A brief history of the work of the Shell Committee, its organization, and the part played by the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company in producing munitions during the first two and a half years of the War.

On September 8, 1915, Col. Alex Bertram, Thomas Cantley, and George W. Watts were summoned by the Federal Minister of Militia, Sir Sam Hughes, to Valcartier. On meeting the Minister he stated that the British Secretary of State for War had advised the Canadian Government that the War Office were desirous of having shrapnel shells made in Canada, that the Canadian Government had decided to entrust the matter to a Committee of Manufacturers, and had so advised the War Office. It was understood that the advice of the Minister had been accepted, and that the names of the three gentlemen above referred to had been approved by the War Office as a Committee to carry on the work on their behalf. The men above named were then asked to serve as such Committee, without remuneration, which they agreed to do, and were requested to select one of their number as Chairman. On the suggestion of Thos. Cantley, Colonel Bertram was appointed Chairman, the Minister confirming the appointment of the Committee by a memorandum initialed “For Action.”

Later, Mr. E. Carnegie, of Welland, was added to the Committee, and at their request the Minister agreed that Colonel Benson, Master General of Ordnance; Colonel Lafferty, Superintendent of the Dominion Arsenal; and Colonel Greville Harston, Inspector of Arms and Ammunition, should be added as Technical Members.

The first meeting was held the same evening (September 8th) at the Chateau Frontenac, Quebec. The second meeting was held the following day at the office of the Superintendent of the Dominion Arsenal. The Committee were accorded the privilege of dissecting the manufacturing costs of the various operations involved in making shells of this type at the Dominion Arsenal, which at that time had an out-turn of about 200 per day.

From the data there available and their experience as manufacturers the Committee advised the War Office that 200,000 shrapnel shells could be produced by the Committee and supplied to the War Office at a price of $8.30 for the 15–pounder, and $8.55 each for the 18–pounder. On this information being cabled to London the Committee were at once instructed to proceed with the order.

After the order was in process of execution a contract was presented by a representative of the War Office to the four civilian members, viz., Messrs. Bertram, Cantley, Watt and Carnegie, under which contract they were obligated to supply the War Office with these shells at the prices stated. This contract was duly executed, the Honorable Minister of Militia signing on behalf of and representing, the War Office, the civilian members signing on their own behalf.

While the first order was for 200,000 shells, additional orders were placed by the War Office with the Committee at various times between September, 1914, and November, 1915, aggregating in all $345,222,870.24. The contract prices were in most cases named by the War Office. In some cases the prices were the result of compromise arranged by cable between the Committee and the War Office. In other cases the prices were those suggested by the Committee and were accepted by the War Office.

As already stated, every order was covered by a contract between the War Office on the one hand and the four civilian members of the Committee on the other, for the carrying out of which the civilian members were collectively and individually responsible. When they resigned office a statement, which was prepared and duly audited showing the total cost, together with the surplus based on prices agreed upon and covered by contracts between the War Office and the four civilian members, showed that the contracts entered into amounted in all to $345,222,874.34. Approximately 87½ per cent. of these orders were then completed, and the surplus—the difference between the contract price and the cost of production—was $42,097,584.57, less overhead charges, cost of inspection, guages, etc., of $737,400.31. If 12½ per cent. be added to this overhead charge to meet similar expenses incidental to the completion of the contracts, $92,175.03 would require to be added, making the total overhead expenditure $829,575.34, or a total net surplus to the credit of the Committee on November 30, 1915, of $41,268,009.23. The total overhead cost, covering inspection, cost of guages, accounting, and office expense of the Committee, worked out at.17, or less than one-fifth of one per cent. of contract prices.

In this connection it may be stated that the prices paid by the War Office to American makers in many cases were considerably higher than those paid in Canada for shells and other material. In other cases, where the prices were approximately the same, the volume of orders entrusted to the United States makers were very much greater than the corresponding orders placed with the Canadian Shell Committee, and the American prices should have been considerably lower. Further, the orders placed in the United States were entrusted to an agent, who is reported to have received a handsome commission, whereas the services of the Canadian Shell Committee were freely given.

