1. In my former book I explained the causes of the second war between Rome and Carthage; and described Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, B.C.220-216.and the engagements which took place between them up to the battle of Cannae, on the banks of the Aufidus. I shall now take up the history of Greece during the same period, ending at the same date, and commencing from the 140th Olympiad. But I shall first recall to the recollection of my readers what I stated in my second book on the subject of the Greeks, and especially of the Achaeans; for the league of the latter has made extraordinary progress up to our own age and the generation immediately preceding.
I started, then, from Tisamenus, one of the sons of Orestes, and stated that the dynasty existed from his time to that of Ogygus: Recapitulation of Achaean history, before B.C.220, contained in Book II., cc. 41-71.that then there was an excellent form of democratical federal government established: and that then the league was broken up by the kings of Sparta into separate towns and villages. Then I tried to describe how these towns began to form a league once more: which were the first to join; and the policy subsequently pursued, which led to their inducing all the Peloponnesians to adopt the general title of Achaeans, and to be united under one federal government. Ending with the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, before the 140th Olympiad, B.C.220-216.Descending to particulars, I brought my story up to the flight of Cleomenes, King of Sparta: then briefly summarising the events included in my prefatory sketch up to the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, who all three died at about the same time, I announced that my main history was to begin from that point.
2. I thought this was the best point; first, because it is there that Aratus leaves off, and I meant my work, Reasons for starting from this point. (1.) The fact that the history of Aratus ends at that point. (2.) The possibility of getting good evidence. (3.) The changes in the various governments in the 139th Olympiad. B.C.224-220. as far as it was Greek history, to be a continuation of his; and, secondly, because the period thus embraced in my history would fall partly in the life of my father, and partly in my own; and thus I should be able to speak as eye-witness of some of the events, and from the information of eye-witnesses of others. To go further back and write the report of a report, traditions at second or third hand, seemed to me unsatisfactory either with a view to giving clear impressions or making sound statements. But, above all, I began at this period because it was then that the history of the whole world entered on a new phase. Philip, son of Demetrius, had just become the boy king of Macedonia; Achaeus, prince of Asia on this side of Taurus, had converted his show of power into a reality; Antiochus the Great had, a short time before, by the death of his brother Seleucus, succeeded while quite a young man to the throne of Syria; Ariarathes to that of Cappadocia; and Ptolemy Philopator to that of Egypt. Not long afterwards Lycurgus became King of Sparta, and the Carthaginians had recently elected Hannibal general to carry on the war lately described. Every government therefore being changed about this time, there seemed every likelihood of a new departure in policy: which is but natural and usual, and in fact did at this time occur. For the Romans and Carthaginians entered upon the war I have described; Antiochus and Ptolemy on one for the possession of Coele-Syria; and the Achaeans and Philip one against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians. The causes of this last war must now be stated.
3. The Aetolians had long been discontented with a state of peace and tired at living at their own charges; The Aetolians. for they were accustomed to live on their neighbours, and their natural ostentation required abundant means to support it. Enslaved by this passion they live a life as predatory as that of wild beasts, respecting no tie of friendship and regarding every one as an enemy to be plundered.
Hitherto, however, as long as Antigonus Doson was alive, their fear of the Macedonians had kept them quiet. B.C.222.But when he was succeeded at his death by the boy Philip, they conceived a contempt for the royal power, and at once began to look out for a pretext and opportunity for interfering in the Peloponnese: induced partly by an old habit of getting plunder from that country, and partly by the belief that, now the Achaeans were unsupported by Macedonia, they would be a match for them. While their thoughts were fixed on this, chance to a certain extent contributed to give them the opportunity which they desired.
There was a certain man of Trichonium201 named Dorimachus, son of that Nicostratus who made the treacherous attack The raids of Dorimachus in Messenia.on the Pan-Boeotian congress.202 This Dorimachus, being young and inspired with the true spirit of Aetolian violence and aggressiveness, was sent by the state to Phigalea in the Peloponnese, which, being on the borders of Arcadia and Messenia, happened at that time to be in political union with the Aetolian league. His mission was nominally to guard the city and territory of Phigalea, but in fact to act as a spy on the politics of the Peloponnese. A crowd of pirates flocked to him at Phigalea; and being unable to get them any booty by fair means, because the peace between all Greeks which Antigonus had concluded was still in force, he was finally reduced to allowing the pirates to drive off the cattle of the Messenians, though they were friends and allies of the Aetolians. These injurious acts were at first confined to the sheep on the border lands; but becoming more and more reckless and audacious, they even ventured to break into the farm-houses by sudden attacks at night. The Messenians were naturally indignant, and sent embassies to Dorimachus; which he at first disregarded, because he wanted not only to benefit the men under him, but himself also, by getting a share in their spoils. But when the arrival of such embassies became more and more frequent, owing to the perpetual recurrence of these acts of depredation, he said at last that he would come in person to Messene, and decide on the claims they had to make against the Aetolians. When he came, however, and the sufferers appeared, he laughed at some, threatened to strike others, and drove others away with abusive language.
4. Even while he was actually in Messene, the pirates came close to the city walls in the night, and by means of scaling-ladders broke into a country-house called Chiron’s villa; killed all the slaves who resisted them; and having bound the others, Dorimachus leaves Messene. took them and the cattle away with them. The Messenian Ephors had long been much annoyed by what was going on, and by the presence of Dorimachus in their town; but this they thought was too insolent: and they accordingly summoned him to appear before the assembled magistrates. There Sciron, who happened to be an Ephor at the time, and enjoyed a high reputation for integrity among his fellow-citizens, advised that they should not allow Dorimachus to leave the city, until he had made good all the losses sustained by the Messenians, and had given up the guilty persons to be punished for the murders committed. This suggestion being received with unanimous approval, as but just, Dorimachus passionately exclaimed that “they were fools if they imagined that they were now insulting only Dorimachus, and not the Aetolian league.” In fact he expressed the greatest indignation at the whole affair, and said that “they would meet with a public punishment, which would serve them well right.” Now there was at that time in Messene a man of disgraceful and effeminate character named Babyrtas, who was so exactly like Dorimachus in voice and person, that, when he was dressed in Dorimachus’s sun-hat and cloak, it was impossible to tell them apart; and of this Dorimachus was perfectly aware. When therefore he was speaking in these threatening and insolent tones to the Messenian magistrates, Sciron lost his temper and said “Do you think we care for you or your threats, Babyrtas?” After this Dorimachus was compelled for the present to yield to circumstances, and to give satisfaction for the injuries inflicted upon the Messenians: but when he returned to Aetolia, he nursed such a bitter and furious feeling of anger at this taunt, that, without any other reasonable pretext, but for this cause and this alone, he got up a war against the Messenians.
5. The Strategus of the Aetolians at that time was Ariston; but being from physical infirmities unable to serve in the field, Dorimachus becomes practically Strategus of Aetolia, B.C.221.and being a kinsman of Dorimachus and Scopas, he had somehow or another surrendered his whole authority to the former. In his public capacity Dorimachus could not venture to urge the Aetolians to undertake the Messenian war, because he had no reasonable pretext for so doing: the origin of his wish being, as everybody well knew, the wrongs committed by himself and the bitter gibe which they had brought upon him. He therefore gave up the idea of publicly advocating the war, He induces Scopas to go to war with Messenia, Epirus, Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia. but tried privately to induce Scopas to join in the intrigue against the Messenians: He pointed out that there was now no danger from the side of Macedonia owing to the youth of the king (Philip being then only seventeen years old); that the Lacedaemonians were alienated from the Messenians; and that they possessed the affection and alliance of the Eleans; and these circumstances taken together would make an invasion of Messenia perfectly safe. But the argument most truly Aetolian which he used was to put before him that a great booty was to be got from Messenia, because it was entirely unguarded, and had alone, of all the Peloponnesian districts, remained unravaged throughout the Cleomenic war. And, to sum up all, he argued that such a move would secure them great popularity with the Aetolians generally. And if the Achaeans were to try to hinder their march through the country, they would not be able to complain if they retaliated: and if, on the other hand, they did not stir, would be no hindrance to their enterprise. Besides, he affirmed that they would have plenty of pretext against the Messenians; for they had long been in the position of aggressors by promising the Achaeans and Macedonians to join their alliance.
By these, and similar arguments to the same effect, he roused such a strong feeling in the minds of Scopas and his friends, that, without waiting for a meeting of the Aetolian federal assembly, and without communicating with the Apocleti or taking any of the proper constitutional steps, of their own mere impulse and opinion they committed acts of hostility simultaneously against Messenia, Epirus, Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia.
6. By sea they immediately sent out privateers, who, falling in with a royal vessel of Macedonia near Cythera, Acts of hostility against Macedonia, brought it with all its crew to Aetolia, and sold ship-owners, sailors, and marines, and finally the ship itself. Then they began sacking the seaboard of Epirus, employing the aid of some Cephallenian ships for carrying out this act of violence. Epirus, and Acarnania. They tried also to capture Thyrium in Acarnania. At the same time they secretly sent some men to seize a strong place called Clarium, in the centre of the territory of Megalopolis; which they used thenceforth as a place of sale for their spoils, and a starting place for their marauding expeditions. However Timoxenus, the Achaean Strategus, with the assistance of Taurion, who had been left by Antigonus in charge of the Macedonian interests in the Peloponnese, took the place after a siege of a very few days. For Antigonus retained Corinth, in accordance with his convention with the Achaeans, made at the time of the Cleomenic war;203 and had never restored Orchomenus to the Achaeans after he had taken it by force, but claimed and retained it in his own hands; with the view, as I suppose, not only of commanding the entrance of the Peloponnese, but of guarding also its interior by means of his garrison and warlike apparatus in Orchomenus.
Dorimachus and Scopas waited until Timoxenus had a very short time of office left, and when Aratus, though elected by the Achaeans for the coming year, would not yet be in office;204 and then collecting a general levy of Aetolians at Rhium, and preparing means of transport, with some Cephallenian ships ready to convoy them, Before midsummer B.C.220. Invasion of Messenia by Dorimachus and Scopas. they got their men across to the Peloponnese, and led them against Messenia. While marching through the territories of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea they pretended that they did not wish to do any injury to the Achaeans; but their forces, from their inveterate passion for plunder, could not be restrained from robbing the country; and consequently they committed outrages and acts of violence all along their line of march, till they arrived at Phigalea. Thence, by a bold and sudden movement, they entered Messenia; and without any regard for their ancient friendship and alliance with the Messenians, or for the principles of international justice common to all mankind, subordinating every consideration to their selfish greed, they set about plundering the country without resistance, the Messenians being absolutely afraid to come out to attack them.
7. This being the time, according to their laws, for the meeting of the Achaean federal assembly, The Achaean league decide to assist the Messenians.the members arrived at Aegium. When the assembly met, the deputies from Patrae and Pharae made a formal statement of the injuries inflicted upon their territories during the passage of the Aetolians: an embassy from Messenia also appeared, begging for their assistance on the ground that the treatment from which they were suffering was unjust and in defiance of treaty. When these statements were heard, great indignation was felt at the wrongs of Patrae and Pharae, and great sympathy for the misfortunes of the Messenians. But it was regarded as especially outrageous that the Aetolians should have ventured to enter Achaia with an army, contrary to treaty, without obtaining or even asking for permission from any one to pass through the country. Roused to indignation by all these considerations, the assembly voted to give assistance to the Messenians: that the Strategus should summon a general levy of the Achaean arms: and that whatever was decided by this levy, when it met, should be done. Now Timoxenus, the existing Strategus, was just on the point of quitting office, and felt besides small confidence in the Achaeans, because martial exercise had been allowed to fall into neglect among them; he therefore shrank from undertaking the expedition, or from even summoning the popular levy. The fact was that, after the expulsion of Cleomenes, King of Sparta, the Peloponnesians, B.C.222-221. weary of the wars that had taken place, and trusting to the peaceful arrangement that had been come to, neglected all warlike preparations. Aratus, however, indignant and incensed at the audacity of the Aetolians, was not inclined to take things so calmly, for he had in fact a grudge of long standing against these people. Wherefore he was for instantly summoning the Achaeans to an armed levy, and was all eagerness to attack the Aetolians. Aratus becomes Strategus of the Achaean league, B.C.220 (May-June). Eventually he took over from Timoxenus the seal of the league, five days before the proper time, and wrote to the various cities summoning a meeting in arms of all those who were of the military age, at Megalopolis. But the peculiar character of this man, I think, makes it proper for me to give a brief preliminary sketch of him.
8. Aratus had many of the qualities of a great ruler. He could speak, and contrive, and conceal his purpose: Character of Aratus. no one surpassed him in the moderation which he showed in political contests, or in his power of attaching friends and gaining allies: in intrigue, stratagem, and laying plots against a foe, and in bringing them to a successful termination by personal endurance and courage, he was pre-eminent. Many clear instances of these qualities may be found; but none more convincing than the episodes of the capture of Sicyon and Mantinea, of the expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and especially of the surprise of the Acrocorinthus.205 On the other hand whenever he attempted a campaign in the field, he was slow in conception and timid in execution, and without personal gallantry in the presence of danger. The result was that the Peloponnese was full of trophies which marked reverses sustained by him; and that in this particular department he was always easily defeated. So true is it that men’s minds, no less than their bodies, have many aspects. Not only is it the case that the same man has an aptitude for one class of activities and not for another; it often happens that in things closely analogous, the same man will be exceedingly acute and exceedingly dull, exceedingly courageous and exceedingly timid. Nor is this a paradox: it is a very ordinary fact, well known to all attentive observers. For instance you may find men who in hunting show the greatest daring in grappling with wild beasts, and yet are utter cowards in the presence of an armed enemy. Or again, in actual war some are active and skilful in single combats, who are yet quite ineffective in the ranks. For example, the Thessalian cavalry in squadron and column are irresistible, but when their order is once broken up, they have not the skill in skirmishing by which each man does whatever the time and place suggests: while, on the other hand, exactly the reverse of this is the case with the Aetolians. The Cretans, again, either by land or sea, in ambushes and piratical excursions, in deceiving the enemy, in making night attacks, and in fact in every service which involves craft and separate action, are irresistible; but for a regular front to front charge in line they have neither the courage nor firmness; and the reverse again is the case with the Achaeans and Macedonians.
I have said thus much, that my readers may not refuse me credit if I have at times to make contradictory statements about the same men and in regard to analogous employments. To return to my narrative.
9. The men of military age having assembled in arms at Megalopolis, in accordance with the decree of the federal assembly, The armed levy of Achaeans summoned. the Messenian envoys once more came forward, and entreated the people not to disregard the flagrant breach of treaty from which they were suffering; and expressed their willingness to become allies of the league, and their anxiety to be enrolled among its members. The Achaean magistrates declined the offered alliance, on the ground that it was impossible to admit a new member without the concurrence of Philip and the other allies,—for the sworn alliance negotiated by Antigonus during the Cleomenic war was still in force, and included Achaia, Epirus, Phocis, Macedonia, Boeotia, Acarnania, and Thessaly;—but they said that they would march out to their relief, if the envoys there present would place their sons in Sparta, as hostages for their promise not to make terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans. The Spartans among the rest were encamped on the frontier of Megalopolis, having marched out in accordance with the terms of their alliance; but they were acting rather as reserves and spectators than as active allies. Dorimachus ordered to quit Messenia without passing through Achaia. Having thus settled the terms of the arrangement with the Messenians, Aratus sent a messenger to the Aetolians to inform them of the decree of the Achaean federation, and to order them to quit the territory of Messenia without entering that of Achaia, on pain of being treated as enemies if they set foot in it. When they heard the message and knew that the Achaeans were mustered in force, Scopas and Dorimachus thought it best for the present to obey. Scopas and Dorimachus prepare to obey. They therefore at once sent despatches to Cyllene and to the Aetolian Strategus, Ariston, begging that the transports should be sent to a place on the coast of Elis called the island of Pheia;206 and they themselves two days later struck camp, and laden with booty marched towards Elis. For the Aetolians always maintained a friendship with the Eleans that they might have through them an entrance for their plundering and piratical expeditions into the Peloponnese.
10. Aratus waited two days: and then, foolishly believing that the Aetolians would return by the route they had indicated, Aratus dismisses the Achaean levy, with the exception of 3000 foot and 300 horse. he dismissed all the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to their homes, except three thousand foot and three hundred horse and the division under Taurion, which he led to Patrae, with the view of keeping on the flank of the Aetolians. But when Dorimachus learnt that Aratus was thus watching his march, and was still under Dorimachus turns upon Aratus. arms; partly from fear of being attacked when his forces were engaged on the embarkation, and partly with a view to confuse the enemy, he sent his booty on to the transports with a sufficient number of men to secure their passage, under orders to meet him at Rhium where he intended to embark; while he himself, after remaining for a time to superintend and protect the shipment of the booty, changed the direction of his march and advanced towards Olympia. But hearing that Taurion, with the rest of the army, was near Cleitoria; and feeling sure that in these circumstances he would not be able to effect the crossing from Rhium without danger and a struggle with the enemy; he made up his mind that it would be best for his interests to bring on an engagement with the army of Aratus as soon as possible, since it was weak in numbers and wholly unprepared for the attack. He calculated that if he could defeat this force, he could then plunder the country, and effect his crossing from Rhium in safety, while Aratus was waiting and deliberating about again convoking the Achaean levy; but if on the other hand Aratus were terrified and declined the engagement, he would then effect his departure unmolested, whenever he thought it advisable. With these views, therefore, he advanced, and pitched his camp at Methydrium in the territory of Megalopolis.
