Governor Dinwiddie’s zeal had increased in inverse ratio to the success of Virginian arms. After Washington’s repulse at Fort Necessity he redoubled his energies, incited by a letter received from one of Washington’s hostages at Fort Duquesne. Colonel Innes was appointed to command the Virginia troops and superintend the erection of Fort Cumberland, while Washington was ordered to fill up his depleted companies by enlistments and to move out again to Fort Cumberland. Indeed it was only by objections urged in the very strongest manner that the inconsiderate Governor was deterred from launching another destitute and ill-equipped expedition into the snow-drifted Alleghenies.

But there was activity elsewhere than in Virginia during the winter of 1754-5. Contrecoeur, commanding at Fort Duquesne, sent clear reports of the campaign of 1754. The French cause was strengthening. The success of the French had had a wonderful effect on the indifferent Indians; hundreds before only half-hearted came readily under French domination. All this was of utmost moment to New France, possibly of more importance than keeping her chain of forts to Quebec unbroken. As Joncaire, the drunken commander on the Allegheny, had told Washington in 1753, the English could raise two men in America to their one—but not including their Indians.

It is, probably, impossible for us to realize with what feelings the French anticipated war with England on the American continent. The long campaigns in Europe had cost both nations much and had brought no return to either. Even Marshal Saxe’s brilliant victories were purchased at a fabulous price, and, at the end, Louis had given up all that was gained in order to pose “as a Prince and not as a merchant.” But in America there was a prize which both of these nations desired and which was worth fighting for—the grandest prize ever won in war! Between the French and English colonies lay this black forest stretching from Maine through New York and Pennsylvania and Virginia to the Gulf of Mexico. It seemed, to the French, the silliest dream imaginable for the English to plan to pierce this forest and conquer New France. To reach any of the French forts a long passage by half-known courses through an inhospitable wilderness was necessary; and the French knew by a century of experience what a Herculean task it was to carry troops and stores over the inland water and land ways of primeval America. But for the task they had had much assistance from the Indians and were favored in many instances by the currents of these rivers; the English had almost no Indian allies and in every case were compelled to ascend their rivers to reach the French. However, the formation of the Ohio Company and the lively days of the summer of 1754 in the Alleghenies aroused France as nothing else could; here was one young Virginian officer who had found his way through the forests, and there was no telling how many more there might be like him. And France, tenfold more disturbed by Washington’s campaign than there was need for, performed wonders during the winter of 1754-5. The story of the action at Fort Necessity was transmitted to London and was represented by the British ambassadors at Paris as an open violation of the peace, “which did not meet with the same degree of respect,” writes a caustic historian, “as on former occasions of complaint: the time now nearly approaching for the French to pull off the mask of moderation and peace.”[1] As if to confirm this suspicion, the French marine became suddenly active, the Ministry ordered a powerful armament to be fitted at Brest; “in all these armaments,” wrote the Earl of Holderness’s secret agent, “there appeared a plain design to make settlements and to build forts; besides, that it was given out, they resolved to augment the fortifications at Louisburg, and to build more forts on the Ohio.”[2]

But there was activity now in England, too. Governor Sharpe of Maryland, but lately appointed Commander-in-chief in America, had only a hint of what was being planned and was to have even less share in its accomplishment; in vain his friends extolled him as honest—“a little less honesty,” declared George II, characteristically, “and a little more ability were more to be desired at the moment.” And the rule worked on both sides of the Atlantic. American affairs had long been in the hands of the Secretary of the Board of Trade, the Duke of Newcastle, as perfect an ass as ever held high office. He had opposed every policy that did not accord with his own “time serving selfishness” with a persistency only matched by his unparalleled ignorance. Once thrown into a panic, it is said, at a rumor that a large French army had been thrown into Cape Breton, he was asked where the necessary transports had been secured.

“Transports,” he shrieked, “I tell you they marched by land!”

