The Japanese Bank issuesThe Japanese Bank issues notes.... Independence Club scare.... light-houses.... Opening of work on Seoul-Wiju R.R.... combination against Yi Yong-ik.... he is accused and degraded.... rescued by Russian guard.... protest of the Japanese against his return.... Yi Keun-t’ak.... Russian complacency.... Russian policy in the Far East.... contrast between Russia’s and Japan’s aims.

At this point the First Bank of Japan, called the Dai Ichi Ginko, brought up a scheme for putting out an issue of special bank notes that would not circulate outside of Korea. Korea was importing much more than she exported and the balance of trade being against her it was impossible to keep Japanese paper in the country in sufficient quantities to carry on ordinary local trade. For this reason the bank received the sanction of the Korean Government to put out this issue of bank paper which could not be sent abroad but would be extremely useful as a local currency. This was done and it was found to work admirably. The Koreans had confidence in this money and it circulated freely. It had two advantages not enjoyed by any form of Korean currency, namely, it was a stable currency and suffered no fluctuations and it was in large enough denominations to make it possible to transfer a thousand dollars from one man’s pocket to that of another without employing a string of pack-ponies to carry the stuff.

But we must retrace our steps and note some other events of interest that happened in the spring months. One of these was the scare in government circles over the reported revival of the Independence Club under the encouragement of a so-called Korean Party in Tokyo, to which it was believed some Korean political refugees belonged. A great stir was made in Seoul and several men were arrested, but there was no evidence that would pay sifting, and though it was evident that the government would have been glad to find a true bill against some of the men who were arrested it was forced by lack of evidence to let them go. The incident was of importance only as showing the extreme sensitiveness of the government on the point, and its determination, now that the Independence Party was down, to keep it down.

The one important material improvement of the year was the adoption of a plan for the building of some thirty light-houses on the coast of Korea. Ever since the opening up of foreign trade the lack of proper lights especially on the western coast had been a matter of growing concern to shipping companies. This concern was warranted by the dangerous nature of the coast where high tides, a perfect network of islands and oft-prevailing fogs made navigation a most difficult and dangerous matter. The fact that light-houses ought to have been built ten years ago does not detract from the merit of those who at last took the matter in hand and pushed it to an issue.

The month of May witnessed a spectacular event in the ceremony of the formal opening of work on the Seoul-Wiju Railway. The spirit was willing but the flesh was weak. Neither French nor Russian money was forthcoming to push the work, and so the Korean government was invited to finance the scheme. Yi Yong-ik was made president of the company and if there had been a few thousand more ex-prefects to mulct he might have raised enough money to carry the road a few miles; but it is much to be feared that his financial ability, so tenderly touched upon by the Japanese Minister in his speech on that “auspicious occasion,” was scarcely sufficient for the work, and the plan was not completed. There is much reason to believe that this whole operation was mainly a scheme on the part of the Russians to preempt the ground in order to keep the Japanese out.

As the year wore toward its close the usurpation of numerous offices by Yi Yong-ik and his assumption of complete control in the palace bore its legitimate fruit in the intense hatred of four-fifths of the entire official class. He was looked upon as but one more victim destined to the same fate which had overtaken Kim Hong-nyuk and Kim Yung-jun. But in his case the difficulties were much greater. Yi Yong-ik had put away in some safe place an enormous amount of Government money and he held it as a hostage for his personal safety. Until that money was safely in the Imperial treasury even the revenge would not be sweet enough to make it worth the loss. Not only so but the whole finances of the Household were in his hands and his sudden taking off would leave the accounts in such shape that no one could make them out, and enormous sums due the department would be lost. Yi Yong-ik had fixed himself so that his life was better worth than his death however much that might be desired. But the officiary at large cared little for this. There was no doubt that the one person who should accomplish the overthrow of the favorite and thus bring embarrassment to the Imperial purse would suffer for it, but Korean intrigue was quite capable of coping with a little difficulty like this. The result must be brought about by a combination so strong and so unanimous that no one would ever know who the prime mover was. This at least is a plausible theory and the only one that adequately explains how and why the scheme miscarried. The whole course of the intrigue is so characteristically Korean and includes so many elements of genuinegenuine humor, in spite of its object, that we will narrate it briefly. It must of course be understood that the officials were keenly on the lookout for an opportunity to get the hated favorite on the hip and in such a manner that even his financial value to the Emperor would not avail him.