In the early stages the executive work of the Committee was carried on by General Bertram, whose time was largely taken up in co-ordinating the machining of parts, and the placing of orders for components among Canadian manufacturers, while Thomas Cantley undertook to carry out experiments, both chemical and physical, looking to the production of open hearth basic steel to meet the specifications and tests called for by the War Office. Experiments were also carried out later in regard to steel discs, base plates, nose plugs, alloy steel armor plating, etc. Later Colonel Bertram, Thos. Cantley and G. W. Watts collaborated in fixing prices for component parts and machining and assembling of the different size shells. Later they devised a complete system of records, inspection sheets, transfer and shipping forms, store and stock forms, and a complete system of accounting was worked out and inaugurated by them.

Late in September the Minister of Militia, on the suggestion of the Committee, approved the appointment of David Carnegie as Ordnance Adviser to the Committee, in view of the fact that he had had considerable experience in munition work at Woolwich Arsenal.

When the War Office first appealed to Canada for assistance in supplying munitions, little was known of shell manufacturing in Canada. This being the case the Canadian Government decided that a Committee of Manufacturers could better serve the War Office than could the Government through any of the Departments; and then followed the formation of the Shell Committee as originally outlined. The Committee had before them three problems: First, that of securing steel of the requisite character; secondly, the forging of the steel into shell bodies, together with the supply of other component parts, comprising brass, copper, tin, zinc and antimony; and thirdly, the machining and assembling of these various component parts.

Up to the time that the request came from the War Office practically no men in Canada, with the exception of those employed at the Dominion Arsenal, knew anything about the manufacture of shells, or the material required for same. The steel hitherto used at the Dominion Arsenal had been supplied by the Crucible Steel Co. of America, and the War Office had stipulated that only Acid Open Hearth Siemens-Martin steel could be employed in shell forgings. As no Siemens-Martin steel was produced in Canada, and if the War Office adhered to their stipulation in that respect the entire steel supply would have to be obtained in the United States, the American makers, feeling sure that this would be done, promptly advanced their prices approximately forty per cent.

At this juncture the Minister of Militia appealed to Thomas Cantley, then President and General Manager of the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co., as to whether the Scotia plant could not produce steel which would meet not only the chemical but physical requirements of the War Office shell specifications. He at once expressed the belief that they could do so, and immediately proceeded to carry out exhaustive experiments, both chemical and physical, which proved conclusively that the Scotia Company could produce steel as called for by the War Office, and offered to supply it at a price as low as the original price asked by the American works, and indeed below the American price. Within a few days of receipt of the first order by the Shell Committee from the War Office, the Scotia Company supplied the Committee with steel for 200,000 shrapnel shells. The difference in price paid to the Scotia Company and the price asked by the American Co. for the steel supplied on this small order amounted to over $40,000.

As regards forging of shells, the cost of producing the various component parts, the labor involved in finishing and assembling these—the Committee were supplied with the cost of these various operations as carried on at the Dominion Arsenal, but the difficulty involved was that the work, having been done there by a class of machine not in general use in Canada, and with the comparatively small order in hand, manufacturers could not be found who would purchase and install plant for this work and turn out shells within a reasonable time and price.

Manufacturers throughout the country were invited to visit the Dominion Arsenal at Quebec, where they would be shown the various operations involved, and given all information re cost, methods employed, etc. Quite a number responded to this invitation. Some offered to undertake the work; others declined to undertake it on any basis whatever.

Colonel Bertram volunteered that the John Bertram & Sons Co. would do a certain amount of machining and assembling, and Thos. Cantley, through his Company, the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co., undertook to supply the steel and forgings, while Mr. Watt, of the Canadian General Electric Company, agreed to make some of the component parts. Sir Thomas Shaughnessy, on being appealed to by the Committee for assistance, instructed the Superintendent of the Angus Shops to take on some of the work, and generously promised that the Angus Shops would take up their share of the enterprise.

With the start made by these firms to encourage them, a few other manufacturers were induced to take up a share of the work, and thus the supply of components parts and machining of same for the first 200,000 shells was finally placed, and this initial order was shipped complete and to the entire satisfaction of the War Office some considerable time before the contract date.