11. But the leaders of the Achaeans, on learning the arrival of the Aetolians, adopted a course of proceeding quite unsurpassable for folly. The Battle of Caphyae, B.C.220.They left the territory of Cleitor and encamped at Caphyae; but the Aetolians marching from Methydrium past the city of Orchomenus, they led the Achaean troops into the plain of Caphyae, and there drew them up for battle, with the river which flows through that plain protecting their front. The difficulty of the ground between them and their enemy, for there were besides the river a number of ditches not easily crossed,207 and the show of readiness on the part of the Achaeans for the engagement, caused the Aetolians to shrink from attacking according to their original purpose; but they retreated in good order to the high ground of Oligyrtus, content if only they were not attacked and forced to give battle. But Aratus, when the van of the Aetolians was already making the ascent, while the cavalry were bringing up the rear along the plain, and were approaching a place called Propus at the foot of the hills, sent out his cavalry and light-armed troops, under the command of Epistratus of Acarnania, with orders to attack and harass the enemy’s rear. Now if an engagement was necessary at all, they ought not to have attempted it with the enemy’s rear, when they had already accomplished the march through the plain, but with his van directly it had debouched upon the plain: for in this way the battle would have been wholly confined to the plain and level ground, where the peculiar nature of the Aetolian arms and general tactics would have been least effective; while the Achaeans, from precisely opposite reasons, would have been most effective and able to act. As it was, they surrendered the advantages of time and place which were in their favour, and deliberately accepted the conditions which were in favour of the enemy.
12. Naturally the result of the engagement was in harmony with such a beginning. For when the light-armed troops approached, The Achaeans defeated. the Aetolian cavalry retired in good order up the hill, being anxious to effect a junction with their own infantry. But Aratus, having an imperfect view of what was going on, and making a bad conjecture of what would happen next, no sooner saw the cavalry retiring, than, hoping that they were in absolute flight, he sent forward the heavy-armed troops of his two wings, with orders to join and support the advanced guard of their light-armed troops; while he himself, with his remaining forces, executed a flank movement, and led his men on at the double. But the Aetolian cavalry had now cleared the plain, and, having effected the junction with their infantry, drew up under cover of the hill; massed the infantry on their flanks; and called to them to stand by them: the infantry themselves showing great promptness in answering to their shouts, and in coming to their relief, as the several companies arrived. Thinking themselves now sufficiently strong in numbers, they closed their ranks, and charged the advanced guard of Achaean cavalry and light armed troops; and being superior in number, and having the advantage of charging from higher ground, after a long struggle, they finally turned their opponents to flight: whose flight involved that of the heavy-armed troops also which were coming to their relief. For the latter were advancing in separate detachments in loose order, and, either in dismay at what was happening, or upon meeting their flying comrades on their retreat, were compelled to follow their example: the result being that, whereas the number of those actually defeated on the field was less than five hundred, the number that fled was more than two thousand. Taught by experience what to do, the Aetolians followed behind them with round after round of loud and boisterous shouts. The Achaeans at first retreated in good order and without danger, because they were retiring upon their heavy-armed troops, whom they imagined to be in a place of safety on their original ground; but when they saw that these too had abandoned their position of safety, and were marching in a long straggling line, some of them immediately broke off from the main body and sought refuge in various towns in the neighbourhood; while others, meeting the phalanx as it was coming up to their relief, proved to be quite sufficient, without the presence of an enemy, to strike fear into it and force it into headlong flight. They directed their flight, as I said, to the towns of the neighbourhood. Orchomenus and Caphyae, which were close by, saved large numbers of them: and if this had not been the case, they would in all probability have been annihilated by this unlooked-for catastrophe. Such was the result of the engagement at Caphyae.
13. When the people of Megalopolis learnt that the Aetolians were at Methydrium, they came to the rescue en masse, The Aetolians retire at their leisure.at the summons of a trumpet, on the very day after the battle of Caphyae; and were compelled to bury the very men with whose assistance they had expected to fight the Aetolians. Having therefore dug a trench in the territory of Caphyae, and collected the corpses, they performed the funeral rites of these unhappy men with all imaginable honour. But the Aetolians, after this unlooked-for success gained by the cavalry and light-armed troops, traversed the Peloponnese from that time in complete security. In the course of their march they made an attack upon the town of Pellene, and, after ravaging the territory of Sicyon, finally quitted the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus.
This then, was the cause and occasion of the Social war: its formal beginning was the decree passed by all the allies after these events, which was confirmed by a general meeting held at Corinth, on the proposal of King Philip, who presided at the assembly.
14. A few days after the events just narrated the ordinary meeting of the Achaean federal assembly took place, Midsummer, B.C.220. and Aratus was bitterly denounced, publicly as well as privately, as indisputably responsible for this disaster; and the anger of the general public was still further roused and embittered by the invectives of his political opponents. It was shown to every one’s satisfaction that Aratus had been guilty of four flagrant errors. His first was that, having taken office before his predecessor’s time was legally at an end, he had availed himself of a time properly belonging to another to engage in the sort of enterprise in which he was conscious of having often failed. Attacked at the Achaean Congress, Aratus successfully defends himself. His second and graver error was the disbanding the Achaeans, while the Aetolians were still in the middle of the Peloponnese; especially as he had been well aware beforehand that Scopas and Dorimachus were anxious to disturb the existing settlement, and to stir up war. His third error was to engage the enemy, as he did, with such a small force, without any strong necessity; when he might have retired to the neighbouring towns and have summoned a levy of the Achaeans, and then have engaged, if he had thought that measure absolutely necessary. But his last and gravest error was that, having determined to fight, he did so in such an ill-considered manner, and managed the business with so little circumspection, as to deprive himself of the advantages of the plain and the support of his heavy-armed troops, and allow the battle to be settled by light-armed troops, and to take place on the slopes, than which nothing could have been more advantageous or convenient to the Aetolians. Such were the allegations against Aratus. He, however, came forward and reminded the assembly of his former political services and achievements; and urged in his defence that, in the matters alleged, his was not the blame for what had occurred. He begged their indulgence if he had been guilty of any oversight in the battle, and claimed that they should at any rate look at the facts without prejudice or passion. These words created such a rapid and generous change in the popular feeling, that great indignation was roused against the political opponents who attacked him; and the resolutions as to the measures to be taken in the future were passed wholly in accordance with the views of Aratus.
15. These events occurred in the previous Olympiad,208 what I am now going to relate belong to the 140th. 139th Olympiad, B.C.224-220; 140th Olympiad, B.C.220-216. The resolutions passed by the Achaean federal assembly were these. That embassies should be sent to Epirus, Boeotia, Phocis, Acarnania, and Philip, to declare how the Aetolians, in defiance of treaty, had twice entered Achaia with arms, The Achaean league determine upon war with the Aetolians, and send round to their allies for assistance. and to call upon them for assistance in virtue of their agreement, and for their consent to the admission of the Messenians into the alliance. Next, that the Strategus of the Achaeans should enrol five thousand foot and five hundred horse, and support the Messenians in case the Aetolians were to invade their territory; and to arrange with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians how many horse and foot were to be supplied by them severally for the service of the league. These decrees showed a noble spirit on the part of the Achaeans in the presence of defeat, which prevented them from abandoning either the cause of the Messenians or their own purpose. Those who were appointed to serve on these embassies to the allies proceeded to carry them out; while the Strategus at once, in accordance with the decree, set about enrolling the troops from Achaia, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians to supply each two thousand five hundred infantry and two hundred and fifty cavalry, so that the whole army for the coming campaign should amount to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.
On the day of their regular assembly the Aetolians also met and decided to maintain peace with the Spartans and Messenians; hoping by that crafty measure to tamper with the loyalty of the Achaean allies and sow disunion among them. With the Achaeans themselves they voted to maintain peace, on condition that they withdrew from alliance with Messenia, and to proclaim war if they refused,—than which nothing could have been more unreasonable. For being themselves in alliance, both with Achaeans and Messenians, they proclaimed war against the former, unless the two ceased to be in alliance and friendly relationship with each other; while if the Achaeans chose to be at enmity with the Messenians, they offered them a separate peace. Their proposition was too iniquitous and unreasonable to admit of being even considered.
16. The Epirotes and King Philip on hearing the ambassadors consented to admit the Messenians to alliance; but though the conduct of the Aetolians caused them momentary indignation, they were not excessively moved by it, because it was no more than what the Aetolians habitually did. Their anger, therefore, was short-lived, and they presently voted against going to war with them. So true is it that an habitual course of wrong-doing finds readier pardon than when it is spasmodic or isolated. The former, at any rate, was the case with the Aetolians: they perpetually plundered Greece, and levied unprovoked war upon many of its people: they did not deign either to make any defence to those who complained, but answered only by additional insults if any one challenged them to arbitration for injuries which they had inflicted, or indeed which they meditated inflicting. Treachery of the Spartans.And yet the Lacedaemonians, who had but recently been liberated by means of Antigonus and the generous zeal of the Achaeans, and though they were bound not to commit any act of hostility towards the Macedonians and Philip, sent clandestine messages to the Aetolians, and arranged a secret treaty of alliance and friendship with them.
The army had already been enrolled from the Achaeans of military age, and had been assigned to the duty of assisting the Lacedaemonians and Messenians, Invasion of Achaia by the Aetolians and Illyrians. when Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos sailed with ninety galleys beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of their treaty with Rome. These men first touched at Pylos, and failing in an attack upon it, they separated: Demetrius making for the Cyclades, from some of which he exacted money and plundered others; while Scerdilaidas, directing his course homewards, put in at Naupactus with forty galleys at the instigation of Amynas, king of the Athamanes, who happened to be his brother-in-law; and after making an agreement with the Aetolians, by the agency of Agelaus, for a division of spoils, he promised to join them in their invasion of Achaia. With this agreement made with Scerdilaidas, and with the co-operation of the city of Cynaetha, Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas, collected a general levy of the Aetolians, and invaded Achaia in conjunction with the Illyrians.
17. But the Aetolian Strategus Ariston, ignoring everything that was going on, remained quietly at home, asserting that he was not at war with the Achaeans, but was maintaining peace: a foolish and childish mode of acting,—for what better epithets could be applied to a man who supposed that he could cloak notorious facts by mere words? Meanwhile Dorimachus and his colleague had marched through the Achaean territory and suddenly appeared at Cynaetha.
Cynaetha was an Arcadian city209 which, for many years past, had been afflicted with implacable and violent political factions. The previous history of Cynaetha. The two parties had frequently retaliated on each other with massacres, banishments, confiscations, and redivisions of lands; but finally the party which affected the Achaean connexion prevailed and got possession of the city, securing themselves by a city-guard and commandant from Achaia. This was the state of affairs when, shortly before the Aetolian invasion, the exiled party sent to the party in possession intreating that they would be reconciled and allow them to return to their own city; whereupon the latter were persuaded, and sent an embassy to the Achaeans with the view of obtaining their consent to the pacification. The Achaeans readily consented, in the belief that both parties would regard them with goodwill: since the party in possession had all their hopes centred in the Achaeans, while those who were about to be restored would owe that restoration to the consent of the same people. Accordingly the Cynaethans dismissed the city guard and commandant, and restored the exiles, to the number of nearly three hundred, after taking such pledges from them as are reckoned the most inviolable among all mankind. But no sooner had they secured their return, than, without any cause or pretext arising which might give a colour to the renewal of the quarrel, but on the contrary, at the very first moment of their restoration, they began plotting against their country, and against those who had been their preservers. I even believe that at the very sacrifices, which consecrated the oaths and pledges which they gave each other, they were already, even at such a solemn moment, revolving in their minds this offence against religion and those who had trusted them. For, as soon as they were restored to their civil rights they called in the Aetolians, and betrayed the city into their hands, eager to effect the utter ruin both of the people who had preserved, and the city which had nourished, them.
18. The bold stroke by which they actually consummated this treason was as follows. Of the restored exiles certain officers had been appointed called Polemarchs, whose duty it was to lock the city-gates, and keep the keys while they remained closed, and also to be on guard during the day at the gate-houses. The Aetolians accordingly waited for this period of closing the gates, ready to make the attempt, and provided with ladders; while the Polemarchs of the exiles, having assassinated their colleagues on guard at the gate-house, opened the gate. Some of the Aetolians, therefore, got into the town by it, while others applied their ladders to the walls, and mounting by their means, took forcible possession of them. The inhabitants of the town, panic-stricken at the occurrence, could not tell which way to turn. They could not give their undivided energies to opposing the party which was forcing its way through the gate, because of those who were attacking them at the walls; nor could they defend the walls owing to the enemies that were pouring through the gate. The Aetolians having thus become rapidly masters of the town, in spite of the injustice of the whole proceeding, did one act of supreme justice. For the very men who had invited them, and betrayed the town to them, they massacred before any one else, and plundered their property. They then treated all the others of the party in the same way; and, finally, taking up their quarters in the houses, they systematically robbed them of all valuables, and in many cases put Cynaethans to the rack, if they suspected them of having anything concealed, whether money, or furniture, or anything else of unusual value.
After inflicting this ruin on the Cynaethans they departed, leaving a garrison to guard the walls, and marched towards Lusi. Arrived at the temple of Artemis, which lies between Cleitor and Cynaetha, and is regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to plunder the cattle of the goddess and the other property round the temple. But the people of Lusi acted with great prudence: they gave the Aetolians some of the sacred furniture, and appealed to them not to commit the impiety of inflicting any outrage. The gift was accepted, and the Aetolians at once removed to Cleitor and pitched their camp under its walls.
19. Meanwhile Aratus, the Achaean Strategus, had despatched an appeal for help to Philip; Measures taken by Aratus. was collecting the men selected for service; and was sending for the troops, arranged for by virtue of the treaty, from Sparta and Messenia.
The Aetolians at first urged the people of Cleitor to abandon their alliance with the Achaeans and adopt one with themselves; The Aetolians at the temple of Artemis. They fail at Cleitor. and upon the Cleitorians absolutely refusing, they began an assault upon the town, and endeavoured to take it by an escalade. But meeting with a bold and determined resistance from the inhabitants, they desisted from the attempt; and breaking up their camp marched back to Cynaetha, driving off with them on their route the cattle of the goddess. They at first offered the city to the Eleans, but upon their refusing to accept it, they determined to keep the town in their own hands, They burn Cynaetha and return home. and appointed Euripides to command it: but subsequently, on the alarm of an army of relief coming from Macedonia, they set fire to the town and abandoned it, directing their march to Rhium with the purpose of there taking ship and crossing home. But when Taurion heard of the Aetolian invasion, Demetrius of Pharos. and what had taken place at Cynaetha, and saw that Demetrius of Pharos had sailed into Cenchreae from his island expedition, he urged the latter to assist the Achaeans, and dragging his galleys across the Isthmus to attack the Aetolians as they crossed the gulf. Now though Demetrius had enriched himself by his island expedition, he had had to beat an ignominious retreat, owing to the Rhodians putting out to sea to attack him: he was therefore glad to accede to the request of Taurion, as the latter undertook the expense of having his galleys dragged across the Isthmus.210 He accordingly got them across, and arriving two days after the passage of the Aetolians, plundered some places on the seaboard of Aetolia and then returned to Corinth.
The Lacedaemonians had dishonourably failed to send the full complement of men to which they were Treason of the Spartans. bound by their engagement, but had despatched a small contingent only of horse and foot, to save appearances.
Aratus however, having his Achaean troops, behaved in this instance also with the caution of a statesman, Inactivity of Aratus. rather than the promptness of a general: for remembering his previous failure he remained inactively watching events, until Scopas and Dorimachus had accomplished all they wanted and were safe home again; although they had marched through a line of country which was quite open to attack, full of defiles, and wanting only a trumpeter211 to sound a call to arms. But the great disaster and misfortunes endured by the Cynaethans at the hands of the Aetolians were looked upon as most richly deserved by them.
20. Now, seeing that the Arcadians as a whole have a reputation for virtue throughout Greece, The reasons of the barbarity of the Cynaethans. Their neglect of the refining influences of music, which is carefully encouraged in the rest of Arcadia. not only in respect of their hospitality and humanity, but especially for their scrupulous piety, it seems worth while to investigate briefly the barbarous character of the Cynaethans: and inquire how it came about that, though indisputably Arcadians in race, they at that time so far surpassed the rest of Greece in cruelty and contempt of law.
