiculously small, and when a war broke out it was always difficult to get men in a hurry. Many of the best seamen would have taken service on board merchant ships and would, perhaps, be at sea; and life on the king's ships in time of war was often so rough that it is not surprising that men should have avoided it. The usual difficulty of manning the fleet at the beginning of a war was increased at the present time, for it was calculated that the revolt of the colonies deprived England of 1,800 seamen. The navy in time of war was recruited by impressment, a system which, though recognised by common law, entailed much hardship. Seamen were kidnapped, often after a bloody struggle, and if caught inland were sent to the ports ironed like criminals. Men who had been at sea for years were liable, as soon as their ships neared home, to be taken out of them, put into a press tender and sent to sea again. Merchant ships were stripped of their best men, and were left to be brought into port by the master and a few lads. The press gangs looked for trained seamen, though when a war lasted for some years they took what they could get; landsmen were impressed, and the press was sometimes abused as a means of getting rid of a personal enemy, a rival in love, or an inconvenient claimant. The system was expensive; it was stated that from 4,000 to 5,000 seamen were employed on the business, and that every pressed man who was found to be fit for sea cost the nation £30. High bounties were offered, but they failed to entice men to enter a service which the press might make practically continuous, and a proposal for a limited term of service was rejected by the commons. The supplies for the year amounted to £12,592,534. New taxes calculated to yield £237,000 were laid on male servants, a guinea on each, stamps, imported glass, auctioneers, and sales by auction; and the deficiency of £5,500,000 was met by a loan, raised at 4 per cent., with a premium of ½ per cent. to meet the state of the stocks.

While war was thus increasing the burden of the nation, the king again applied to parliament for payment of the arrears of the civil list, amounting to £618,000. The ministers exhibited accounts which failed to satisfy the opposition. Wilkes pointed out that payments since 1769 of £171,000 and £114,000 for secret service were each noted in a single line, and that there was a general charge of £438,000 for pensions. As in 1769, the arrears must be traced to an expenditure which increased the king's influence. Wilkes said this plainly, Burke in less broad terms, and Fox taunted North with the pledge given when he was in office in 1769 that no such demand should be made again. Besides money deliberately spent in corruption, vast sums were wasted on abuses in the royal household, on sinecures, and on other useless places of profit. One of the king's turnspits was a member of the house of commons, and paid £5 a year to a humble deputy, and no fewer than twenty-three separate tables were kept up, eleven for the nurses. For such abuses George was only partially responsible. Though he lived with a frugality which was almost meanness, he was in dire distress for money; the wages of his menial servants were six quarters in arrear, and he owed his coal-merchant £6,000.[120] After much discussion the money was voted, and the civil list was increased to £900,000 a year. In presenting the bill to the king the speaker, Sir Fletcher Norton, dwelt on the magnificence of the gift, and added that the commons were confident that he would apply wisely what they had granted liberally. Though the court party in the commons declared that he had not expressed the feeling of the house, he received a vote of thanks for his speech. Towards the close of the session Chatham was sufficiently recovered from his long illness again to attend parliament, and moved an address to the crown to put an end to the war. He pointed out the danger of foreign intervention, and declared that France was already destroying our commerce. The idea of conquering America was absurd; America would not be conquered by the loss of ten pitched battles. He was against American independence, but this country, he said, was the aggressor, and "instead of exacting unconditional submission from the colonies, we should grant them unconditional redress". His motion was negatived by 99 votes to 28.