So soon as the work involved in the first trial order had been accepted by the manufacturers referred to, the Committee took up the organization necessary for the co-ordinating of the work on a larger scale; and as large orders were received in rapid succession from the War Office, contracts were made with different manufacturers for component parts, which were bought outright by the Committee. A full set of component parts for each shell was supplied by the assembly contractors, by whom these were finished and returned as completed shells, they being paid a fixed price on the shells which were completed, and which passed all the tests demanded by the War Office, and were certified as such by the Government Inspection Bureau. The component parts before being accepted by the Committee and delivered to the finishing contractors were inspected and certified by the Committee’s inspectors. Any component parts spoiled by the assembly manufacturers had to be paid for by them at the actual cost of same.

The first experiences of the forging and finishing contractors alike were disappointing. It was an entirely new business to everybody engaged in the work, and the usual initial difficulties were met and overcome with varying success.

It is safe to say that as far as the first order of 200,000 shells was concerned, the companies engaged, either as makers of component parts or as assembly contractors, received little, if any, profit for their work. They had only the usual reward that comes to pioneers in any new work.

When the new and larger orders came in, both the material and the work were thrown open to competition. The Dominion Steel Corporation, the Steel Company of Canada, and other smaller steel producers were asked to supply steel and forgings. The same thing applied to manufacturing establishments, which were in a position to supply other component parts or to take on the work of machining and assembling. By the early part of 1915 the work was distributed throughout the entire Dominion.

Those who had done the pioneering work, and who won their position through dearly-bought experience, and by venturing in where others lacked courage to do so, came under criticism from others who had not hitherto undertaken any of the work. To overcome this difficulty and to assure hearty co-operation in the production of the largest amount of munitions possible, the Committee adopted the principle of naming a flat price for each component part, as well as for the machining and assembling of each size shell.

All the orders placed thereafter, from time to time, were placed at a uniform price, both for the component parts and for the finishing of the shells. The instant effect of this was that the accumulated experience of the pioneering firms was placed at the disposal of the other manufacturers. Both forging and finishing shops were thrown open, their methods of working and costs were fully explained, and shown to other manufacturers. The newcomers thus saved the heavy cost of experimental work.

New methods, improvements of great value in connection with the execution of the work, the outcome of the initiative adaptability of Canadians, wrought a revolution in the methods of production. All these improvements were in every case put within the reach of other manufacturers. Many of these have been adopted, not only by Canadian shell makers, but by shell makers in the United States and Great Britain.

During the organization period from September, 1914, to April, 1915, more than one member of the Committee worked from ten to seventeen hours per day, Sundays and holidays not excepted, and none of the members then appointed received one dollar by way of remuneration.

The part played by the New Glasgow works of the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company in the Great War is an interesting one. At the beginning of hostilities in August, 1914, there were only two Steel Companies in the United States who had either the plant or experience to produce either shells or armor plates, while none of the Canadian steel plants had any experience whatever.

The first production of munition material, by way of shells and shell steel, was undertaken in Canada by the Shell Committee, and the story of the experiments carried on in the early days of September, 1914, which resulted in convincing the British War Office that basic steel, as made in Canada, would meet all the requirements of both shrapnel and high explosive shells, and which resulted in very large orders for munitions coming to Canada, is well known to all Nova Scotians, and has become a matter of history.

Between October, 1914, when the Scotia plants produced 22,000 shell forgings, and the signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, the New Glasgow plant had made more than 15,000,000 shells—these ranging in size from the 15–pounder shrapnel to 12–inch high explosive, the local plant being the only one in Canada which made the latter size. The total tonnage of forged shells produced at New Glasgow amounted in round figures to 180,000 tons. In addition to this a very considerable tonnage of shell and other munition steel was shipped to be worked up in other shell forging establishments in Canada and Great Britain. A further considerable tonnage was worked up into marine forgings. British shipyards about this time experienced great difficulty in obtaining heavy marine forgings to meet Lloyd’s specification and tests. The Scotia forges had long been on Lloyd’s list as approved makers of Marine Forgings. The British shipbuilders’ difficulty was now met by Scotia, which supplied to various yards on the Clyde, the East Coast, and other yards complete sets of marine forgings of all classes for both mercantile and other vessels of large tonnage. The total quantity of marine forgings supplied Great Britain since the outbreak of war amounted to 9,000 tons.

Most Nova Scotians are probably entirely ignorant of the considerable amount of what might be called “research” and experimental work carried out at the New Glasgow plant for the Government, and while this did not produce the tangible results brought about in connection with the manufacture of shells, not a little of the data and knowledge accumulated, contributed in a very considerable degree to the successful development of both the offensive and the defensive equipment of the Allied forces.