They seem then to me to be the first, and indeed the only, Arcadians who have abandoned institutions nobly conceived by their ancestors and admirably adapted to the character of all the inhabitants of Arcadia. For music, and I mean by that true music, which it is advantageous to every one to practise, is obligatory with the Arcadians. For we must not think, as Ephorus in a hasty sentence of his preface, wholly unworthy of him, says, that music was introduced among mankind for the purpose of deception and jugglery; nor must the ancients Cretans and Spartans be supposed to have introduced the pipe and rhythmic movement in war, instead of the trumpet, without some reason; nor the early Arcadians to have given music such a high place in their constitution, that not only boys, but young men up to the age of thirty, are compelled to practise it, though in other respects most simple and primitive in their manner of life. Every one is familiarly acquainted with the fact that the Arcadians are the only people among whom boys are by the laws trained from infancy to sing hymns and paeans, in which they celebrate in the traditional fashion the heroes and gods of their particular towns. They next learn the airs of Philoxenus and Timotheus, and dance with great spirit to the pipers at the yearly Dionysia in the theatres, the boys at the boys’ festival, and the young men at what is called the men’s festival. Similarly it is their universal custom, at all festal gatherings and banquets, not to have strangers to make the music, but to produce it themselves, calling on each other in turn for a song. They do not look upon it as a disgrace to disclaim the possession of any other accomplishment: but no one can disclaim the knowledge of how to sing, because all are forced to learn, nor can they confess the knowledge, and yet excuse themselves from practising it, because that too among them is looked upon as disgraceful. Their young men again practise a military step to the music of the pipe and in regular order of battle, producing elaborate dances, which they display to their fellow-citizens every year in the theatres, at the public charge and expense.
21. Now the object of the ancient Arcadians in introducing these customs was not, as I think, the gratification of luxury and extravagance. The object of the musical training of the Arcadians. They saw that Arcadia was a nation of workers; that the life of the people was laborious and hard; and that, as a natural consequence of the coldness and gloom which were the prevailing features of a great part of the country, the general character of the people was austere. For we mortals have an irresistible tendency to yield to climatic influences: and to this cause, and no other, may be traced the great distinctions which prevail amongst us in character, physical formation, and complexion, as well as in most of our habits, varying with nationality or wide local separation. And it was with a view of softening and tempering this natural ruggedness and rusticity, that they not only introduced the things which I have mentioned, but also the custom of holding assemblies and frequently offering sacrifices, in both of which women took part equally with men; and having mixed dances of girls and boys and in fact did everything they could to humanise their souls by the civilising and softening influence of such culture. The people of Cynaetha entirely neglected these things, although they needed them more than any one else, because their climate and country is by far the most unfavourable in all Arcadia; and on the contrary gave their whole minds to mutual animosities and contentions. They in consequence became finally so brutalised, that no Greek city has ever witnessed a longer series of the most atrocious crimes. I will give one instance of the ill fortune of Cynaetha in this respect, and of the disapproval of such proceedings on the part of the Arcadians at large. When the Cynaethans, after their great massacre, sent an embassy to Sparta, every city which the ambassadors entered on their road at once ordered them by a herald to depart; while the Mantineans not only did that, but after their departure regularly purified their city and territory from the taint of blood, by carrying victims round them both.
I have had three objects in saying thus much on this subject. First, that the character of the Arcadians should not suffer from the crimes of one city: secondly, that other nations should not neglect music, from an idea that certain Arcadians give an excessive and extravagant attention to it: and, lastly, I speak for the sake of the Cynaethans themselves, that, if ever God gives them better fortune, they may humanise themselves by turning their attention to education, and especially to music.
22. To return from this digression. When the Aetolians had reached their homes in safety after this raid Philip V. comes to Corinth. B.C.220. upon the Peloponnese, Philip, coming to the aid of the Achaeans with an army, arrived at Corinth. Finding that he was too late, he sent despatches to all the allies urging them to send deputies at once to Corinth, to consult on the measures required for the common safety. Meanwhile he himself marched towards Tegea, being informed that the Lacedaemonians were in a state of revolution, Advances toward Sparta. and were fallen to mutual slaughter. For being accustomed to have a king over them, and to be entirely submissive to their rulers, their sudden enfranchisement by means of Antigonus, and the absence of a king, produced a state of civil war; because they all imagined themselves to be on a footing of complete political equality. At first two of the five Ephors kept their views to themselves; while the other three threw in their lot with the Aetolians, because they were convinced that the youth of Philip would prevent him as yet from having a decisive influence in the Peloponnese. But when, contrary to their expectations, the Aetolians retired quickly from the Peloponnese, and Philip arrived still more quickly from Macedonia, the three Ephors became distrustful of Adeimantus, one of the other two, because he was privy to and disapproved of their plans; and were in a great state of anxiety lest he should tell Philip everything as soon as that monarch approached. After some consultation therefore with certain young men, Adeimantus assassinated. they published a proclamation ordering all citizens of military age to assemble in arms in the sacred enclosure of Athene of the Brazen-house, on the pretext that the Macedonians were advancing against the town. This startling announcement caused a rapid muster: when Adeimantus, who disapproved of the measure, came forward and endeavoured to show that “the proclamation and summons to assemble in arms should have been made some time before, when they were told that their enemies the Aetolians were approaching the frontier: not then, when they learnt that their benefactors and preservers the Macedonians were coming with their king.” In the middle of this dissuasive speech the young men whose co-operation had been secured struck him dead, and with him Sthenelaus, Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and several other citizens; whereupon Polyphontes and certain of his party, seeing clearly what was going to happen, went off to join Philip.
23. Immediately after the commission of this crime, the Ephors who were then in power sent men to Philip, Philip summons Spartan deputies to Tegea. to accuse the victims of this massacre; and to beg him to delay his approach, until the affairs of the city had returned to their normal state after this commotion; and to be assured meanwhile that it was their purpose to be loyal and friendly to the Macedonians in every respect. These ambassadors found Philip near Mount Parthenius,212 and communicated to him their commission. Having listened, he bade the ambassadors make all haste home, and inform the Ephors that he was going to continue his march to Tegea, and expected that they would as quickly as possible send him men of credit to consult with him on the present position of affairs. After hearing this message from the king, the Lacedaemonian officers despatched ten commissioners headed by Omias to meet Philip; who, on arriving at Tegea, and entering the king’s council chamber, accused Adeimantus of being the cause of the late commotion; and promised that they would perform all their obligations as allies to Philip, and show that they were second to none of those whom he looked upon as his most loyal friends, in their affection for his person. With these and similar asseverations the Lacedaemonian commissioners left the council chamber. The members of the council were divided in opinion: one party knowing the secret treachery of the Spartan magistrates, and feeling certain that Adeimantus had lost his life from his loyalty to Macedonia, while the Lacedaemonians had really determined upon an alliance with the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of the Lacedaemonians, by treating them precisely as Alexander had treated the Thebans, immediately after his assumption of his sovereignty. But another party, consisting of the older counsellors, sought to show that such severity was too great for the occasion, and that all that ought to be done was to rebuke the offenders, depose them, and put the management of the state and the chief offices in the hands of his own friends.
24. The king gave the final decision, if that decision may be called the king’s: for it is not reasonable The king decides not to chastise Sparta. to suppose that a mere boy should be able to come to a decision on matters of such moment. Historians, however, must attribute to the highest official present the final decisions arrived at: it being thoroughly understood among their readers that propositions and opinions, such as these, in all probability proceed from the members of the council, and particularly from those highest in his confidence. In this case the decision of the king ought most probably to be attributed to Aratus. It was to this effect: the king said that “in the case of injuries inflicted by the allies upon each other separately, his intervention ought to be confined to a remonstrance by word of mouth or letter; but that it was only injuries affecting the whole body of the allies which demanded joint intervention and redress: and seeing that the Lacedaemonians had plainly committed no such injury against the whole body of allies, but professed their readiness to satisfy every claim that could with justice be made upon them, he held that he ought not to decree any measure of excessive severity against them. For it would be very inconsistent for him to take severe measures against them for so insignificant a cause; while his father inflicted no punishment at all upon them, though when he conquered them they were not allies but professed enemies.” It having, therefore, been formally decided to overlook the incident, the king immediately sent Petraeus, one of his most trusted friends, with Omias, to exhort the people to remain faithful to their friendship with him and Macedonia, and to interchange oaths of alliance; while he himself started once more with his army and returned towards Corinth, having in his conduct to the Lacedaemonians given an excellent specimen of his policy towards the allies.
25. When he arrived at Corinth he found the envoys from the allied cities already there; and in consultation The congress of allies at Corinth declare war against the Aetolians. with them he discussed the measures to be taken in regard to the Aetolians. The complaints against them were stated by the various envoys. The Boeotians accused them of plundering the temple of Athene at Itone213 in time of peace: the Phocians of having attacked and attempted to seize the cities of Ambrysus and Daulium: the Epirotes of having committed depredations in their territory. The Acarnanians showed how they had contrived a plot for the betrayal of Thyrium into their hands, and had gone so far as to actually assault it under cover of night. The Achaeans made a statement showing that they had seized Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis; traversed the territories of Patrae and Pharae, pillaging the country as they went; completely sacked Cynaetha; plundered the temple of Artemis in Lusi; laid siege to Cleitor; attempted Pylus by sea, and Megalopolis by land, doing all they could by aid of the Illyrians to lay waste the latter after its recent restoration. After listening to these depositions, the congress of allies unanimously decided to go to war with the Aetolians. A decree was, therefore, formulated in which the aforesaid causes for war were stated as a preamble, and a declaration sub-joined of their intention of restoring to the several allies any portion of their territory seized by the Aetolians since the death of Demetrius, father of Philip; and similarly of restoring to their ancestral forms of government all states that had been compelled against their will to join the Aetolian league; with full possession of their own territory and cities; subject to no foreign garrison or tribute; in complete independence; and in enjoyment of their own constitutions and laws. Finally a clause in the decree declared their intention of assisting the Amphictyonic council to restore the laws, and to recover its control of the Delphic temple, wrested from it by the Aetolians, who were determined to keep in their own hands all that belonged to that temple.
26. This decree was made in the first year of the 140th Olympiad, and with it began the so-called Social war, B.C.220. the commencement of which was thoroughly justifiable and a natural consequence of the injurious acts of the Aetolians. The first step of the congress was to send commissioners at once to the several allies, that the decree having been confirmed by as many as possible, all might join in this national war. Philip also sent a declaratory letter to the Aetolians, in order that, if they had any justification to put forward on the points alleged against them, they might even at that late hour meet and settle the controversy by conference: “but if they supposed that they were, with no public declaration of war, to sack and plunder, without the injured parties retaliating, on pain of being considered, if they did so, to have commenced hostilities, they were the most simple people in the world.” On the receipt of this letter the Aetolian magistrates, thinking that Philip would never come, named a day on which they would meet him at Rhium. When they were informed, however, that he had actually arrived there, they sent a despatch informing him that they were not competent, before the meeting of the Aetolian assembly, to settle any public matter on their own authority. But when the Achaeans met at the usual federal assembly, they ratified the decree, and published a proclamation authorising reprisals upon the Aetolians. And when King Philip appeared before the council at Aegium, and informed them at length of all that had taken place, they received his speech with warmth, and formally renewed Autumn, B.C. 220. with him personally the friendship which had existed between his ancestors and themselves.
27. Meanwhile, the time of the annual election having come round, the Aetolians elected Scopas as their Strategus, Scopas elected Aetolian Strategus. the man who had been the moving spirit in all these acts of violence. I am at a loss for fitting terms to describe such a public policy. To pass a decree against going to war,214 and yet to go on an actual expedition in force and pillage their neighbours’ territories: not to punish one of those responsible for this: but on the contrary to elect as Strategi and bestow honours on the leaders in these transactions,—this seems to me to involve the grossest disingenuousness. I can find no word which better describes such a treacherous policy; and I will quote two instances to show what I mean by it. When Phoebidas treacherously seized the Cadmeia, B.C.382.the Lacedaemonians fined the guilty general but declined to withdraw the garrison, on the ground that the wrong was fully atoned for by the punishment of the perpetrator of it: though their plain duty was to have done the reverse, for it was the latter which was of importance to the Thebans. Again this same people published a proclamation giving the various cities freedom and autonomy in accordance B.C.387. with the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, and yet did not withdraw their Harmosts from the cities. B.C.385. Again, having driven the Mantineans from their home, who were at the time their friends and allies, they denied that they were doing any wrong, inasmuch as they removed them from one city and settled them in several. But indeed a man is a fool, as much as a knave, if he imagines that, because he shuts his own eyes, his neighbours cannot see. Their fondness for such tortuous policy proved however, both to the Lacedaemonians and Aetolians, the source of the greatest disasters; and it is not one which should commend itself to the imitation either of individuals or states, if they are well advised.
King Philip, then, after his interview with the Achaean assembly, started with his army on the way to Macedonia, in all haste to make preparations for war; leaving a pleasant impression in the minds of all the Greeks: for the nature of the decree, which I have mentioned as having been passed by him,215 gave them good hopes of finding him a man of moderate temper and royal magnanimity.
28. These transactions were contemporaneous with Hannibal’s expedition against Saguntum, after his conquest of all Iberia south of the Iber. Now, had the first attempts of Hannibal been from the beginning involved with the transactions in Greece, it would have been plainly my proper course to have narrated the latter side by side with those in Iberia in my previous book, with an eye solely to dates. But seeing that the wars in Italy, Greece, and Asia were at their commencements entirely distinct, and yet became finally involved with each other, I decided that my history of them must also be distinct, until I came to the point at which they became inseparably interlaced, and began to tend towards a common conclusion. Thus both will be made clear,—the account of their several commencements: and the time, manner, and causes which led to the complication and amalgamation, of which I spoke in my introduction. This point having been reached, I must thenceforth embrace them all in one uninterrupted narrative. This amalgamation began towards the end of the war, in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. B.C.118. From that year, therefore, my history will, with a due regard to dates, become a general one. Before that year it must be divided into distinct narratives, with a mere recapitulation in each case of the events detailed in the preceding book, introduced for the sake of facilitating the comprehension, and rousing the admiration, of my readers.
29. Philip then passed the winter in Macedonia, in an energetic enlistment of troops for the coming campaign, Philip secures the support of Scerdilaidas. and in securing his frontier on the side of the Barbarians. And having accomplished these objects, he met Scerdilaidas and put himself fearlessly in his power, and discussed with him the terms of friendship and alliance; and partly by promising to help him in securing his power in Illyria, and partly by bringing against the Aetolians the charges to which they were only too open, persuaded him without difficulty to assent to his proposals. The fact is that public crimes do not differ from private, except in quantity and extent; and just as in the case of petty thieves, what brings them to ruin more than anything else is that they cheat and are unfaithful to each other, so was it in the case of the Aetolians. They had agreed with Scerdilaidas to give him half the booty, if he would join them in their attack upon Achaea; but when, on his consenting to do so, and actually carrying out his engagement, they had sacked Cynaetha and carried off a large booty in slaves and cattle, they gave him no share in the spoil at all. He was therefore already enraged with them; and required very little persuasion on Philip’s part to induce him to accept the proposal, and agree to join the alliance, on condition of receiving a yearly subsidy of twenty talents; and, in return, putting to sea with thirty galleys and carrying on a naval war with the Aetolians.
30. While Philip was thus engaged, the commissioners sent out to the allies were performing their mission. The Acarnanians, B.C.220. The first place they came to was Acarnania; and the Acarnanians, with a noble promptitude, confirmed the decree and undertook to join the war against the Aetolians with their full forces. And yet they, if any one, might have been excused if they had put the matter off, and hesitated, and shown fear of entering upon a war with their neighbours; both because they lived upon the frontiers of Aetolia, and still more because they were peculiarly open to attack, and, most of all, because they had a short time before experienced the most dreadful disasters from the enmity of the Aetolians. But I imagine that men of noble nature, whether in private or public affairs, look upon duty as the highest consideration; and in adherence to this principle no people in Greece have been more frequently conspicuous than the Acarnanians, although the forces at their command were but slender. With them, above all others in Greece, an alliance should be sought at a crisis, without any misgiving; for they have, individually and collectively, an element of stability and a spirit of liberality. The conduct of the Epirotes was in strong contrast. Duplicity of the Epirotes.When they heard what the commissioners had to say, indeed, they, like the Acarnanians, joined in confirming the decree, and voted to go to war with the Aetolians at such time as Philip also did the same; but with ignoble duplicity they told the Aetolian envoys that they had determined to maintain peace with them.
Ambassadors were despatched also to King Ptolemy, to urge him not to send money to the Aetolians, Ptolemy Philopator. nor to supply them with any aid against Philip and the allies.
31. The Messenians again, on whose account the war began, answered the commissioners sent to them that, Timidity of the Messenians. seeing Phigalia was on their frontier and was in the power of the Aetolians, they would not undertake the war until that city was wrested from them. This decision was forcibly carried, much against the will of the people at large, by the Ephors Oenis and Nicippus, and some others of the oligarchical party: wherein they showed, to my thinking, great ignorance of their true interests. I admit, indeed, that war is a terrible thing; but it is less terrible than to submit to anything whatever in order to avoid it. For what is the meaning of our fine talk about equality of rights, freedom of speech, and liberty, if the one important thing is peace? We have no good word for the Thebans, B.C.480-479. Pindar fr. because they shrunk from fighting for Greece and chose from fear to side with the Persians,—nor indeed for Pindar who supported their inaction in the verses—216
A quiet haven for the ship of state
Should be the patriot’s aim,
And smiling peace, to small and great
That brings no shame.