A fresh plan for obtaining the mastery of the line of the Hudson was already in course of preparation. Burgoyne, who returned home in December, obtained the command of the northern army, and, on February 28, laid a project of campaign before the government. He proposed to secure Ticonderoga and the lakes, and march down the Hudson to Albany, where he was to effect a junction with Howe, previously detaching a small force to create a diversion by advancing from Oswego and down the Mohawk river to Albany. The object of this plan was to open communication between New York and Canada, cut off New England from the southern provinces, and enable Howe to operate in the south with an overwhelming force. He pointed out the difficulties of the proposed march and suggested alternative schemes; but his first project was chosen by the king, and he was ordered to carry it out. The projected campaign, if successful, would have been disastrous to the Americans. Its success depended on Howe's co-operation. An invasion by distinct armies, such as Burgoyne proposed, with bases far apart and acting on converging lines, can only be undertaken with safety when intercommunication is secure and co-operation assured. Otherwise one of the invading armies is liable to be crushed before it can receive help from another, specially when, as was the case here, the enemy can act on lines interior to those on which the invaders move. Burgoyne fell into the error, common throughout the war, of trusting too much to loyalist help. Apart from that, however, his project assumed that Howe would be advancing up the Hudson in time to get between him and any large force which might advance against him, and it failed miserably, because Howe did not co-operate with him. Germain informed Carleton of the plan and ordered him to resign the command of the northern army to Burgoyne; he was to command only within his own province, keeping 3,700 men with him, and was to forward Burgoyne's expedition. Germain reproached him for his retirement from Ticonderoga, which, he said, gave Washington the means of breaking the British line at Trenton. Carleton was indignant at this unworthy treatment, and though he did what he could to help Burgoyne, he resigned the governor-generalship.[121]During the winter Howe formed a plan for taking Philadelphia, and on December 20, 1776, expounded it by letter to Germain, observing that the northern army would not reach Albany before September. Germain wrote on March 8 approving of his plan,[122] which might have been executed without preventing the junction contemplated by the minister. After some unimportant operations Howe took the field in June, and on the 5th received a copy of Carleton's instructions relating to Burgoyne's campaign. Washington's difficulties were then somewhat relieved; he encamped at Middlebrook in a position too strong to be forced; he would not be enticed to a general engagement, and Howe could not leave him in his rear and push on to Philadelphia. Time was passing, yet Howe was still set on prosecuting his design on Philadelphia. Finally he embarked an army of 14,000 men at Sandy Hook, and instead of remaining to be in readiness to co-operate with Burgoyne, left Clinton with 8,500 men to garrison New York and "act as circumstances may direct," and on July 23 sailed for the Delaware, where he considered he would be sufficiently near to New York to act with Burgoyne, if necessary, and yet could carry out his own main design. The naval officers were unwilling to risk disembarkation in the Delaware, and Howe, determined not to give up his design, sailed for Chesapeake bay. The fleet met with contrary winds, and it was not until August 25 that his army landed at the head of Elk river. Washington with about an equal force marched to the north of the Brandywine to defend Philadelphia. The two armies met on September 11. Howe, who well knew how to handle an army in the field, out-manoeuvred him, and after some sharp fighting the American army was defeated with a loss of over 1,400 men, killed, wounded, and taken, and eleven guns. Congress again decamped, and on the 27th Cornwallis took possession of Philadelphia amid the acclamations of a large part of the inhabitants, while Howe and the main army encamped at Germantown, five miles to the north.

In order to secure communication with New York and to supply the army, it was all-important that the fleet should be able to pass up the Delaware, which was strongly defended by forts, a bar, and a fleet of little vessels; and Howe detached troops to act against the forts. Washington lay a few miles to the north; he was joined by strong reinforcements, and determined to take advantage of the division of the British troops. He formed a plan for surprising and driving in their advanced posts, cutting their force in two, crushing their right wing, and then doubling the whole army back on the Schuylkill river where it would be at his mercy. He attacked at daybreak on October 4 under cover of a fog. The head of the British position was insufficiently guarded and the 40th regiment was driven back. At this critical moment its commander, Musgrave, and a party of his men stopped the enemy's advance by seizing a house which stood in their way and holding it against them until the army had time to form. His gallant conduct saved the army. The Americans fought well until, misled by the fog, one of their brigades fired on another. This threw them into disorder, which was increased by the drunkenness of some of their officers and men. Cornwallis came up from Philadelphia in hot haste and pressed upon them. They retreated with a loss of 673 killed and wounded, and 400 taken; on the British side the casualties were 551. Both in this action and in the battle on the Brandywine the Americans showed that they had learned to fight with resolution and to retreat in good order. The two engagements proved that though they might be defeated in the field, the war would not come to a speedy end, and this enlisted foreign sympathy and encouraged France to intervene on their side.For a month Howe was engaged in opening the passage of the Delaware. He sent for 4,000 men from New York. This reduction of the garrison was most unfortunate, for, as we shall see, it put an end to Clinton's attempt to co-operate with Burgoyne.[123] At last the defences of the river were destroyed, and communication was established between the army and the fleet. Washington retreated to Valley Forge, about twenty-five miles from Philadelphia, and there put his army into quarters. During the winter his troops suffered terribly from lack of clothing and provisions. By Christmas nearly 3,000 were unfit for duty because they were "barefoot or otherwise naked". They deserted in parties, a large number came to the British quarters, and scarcely a day passed without the resignation of an officer. In February, 1778, there was almost a famine in the camp, and Washington feared a general mutiny and dispersion.[124]