One day, while in conversation with Lady Om, the Emperor’s favorite concubine who has been mistress of the palace since the death of the Queen, Yi Yong-ik compared her to Yang Kwi-bi a concubine of the last Emperor of the Tang dynasty in China. He intended this as a compliment but as his education is very limited he was not aware that he could have said nothing more insulting; for Kwi-bi by her meretricious arts is believed to have brought about the destruction of the Tang dynasty. At the time Lady Om herself was unaware that anything derogatory had been said and she received the supposed compliment with complacency; but her nephew who was present, not understanding the reference, went and asked someone else about it and learned the truth of the matter. He doubtless knew that Yi Yong-ik was not aware of his gaucherie and so held his peace for a time, but in some way the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister heard a rumor that something insulting had been said. They called up the nephew of Lady Om and from him learned the damning facts. They also knew well enough that no insult had been intended but here was a “case” to be worked to its fullest capacity. The most sanguine could not hope that the hated favorite would give them a better hold upon him than this: for the position of Lady Om was a very delicate one and there had been a dispute on for years between the Emperor’s counsellors as to the advisability of raising her to the position of Empress. A word against her was a most serious matter.

Everything was now ready for the grand coup and on the 27th of NovemberNovember fourteen of the highest officials memorialized the throne declaring that Yi Yong-ik was a traitor and must be condemned and executed at once. His Majesty suggested a little delay but on the evening of the same day the same men presented a second memorial couched in still stronger language, and they followed if up the next morning with a third. To their urgent advice was added that of Lady Om herself and of many other of the officials. A crowd of officials gathered at the palace gate and on their knees awaited the decision of the Emperor. There was not a single soul of all that crowd but knew that the charge was a mere excuse and yet it was nominally valid. It was the will of that powerful company against the will of the Emperor. The tension was tootoo great and His Majesty at last reluctantly consented, or at least expressed consent; but he first ordered the accused to be stripped of all his honors and to render all his accounts. This was nominally as reasonable as was the charge against the man. It was a case of “diamond cut diamond” in which the astuteness of the Emperor won. The accusers could not object to having the accused disgorge before being executed but it was at this very point that they were foiled Yi Yong-ik’s accounts were purposely in such shape that it would have taken a month to examine them, for he alone held the key. Nothing can exceed the desperate coolness of the man under the awful ordeal. At one point, just after the acquiescence of the Emperor, the written sentence of death is said to have gone forth but was recalled just as it was to have gone out of the palace gates, after which there would have been no recall. No man ever escaped by a narrower margin. When Yi Yong-ik presented his accounts the Emperor announced that it would take some days to straighten matters out since the accused was the only man to unravel the skein. Here was probably the crucial point in the intrigue. If the white heat of the day before had been maintained and the officials had demanded instant punishment, accounts or no accounts, the thing would have been done, but as it happened the consciousness of having won relaxed the tension to such a degree that the accused gained time. This time was utilized by calling in a Russian guard and spiriting the accused away to the Russian Legation. This accomplished His Majesty suavely announced that the case would be considered, but that meanwhile the officials must disperse. There were further memorials, resignations en masse, passionate recriminations until at last two or three officials who had held their peace saw that the game was up and, in order to curry favor themselves, offered a counter memorial charging Yi Yong-ik’s accusers with indirection. This was listened to and the Prime Minister was deprived of his official rank. This made possible a compromise whereby both Yi Yong-ik and the Prime Minister were restored to all their former honors and all went “merry as a marriage bell.” But it was thought best to let Yi Yong-ik travel for his own and his country’s good, so he was made Commissioner to Buy Annam Rice, which was itself a pretty piece of diplomacy since it recalled prominently to the people the one phase of the injured man’s career which they could unhesitatingly applaud. He was taken off in a Russian cruiser to Port Arthur—to buy Annam rice!