For though his advice was for the moment acceptable, it was not long before it became manifest that his opinion was as mischievous as it was dishonourable. For peace, with justice and honour, is the noblest and most advantageous thing in the world; when joined with disgrace and contemptible cowardice, it is the basest and most disastrous.217
32. The Messenian leaders, then, being of oligarchical tendencies, and aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too much inclined to peace. On many critical occasions indeed they managed to elude fear and danger: but all the while this policy of theirs was accumulating a heavy retribution for themselves; and they finally involved their country in the gravest misfortunes. And the reason in my opinion was this, that being neighbours to two of the most powerful nations in the Peloponnese, or I might almost say in Greece, I mean the Arcadians and Lacedaemonians,—one of which had been irreconcilably hostile to them from the moment they occupied the country, and the other disposed to be friendly and protect them,—they never frankly accepted hostility to the Spartans, or friendship with the Arcadians. Accordingly when the attention of the former was distracted by domestic or foreign war, the Messenians were secure; for they always enjoyed peace and tranquillity from the fact of their country lying out of the road: but when the Lacedaemonians, having nothing else on hand to distract their attention, took to inflicting injuries on them, they were unable to withstand the superior strength of the Lacedaemonians by their own power; and, having failed to secure the support of their true friends, who were ready to do anything for their protection, they were reduced to the alternatives of becoming the slaves of Sparta and enduring her heavy exactions; or of leaving their homes to escape from this servitude, abandoning their country with wives and children. And this has repeatedly happened to them within comparatively recent times.
That the present settlement of the Peloponnese may prove a lasting one, so that no measure such as I am about to describe may be ever necessary, is indeed my earnest wish: but if anything does happen to disturb it, and threaten revolutionary changes, the only hope for the Messenians and Megalopolitans of continuing to occupy their present territory, that I can see, is a recurrence to the policy of Epaminondas. They must resolve, that is to say, upon a cordial and sincere partnership with each other in every danger and labour.
33. And perhaps my observation may receive some support from ancient history. For, among many other indications, it is a fact that the Messenians did set up a pillar close to the altar of Zeus Lycaeus in the time of Aristomenes,218 according to the evidence of Callisthenes, in which they inscribed the following verses:
A faithless king will perish soon or late!
Messene tracked him down right easily,
The traitor:—perjury must meet its fate;
Glory to Zeus, and life to Arcady!
The point of this is, that, having lost their own country, they pray the gods to save Arcadia as their second country.219 And it was very natural that they should do so; for not only did the Arcadians receive them when driven from their own land, at the time of the Aristomenic war, and make them welcome to their homes and free of their civic rights; but they also passed a vote bestowing their daughters in marriage upon those of the Messenians who were of proper age; and besides all this, investigated the treason of their king Aristocrates in the battle of the Trench; and, finding him guilty, put him to death and utterly destroyed his whole family. But setting aside these ancient events, what has happened recently after the restoration of Megalopolis and Messene will be sufficient to support what I have said. B.C.362.For when, upon the death of Epaminondas leaving the result of the battle of Mantinea doubtful, the Lacedaemonians endeavoured to prevent the Messenians from being included in the truce, hoping even then to get Messenia into their own hands, the Megalopolitans, and all the other Arcadians who were allied with the Messenians, made such a point of their being admitted to the benefits of the new confederacy, that they were accepted by the allies and allowed to take the oaths and share in the provisions of the peace; while the Lacedaemonians were the only Greeks excluded from the treaty. With such facts before him, could any one doubt the soundness of the suggestion I lately made?
I have said thus much for the sake of the Arcadians and Messenians themselves; that, remembering all the misfortunes which have befallen their countries at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, they may cling close to the policy of mutual affection and fidelity; and let no fear of war, or desire of peace, induce them to abandon each other in what affects the highest interests of both.
34. In the matter of the commissioners from the allies, to go back to my story, the behaviour of the Lacedaemonians was very characteristic. Division of opinion in Sparta, B.C.220. For their own ill-considered and tortuous policy had placed them in such a difficulty, that they finally dismissed them without an answer: thus illustrating, as it seems to me, the truth of the saying, that, “boldness pushed to extremes amounts to want of sense, and comes to nothing.” Subsequently, however, on the appointment of new Ephors, the party who had originally promoted the outbreak, and had been the causes of the massacre, sent to the Aetolians to induce them to despatch an ambassador to Sparta. The Aetolians gladly consented, and in a short time Machatas arrived there in that capacity. Pressure was at once put upon the Ephors to allow Machatas to address the people,220 and to re-establish royalty in accordance with the ancient constitution, and not to allow the Heraclid dynasty to be any longer suppressed, contrary to the laws. The Ephors were annoyed at the proposal, but were unable to withstand the pressure, and afraid of a rising of the younger men: they therefore answered that the question of restoring the kings must be reserved for future consideration; but they consented to grant Machatas an opportunity of addressing a public assembly. When the people accordingly were met, Machatas came forward, and in a long speech urged them to embrace the alliance with Aetolia; inveighing in reckless and audacious terms against the Macedonians, while he went beyond all reason and truth in his commendations of the Aetolians. Upon his retirement, there was a long and animated debate between those who supported the Aetolians and advised the adoption of their alliance, and those who took the opposite side. When, however, some of the elders reminded the people of the good services rendered them by Antigonus and the Macedonians, and the injuries inflicted on them by Charixenus and Timaeus,—when the Aetolians invaded them with their full force and ravaged their territory, enslaved the neighbouring villages, and laid a plot for attacking Sparta itself by a fraudulent and forcible restoration of exiles,—these words produced a great revulsion of feeling, and the people finally decided to maintain the alliance with Philip and the Macedonians. Machatas accordingly had to go home without attaining the object of his mission.
35. The party, however, at Sparta who were the original of the instigators of the outbreak could not make up their minds to give way. Murder of the Ephors, B.C.220. They once more therefore determined to commit a crime of the most impious description, having first corrupted some of the younger men. It was an ancestral custom that, at a certain sacrifice, all citizens of military age should join fully armed in a procession to the temple of Athene of the Brazen-house, while the Ephors remained in the sacred precinct and completed the sacrifice. As the young men therefore were conducting the procession, some of them suddenly fell upon the Ephors, while they were engaged with the sacrifice, and slew them. The enormity of this crime will be made apparent by remembering that the sanctity of this temple was such, that it gave a safe asylum even to criminals condemned to death; whereas its privileges were now by the cruelty of these audacious men treated with such contempt, that the whole of the Ephors were butchered round the altar and the table of the goddess. In pursuance of their purpose they next killed one of the elders, Gyridas, and drove into exile those who had spoken against the Aetolians. They then chose some of their own body as Ephors, and made an alliance with the Aetolians. Their motives for doing all this, for incurring the enmity of the Achaeans, for their ingratitude to the Macedonians, and generally for their unjustifiable conduct towards all, was before everything else their devotion to Cleomenes, and the hopes and expectations they continued to cherish that he would return to Sparta in safety. So true it is that men who have the tact to ingratiate themselves with those who surround them can, even when far removed, leave in their hearts very effective materials for kindling the flame of a renewed popularity. This people for instance, to say nothing of other examples, after nearly three years of constitutional government, following the banishment of Cleomenes, without once thinking of appointing kings at Sparta, no sooner heard of the death of Cleomenes than they were eager—populace and Ephors alike—to restore kingly rule. Agesipolis appointed king, Accordingly the Ephors who were in sympathy with the conspirators, and who had made the alliance with Aetolia which I just now mentioned, did so. One of these kings so restored they appointed in accordance with the regular and legal succession, namely Agesipolis. He was a child at the time, a son of Agesipolis, and grandson of that Cleombrotus who had become king, B.C.242.as the next of kin to this family, when Leonidas was driven from office. As guardian of the young king they elected Cleomenes, son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis.
Of the other royal house there were surviving two sons of Archidamus, son of Eudamidas, by the daughter of Hippodemon; and Lycurgas. as well as Hippodemon himself, the son of Agesilaus, and several other members of the same branch, though somewhat less closely connected than those I have mentioned. But these were all passed over, and Lycurgus was appointed king, none of whose ancestors had ever enjoyed that title. A present of a talent to each of the Ephors made him “descendant of Hercules” and king of Sparta. So true is it all the world over that such nobility221 is a mere question of a little money.
The result was that the penalty for their folly had to be paid, not by the third generation, but by the very authors of this royalist restoration.
36. When Machatas heard what had happened at Sparta, he returned thither and urged the Ephors and kings to go to war with the Achaeans; Spartans attack Argos, and proclaim war with the Achaeans. arguing that that was the only way of stopping the ambition of the party in Sparta who were doing all they could to break up the alliance with the Aetolians, or of the party in Aetolia who were co-operating with them. Having obtained the consent of the Ephors and kings, Machatas returned home with a success secured him by the blindness of his partisans in Sparta; while Lycurgus with the army and certain others of the citizens invaded the Argive territory, the inhabitants being quite unprepared for an attack, owing to the existing settlement. By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta, but was repulsed at Glympes and Zarax. After these achievements of their king, the Lacedaemonians proclaimed a licence of reprisal against the Achaeans. With the Eleans also Machatas was successful in persuading them, by the same arguments as he had used at Sparta, to go to war with the Achaeans.
The unexpected success of these intrigues caused the Aetolians to enter upon the war with high spirits. But it was quite the contrary with the Achaeans: for Philip, on whom their hopes rested, was still busy with his preparations; the Epirotes were hesitating about going to war, and the Messenians were entirely passive; and meantime the Aetolians, aided by the blind policy of the Eleans and Lacedaemonians, were threatening them with actual war on every side.
37. The year of Aratus’s office was just expiring, and his son Aratus the younger had been elected to succeed him as Strategus, Aratus succeeded by his son as Strategus of the Achaeans, May B.C.219. and was on the point of taking over the office. Scopas was still Strategus of the Aetolians, and in fact it was just about the middle of his year. For the Aetolians hold their elections immediately after the autumn equinox, while the Achaeans hold theirs about the time of the rising of the Pleiads. As soon therefore as summer had well set in, and Aratus the younger had taken over his office, all these wars at once began simultaneously. Hannibal began besieging Saguntum; June-September. B.C.219. the Romans sent Lucius Aemilius with an army to Illyria against Demetrius of Pharos,—of both which I spoke in the last book; Antiochus, having had Ptolemais and Tyre betrayed to him by Theodotus, meditated attacking Coele-Syria; and Ptolemy was engaged in preparing for the war with Antiochus. While Lycurgus, wishing to make a beginning after the pattern of Cleomenes, pitched his camp near the Athenaeum of Megalopolis and was laying siege to it: the Achaeans were collecting mercenary horse and foot for the war which was upon them: and Philip, finally, was starting from Macedonia with an army consisting of ten thousand heavy-armed soldiers of the phalanx, five thousand light-armed, and eight hundred cavalry. Such was the universal state of war or preparation for war.
38. At the same time the Rhodians went to war with the Byzantines, for reasons which I Rhodian and Byzantium war, 220-219 B.C. must now describe.
As far as the sea is concerned, Byzantium occupies a position the most secure and in every way the most Advantages of the situation of Byzantium. advantageous of any town in our quarter of the world: while in regard to the land, its situation is in both respects the most unfavourable. By sea it so completely commands the entrance to the Pontus, that no merchant can sail in or out against its will. The Pontus therefore being rich in what the rest of the world requires for the support of life, the Byzantines are absolute masters of all such things. For those commodities which are the first necessaries of existence, cattle and slaves, are confessedly supplied by the districts round the Pontus in greater profusion, and of better quality, than by any others: and for luxuries, they supply us with honey, wax, and salt-fish in great abundance; while they take our superfluous stock of olive oil and every kind of wine. In the matter of corn there is a mutual interchange, they supplying or taking it as it happens to be convenient. Now the Greeks would necessarily have been excluded entirely from traffic in these articles, or at least would have had to carry it on at a loss, if the Byzantines had adopted a hostile attitude, and made common cause formerly with the Gauls, or still more at this time with the Thracians, or had abandoned the place altogether: for owing to the narrowness of the strait, and the number of the barbarians along its shores, it would have become entirely impassable to our ships. The Byzantines themselves probably feel the advantages of the situation, in the supplies of the necessaries of life, more than any one else; for their superfluity finds a ready means of export, and what they lack is readily imported, with profit to themselves, and without difficulty or danger: but other people too, as I have said, get a great many commodities by their means. As common benefactors therefore of all Greece they might justly expect, not only gratitude, but the united assistance of Greeks, when threatened by the barbarians.
But since the peculiar natural advantages of this site are generally unknown, because it lies somewhat outside the parts of the world ordinarily visited; and since it is an universal wish to be acquainted with things of this sort, by ocular inspection, if possible, of such places as have any unusual or remarkable features; or, if that is impossible, by having in our minds some ideas or images of them as like the truth as may be, I must now state the facts of the case, and what it is that makes this city so eminently rich and prosperous.
39. The sea called “The Pontus” has a circumference of twenty-two thousand stades, and two mouths The Pontus. diametrically opposite to each other, the one opening into the Propontis and the other into the Maeotic Lake; which latter also has itself a circumference of eight thousand stades. Into these two basins many great rivers discharge themselves on the Asiatic side, and still larger and more numerous on the European; and so the Maeotic lake, as it gets filled up, flows into the Pontus, and the Pontus into the Propontis. The mouth of the Maeotic lake is called the Cimmerian Bosporus, about thirty stades broad and sixty long, and shallow all over; that of the Pontus is called the Thracian Bosporus, and is a hundred and twenty stades long, and of a varying breadth. Between Calchedon and Byzantium the channel is fourteen stades broad, and this is the entrance at the end nearest the Propontis. Coming from the Pontus, it begins at a place called Hieron, at which they say that Jason on his return voyage from Colchis first sacrificed to the twelve gods. This place is on the Asiatic side, and its distance from the European coast is twelve stades, measuring to Sarapieium, which lies exactly opposite in Thrace. There are two causes which account for the fact that the waters, both of the Maeotic lake and the Pontus, continually flow outwards. One is patent at once to every observer, namely, that by the continual discharge of many streams into basins which are of definite circumference and content, the water necessarily is continually increasing in bulk, and, had there been no outlet, would inevitably have encroached more and more, and occupied an ever enlarging area in the depression: but as outlets do exist, the surplus water is carried off by a natural process, and runs perpetually through the channels that are there to receive it. The second cause is the alluvial soil brought down, in immense quantities of every description, by the rivers swollen from heavy rains, which forms shelving banks and continually forces the water to take a higher level, which is thus also carried through these outlets. Now as this process of alluvial deposit and influx of water is unceasing and continuous, so also the discharge through the channels is necessarily unceasing and continuous.
These are the true causes of the outflow of the Pontus, which do not depend for their credit on the stories of merchants, but upon the actual observation of nature, which is the most accurate method discoverable.
40. As I have started this topic I must not, as most historians do, leave any point undiscussed, or only barely stated. My object is rather to give information, and to clear up doubtful points for my readers. This is the peculiarity of the present day, in which every sea and land has been thrown open to travellers; and in which, therefore, one can no longer employ the evidence of poets and fabulists, as my predecessors have done on very many points, “offering,” as Heraclitus says, “tainted witnesses to disputed facts,”—but I must try to make my narrative in itself carry conviction to my readers.
I say then the Pontus has long been in process of being filled up with mud, and that this process is actually going on now: and further, that in process of time both it and the Propontis, assuming the same local conditions to be maintained, and the causes of the alluvial deposit to continue active, will be entirely filled up. For time being infinite, and the depressions most undoubtedly finite, it is plain that, even though the amount of deposit be small, they must in course of time be filled. For a finite process, whether of accretion or decrease, must, if we presuppose infinite time, be eventually completed, however infinitesimal its progressive stages may be. In the present instance the amount of soil deposited being not small, but exceedingly large, it is plain that the result I mentioned will not be remote but rapid. And, in fact, it is evident that it is already taking place. The Maeotic lake is already so much choked up, that the greater part of it is only from seven to five fathoms deep, and accordingly cannot any longer be passed by large ships without a pilot. And having moreover been originally a sea precisely on a level with the Pontus, it is now a freshwater lake: the sea-water has been expelled by the silting up of the bottom, and the discharge of the rivers has entirely overpowered it. The same will happen to the Pontus, and indeed is taking place at this moment; and though it is not evident to ordinary observers, owing to the vastness of its basin, yet a moderately attentive study will discover even now what is going on.