Meanwhile the British were in comfortable quarters in Philadelphia. Howe's object was attained; but though the capture of their capital discouraged the Americans, the loss of Philadelphia is not to be compared with the loss of a capital of an organised state; it did not paralyse an administrative machinery or lessen the means of resistance. Howe's anxiety for its capture largely proceeded from his expectation that it would be followed by a rising of the loyalists; he placed too high a value on professions of loyalty and on loyalist support. In itself the place was important; it was the largest of the American towns, and it opened communication between the northern and southern provinces, though so long as an insurgent army existed in Pennsylvania, an invader could not safely take advantage of its position. British officers marvelled that Howe did not attack Washington while his army was in so miserable a state. His inactivity cannot be defended satisfactorily. He was looking forward to be relieved of his command; he was disgusted by the inadequate response made by the government to his repeated demands for large reinforcements; he informed Germain that without 10,000 more troops the war would not be ended in the next campaign, and on October 22 wrote resigning his command. He allowed the discipline of his army to become lax. The winter was spent in idleness and dissipation. A bank at faro was opened, and many officers were ruined by gambling. All ranks were demoralised, and sober townspeople who had welcomed the arrival of the troops were disgusted by their disorderly behaviour. The only fruit of Howe's victories during the campaign of 1777 was the acquisition of good winter quarters at Philadelphia, and that he purchased at the price of an appalling disaster to a British army.[125]Burgoyne took the field in June with 7,251 rank and file of regular troops, of which 3,116 were Germans, 148 militia, and 503 Indians, in all 7,902. Shortly before he left Canada a small force set out under Colonel St. Leger to march from Lake Ontario, take Fort Stanwix, and form a junction with him by an advance through the Mohawk valley. Burgoyne's army was in fine order, but the arrangements for the carriage of supplies and the making of roads were insufficient. His troops were carried up Lake Champlain and landed at Crown Point, where he made a speech to his Indian allies, commanding them to observe the customs of civilised warfare and to behave with humanity. He was to find that such orders could not be enforced. On July 6, almost as soon as he arrived at Ticonderoga, the Americans hastily abandoned it, leaving their guns behind them. They were promptly pursued and suffered heavy losses. The fugitives joined Schuyler, the commander of the army in the north, at Fort Edward; he evacuated the place and retreated southwards in the direction of Albany. The news of Burgoyne's success caused much rejoicing in England. George is said to have rushed into the queen's room as soon as he heard of it crying, "I have beat them! beat all the Americans!" For the moment the Americans were panic-struck. Men said angrily that their troops would never hold a place until a general had been shot, and Schuyler was superseded by Gates.

On July 10 Burgoyne set out to march from Skenesborough to Fort Edward, sending his artillery and stores by water to Fort George. His route, though not more than twenty miles, was extremely difficult; it was obstructed by trees felled by the enemy and lay through swamps and forests, and at least forty bridges had to be constructed in its course. He might have avoided these difficulties by returning to Ticonderoga and conveying his army by water up Lake George; but he rejected that route because he thought that a retrograde movement would discourage his troops and abate the panic of the enemy. His army did not reach the Hudson until the 30th. At Fort Edward his supplies ran short and he had to wait there, for his means of transport were not sufficient to bring his stores from Fort George. Garrisons had to be found for Ticonderoga and for posts of communication, and this diminished his army. Meanwhile the enemy was increasing in force. While at Ticonderoga he published a foolish proclamation reminding those who persisted in rebellion that he had it in his power to let loose the Indians upon them. Nothing would have induced him to commit so hideous a crime, and his proclamation only served to enrage the Americans and swell the number of their troops. The Indians were offended by his efforts to restrain them, and deserted him; they were no loss, for they caused more trouble than they were worth, and some excesses which they committed, and specially the murder of a Miss McCrae by an Indian who, it is said, was sent by her betrothed to bring her into the British lines, excited widespread indignation. Burgoyne was in sore need of supplies and made an attempt to seize the insurgents' stores and horses collected at Bennington. He sent only some 500 men on this service, for he was assured that the district was friendly. It was far otherwise. The party was surrounded on August 16, and another detachment formed of German troops which was despatched to help them marched so slowly that it did not come up in time. Both bodies were defeated with a loss, perhaps, of about 500 men.