“By land, to the island of Cape Breton?” was the astonished reply.

“What, is Cape Breton an island? Are you sure of that?” and he ran away with an “Egad, I will go directly and tell the King that Cape Breton is an island!” It is not surprising that a government which could ever have tolerated such a man in high office should have neglected, then abused, and then lost its American colonies.

But Newcastle gave way to an abler man. The new campaign in North America was the conception of the Captain-general of the British Army, the Duke of Cumberland, hero of Culloden.

On November 14, 1754, King George opened Parliament with the statement that “His principal view should be to strengthen the foundation, and secure the duration of a general peace; to improve the present advantages of it for promoting the trade of his good subjects, and protecting those possessions which constitute one great source of their wealth and commerce.” Only in this vague way did His Majesty refer to the situation in America, lest he precipitate a debate; but Parliament took the cue and voted over four million pounds—one million of which was to be devoted to augmenting England’s forces “by land and sea.” Cumberland’s plan for the operations against the French in America had, sometime before, been forwarded to the point of selecting a Generalissimo to be sent to that continent. Major-General Edward Braddock was appointed to the service, upon the Duke of Cumberland’s recommendation, on September 24.

Edward Braddock was a lieutenant-colonel of the line and a major of the Foot Guards, the choicest corps of the British army—a position which cost the holder no less than eighteen thousand dollars. He was born in Ireland but was not Irish, for neither Scot, Irish, nor Papist could aspire to the meanest rank of the Foot Guards. He was as old as his century. His promotion in the army had been jointly due to the good name of his father, Edward Braddock I, who was retired as Major-general in 1715, to his passion for strict discipline, and to the favor of His Grace the Duke of Cumberland. Braddock’s personal bravery was proverbial; it was said that his troops never faced a danger when their commander was not “greedy to lead.” In private life he was dissolute; in disposition, “a very Iroquois,” according to Walpole. Yet certain of his friends denied the brutality which many attributed to him. “As we were walking in the Park,” one of Braddock’s admirers has recorded, “we heard a poor fellow was to be chastized; when I requested the General to beg off the offender. Upon his application to the general officer, whose name was Dury, he asked Braddock, How long since he had divested himself of brutality and the insolence of his manner? To which the other replied, ‘You never knew me insolent to my inferiors. It is only to such rude men as yourself that I behave with the spirit which I think they deserve.’”[3] And yet, when his sister Fanny hanged herself with a silver girdle to her chamber door, after losing her fortune at the gaming tables, the brute of a brother observed, “I always thought she would play till she would be forced to tuck herself up.” On the other hand it need not be forgotten that Braddock was for forty-three years in the service of the famed Coldstream Guards; that he probably conducted himself with courage in the Vigo expedition and in the Low Countries, and was a survivor of bloody Dettingen, Culloden, Fontenoy, and Bergen-op-Zoom. In 1753 he was stationed at Gibraltar where, “with all his brutality,” writes Walpole, “he made himself adored, and where scarce any governor was endured before.”[4]

Two months and one day after Braddock’s commission was signed he received two letters of instructions, one from the King and one from the Duke of Cumberland. “For your better direction in discharge of y^e Trust thereby reposed in You,” reads the King’s letter, “We have judged it proper to give You the following Instructions.” The document is divided into thirteen heads:

1. Two regiments of Foot commanded by Sir Peter Halket and Colonel Dunbar, with a train of artillery and necessary ships were ordered to “repair to North America.”

2. Braddock ordered to proceed to America and take under his command these troops, cultivating meanwhile “a good understanding & correspondence with Aug. Keppel Esq^r.” who was appointed commander of the American squadron.

3. Orders him also to take command of and properly distribute 3000 men which the Governors of the provinces had been ordered to raise to serve under Governor Shirley and Sir William Pepperell; informs him that Sir John St. Clair, deputy Quarter Master General, and Jas. Pitcher Esq^r., “our commissary of y^e musters, in North America,” had been sent to prepare for the arrival of the troops from Ireland and for raising the troops in America. Upon Braddock’s arrival he should inform himself of the progress of these preparations.