41. For the Danube discharging itself into the Pontus by several mouths, we find opposite it a bank formed by the mud discharged from these mouths extending for nearly a thousand stades, at a distance of a day’s sail from the shore as it now exists; upon which ships sailing to the Pontus run, while apparently still in deep water, and find themselves unexpectedly stranded on the sandbanks which the sailors call the Breasts. That this deposit is not close to the shore, but projected to some distance, must be accounted for thus: exactly as far as the currents of the rivers retain their force from the strength of the descending stream, and overpower that of the sea, it must of course follow that to that distance the earth, and whatever else is carried down by the rivers, would be projected, and neither settle nor become fixed until it is reached. But when the force of the currents has become quite spent by the depth and bulk of the sea, it is but natural that the soil held in solution should settle down and assume a fixed position. This is the explanation of the fact, that, in the case of large and rapid rivers, such embankments are at considerable distances, and the sea close in shore deep; while in the case of smaller and more sluggish streams, these sandbanks are at their mouths. The strongest proof of this is furnished by the case of heavy rains; for when they occur, rivers of inferior size, overpowering the waves at their mouths, project the alluvial deposit out to sea, to a distance exactly in proportion to the force of the streams thus discharging themselves. It would be mere foolish scepticism to disbelieve in the enormous size of this sandbank, and in the mass of stones, timber, and earth carried down by the rivers; when we often see with our own eyes an insignificant stream suddenly swell into a torrent, and force its way over lofty rocks, sweeping along with it every kind of timber, soil, and stones, and making such huge moraines, that at times the appearance of a locality becomes in a brief period difficult to recognise.222
42. This should prevent any surprise that rivers of such magnitude and rapidity, flowing perpetually instead of intermittently, should produce these effects and end by filling up the Pontus. For it is not a mere probability, but a logical certainty, that this must happen. And a proof of what is going to take place is this, that in the same proportion as the Maeotic lake is less salt than the Pontus, the Pontus is less so than the Mediterranean. From which it is manifest that, when the time which it has taken for the Maeotic lake to fill up shall have been extended in proportion to the excess of the Pontic over the Maeotic basin, then the Pontus will also become like a marsh and lake, and filled with fresh water like the Maeotic lake: nay, we must suppose that the process will be somewhat more rapid, insomuch as the rivers falling into it are more numerous and more rapid. I have said thus much in answer to the incredulity of those who cannot believe that the Pontus is actually being silted up, and will some day be filled; and that so vast a sea will ever become a lake or marsh. But I have another and higher object also in thus speaking: which is to prevent our ignorance from forcing us to give a childish credence to every traveller’s tale and marvel related by voyagers; and that, by possessing certain indications of the truth, we may be enabled by them to test the truth or falsehood of anything alleged by this or that person.
43. I must now return to the discussion of the excellence of the site of Byzantium. Site of Byzantium. The length of the channel connecting the Pontus and Propontis being, as I have said, a hundred and twenty stades, and Hieron marking its termination towards the Pontus, and the Strait of Byzantium that towards the Propontis,—half-way between these, on the European side, stands Hermaeum, on a headland jutting out into the channel, about five stades from the Asiatic coast, just at the narrowest point of the whole channel; B.C.512. where Darius is said to have made his bridge of ships across the strait, when he crossed to invade Scythia. In the rest of the channel the running of the current from the Pontus is much the same, owing to the similarity of the coast formation on either side of it; but when it reaches Hermaeum on the European side, which I said was the narrowest point, the stream flowing from the Pontus, and being thus confined, strikes the European coast with great violence, and then, as though by a rebound from a blow, dashes against the opposite Asiatic coast, and thence again sweeps back and strikes the European shore near some headlands called the Hearths: thence it runs rapidly once more to the spot on the Asiatic side called the Cow, the place on which the myth declares Io to have first stood after swimming the channel. Finally the current runs from the Cow right up to Byzantium, and dividing into two streams on either side of the city, the lesser part of it forms the gulf called the Horn, while the greater part swerves once more across. But it has no longer sufficient way on it to reach the opposite shore on which Calchedon stands: for after its several counter-blows the current, finding at this point a wider channel, slackens; and no longer makes short rebounds at right angles from one shore to the other, but more and more at an obtuse angle, and accordingly, falling short of Calchedon, runs down the middle of the channel.
44. What then makes Byzantium a most excellent site, and Calchedon the reverse, is just this: and although at first sight both positions seem equally convenient, the practical fact is that it is difficult to sail up to the latter, even if you wish to do so; while the current carries you to the former, whether you will or no, as I have just now shown. And a proof of my assertion is this: those who want to cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail straight across the channel, but coast up to the Cow and Chrysopolis,—which the Athenians formerly seized, by the advice of Alcibiades, B.C.410. when they for the first time levied customs on ships sailing into the Pontus,223—and then drift down the current, which carries them as a matter of course to Byzantium. And the same is the case with a voyage on either side of Byzantium. For if a man is running before a south wind from the Hellespont, or to the Hellespont from the Pontus before the Etesian winds, if he keeps to the European shore, he has a direct and easy course to the narrow part of the Hellespont between Abydos and Sestos, and thence also back again to Byzantium: but if he goes from Calchedon along the Asiatic coast, the case is exactly the reverse, from the fact that the coast is broken up by deep bays, and that the territory of Cyzicus projects to a considerable distance. Nor can a man coming from the Hellespont to Calchedon obviate this by keeping to the European coast as far as Byzantium, and then striking across to Calchedon; for the current and other circumstances which I have mentioned make it difficult. Similarly, for one sailing out from Calchedon it is absolutely impossible to make straight for Thrace, owing to the intervening current, and to the fact that both winds are unfavourable to both voyages; for as the south wind blows into the Pontus, and the north wind from it, the one or the other of these must be encountered in both these voyages. These, then, are the advantages enjoyed by Byzantium in regard to the sea: I must now describe its disadvantages on shore.
45. They consist in the fact that its territory is so completely hemmed in by Thrace from shore to shore, that the Byzantines have a perpetual and dangerous war continually on hand with the Thracians. Disadvantages of Byzantium. For they are unable once for all to arm and repel them by a single decisive battle, owing to the number of their people and chiefs. For if they conquer one chief, three others still more formidable invade their territory. Nor again do they gain anything by consenting to pay tribute and make terms; for a concession of any sort to one brings at once five times as many enemies upon them. Therefore, as I say, they are burdened by a perpetual and dangerous war: for what can be more hazardous or more formidable than a war with barbarians living on your borders? Nay, it is not only this perpetual struggle with danger on land, but, apart from the evils that always accompany war, they have to endure a misery like that ascribed by the poets to Tantalus: for being in possession of an extremely fertile district, no sooner have they expended their labour upon it and been rewarded by crops of the finest quality, than the barbarians sweep down, and either destroy them, or collect and carry them off; and then, to say nothing of the loss of their labour and expense, the very excellence of the crops enhances the misery and distress of seeing them destroyed before their eyes. Still, habit making them able to endure the war with the Thracians, they maintained their original connexions with the other Greeks; but when to their other misfortunes was added the attack of the Gauls under Comontorius, they were reduced to a sad state of distress indeed.
46. These Gauls had left their country with Brennus, and having survived the battle at Delphi and made their way to the Hellespont, The Gauls, B.C.279. instead of crossing to Asia, were captivated by the beauty of the district round Byzantium, and settled there. Then, having conquered the Thracians and erected Tyle224 into a capital, they placed the Byzantines in extreme danger. In their earlier attacks, made under the command of Comontorius their first king, the Byzantines always bought them off by presents amounting to three, or five, or sometimes even ten thousand gold pieces, on condition of their not devastating their territory: and at last were compelled to agree to pay them a yearly tribute of eighty talents, until the time of Cavarus, in whose reign their kingdom came to an end; and their whole tribe, being in their turn conquered by the Thracians, were entirely annihilated. It was in these times, then, that being hard pressed by the payment of these exactions, the Byzantines first sent embassies to the Greek states with a prayer for aid and support in their dangerous situation: but being disregarded by the greater number, they, under pressure of necessity, attempted to levy dues upon ships sailing into the Pontus.
47. Now this exaction by the Byzantines of a duty upon goods brought from the Pontus, The Byzantines levy a toll. being a heavy loss and burden to everybody, was universally regarded as a grievance; and accordingly an appeal from all those engaged in the trade was made to the Rhodians, as acknowledged masters of the sea: and it was from this circumstance that the war originated of which I am about to speak.
For the Rhodians, roused to action by the loss incurred by themselves, as well as that of their neighbours, The Rhodians declare war, B.C.220. at first joined their allies in an embassy to Byzantium, and demanded the abolition of the impost. The Byzantines refused compliance, being persuaded that they were in the right by the arguments advanced by their chief magistrates, Hecatorus and Olympidorus, in their interview with the ambassadors. The Rhodian envoys accordingly departed without effecting their object. But upon their return home, war was at once voted against Byzantium on these grounds; and messengers were immediately despatched to Prusias inviting his co-operation in the war: for they knew that Prusias was from various causes incensed with the Byzantines.
48. The Byzantines took steps of a similar nature, by sending to Attalus and Achaeus begging for their assistance. For his part Attalus was ready enough to give it: but his importance was small, because he had been reduced within the limits of his ancestral dominions by Achaeus. But Achaeus who exercised dominion throughout Asia on this side Taurus, and had recently established his regal power, promised assistance; and his attitude roused high hopes in the minds of the Byzantines, and corresponding depression in those of the Rhodians and Prusias. Achaeus. Achaeus was a relation of the Antiochus who had just succeeded to the kingdom of Syria; and he became possessed of the dominion I have mentioned through the following circumstances. After the death of Seleucus, father of the above-named Antiochus, and the succession of his eldest son Seleucus to the throne, B.C.226. Achaeus accompanied the latter in an expedition over Mount Taurus, about two years before the period of which we are speaking.225 For as soon as Seleucus the younger had succeeded to the kingdom he learnt that Attalus had already reduced all Asia on this side of Taurus under his power; and being accordingly eager to support his own rights, he crossed Taurus with a large army. There he was treacherously assassinated by Apaturius the Gaul, and Nicanor. Achaeus, in right of his relationship, promptly revenged his murder by killing Nicanor and Apaturius; and taking supreme command of the army and administration, conducted it with wisdom and integrity. For the opportunity was a convenient one, and the feeling of the common soldiers was all in favour of his assuming the crown; yet he refused to do so, and preserving the royal title for Antiochus the younger, son of Seleucus, went on energetically with the expedition, and the recovery of the whole of the territory this side Taurus. Meeting however with unexpected success,—for he shut up Attalus within the walls of Pergamus and became master of all the rest of the country,—he was puffed up by his good fortune, and at once swerved from his straightforward course of policy. He assumed the diadem, adopted the title of king, and was at this time the most powerful and formidable of all the kings and princes this side Taurus. This was the man on whose help the Byzantines relied when they undertook the war against the Rhodians and Prusias.
49. As to the provocations given before this to Prusias by the Byzantines they were various. Prusias. In the first place he complained that, having voted to put up certain statues of him, they had not done so, but had delayed or forgotten it. In the second place he was annoyed with them for taking great pains to compose the hostility, and put an end to the war, between Achaeus and Attalus; because he looked upon a friendship between these two as in many ways detrimental to his own interests. He was provoked also because it appeared that when Attalus was keeping the festival of Athene, the Byzantines had sent a mission to join in the celebration; but had sent no one to him when he was celebrating the Soteria. Nursing therefore a secret resentment for these various offences, he gladly snatched at the pretext offered him by the Rhodians; and arranged with their ambassadors that they were to carry on the war by sea, while he would undertake to inflict no less damage on the enemy by land.
Such were the causes and origin of the war between Rhodes and Byzantium.
50. At first the Byzantines entered upon the war with energy, in full confidence of receiving the assistance of Achaeus; Hostilities commence, B.C.220. and of being able to cause Prusias as much alarm and danger by fetching Tiboetes from Macedonia as he had done to them. For Prusias, entering upon the war with all the animosity which I have described, had seized the place called Hieron at the entrance of the channel, which the Byzantines not long before had purchased for a considerable sum of money, because of its convenient situation; and because they did not wish to leave in any one else’s hands a point of vantage to be used against merchants sailing into the Pontus, or one which commanded the slave trade, or the fishing. Besides this, Prusias had seized in Asia a district of Mysia, which had been in the possession of Byzantium for many years past.
Meanwhile the Rhodians manned six ships and received four from their allies; and, having elected Xenophantus to command them, they sailed with this squadron of ten ships to the Hellespont. Nine of them dropped anchor near Sestos, and stopped ships sailing into the Pontus; with the tenth the admiral sailed to Byzantium, to test the spirit of the people, and see whether they were already sufficiently alarmed to change their minds about the war. Finding them resolved not to listen he sailed away, and, taking up his other nine ships, returned to Rhodes with the whole squadron.
Meanwhile the Byzantines sent a message to Achaeus asking for aid, and an escort to conduct Tiboetes from Macedonia. For it was believed that Tiboetes had as good a claim to the kingdom of Bithynia as Prusias, who was his nephew.
51. But seeing the confident spirit of the Byzantines, the Rhodians adopted an exceedingly able plan to obtain their object. The Rhodians secure the friendship of Achaeus. They perceived that the resolution of the Byzantines in venturing on the war rested mainly on their hopes of the support of Achaeus. Now they knew that the father of Achaeus was detained at Alexandria, and that Achaeus was exceedingly anxious for his father’s safety: they therefore hit upon the idea of sending an embassy to Ptolemy, and asking him to deliver this Andromachus to them. This request, indeed, they had before made, but without laying any great stress upon it: now, however, they were genuinely anxious for it; that, by doing this favour to Achaeus, they might lay him under such an obligation to them, that he would be unable to refuse any request they might make to him. When the ambassadors arrived, Ptolemy at first deliberated as to detaining Andromachus; because there still remained some points of dispute between himself and Antiochus unsettled; and Achaeus, who had recently declared himself king, could exercise a decisive influence in several important particulars. For Andromachus was not only father of Achaeus, but brother also of Laodice, the wife of Seleucus.226 However, on a review of the whole situation, Ptolemy inclined to the Rhodians; and being anxious to show them every favour, he yielded to their request, and handed over Andromachus to them to conduct to his son. Having accordingly done this, and having conferred some additional marks of honour on Achaeus, they deprived the Byzantines of their most important hope. And this was not the only disappointment which the Byzantines had to encounter; for as Tiboetes was being escorted from Macedonia, he entirely defeated their plans by dying. This misfortune damped the ardour of the Byzantines, while it encouraged Prusias to push on the war. On the Asiatic side he carried it on in person, and with great energy; while on the European side he hired Thracians who prevented the Byzantines from leaving their gates. For their party being thus baulked of their hopes, and surrounded on every side by enemies, the Byzantines began to look about then for some decent pretext for withdrawing from the war.
52. So when the Gallic king, Cavarus, came to Byzantium, and showed himself eager to put an end to the war, The Gallic king, Cavarus, negotiates a peace, B.C.220. and earnestly offered his friendly intervention, both Prusias and the Byzantines consented to his proposals. And when the Rhodians were informed of the interference of Cavarus and the consent of Prusias, being very anxious to secure their own object also, they elected Aridices as ambassador to Byzantium, and sent Polemocles with him in command of three triremes, wishing, as the saying is, to send the Byzantines “spear and herald’s staff at once.” Upon their appearance a pacification was arranged, in the year of Cothon, son of Callisthenes, Hieromnemon in Byzantium.227 The treaty with the Rhodians was simple: “The Byzantines will not collect toll from any ship sailing into the Pontus; and in that case the Rhodians and their allies are at peace with the Byzantines.” But that with Prusias contained the following provisions: “There shall be peace and amity for ever between Prusias and the Byzantines; the Byzantines shall in no way attack Prusias, nor Prusias the Byzantines. Prusias shall restore to Byzantines all lands, forts, populations, and prisoners of war, without ransom; and besides these things, the ships taken at the beginning of the war, and the arms seized in the fortresses; and also the timbers, stone-work, and roofing belonging to the fort called Hieron” (for Prusias, in his terror of the approach of Tiboetes, had pulled down every fort which seemed to lie conveniently for him): “finally, Prusias shall compel such of the Bithynians as have any property taken from the Byzantine district of Mysia to restore it to the farmers.”
Such were the beginning and end of the war of Rhodes and Prusias with Byzantium.
53. At the same time the Cnossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians, and persuaded them to send them War between Rhodes and Crete. the ships that were under the command of Polemocles, and to launch three undecked vessels besides and send them also to Crete. The Rhodians having complied, and the vessels having arrived at Crete, the people of Eleutherna suspecting that one of their citizens named Timarchus had been put to death by Polemocles to please the Cnossians, first proclaimed a right of reprisal against the Rhodians, and then went to open war with them.
54. The people of Lyttos,228 too, a short time before this, met with an irretrievable disaster. The destruction of Lyttos. At that time the political state of Crete as a whole was this. The Cnossians, in league with the people of Gortyn, had a short time previously reduced the whole island under their power, with the exception of the city of Lyttos; and this being the only city which refused obedience, they resolved to go to war with it, being bent upon removing its inhabitants from their homes, as an example and terror to the rest of Crete. Accordingly at first the whole of the other Cretan cities were united in war against Lyttos: but presently when some jealousy arose from certain trifling causes, as is the way with the Cretans, they separated into hostile parties, the peoples of Polyrrhen, Cere, and Lappa, along with the Horii and Arcades,229 forming one party and separating themselves from connexion with the Cnossians, resolved to make common cause with the Lyttians. Among the people of Gortyn, again, the elder men espoused the side of Cnossus, the younger that of Lyttos, and so were in opposition to each other. Taken by surprise by this disintegration of their allies, the Cnossians fetched over a thousand men from Aetolia in virtue of their alliance: upon which the party of the elders in Gortyn immediately seized the citadel; introduced the Cnossians and Aetolians; and either expelled or put to death the young men, and delivered the city into the hands of the Cnossians. And at the same time, the Lyttians having gone out with their full forces on an expedition into the enemy’s territory, the Cnossians got information of the fact, and seized Lyttos while thus denuded of its defenders. The children and women they sent to Cnossus; and having set fire to the town, thrown down its buildings, and damaged it in every possible way, returned. When the Lyttians reached home from their expedition, and saw what had happened, they were struck with such violent grief that not a man of the whole host had the heart to enter his native city; but one and all having marched round its walls, with frequent cries and lamentations over their misfortune and that of their country, turned back again towards the city of Lappa. The people of Lappa gave them a kind and entirely cordial reception; and having thus in one day become cityless and aliens, they joined these allies in their war against the Cnossians. Thus at one fell swoop was Lyttos, a colony of Sparta and allied with the Lacedaemonians in blood, the most ancient of the cities in Crete, and by common consent the mother of the bravest men in the island, utterly cut off.