News came of the failure of St. Leger's expedition. On his arrival at Oswego he was joined by Sir John Johnson and Butler with their loyalist regiments, and by a force of Indians whom Johnson, one of their superintendents, and the Mohawk leader, Brant, persuaded to march with them. He besieged Fort Stanwix, and, on August 6, defeated a force sent to relieve it. But his guns were too light for siege operations; the garrison held out, and his Indians forced him to raise the siege. During his retreat they mutinied; he was barely able to bring off his regular troops, and lost his guns and stores. Burgoyne was in a dangerous position; the country swarmed with enemies; "wherever the king's troops point," he wrote, "militia to the number of three or four thousand assemble in a few hours". He might have retreated to Fort Edward, where he would have had communication with Lake George; but he held that he was bound by his orders to advance, and on September 15, after collecting provisions for about a month, he conveyed his force to the western bank of the Hudson and cut himself off from communication with the lakes. Besides artillery, he had then with him only 5,000 men under arms.[126] On the 19th his force was partially engaged by Arnold at Freeman's Farm. The British held their ground but lost over 500 men, and Gates, the American commander, with 11,000 men, who did not take part in the fight, occupied a strong position in front of them. A message came from Clinton that he was about to attack the forts on the Hudson below Albany, and Burgoyne sent answer that he hoped to be able to hold his ground until October 20. He fortified his position and waited for further news. None came to him. The insurgent forces grew to at least 16,000 men; Burgoyne's provisions were becoming exhausted and on October 3 he put his little army on half rations. Despite the overwhelming number of the enemy, he moved forward on the 7th to ascertain whether he could force a passage through their lines. He was defeated with heavy loss and fell back on Saratoga.

A council of war held on the 12th decided on a retreat to Fort Edward. It was too late; the Americans held the fords and had a strong force encamped between Fort George and Fort Edward. Only 3,500 fighting men were left with Burgoyne; he was completely surrounded, and on the 14th he opened negotiations with Gates. Even then he refused to surrender unconditionally, and the convention of Saratoga was concluded on the 17th. His troops marched out with the honours of war, and were to be allowed to return to England on condition of not serving again in the war. The whole number which surrendered, including camp-followers, labourers, and detachments, was 5,762. Gates's behaviour at the surrender was such as became an officer and a gentleman. Congress shamefully broke the engagement. The captive troops were marched to Boston, but when the transports called for them, they were not allowed to embark. The paltry subterfuges by which congress defended its conduct only throw a specially odious light on its sacrifice of honour to policy. From the beginning of the war both sides made frequent complaints as to the treatment of prisoners, and both apparently with justice. Burgoyne's men were shamefully treated. He and his staff were allowed to return home in the spring of 1778; others were exchanged from time to time, but the mass of the army never came back. Clinton, who was then unaware of Burgoyne's distress, did what he could to render his position secure in case he arrived at Albany. As soon as he received reinforcements from England, he pushed up the Hudson and on October 6 destroyed the forts which barred the passage of our ships. He could do no more, for he was forced to send 4,000 men to Howe and could not leave New York without a sufficient garrison. A messenger from Burgoyne at last reached him. The way being cleared, the ships ascended the river and burnt the batteries and town at Esopus creek. The news of Clinton's activity doubtless secured Burgoyne more favourable terms than Gates was at first inclined to grant.The chief blame for this disaster must rest on Howe. His assertion that Philadelphia was the prime object of his campaign made Germain uneasy, and he wrote to him on May 18 that whatever he might meditate, he was not to neglect to co-operate with the northern army.[127] This despatch did not reach Howe until August 16, when he had made co-operation with Burgoyne impossible. A few days later Germain wrote again; the despatch was not ready for his signature at the time at which he wished to go into the country, and when he came back it was forgotten. It was a piece of gross carelessness, but an undue importance has been attached to it.[128] Howe was well aware of Burgoyne's expedition. On June 5 he had received a copy of a despatch from Germain which told him that Burgoyne was ordered to "force his way to Albany" and join him with the utmost speed.[129] Nevertheless, he persisted in pursuing his own plan. He must have hesitated whether to reach Philadelphia by land or water. When in June he at last made up his mind to move, he evidently tried to reach Philadelphia by land. If he had succeeded and had swept Washington before him, he might have kept in communication with Burgoyne and have co-operated with him. Failing in this, he decided to go by sea, and when he was told that he could not safely land in the Delaware, went on to Chesapeake bay. When he gained his object by taking Philadelphia he did so by a course which made it impossible for him to co-operate with Burgoyne, and put Washington's army between them.