While this work was being done secrecy was essential, nothing was said and but little known of the work carried on along these lines. Now that the War is over the necessity for secrecy appears to be past.

In February, 1919, the firm of William Beardmore and Co., of Glasgow, Scotland, in their works magazine, told the story of the evolution and development by them of bullet-proof material for the protection of armored cars, trench shields, armor-plate for the celebrated “tanks,” and other work of a like character. The story, as told by the Beardmore people, in many important particulars runs on all fours with the experiments and results obtained at New Glasgow during the latter weeks of 1914 and the early part of 1915, when a series of exhaustive experiments were carried out at New Glasgow, first in connection with the production and testing of bullet-resisting steel plate.

This matter was first brought to the attention of the writer by General Sir Sam Hughes in connection with the shield shovel, of which a good deal was heard during 1915 and 1916. This spade, as supplied by the American makers, was formed with a sharp cutting edge, and a loophole for a rifle, but had no handle. When deliveries began to be made by the American manufacturers, a certain quantity was collected at random and turned over to the writer for testing. This was carried out at the rifle range, of the Fifth Royal Highlanders in the basement of the Bleury Street Armory, Montreal. It was then found that while practically all would stand Mark Six British Service Ammunition, they failed to withstand the much greater impact of Mark Seven Ammunition. Mark Six had a muzzle velocity of about 1,800 feet per second. Further investigation showed that the difference in bullet resisting power in the plates submitted was due to lack of uniformity.

No handles had been supplied with the shovels, and no apparent effort had been made by the manufacturers to supply one which was suitable. Scotia’s engineers were asked to meet the difficulty, which they did, and finally offered one which was adopted, weighed eight ounces, and was secured by a single rivet passing through a square slotted hole in the body of the shovel below the base of the tang.

At this time the question of supplying our army with armored machine-gun automobile trucks had become a pressing matter. The question had been turned over to a Toronto Committee. Great delay was experienced in securing sufficient suitable bullet-resisting plate, and serious confusion resulted. The experiments in connection with the shovel had thrown great doubt on the efficiency of the steel being supplied by the Americans, and again the Scotia Company were asked to carry out tests and advise as to the matter.

From hints which had filtered through from the army in France and Flanders it was known that the German Spitzer bullet was much more effective than the British new Mark Seven, and while the armor-plating contracted to be supplied by the Americans for these cars was guaranteed to withstand Mark Seven British Ammunition at 300 yards, the rumors in regard to the penetrating powers of the German Spitzer ammunition were most disquieting, and could not be ignored.

At that time the United States were neutral, but were making ammunition for the Allies and others. By methods, which it is not necessary here to refer to, or explain, the General Manager of the Scotia Company was able to obtain a German Mauser Service Rifle, and by an expenditure out of all proportion to the real value, 1,000 rounds of German Mauser Spitzer service ammunition was also secured. An improvised range was set up on the ice on the East River, Nova Scotia, at a point where, protected by steep banks, firing tests could be carried out, when it was demonstrated that .311 Spitzer German ammunition, which, carefully chronographed, gave a muzzle velocity of 2,915 feet per second, easily penetrated the armor plate which resisted Mark Seven British Ammunition fired from either the Lee-Enfield or Ross Rifle.

The effect, of course, was to call a halt to the manufacture of these plates, and at the same time to push forward experiments then under way in the production by the Scotia Company of bullet-resisting alloy armor plates. Within a short time New Glasgow was able to offer the Department of Militia alloy steel, heat-treated plates, not exceeding 3–16th of an inch thick, which successfully withstood point-blank impact at one yard from Mark 7 ammunition fired from the latest model Ross rifle. In one case two shots had struck the plate within less than one-half inch of each other, and they neither penetrated nor cracked the plate.

Plates somewhat thicker were later supplied which withstood German Mauser ammunition at point blank range, and the result given by these plates when tested at the Proving Station in Toronto were so satisfactory that the Artillery Proving Officers, after the tests, placed them on exhibition outside the Camp, and later reported that the men felt the utmost confidence with the protection afforded them by this plating, which later was supplied and fitted to a proportion of the machine-gun trucks then being equipped. Later the British Government asked the Scotia Company to tender for similar protective plating for armored trucks.