55. But the peoples of Polyrrhen and Lappa and all their allies, seeing that the Cnossians clung to the alliance of the Aetolians, Appeal to the Achaeans and Philip. and that the Aetolians were at war with King Philip and the Achaeans, sent ambassadors to the two latter asking for their help and to be admitted to alliance with them. Both requests were granted: they were admitted into the roll of allies, and assistance was sent to them, consisting of four hundred Illyrians under Plator, two hundred Achaeans, and a hundred Phocians; whose arrival was of the utmost advantage to the interest of Polyrrhenia and her allies: for in a brief space of time they shut the Eleuthernaeans and Cydonians within their walls, and compelled the people of Aptera to forsake the alliance of the Cnossians and share their fortunes. When these results had been obtained, the Polyrrhenians and their allies joined in sending to the aid of Philip and the Achaeans five hundred Cretans, the Cnossians having sent a thousand to the Aetolians a short time before; both of which contingents took part in the existing war on their respective sides. Nay more, the exiled party of Gortyn seized the harbour of Phaestus,230 and also by a sudden and bold attack occupied the port of Gortyn itself; and from these two places as bases of operation they carried on the war with the party in the town. Such was the state of Crete.
56. About the same time Mithridates also declared war against the people of Sinope; Mithridates IV., king of Pontus, declares war against Sinope. which proved to be the beginning and occasion of the disaster which ultimately befell the Sinopeans. Upon their sending an embassy with a view to this war to beg for assistance from the Rhodians, the latter decided to elect three men, and to grant them a hundred and forty thousand drachmae with which to procure supplies needed by the Sinopeans. The men so appointed got ready ten thousand jars of wine, three hundred talents231 of prepared hair, a hundred talents of made-up bowstring, a thousand suits of armour, three thousand gold pieces, and four catapults with engineers to work them. The Sinopean envoys took these presents and departed; for the people of Sinope, being in great anxiety lest Mithridates should attempt to besiege them both by land and sea, were making all manner of preparations with this view. Sinope lies on the right-hand shore of the Pontus as one sails to Phasis, and is built upon a peninsula jutting out into the sea: it is on the neck of this peninsula, connecting it with Asia, which is not more than two stades wide, that the city is so placed as to entirely close it up from sea to sea; the rest of the peninsula stretches out into the open sea,—a piece of flat land from which the town is easily accessible, but surrounded by a steep coast offering very bad harbourage, and having exceedingly few spots admitting of disembarkation. The Sinopeans then were dreadfully alarmed lest Mithridates should blockade them, by throwing up works against their town on the side towards Asia, and by making a descent on the opposite side upon the low ground in front of the town: and they accordingly determined to strengthen the line of the peninsula, where it was washed by the sea, by putting up wooden defences and erecting palisades round the places accessible from the sea; and at the same time by storing weapons and stationing guards at all points open to attack: for the whole area is not large, but is capable of being easily defended and by a moderate force.
Such was the situation at Sinope at the time of the commencement of the Social war,—to which I must now return.
57. King Philip started from Macedonia with his army for Thessaly and Epirus, being bent on taking that route in his invasion of Aetolia. The History of the Social war resumed from ch. 37. Philip starts for Aetolia, B.C.219. Night surprise of Aegira. And at the same time Alexander and Dorimachus, having succeeded in establishing an intrigue for the betrayal of Aegira, had collected about twelve hundred Aetolians into Oeanthe, which is in Aetolia, exactly opposite the above-named town; and, having prepared vessels to convey them across the gulf, were waiting for favourable weather for making the voyage in fulfilment of their design. For a deserter from Aetolia, who had spent a long time at Aegira, and had had full opportunity of observing that the guards of the gate towards Aegium were in the habit of getting drunk, and keeping their watch with great slackness, had again and again crossed over to Dorimachus; and, laying this fact before him, had invited him to make the attempt, well knowing that he was thoroughly accustomed to such practices. The city of Aegira lies on the Peloponnesian coast of the Corinthian gulf, between the cities of Aegium and Sicyon, upon some strong and inaccessible heights, facing towards Parnassus and that district of the opposite coast, and standing about seven stades back from the sea. At the mouth of the river which flows past this town Dorimachus dropped anchor under cover of night, having at length obtained favourable weather for crossing. He and Alexander, accompanied by Archidamus the son of Pantaleon and the main body of the Aetolians, then advanced towards the city along the road leading from Aegium. But the deserter, with twenty of the most active men, having made his way by a shorter cut than the others over the cliffs where there was no road, owing to his knowledge of the locality, got into the city through a certain water-course and found the guards of the gate still asleep. Having killed them while actually in their beds, and cut the bolts of the gates with their axes, they opened them to the Aetolians. Having thus surprised the town, they behaved with a conspicuous want of caution, which eventually saved the people of Aegira, and proved the destruction of the Aetolians themselves. They seemed to imagine that to get within the gates was all there was to do in occupying an enemy’s town; and accordingly acted as I shall now describe.
58. They kept together for a very brief space of time near the market-place, and then scattering in every direction, Alexander killed. in their passion for plunder, rushed into the houses and began carrying off the wealth they contained. But it was now broad daylight: and the attack being wholly unexpected and sudden, those of the Aegiratans whose houses were actually entered by the enemy, in the utmost terror and alarm, all took to flight and made their way out of the town, believing it to be completely in the power of the enemy; but those of them whose houses were untouched, and who, hearing the shouting, sallied out to the rescue, all rushed with one accord to the citadel. These last continually increased in number and confidence; while the Aetolians on the contrary kept continually becoming less closely united, and less subject to discipline, from the causes above mentioned. But Dorimachus, becoming conscious of his danger, rallied his men and charged the citizens who were occupying the citadel: imagining that, by acting with decision and boldness, he would terrify and turn to flight those who had rallied to defend the town. But the Aegiratans, cheering each other on, offered a strenuous resistance, and grappled gallantly with the Aetolians. The citadel being unwalled, and the struggle being at close quarters and man to man, the battle was at first as desperate as might be expected between two sides, of which one was fighting for country and children, the other for bare life. Finally the invading Aetolians were repulsed: and the Aegiratans, taking advantage of their higher position, made a fierce and vigorous charge down the slope upon the enemy; which struck such terror in them, that in the confusion that followed the fugitives trampled each other to death at the gates. Alexander himself fell fighting in the actual battle; but Archidamus was killed in the struggle and crush at the gates. Of the main body of Aetolians, some were trampled to death; others flying over the pathless hills fell over precipices and broke their necks; while such as escaped in safety to the ships managed, after shamefully throwing away their arms, to sail away and escape from what seemed a desperate danger. Thus it came about that the Aegiratans having lost their city by their carelessness, unexpectedly regained it by their valour and gallantry.
59. About the same time Euripidas, who had been sent out to act as general to the Eleans, Euripidas. after overrunning the districts of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, and collecting a considerable amount of booty, was marching back to Elis. But Miccus of Dyme, who happened at the time to be Sub-strategus of the Achaean league, went out to the rescue with a body of Dymaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, and attacked him as he was returning. But proceeding too precipitately, he fell into an ambush and lost a large number of his men: for forty of his infantry were killed and about two hundred taken prisoners. Elated by this success, Euripidas a few days afterwards made another expedition, and seized a fort belonging to the Dymaeans on the river Araxus, standing in an excellent situation, and called the Wall, which the myths affirm to have been anciently built by Hercules, when at war with the Eleans, as a base of operations against them.
60. The peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea having been worsted in their attempt to relieve the country, and afraid of what would happen from this capture of the fort, first sent messengers to the Strategus, Aratus, Inactivity of Aratus. Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea separate from the league. to inform him of what had happened and to ask for aid, and afterwards a formal embassy with the same request. But Aratus was unable to get the mercenaries together, because in the Cleomenic war the Achaeans had failed to pay some of the wages of the hired troops: and his entire policy and management of the whole war was in a word without spirit or nerve. Accordingly Lycurgus seized the Athenaeum of Megalopolis, and Euripidas followed up his former successes by taking Gortyna232 in the territory of Telphusa. But the people of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, despairing of assistance from the Strategus, came to a mutual agreement to cease paying the common contribution to the Achaean league, and to collect a mercenary army on their own account, three hundred infantry and fifty horse; and to secure the country by their means. In this action they were considered to have shown a prudent regard for their own interests, but not for those of the community at large; for they were thought to have set an evil example, and supplied a precedent to those whose wish it was to break up the league. But in fact the chief blame for their proceeding must rightfully be assigned to the Strategus, who pursued such a dilatory policy, and slighted or wholly rejected the prayers for help which reached him from time to time. For as long as he has any hope, from relations and allies, any man who is in danger will cling to them; but when in his distress he has to give up that hope, he is forced to help himself the best way he can. Wherefore we must not find fault with the people of Tritaea, Pharae, and Dyme for having mercenaries on their own account, when the chief magistrate of the league hesitated to act: but some blame does attach to them for renouncing the joint contribution. They certainly were not bound to neglect to secure their own safety by every opportunity and means in their power; but they were bound at the same time to keep up their just dues to the league: especially as the recovery of such payment was perfectly secured to them by the common laws; and most of all because they had been the originators of the Achaean confederacy.233
61. Such was the state of things in the Peloponnese when King Philip, after crossing Thessaly, Philip V. at Ambracia, B.C.219. arrived in Epirus. Reinforcing his Macedonians by a full levy of Epirotes, and being joined by three hundred slingers from Achaia, and the five hundred Cretans sent him by the Polyrrhenians, he continued his march through Epirus and arrived in the territory of the Ambracians. Now, if he had continued his march without interruption, and thrown himself into the interior of Aetolia, by the sudden and unlooked-for attack of so formidable an army he would have put an end to the whole campaign: but as it was, he was over-persuaded by the Epirotes to take Ambracus first; and so gave the Aetolians an interval in which to make a stand, to take precautionary measures, and to prepare for the future. For the Epirotes, thinking more of their own advantage than of that of the confederacy, and being very anxious to get Ambracus234 into their power, begged Philip to invest the town and take it before doing anything else: the fact being that they regarded it as a matter of the utmost importance to recover Ambracia from the Aetolians; and thought that the only way of doing this was to become masters of this place, Ambracus, and besiege the town of Ambracia from it. For Ambracus is a place strongly fortified by walls and out-works, standing in the midst of marshes, and approached from the land by only one narrow raised causeway; and commanding by its situation both the district and town of Ambracia.
62. While Philip, then, by the persuasion of the Epirotes, pitching his camp near Ambracus, was engaged in making his preparations for the siege, Scopas raised a general levy of Aetolians, and marching through Thessaly crossed the frontiers of Macedonia; traversed the plain of Plena, and laid it waste; and after securing considerable booty, Scopas tries to effect a diversion by invading Macedonia. On his return he destroys Dium. returned by the road leading to Dium. The inhabitants of that town abandoning the place, he entered it and threw down its walls, houses, and gymnasium; set fire to the covered walks round the sacred enclosure, and destroyed all the other offerings which had been placed in it, either for ornament, or for the use of visitors to the public assemblies, and threw down all the statues of the kings. And this man, who, at the very beginning and first action of the war, had thus turned his arms against the gods as well as men, was not treated on his return to Aetolia as guilty of impiety, but was honoured and looked up to. For he had indeed filled the Aetolians with empty hopes and irrational conceit. From this time they indulged the idea that no one would venture to set foot in Aetolia, while they would be able without resistance not only to plunder the Peloponnese, which they were quite accustomed to do, but Thessaly and Macedonia also.
63. When he heard what had happened in Macedonia, and had thus paid on the spot for the selfishness and folly of the Epirotes, Ambracus taken. Philip proceeded to besiege Ambracus. By an energetic use of earthworks, and other siege operations, he quickly terrified the people into submission, and the place surrendered after a delay of forty days in all. He let the garrison, consisting of five hundred Aetolians, depart on fixed conditions, and gratified the cupidity of the Epirotes by handing over Ambracus to them, while he himself set his army in motion, and marched by way of Charadra, being anxious to cross the Ambracian gulf where it is narrowest, that is to say, near the Acarnanian temple called Actium. For this gulf is a branch of the Sicilian sea between Epirus and Acarnania, with a very narrow opening of less than five stades, but expanding as it extends inland to a breadth of a hundred stades; while the length of the whole arm from the open sea is about three hundred stades. It forms the boundary between Epirus on the north and Acarnania on the south. Philip, therefore, having got his army across this entrance of the gulf, and advanced through Acarnania, came to the city of Phoeteiae, which belonged to the Aetolians;235 having, during his march, Philip enters Aetolia; takes Phoeteiae. been joined by an Acarnanian force of two thousand foot and two hundred horse. Encamping under the walls of this town, and making energetic and formidable assaults upon it during two days, it was surrendered to him on terms, and the Aetolian garrison were dismissed on parole. Next night, however, five hundred other Aetolians, believing the town still untaken, came to its relief; whose arrival being ascertained beforehand by the king, he stationed some men in ambush at certain convenient spots, and slew most of the new-comers and captured all but a very few of the rest. After these events, he distributed a month’s rations of corn among his men from what had been captured, for a large store was found collected at Phoeteiae, and then continued his advance into the territory of Stratus. At about ten stades from that town he pitched his camp on the banks of the river Achelous; and from that began laying waste the country without resistance, none of the enemy venturing out to attack him.
64. Meanwhile the Achaeans, being hard pressed by the war, and ascertaining that the king was not far off, Metropolis and Conope. sent ambassadors to him begging for help. They found Philip still in his camp near Stratus, and there delivered their commission: and besides the message with which they were charged, they pointed out to him the richness of the booty which his army would get from the enemy’s country, and tried to persuade him to cross to Rhium and invade Elis. The king listened to what they had to say, and kept the ambassadors with him, alleging that he must consider of their request; and meanwhile broke up his camp, and marched in the direction of Metropolis and Conope. The Aetolians kept possession of the citadel of Metropolis but abandoned the town: whereupon Philip set fire to Metropolis, and continued his advance against Conope. But when the Aetolian horse rallied and ventured to meet him at the ford of the Achelous, which is about twenty stades before you reach the town, believing that they would either stop his advance altogether, or inflict much damage on the Macedonians while crossing the river; Skirmish on the Achelous. the king, fully understanding their tactics, ordered his light-armed troops to enter the river first and to cross it in close order, keeping to their regular companies, and with shields interlocked. His orders were obeyed: and as soon as the first company had effected the crossing, the Aetolian cavalry attacked it; but they could make no impression upon it, standing as it did in close order, and being joined in similar close order, shield to shield, by a second and a third company as they crossed. Therefore they wheeled off discomfited and retired to the city. Ithoria.From this time forth the proud gallantry of the Aetolians was fain to confine itself to the protection of the towns, and keep quiet; while Philip crossed with his army, and after wasting this district also without resistance, arrived at Ithoria. This is a position completely commanding the road, and of extraordinary strength, natural as well as artificial. On his approach, however, the garrison occupying the place abandoned it in a panic; and the king, taking possession, levelled it to the ground: and gave orders to his skirmishing parties to treat all forts in the district in the same way.
65. Having thus passed the narrow part of the road, he proceeded at a slow and deliberate pace, giving his army time to collect booty from the country; and by the time he reached Oeniadae his army was richly provided with every kind of goods. But he resolved first to take Paeanium: Paeanium. and having pitched his camp under its walls, by a series of assaults carried the place by force,—a town not large in circumference, for that was less than seven stades, but second to none in the construction of its houses, walls, and towers. The wall of this town he levelled with its foundation, and, breaking down its houses, he packed their timbers and tiles with great care upon rafts, and sent them down the river to Oeniadae. At first the Aetolians resolved to hold the citadel in Oeniadae, which they had strengthened with walls and other fortifications; but upon Philip’s approach they evacuated it in a panic. The king therefore having taken this city also, advanced from it and encamped on a certain secure position in Calydonia, called Elaeus, which had been rendered extraordinarily strong with walls and other fortifications by Attalus, who undertook the work for the Aetolians. Having carried this also by assault, and plundered the whole of Calydonia, the Macedonians returned to Oeniadae. Fortifies Oeniadae.And observing the convenient position of this place for all purposes, and especially as providing a place of embarkation for the Peloponnese, Philip resolved to build a wall round the town. For Oeniadae lies on the sea-coast, at the juncture of the Acarnanian and Aetolian frontiers, just at the entrance of the Corinthian gulf; and the town faces the sea-coast of Dyme in the Peloponnesus, and is the nearest point to the promontory of Araxus in it; for the intervening sea is not more than a hundred stades across. Looking to these facts he fortified the citadel by itself; and, building a wall round the harbour and dockyards, was intending to connect them with the citadel, employing for the construction the materials brought from Paeanium.