According to the government plan the chief object of his campaign should have been his junction with Burgoyne. The government, that is Germain, certainly erred in not giving him precise orders, while Burgoyne had virtually no discretionary power. Yet it was for Howe, as commander-in-chief on the spot, to judge of the situation without explicit instructions. According to his own statements, his view of the situation was that Burgoyne would march through a friendly country and encounter no enemy except the army of 4,000 men under Schuyler, that Clinton would be able to give him any assistance which he might require, that his own expedition to Philadelphia would divert the enemy from Burgoyne, that he would be able to "account for" Washington, and that if Washington gave him the slip, he would be able to follow him up and prevent him from annoying Burgoyne.[130] These considerations may be supposed to have satisfied him that no direct co-operation with Burgoyne was required of him. Burgoyne had to encounter foes whom neither he nor Howe reckoned upon, and it was Howe's duty to be at hand to prevent their crushing him. Burgoyne made some mistakes in preparing for and prosecuting his campaign, but he and his men exhibited splendid courage, and he is not to be blamed for trying his fortune to the utmost. In view of his orders, and of the risk of leaving a co-operating force unsupported, he was bound to ascertain whether he could force his way through the enemy. The irregular character of the American force rendered success possible, and justified his gallant attempt of October 7. He was a fine soldier, and was regarded with confidence and affection by his subordinates. Clinton seems to have done all that was in his power considering the small force left with him in New York.[131]

The surrender of Burgoyne's army could not in itself affect the issue of the war. Its importance lies in its effect on the policy of foreign nations and specially of France. So far as the Americans alone were concerned, England had good reason to expect ultimate success. They would neither enlist in sufficient numbers to keep up a regular army nor provide for such troops as they had. The meddlesomeness and incapacity of congress were destroying its army; generals were intriguing against one another, soldiers were perishing for lack of necessaries, stores were wasted. Money was scarce and public credit bad. Early in 1778 congress had 5,500,000 paper dollars in circulation, and the value of its paper dollar was from half to a quarter of the silver dollar. Above all, the Americans had no fleet, and were consequently unable to protect their sea-board. Their alliance with France and subsequently with Spain brought them, along with other help, the sea-power without which the issue of the struggle might well have been adverse to them. France and Spain hoped to recoup themselves for former losses, France by conquests in the West Indies, Spain by regaining Gibraltar, Minorca, and Jamaica. In 1775 an agent of the French court went over to America with offers of help, and early in 1776 the Count de Vergennes, foreign minister of Louis XVI., proposed as a system of policy that the Bourbon kings should give secret aid to the Americans and strengthen their own forces, taking care, however, to persuade England that their intentions were pacific. About the same time congress sent Deane to France as a secret agent.

In accordance with the proposal of Vergennes the French and Spanish courts provided money for the Americans; and Beaumarchais, the dramatist, who masqueraded as a firm of merchants in order to conceal the participation of his government, spent it in purchasing military stores for them. The young Marquis de Lafayette and other Frenchmen entered their army. So too did the Poles, Kosciusko and Pulaski, and the Germans, Kalb and Steuben. In December Franklin went over to Paris. The philosophic movement was then at its height in France. The philosophes desired freedom of thought in religion, constitutional liberty, and the abolition of privilege of all kinds. They speculated as to the origins of political and social institutions and the laws of human progress. The works of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were eagerly studied by the nobles and fine ladies of the court with whom philosophisme was fashionable. America they regarded as a land of freedom and primitive simplicity; and they hailed the crude assertions of the Declaration of Independence, issued by a body largely composed of slave-owners, that all men are created equal and with an inalienable right to liberty, as bringing their theories within the range of practical politics. Franklin was received with ludicrous adulation as an embodiment of republican virtue and philosophic thought. He busied himself in stirring up hostility to England. Another American envoy sought help from Prussia. Frederick showed his hatred of England by forbidding some German troops which George had hired to pass through his dominions; but his quarrel with Austria with reference to the Bavarian succession rendered him unwilling to provoke Great Britain: he had no sympathy with the Americans and would not receive their envoy.