When he returned to Seoul a few weeks later the Japanese lodged a strong protest against his return to political power but the Russian authorities made a counter-proposition urging that he was the only man capable of handling the finances of the country. Under existing circumstances the very protest of the Japanese was an argument in his favor and he came back into power on the flood tide, backed, as he had never been before, by the full favor of the Russian party. They naturally expected substantial payment for having saved him, and so far as he was able he liquidated the debt.

Meanwhile another man, Yi Keun-t’ak, had risen to power through servile adherenceadherence to Russian interests. The somewhat enigmatical character of Yi Yong-ik made him to a certain extent an unknown quantity. Not even the Japanese considered him wholly given over to Russia; but this new man was definitely committed to Russian interests and with his rise to important position it became evident for the first time that the Korean Government had decided to rely upon Russia and to reject the aid or the advice of Japan. The end of the year 1902 may be said to have been the approximate time when Japan first realized that all hope of a peaceful solution of the Korean problem was gone. One naturally asks why Korea took this step, and, while we are still too near the event to secure an entirely dispassionate estimate or opinion, there seems to be little doubt that it was because Russia made no pretensions, and expressedexpressed no desire, to reform the administration of the Government. She was perfectly content to let things go along in the old way in the peninsula, knowing that this would constantly and increasingly jeopardize the interests of Japan while she herself had practically no commercial interests to suffer.

The immemorial policy of Russia in Asia sufficiently accounts for her work in Korea. Her policy of gradual absorption of native tribes has never held within its purview the civilizing or the strengthening of those tribes, until they have been gathered under her aegis. On the other hand, until that has been accomplished she has either waited patiently for the disintegration of the native tribes or has actually aided in such disintegration. History shows no case in which Russia has strengthened the hands of another people for the sake of profiting by the larger market that would be opened up; for until very recently the commercial side of the question has scarcely been considered, and even now the commercial interests of Russia depend upon an exclusive market. So that in any case a dominant political influence is the very first step in every move of Russia in the East. Why then should Russia have advised administrative or monetary or any other reform, since such action would inevitably form a bar to the success of her own ultimate plans?

The historian of the future, taking his stand above and out of the smoke of battle, will take a dispassionate view of the whole situation. He will mark the antecedents of these two rival Powers, he will compare their domestic and foreign policies, he will weigh the motives that impelled them, he will mark the instruments wielded by each and the men whom they employed as their intermediaries and agents. Then and not till then will it be possible to tell whether the present recorders of events are right in asserting that while the policies of both Powers are essentially selfish the success of Russia’s policy involves the disintegration and national ruin of the peoples she comes in contact with while the success of Japan’s policy demands the rehabilitation of the Far East.

Much depended upon the attitude which Korea should finally assume toward these two mutually antagonistic policies. If she had sided with Japan and had shown a fixed determination to resist the encroachments of Russia by adopting a policy of internal renovation which would enlist the interest and command the admiration of the world, the present war might have been indefinitely postponed. Whether it could have been finally avoided would depend largely upon the changes that are taking place in Russia herself where in spite of all repressive agencies education and enlightenment are filtering in and causing a gradual change. Here again the future historian may be able to say with confidence that it was better that the war came when it did in that it confirmed Japan in her course of commercial, industrial and intellectual expansion, guaranteed China against disintegration and opened the eyes of the Russians themselves to their need of radical internal reform. And he may be able to say that the temporary suspension of Korean autonomy was but a small price to pay for these enormous benefits to the Far East and to the world at large.