66. But whilst he was still engaged on this work, news was brought to the king that the Dardani, Philip recalled to Macedonia by a threatened invasion of Dardani. suspecting his intention of invading the Peloponnese, were collecting forces and making great preparations with the determination of invading Macedonia. When he heard this, Philip made up his mind that he was bound to go with all speed to the protection of Macedonia: and accordingly he dismissed the Achaean envoys with the answer, which he now gave them, that when he had taken effectual measures with regard to the circumstances that had just been announced to him, he would look upon it as his first business to bring them aid to the best of his ability. Thereupon he broke up his camp, and began his return march with all speed, by the same route as that by which he had come. When he was on the point of recrossing the Ambracian gulf from Acarnania into Epirus, Demetrius of Pharos presented himself, sailing with a single galley, having just been banished from Illyria by the Romans,—as I have stated in the previous book.236 Philip received him with kindness and bade him sail to Corinth, and go thence through Thessaly to Macedonia; while he himself crossed into Epirus and pushed on without a halt. When he had reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani learnt from some Thracian deserters that he was in the country, and they at once in a panic broke up their army, though they were close to the Macedonian frontier. And Philip, being informed of their change of purpose, dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to gather in their harvest: Late summer of B.C.219. while he himself went to Thessaly, and spent the rest of the summer at Larisa.
It was at this season that Aemilius celebrated a splendid triumph at Rome for his Illyrian victories; Contemporary events in Spain and Italy. and Hannibal after the capture of Saguntum dismissed his troops into winter quarters; while the Romans, on hearing of the capture of Saguntum, were sending ambassadors to Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal, and at the same time were making preparations for the war after electing Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus Consuls for the following year, as I have stated in detail in the previous book. My object in recalling the facts here is to carry out my original plan of showing what events in various parts of the world were contemporaneous.
67. And so the first year of this Olympiad was drawing to a close. In Aetolia, the time of the elections having come round, Midsummer B.C. 217. Dorimachus Aetolian Strategus, Sept. B.C.119. Dorimachus was elected Strategus. He was no sooner invested with his office, than, summoning the Aetolian forces, he made an armed foray upon the highlands of Epirus, and began wasting the country with an even stronger passion for destruction than usual; for his object in everything he did was not so much to secure booty for himself, as to damage the Epirotes. Destroys Dodona. And having come to Dodona237 he burnt the colonnades, destroyed the sacred offerings, and even demolished the sacred building; so that we may say that the Aetolians had no regard for the laws of peace or war, but in the one as well as in the other, acted in defiance of the customs and principles of mankind. After those, and other similar achievements, Dorimachus returned home.
But the winter being now considerably advanced, and all idea of the king coming being given up owing to the time of the year, Philip starts again. Philip suddenly started from Larisa with an army of three thousand hoplites armed with brass shields, two thousand light-armed, three hundred Cretans, and four hundred horse of the royal guard; and having transported them into Euboea and thence to Cynos he came through Boeotia and the Megarid to Corinth, Dec. B.C.219. about the time of the winter solstice; having conducted his arrival with such promptitude and secrecy, that not a single Peloponnesian suspected it. He at once closed the gates of Corinth and secured the roads by guards; and on the very next day sent for Aratus the elder to come to him from Sicyon, and issued despatches to the Strategus of the Achaean league and the cities, in which he named a time and place for them all to meet him in arms. Having made these arrangements, he again started, and pitched his camp near the temple of the Dioscuri in Phliasia.
68. Meanwhile Euripidas, with two companies of Eleans,—who combined with the pirates and mercenaries B.C.218, Jan.-Feb. Destruction of a marauding army of Eleans under Euripidas. made up an army of two thousand two hundred men, besides a hundred horse,—started from Psophis and began marching by way of Pheneus and Stymphalus, knowing nothing about Philip’s arrival, with the purpose of wasting the territory of Sicyon. The very night in which it chanced that Philip had pitched his camp near the temple of the Dioscuri, he passed the royal quarters, and succeeded in entering the territory of Sicyon, about the time of the morning watch. But some Cretans of Philip’s army who had left their ranks, and were prowling about on the track of prey, fell into the hands of Euripidas, and being questioned by him informed him of the arrival of the Macedonians. Without saying a word of his discovery to any one, he at once caused his army to face about, and marched back by the same road as that by which he had come; with the intention and hope of getting through Stymphalia, and reaching the difficult ground beyond it, before the Macedonians could catch him. But the king knowing nothing at all about the proceedings of the enemy, at daybreak broke up his camp and began his advance in pursuance of his original plan, determining to march by way of Stymphalus itself to Caphyae: for it was at that town that he had written to the Achaeans to meet him.
69. Now it happened that, just as the Macedonian advanced guard came to the top of the hill, The Eleans come across the Macedonians at the junction of the two roads above Stymphalus. near a place called Apelaurus, about ten stades before you come to Stymphalus, the advanced guard of the Eleans converged upon it also. Understanding from his previous information what had happened, Euripidas took some horsemen with him and avoided the danger by flight, making his way across country to Psophis. The rest of the Eleans being thus deserted by their leader, and panic-struck at what had happened, remained stationary on the road, not knowing what to do, or which way to turn. For at first their officers imagined that the troops they saw were some Achaeans come out to resist them. What favoured this mistake more than anything else were the brass shields of the hoplites: for they imagined that they were Megalopolitans, because the soldiers of that town had borne shields of that sort at the battle of Sellasia against Cleomenes, King Antigonus having furnished them for the occasion. Under this idea, they retired in good order to some rising ground, by no means despairing of getting off safely: but as soon as the Macedonians had advanced close up to them, grasping the true state of the case, they threw down their shields and fled. About twelve hundred of them were taken prisoners; but the rest perished utterly, some at the hands of the Macedonians, and others by falling down precipices: and finally not more than a hundred altogether escaped. Having despatched the spoils and the prisoners to Corinth, Philip continued his expedition. But a great impression was made upon the Peloponnesians: for they had not heard of the king’s arrival until they heard of his victory.
70. Continuing his march through Arcadia, and encountering heavy snow storms and much fatigue in the pass over Mount Oligyrtus, he arrived on the third day at Caphyae. Philip advances to Psophis. There he rested his army for two days, and was joined by Aratus the younger, and the Achaean soldiers whom he had collected; so that, with an army now amounting to ten thousand men, he advanced by way of Clitoria towards Psophis, collecting missiles and scaling ladders from the towns through which he passed. Psophis is a place of acknowledged antiquity, A description of Psophis. and a colony of the Arcadian town of Azanis. Taking the Peloponnesus as a whole, it occupies a central position in the country; but in regard to Arcadia it is on its western frontier, and is close also to the western borderland of Achaia: its position also commands the territory of the Eleans, with whom at that time it was politically united. Philip reached this town on the third day after leaving Caphyae, and pitched his camp on some rising ground overhanging the city, from which he could in perfect security command a view both of the whole town and the country round it. But when the king saw the great strength of the place, he was at a loss what to do. Along the left side of it rushes a violent winter torrent, which for the greater part of the winter is impassable, and in any case renders the city secure and difficult of approach, owing to the size of the bed which its waters have worn out for themselves by slow degrees, in the course of ages, as it comes rushing down from the higher ground. On the east again there is a broad and rapid river, the Erymanthus, about which so many tales are told. This river is joined by the winter torrent at a point south of the town, which is thus defended on three sides by these streams; while the fourth, or northern, side is commanded by a hill, which has been fortified, and serves as a convenient and efficient citadel. The town has walls also of unusual size and construction; and besides all this, a reinforcement of Eleans happened to have just come in, and Euripidas himself was in the town after his escape from Stymphalus.
71. The sight of these things caused Philip much anxious thought. Sometimes he was for giving up his plan of attacking and besieging the place: at others the excellence of its situation made him eager to accomplish this. For just as it was then a source of danger to the Achaeans and Arcadians, and a safe place of arms for the Eleans; Capture of Psophis. so would it on the other hand, if captured, become a source of safety to the Arcadians, and a most convenient base of operations for the allies against the Eleans. These considerations finally decided him to make the attempt: and he therefore issued orders to the Macedonians to get their breakfasts at daybreak, and be ready for service with all preparations completed. Everything being done as he ordered, the king led his army over the bridge across the Erymanthus; and no one having offered him resistance, owing to the unexpectedness of the movement, he arrived under the walls of the town in gallant style and with formidable show. Euripidas and the garrison were overpowered with astonishment; because they had felt certain that the enemy would not venture on an assault, or try to carry a town of such strength; and that a siege could not last long either, owing to the severity of the season. This calculation of chances made them begin to entertain suspicions of each other, from a misgiving that Philip must have established a secret intrigue with some persons in the town against it. But finding that nothing of the sort existed among themselves, the greater number hurried to the walls to defend them, while the mercenary Elean soldiers sallied out of a gate in the upper part of the town to attack the enemy. The king stationed his men who had ladders at three different spots, and divided the other Macedonians among these three parties; this being arranged, he gave the signal by the sound of trumpet, and began the assault on the walls at once. At first the garrison offered a spirited resistance and hurled many of the enemy from their ladders; but when the supply of weapons inside the town, as well as other necessary materials, began to run short,—as was to be expected from the hasty nature of the preparations for defence,—and the Macedonians showed no sign of terror, the next man filling up the place of each who was hurled from the scaling-ladder, the garrison at length turned to flight, and made their escape one and all into the citadel. In the king’s army the Macedonians then made good their footing on the wall, while the Cretans went against the party of mercenaries who had sallied from the upper gate, and forced them to throw away their shields and fly in disorder. Following the fugitives with slaughter, they forced their way along with them through the gate: so that the town was captured at all points at once. The Psophidians with their wives and children retreated into the citadel, and Euripidas with them, as well as all the soldiers who had escaped destruction.
72. Having thus carried the place, the Macedonians at once plundered all the furniture of the houses; and then, setting up their quarters in the houses, took regular possession of the town. But the people who had taken refuge in a body in the citadel, having no provisions with them, Surrender of the citadel of Psophis.and well foreseeing what must happen, made up their minds to give themselves up to Philip. They accordingly sent a herald to the king; and having received a safe-conduct for an embassy, they despatched their magistrates and Euripidas with them on this mission, who made terms with the king by which the lives and liberties of all who were on the citadel, whether citizens or foreigners, were secured. The ambassadors then returned whence they came, carrying an order to the people to remain where they were until the army had marched out, for fear any of the soldiers should disobey orders and plunder them. A fall of snow however compelled the king to remain where he was for some days; in the course of which he summoned a meeting of such Achaeans as were in the army, and after pointing out to them the strength and excellent position of the town for the purposes of the present war, he spoke also of his own friendly disposition towards their nation: and ended by saying, “We hereby yield up and present this town to the Achaeans; for it is our purpose to show them all the favour in our power, and to omit nothing that may testify to our zeal.” After receiving the thanks of Aratus and the meeting, Philip dismissed the assembly, and getting his army in motion, marched towards Lasion. The Psophidians descending from the citadel received back the possession of the town, each man recovering his own house; while Euripidas departed to Corinth, and thence to Aetolia. Those of the Achaean magistrates who were present put Prolaus of Sicyon in command of the citadel, with an adequate garrison; and Pythias of Pallene in command of the town. Such was the end of the incident of Psophis.
73. But when the Elean garrison of Lasion heard of the coming of the Macedonians, Lasion and Stratus. and were informed of what had taken place at Psophis, they at once abandoned the town; so that upon his arrival the king took it immediately, and by way of enhancing his favours to the Achaeans handed Lasion also over to them; and in a similar spirit restored Stratus to the Telphusians, which was also evacuated by the Eleans. On the fifth day after settling these matters he arrived at Olympia. Philip at Olympia. There he offered a sacrifice to Zeus and entertained his officers at a banquet; and, having given his army three days’ rest, commenced his return march. After advancing some way into Elis, he allowed foraging parties to scour the country while he himself lay encamped near Artemisium, as it is called; and after receiving the booty there, he removed to the Dioscurium.238 In the course of this devastation of the country the number of the captives was indeed great, but a still greater number made their escape to the neighbouring villages and strongholds. Prosperity of Elis. For Elis is more populous, as well as more richly furnished with slaves and other property, than the rest of the Peloponnese: and some of the Eleans are so enamoured of a country life, that there are cases of families who, being in enjoyment of considerable wealth, have for two or three generations never entered a public law-court at all.239 And this result is brought about by the great care and attention bestowed upon the agricultural class by the government, to see that their law-suits should be settled on the spot, and every necessary of life abundantly supplied them. To me it seems that they owed these laws and customs originally to the wide extent of their arable land, and still more to the fact that their lives were under the protection of religion; for, owing to the Olympic assembly, their territory was especially exempted by the Greeks from pillage; and they had accordingly been free from all injury and hostile invasion.
74. But in the course of time, when the Arcadians advanced a claim for Lasion and the whole district of Pisa, The ancient privileges of Elis lost. being forced to defend their territory and change their habits of life, they no longer troubled themselves in the least about recovering from the Greeks their ancient and ancestral immunity from pillage, but were content to remain exactly as they were. This in my opinion was a short-sighted policy. For peace is a thing we all desire, and are willing to submit to anything to obtain: it is the only one of our so-called blessings that no one questions. If then there are people who, having the opportunity of obtaining it, with justice and honour, from the Greeks, without question and for perpetuity, neglect to do so, or regard other objects as of superior importance to it, must we not look upon them as undoubtedly blind to their true interests? But if it be objected that, by adopting such a mode of life, they would become easily open to attack and exposed to treachery: I answer that such an event would be rare, and if it did happen, would be a claim on the aid of united Greece; but that for minor injuries, having all the wealth which unbroken peace would be sure to bring them, they would never have been at a loss for foreign soldiers or mercenaries to protect them at certain places and times. As it is, from dread of what is occasional and unlikely, they involve their country and property in perpetual wars and losses.
My object in thus speaking is to admonish the Eleans: for they have never had a more favourable time than the present to get back their ancient privilege of exemption from pillage, which is universally acknowledged to belong to them. Even now, some sparks, so to speak, of their old habit remaining, Elis is more thickly populated than other districts.
75. And therefore during Philip’s occupation of the country the number of prisoners taken was immense; Capture of Thalamae. and the number of those who escaped by flight still greater. An enormous amount of movable property, and an enormous crowd of slaves and cattle, were collected at a place called Thalamae; which was selected for the purpose, because the approach to it was narrow and difficult, and the place itself was retired and not easy to enter. But when the king was informed of the number of those who had taken refuge in this place, resolved to leave nothing unattempted or incomplete, he occupied certain spots which commanded the approach to it, with his mercenaries: while leaving his baggage and main army in his entrenched camp, he himself led his peltasts and light-armed troops through the gorge, and, without meeting with any resistance, came directly under the fortress. The fugitives were panic-stricken at his approach: for they were utterly inexperienced in war and unprovided with means of defence,—a mere rabble hurriedly collected together; they therefore at once surrendered, and among them two hundred mercenary soldiers, of various nationalities, who had been brought there by Amphidamus the Elean Strategus. Having thus become master of an immense booty in goods, and of more than five thousand slaves, and having in addition to these driven off an incalculable number of cattle, Philip now returned to his camp; but finding his army overburdened with spoils of every description, and rendered by that means cumbrous and useless for service, he retraced his steps, and once more marched to Olympia.
76. But now a difficulty arose which was created by Apelles. Apelles was one of those who had Oppressive conduct of Apelles to the Achaeans. been left by Antigonus as guardians of his son, and had, as it happened, more influence than any one else with the king. He conceived the wish to bring the Achaeans into the same position as the Thessalians; and adopted for that purpose a very offensive line of conduct. The Thessalians were supposed to enjoy their own constitution, and to have quite a different status to the Macedonians; but in fact they had exactly the same, and obeyed every order of the royal ministers. It was with the purpose of bringing about the same state of things, that this officer now set himself to test the subservience of the Achaean contingent. At first he confined himself to giving the Macedonian soldiers leave to eject Achaeans from their quarters, who on any occasion had taken possession of them first, as well as to wrest from them any booty they might have taken; but he afterwards treated them with actual violence, through the agency of his subordinates, on any trifling pretext; while such as complained of this treatment, or took the part of those who were being beaten, he personally arrested and put into confinement: being convinced that by this method he would gradually and imperceptibly bring them into the habit of submitting, without remonstrance, to any thing which the king might choose to inflict. And this opinion he deduced from his previous experience in the army of Antigonus, when he had seen the Achaeans willing to endure any hardship, on the one condition of escaping from the yoke of Cleomenes. However, certain young Achaeans held a meeting, and going to Aratus explained to him the policy which was being pursued by Apelles: whereupon Aratus at once went to Philip, feeling that a stand must be made on this point at once and without delay. He made his statement to the king; who, being informed of the facts, first of all encouraged the young men by a promise that nothing of the sort should happen to them again; and then commanded Apelles not to impose any orders upon the Achaeans without consulting their own Strategus.
77. Philip, then, was acquiring a great reputation, not only among those actually in his army, Character of Philip V. but among the other Peloponnesians also, for his behaviour to the allies serving with him, as well as for his ability and courage in the field. Indeed it would not be easy to find a king endowed with more natural qualities requisite for the acquisition of power. He had in an eminent degree a quick understanding, a retentive memory, and a winning grace of manner, joined to a look of royal dignity and authority; and most important of all, ability and courage as a general. What neutralised all these excellent qualities, and made a cruel tyrant of a naturally well-disposed king, it is not easy to say in a few words: and therefore that inquiry must be reserved for a more suitable time than the present.