Besides the stores sent by Beaumarchais and 1,000 livres in cash, France helped the Americans by neglecting to prevent the violation of her neutrality by their ships. Although the Americans could not dispute with Great Britain on the sea, they had a few ships built by congress, more belonging to the maritime provinces, and a vast number of privateers. These ships did much damage to British trade. Already they hovered about the coasts of England and Ireland, and were so dangerous to our merchant vessels that merchants embarked their goods on foreign ships to avoid the risk of capture. By the end of 1778 nearly 1,000 merchant ships were taken by American privateers. Some of these privateers were fitted out in French ports, brought their prizes into them, and sailed from them again on fresh expeditions. Our ambassador, Lord Stormont, complained vigorously of these open breaches of neutrality, and at last the French government took some measures to stop them. The opposition in parliament constantly insisted that, if the war went on, France and Spain would certainly take part with the Americans. The government could no longer ignore, though it still strove to discredit, the danger of foreign intervention. The king's speech at the opening of parliament on October 20, 1777, took note of the naval preparations of the two powers and recommended an augmentation of the navy. Tidings of Burgoyne's disaster reached Europe on December 2. Vergennes at once informed the American agents that his master would make a treaty with them. The alliance was concluded on February 6, 1778; it was agreed that, in the event of war between France and England, neither of the contracting parties should make peace without the consent of the other or until the independence of the United States should be assured by treaty. France renounced all claim to Canada. If taken from England, it was to belong to the United States, while all conquests in the West Indies were to belong to France. Spain at this time declined to join in the alliance. That a treaty was signed was soon generally believed in England; it was officially declared by France on March 13. War between Great Britain and France began in the summer.

With the intervention of France the war enters on a new phase. Thenceforward England had to deal with more powerful enemies than the Americans. The war had lasted for three years and the rebellion was not crushed. Was it too much for England to expect that she would subdue a people of her own stock, as the Americans were then, separated from her by 3,000 miles of sea, and spread over a vast and difficult country? Had she trusted to her navy, as Barrington and others desired, shut the American ports, and held the towns on the coast and the navigable rivers, the insurgents might possibly have been driven to submission without any severe struggle. Conquest by land was decided on. Was Chatham right in declaring in May, 1777, that England could not conquer the Americans? Six months later a capable French officer serving in their army wrote to the French minister of war that, unless his country declared war against England, the Americans would fail to obtain independence; so little enthusiasm for the cause was there among them, so keenly did they feel the privations of the war.[132] In our war in South Africa of 1899-1902 the Boers showed themselves better soldiers than the Americans, and were not less brave; they were akin to us in race, and their country was at least as difficult as America. In both wars our well-drilled troops constantly found their previous training useless or worse; in both we received loyal support from numerous colonials on the spot. While improved means of transport brought South Africa far nearer to us than America was in the eighteenth century, the Boers were better prepared for war than the Americans, and were a more martial people. Yet England conquered them. So far, then, as the Americans alone were concerned, Chatham's assertion must be denied.

Why then had England done so little in those three years? There was much active loyalty on our side: thousands of colonials fought for the crown during the course of the war; in the central provinces at least half the population was for us. Everything depended on the vigour and judgment with which force was applied. In these respects there was failure both at home and on the spot. In the first place the effort required was underestimated. In February, 1774, Gage thought four regiments would keep things quiet; in 1775 it was believed that 10,000 men would be enough; in January, 1776, Howe asked for 20,000, in November his estimate for the next year was 35,000. Germain promised to raise his army to that number, yet instead of 10,000 men he offered him only 7,800 rank and file. On March 26 he confessed that he could only send 2,900, and on April 19 that he had to subtract 400 of these for Canada.[133] The country was strong for coercion, but recruits were hard to raise; it willed the end but not the means. The king and Germain interfered too much with the plans of operations. To direct a war from the other side of the Atlantic in days when letters between the secretary at war and the commander-in-chief seem often to have been nearly two months on their way, was to court failure.

At the outset of the war the enemy was unduly despised both by ministers at home and soldiers in the field. As the British general in command at Belmont is said to have rejected a proposal for turning the Boers' position, declaring that he would "put the fear of God into them," so Howe at Bunker hill delivered a frontal attack on the enemy's entrenchments which cost him over 1,000 men. Then he went to the opposite extreme of over-caution. It is needless to recapitulate the occasions on which either from over-caution or supineness he allowed great opportunities to slip, as notably on Long Island. He, indeed, in a greater degree than any one else is responsible for the British failure to bring the war to an end. Every month improved the fighting qualities of the Americans, under the judicious handling of Washington, and at last France and the other enemies of England saw that they might take them seriously and might turn the war to their own profit.[134]