Starting from Olympia by the road leading to Pharae, Philip came first to Telphusa, Philip continues his campaign. and thence to Heraea. There he had the booty sold by auction, and repaired the bridge over the Alpheus, with the view of passing over it to the invasion of Triphylia.
Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus, Dorimachus, in answer to a request of the Eleans for protection against the devastation they were enduring, despatched six hundred Aetolians, Arrival of Aetolian troops under Phillidas, B.C.218. under the command of Phillidas, to their aid. Having arrived in Elis, and taken over the Elean mercenaries, who were five hundred in number, as well as a thousand citizen soldiers and the Tarentine cavalry,240 he marched to the relief of Triphylia. Triphylia. This district is so called from Triphylus, one of the sons of Arcas, and lies on the coast of the Peloponnese between Elis and Messenia, facing the Libyan Sea, and touching the south-west frontier of Arcadia. It contains the following towns, Samicum, Lepreum, Hypana, Typaneae, Pyrgos, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, Phrixa; all of which, shortly before this, the Eleans had conquered and annexed, as well as the city of Alipheira, which had originally been subject to Arcadia and Megalopolis, but had been exchanged with the Eleans, for some private object of his own, by Lydiadas when tyrant of Megalopolis.
78. Phillidas, then, sent his Elean troops to Lepreum, and his mercenaries to Aliphera; while he himself went with the Aetolian troops to Typaneae, and waited to see what would happen. Meanwhile the king, having got rid of his heavy baggage, and crossed the bridge over the river Alpheus, which flows right under Heraea, came to Alipheira, which lies on a hill precipitous on every side, and the ascent of which is more than ten stades. The citadel is on the very summit of this hill, adorned with a colossal statue of Athene, of extraordinary size and beauty. The origin and purpose of this statue, and at whose expense it was set up, are doubtful questions even among the natives; for it has never been clearly discovered why or by whom it was dedicated: yet it is universally allowed that its skilful workmanship classes it among the most splendid and artistic productions of Hecatodorus241 and Sostratus.
The next morning being fine and bright, the king made his dispositions at daybreak. Capture of Alipheira. He placed parties of men with scaling ladders at several points, and supported each of them with bodies of mercenaries, and detachments of Macedonian hoplites, on the rear of these several parties. His orders being fulfilled with enthusiasm and a formidable display of power, the garrison of Alipheira were kept continually rushing and rallying to the particular spots to which they saw the Macedonians approaching: and while this was going on, the king himself took some picked men, and mounted unobserved over some steep hills up to the suburb of the citadel; and then, at a given signal, all at once put the scaling ladders to the walls and began attempting the town. The king was the first to take the suburb of the acropolis, which had been abandoned by the garrison; and when this was set on fire, those who were defending the town walls, foreseeing what must happen, and afraid that by the fall of the citadel they would be deprived of their last hope, abandoned the town walls, and fled into it: whereupon the Macedonians at once took the walls and the town. Subsequently the garrison on the citadel sent an embassy to Philip, who granted them their lives, and received possession of it also by formal surrender.
79. These achievements of the king alarmed the whole people of Triphylia, and made them take Typanae and Phigalia surrender to Philip. counsel severally for the safety of themselves and their respective cities: while Phillidas left Typaneae, after plundering some of the houses there, and retired to Lepreum. This was the reward which the allies of the Aetolians at that time usually got: not only to be deserted at the hour of utmost need in the most barefaced way, but, by being plundered as well as betrayed, to suffer at the hands of their allies exactly what they had a right to expect from a victorious enemy. But the people of Typaneae surrendered their city to Philip; as also did the inhabitants of Hypana. And the people of Phigalia, hearing of what had taken place in Triphylia, and disliking the alliance with the Aetolians, rose in arms and seized the space round the Polemarchium.242 The Aetolian pirates who were residing in this city, for the purpose of plundering Messene, were able at first to keep down and overawe the people; but when they saw that the whole town was mustering to the rescue, they desisted from the attempt. Having made terms with them, they took their baggage and evacuated the town; whereupon the inhabitants sent an embassy to Philip, and delivered themselves and their town into his hands.
80. While these things were going on, the people of Lepreum, having seized a certain quarter of their town, Lepreum. demanded that the Elean, Aetolian, and Lacedaemonian garrisons (for a reinforcement had come from Sparta also) should all alike evacuate the citadel and city. At first Phillidas refused, and stayed on, hoping to overawe the citizens; but when the king, despatching Taurion with a guard of soldiers to Phigalia, advanced in person towards Lepreum, and was now close to the town, Phillidas lowered his tone, and the Lepreates were encouraged in their determination. It was indeed a glorious act of gallantry on their part. Though there was a garrison within their walls of a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians with the pirates, five hundred mercenaries, and two hundred Lacedaemonians, and though too their citadel was in the occupation of these troops, yet they ventured to make a stand for the freedom of their native city, and would not give up hope of deliverance. Phillidas therefore, seeing that the Lepreates were prepared to offer a stout resistance, and that the Macedonians were approaching, evacuated the town with the Eleans and Lacedaemonians. The Cretans, who had been sent by the Spartans, made their way home through Messenia; but Phillidas departed for Samicum. The people of Lepreum, having thus got control of their own town, sent ambassadors to place it in the power of Philip. Hearing the news, Philip sent all his army, except the peltasts and light-armed troops, to Lepreum; and taking the latter with him, he made all the haste he could to catch Phillidas. He succeeded so far as to capture all his baggage; but Phillidas himself managed to outstrip him and throw himself into Samicum. Samicum, The king therefore sat down before this place: and having sent for the rest of his army from Lepreum, made the garrison believe that he meant to besiege the town. But the Aetolians and Eleans within it, having nothing ready for sustaining a siege beyond their bare hands, alarmed at their situation, held a parley with Philip to secure their lives; and having obtained leave from him to march out with their arms, they departed into Elis. Thus the king became master of Samicum on the spot: and this was followed by deputations from other towns to him, with entreaties for protection; in virtue of which he took over Phrixa, Stylangium, and other towns. Aepium, Bolax, Pyrgos, and Epitalium. Having settled these things, and reduced all Triphylia into his power in six days, he returned to Lepreum; and having addressed the necessary warnings to the Lepreates, and put a garrison into the citadel, he departed with his army towards Heraea, leaving Ladicus of Acarnania in command of Triphylia. When he arrived at Heraea, he made a distribution of all the booty; and taking up again his baggage from Heraea, arrived about the middle of the winter at Megalopolis.
81. While Philip was thus engaged in Triphylia, Chilon the Lacedaemonian, holding that the kingship belonged to him in virtue of birth, Chilon tries to seize the crown of Sparta, B.C.218. and annoyed at the neglect of his claims by the Ephors in selecting Lycurgus, determined to stir up a revolution: and believing that if he took the same course as Cleomenes had done, and gave the common people hopes of land allotments and redivision of property, the masses would quickly follow him, he addressed himself to carrying out this policy. Having therefore agreed with his friends on this subject, and got as many as two hundred people to join his conspiracy, he entered upon the execution of his project. But perceiving that the chief obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of his design were Lycurgus, and those Ephors who had invested him with the crown, he directed his first efforts against them. The Ephors he seized while at dinner, and put them all to death on the spot,—chance thus inflicting upon them the punishment they deserved: for whether we regard the person at whose hands, or the person for whose sake they were thus destroyed, we cannot but say that they richly merited their fate.
After the successful accomplishment of this deed, Chilon went to the house of Lycurgus, whom he found at home, but failed to seize. Assisted by slaves and neighbours Lycurgus was smuggled out of the house, and effected a secret escape; and thence got away by a cross-country route to the town of Pellene in Tripolis. Thus baffled in the most important point of his enterprise, Chilon was greatly discouraged; but was forced all the same to go on with what he had begun. Accordingly he made a descent upon the market-place, and laid violent hands upon those opposed to him; tried to rouse his relations and friends; and declared to the rest of the people there what hopes of success he had. But when nobody seemed inclined to join him, but on the contrary a mob began to collect with threatening looks, he saw how it was, and found a secret way of leaving the town; and, making his way across Laconia, arrived in Achaia alone and an exile. But the Lacedaemonians who were in the territory of Megalopolis, terrified by the arrival of Philip, stowed away all the goods they had got from the country, and first demolished and then abandoned the Athenaeum.
The fact is that the Lacedaemonians enjoyed a most excellent constitution, and had a most extensive Decline of Sparta. power, from the time of the legislation of Lycurgus to that of the battle of Leuctra. But after that event their fortune took an unfavourable turn; and their political state continued ever growing worse and worse, B.C.800(?)-B.C. 371. until they finally suffered from a long succession of internal struggles and partisan warfare; were repeatedly agitated by schemes for the redivision of lands and the banishment of one party or another; and were subjected to the severest possible slavery, culminating in the tyrannical government of Nabis: though the word “tyrant” was one which they had in old times scarcely endured to hear mentioned. However, the ancient history of Sparta as well as the great part of it since, has been recorded by many in terms of eulogy or the reverse; but the part of that history B.C.236-222. which admits of the least controversy is that which followed the entire destruction of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes;243 and that shall be narrated by me in the order of events as they occur.
82. Meanwhile Philip left Megalopolis, and marching by way of Tegea arrived at Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter, Apelles opposes Aratus, Jan.-May, B.C.218. having gained in this campaign an admiration beyond his years for his general conduct and his brilliant achievements. But, in spite of all that had happened, Apelles was by no means inclined to desist from the policy on which he had entered; but was resolved little by little to bring the Achaeans under the yoke. He saw that the most determined opponents of his scheme were the elder and younger Aratus; and that Philip was inclined to listen to them, and especially to the elder, both on account of his former intimacy with Antigonus, and his pre-eminent influence in Achaia, and, most of all, because of his readiness of resource and practical ability: he therefore determined to devote his attention to them, and enter upon the intrigue against them which I shall proceed to describe. He sought out in the several cities all such as were opposed to Aratus, and invited them to visit him: and having got them into his hands he tried all he could to win their affections, encouraged them to look upon him as a friend, and introduced them to Philip. To the king he was always pointing out that, if he listened to Aratus, he would have to treat the Achaeans according to the letter of the treaty of alliance; but that, if he would listen to him, and take men like those which he had introduced to him into favour, he would have the whole of the Peloponnese at his own unfettered disposal. But what he was most anxious about was the election; being desirous to secure the office of Strategus for one of this party, and to oust Aratus in accordance with his settled plan. May, B.C.218.With this purpose, he persuaded Philip to be at Aegium at the time of the Achaean election, on the pretext of being on his way to Elis. The king’s consent to this enabled Apelles himself to be there at the right time; Election of Eperatus as Achaean Strategus. and though he found great difficulty, in spite of entreaties and threats, in carrying his point; yet he did eventually succeed in getting Eperatus of Pharae elected Strategus, and Timoxenus, the candidate proposed by Aratus, rejected.
83. This over, the king departed by way of Patrae and Dyme, and arrived with his army before the fortress called the Wall, Capture of the Wall, and expedition into Elis. which is situated on the frontier of the territory of Dyme, and had a short time before, as I mentioned above,244 been occupied by Euripidas. The king, being anxious at all hazards to recover this place for the Dymaeans, encamped under its walls with his full force: and thereupon the Elean garrison in alarm surrendered the place to Philip, which, though not large, had been fortified with extraordinary care. For though the circumference of its walls was not more than a stade and a half, its height was nowhere less than thirty cubits. Having handed the place over to the Dymaeans, Philip continued his advance, plundering the territory of Elis: and when he had thoroughly devastated it, and acquired a large booty, he returned with his army to Dyme.
84. Meanwhile Apelles, thinking that, by the election of the Achaean Strategus through his influence, The intrigue of Apelles. he had partly succeeded in his policy, began once more attacking Aratus, with the view of entirely detaching Philip from his friendship: and he accordingly determined to make up an accusation against him grounded on the following circumstance: When Amphidamus, the Elean Strategus, had been, with the other refugees, made prisoner at Thalamae, and had been brought among other captives to Olympia, he made earnest efforts by the agency of certain individuals to be allowed an interview with the king. This favour having been accorded him, he made a statement to the effect that it was in his power to bring over the Eleans to the king’s side, and induce them to enter into alliance with him. Philip believed him; and accordingly dismissed Amphidamus without ransom, with instructions to promise the Eleans, that, if they would join the king, he would restore their captive citizens without ransom, and would himself secure their territory safely from all outside attacks: and besides this would maintain them in freedom, without impost or foreign garrison, and in enjoyment of their several constitutions.
But the Eleans refused to listen to the proposal, although the offer was thought attractive and substantial. Apelles therefore used this circumstance to found the false accusation which he now brought before Philip, alleging that Aratus was not a loyal friend to the Macedonians, nor sincere in his feelings towards them: “He was responsible for this alienation of the Eleans; for when the king despatched Amphidamus from Olympia into Elis, Aratus took him aside and talked to him, asserting that it was by no means to the interest of the Peloponnesians that Philip should become supreme in Elis: and this was the reason of the Eleans despising the king’s offers, and clinging to the friendship of the Aetolians, and persisting in war against the Macedonians.”
85. Regarding the matter as important, the first step the king took was to summon the elder and younger Aratus, The king investigates the charge against Aratus. and order Apelles to repeat these assertions in their presence: which he thereupon did in a bold and threatening tone. And upon the king still not saying a word, he added: “Since his Majesty finds you, Aratus, so ungrateful and so exceedingly adverse to his interests, he is determined to summon a meeting of the Achaeans, and, after making a statement of his reasons, forthwith to return to Macedonia.” Aratus the elder answered him with a general exhortation to Philip, never to give a hasty or inconsiderate credit to any thing which might be alleged before him against his friends and allies: but when any such allegation were made, to test its truth before accepting it; for that was the conduct which became a king, and was in every way to his interest. Wherefore he said, “I claim that you should, in the present instance of these accusations of Apelles, summon those who heard my words; and openly produce the man that informed Apelles of them, and omit no means of ascertaining the real truth, before making any statement in regard to these matters to the Achaeans.”
86. The king approved of this speech, and said that he would not neglect the matter, but would thoroughly investigate it. And so for the present the audience was dissolved. But during the following days, while Apelles failed to bring any proof of his allegations, Aratus is cleared. Aratus was favoured by the following combination of circumstances. While Philip was laying waste their territory, the Eleans, suspecting Amphidamus of treachery, determined to arrest him and send him in chains to Aetolia. But getting intelligence of their purpose, he escaped first to Olympia; and there, hearing that Philip was at Dyme engaged in the division of his spoils, he followed him to that town in great haste. When Aratus heard that Amphidamus had been driven from Elis and was come to Dyme, he was delighted, because his conscience was quite clear in the matter; and going to the king demanded that he should summon Amphidamus to his presence; on the ground that the man to whom the words were alleged to have been spoken would best know about the accusations, and would declare the truth; for he had become an exile from his home from Philip’s sake, and had now no hope of safety except in him. These arguments satisfied the king, who thereupon sent for Amphidamus and ascertained that the accusation was false. The result was that from that day forward his liking and respect for Aratus continually increased, while he began to regard Apelles with suspicion; though being still under the influence of his old ascendency, he was compelled to connive at many of his actions.
87. Apelles however by no means abandoned his policy. He began undermining the position of Taurion also, who had been placed in command of the Peloponnese by Antigonus, not indeed openly attacking him, but rather praising his character, and asserting that he was a proper person to be with the king on a campaign; his object being to get some one else appointed to conduct the government of the Peloponnese. This was indeed a novel method of defamation,—to damage one’s neighbours, not by attacking, but by praising their characters; and this method of wreaking one’s malice, envy, and treachery may be regarded as primarily and specially the invention of the jealousy and selfish ambition of courtiers. In the same spirit he began making covert attacks upon Alexander, the captain of the bodyguard, whenever he got an opportunity; being bent on reconstituting by his own authority even the personal attendants of the king, and on making a clean sweep of all arrangements left existing by Antigonus. For as in his life Antigonus had managed his kingdom and his son with wisdom, so at his death he made wise provisions for every department of the State. For in his will he explained to the Macedonians the nature of these arrangements; and also gave definite instructions for the future, how and by whom each of these arrangements was to be carried out: being desirous of leaving no vantage-ground to the courtiers for mutual rivalry and strife. Among these arrangements was one selecting Apelles from among his companions in arms to be one of the guardians of his son; Leontius to command the peltasts; Megaleas to be chief secretary; Taurion to be governor of the Peloponnese; and Alexander to be captain of the bodyguard. Apelles had already got Leontius and Megaleas completely under his influence: and he was now desirous to remove Alexander and Taurion from their offices, and so to control these, as well as all other departments of the government, by the agency of his own friends. And he would have easily succeeded in doing so, had he not raised up an opponent in the person of Aratus. As it was, he quickly reaped the fruits of his own blind selfishness and ambition; for that which he purposed inflicting on his neighbours he had to endure himself, and that within a very brief space. How and by what means this was brought about, I must forbear to tell for the present, and must bring this book to an end: but in subsequent parts of my work I will endeavour to make every detail of these transactions clear.
For the present, after concluding the business which I have described, Philip returned to Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter season with his friends, while he sent back his forces to Macedonia.