4. Provisions for the troops from Ireland had been prepared lest, upon arrival in America, they should be in want.

5. “Whereas, We have given Orders to our said Gov^rs to provide carefully a sufficient Quantity of fresh victuals for y^e use of our Troops at their arrival, & y^t they should also furnish all our officers who may have occasion to go from Place to Place, with all necessaries for travelling by Land, in case there are no means of going by Sea; & likewise, to observe and obey all such orders as shall be given by You or Persons appointed by you from time to time for quartering Troops, impressing Carriages, & providing all necessaries for such Forces as shall arrive or be raised in America, and y^t the s^d several Services shall be performed at the charge of y^e respective Governments, wherein the same shall happen. It is our Will & Pleasure y^t you should, pursuant thereto, apply to our s^d Governors, or any of them, upon all such Exigencies.”

6. The Governors had been directed “to endeavor to prevail upon y^e Assemblies of their respective Provinces to raise forthwith as large a sum as can be afforded as their contribution to a common Fund, to be employed provisionally for y^e general Service in North America.” Braddock was urged to assist in this and have great care as to its expenditure.

7. Concerns Braddock’s relations with the colonial governors; especially directing that a Council of War which shall include them be formed to determine, by majority vote, matters upon which no course has been defined.

8. “You will not only cultivate y^e best Harmony & Friendship possible with y^e several Governors of our Colonies & Provinces, but likewise with y^e Chiefs of y^e Indian Tribes ... to endeavor to engage them to take part & act with our Forces, in such operations as you shall think most expedient.”

9. Concerns securing the alliance and interest of the Indians and giving them presents.

10. Orders Braddock to prevent any commerce between the French and the English provinces.

11. Concerning the relative precedency of royal and colonial commissions.

12. Describes the copies of documents enclosed to Braddock concerning previous relations with the colonies for defense against French encroachment; “... And as Extracts of Lieut Gov^r Dinwiddie’s Letters of May 10^th, June 18^th, & July 24^th, relating to the Summons of the Fort which was erecting on y^e Forks of y^e Monongahela, and y^e Skirmish y^t followed soon after, & likewise of y^e action in the Great Meadows, near the River Ohio, are herewith delivered to you, you will be fully acquainted with what has hitherto happened of a hostile Nature upon the Banks of that River.”

13. Concerns future correspondence between Braddock and the Secretaries of State to whom his reports were to be sent.

The communication from the Duke of Cumberland written by his Aide, Colonel Napier, throws much light upon the verbal directions which Braddock received before he sailed:

“His Royal Highness the Duke, in the several audiences he has given you, entered into a particular explanation of every part of the service you are about to be employed in; and as a better rule for the execution of His Majesty’s instructions, he last Saturday communicated to you his own sentiments of this affair, and since you were desirous of forgetting no part thereof, he has ordered me to deliver them to you in writing. His Royal Highness has this service very much at heart, as it is of the highest importance to his majesty’s American dominions, and to the honour of his troops employed in those parts. His Royal Highness likewise takes a particular interest in it, as it concerns you, whom he recommended to his majesty to be nominated to the chief command.

“His Royal Highness’s opinion is, that immediately after your landing, you consider what artillery and other implements of war it will be necessary to transport to Will’s Creek for your first operation on the Ohio, that it may not fail you in the service; and that you form a second field train, with good officers and soldiers, which shall be sent to Albany and be ready to march for the second operation at Niagara. You are to take under your command as many as you think necessary of the two companies of artillery that are in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland as soon as the season will allow, taking care to leave enough to defend the Island. Captain Ord, a very experienced officer, of whom his Royal Highness has a great opinion, will join you as soon as possible.

“As soon as Shirley’s and Pepperel’s regiments are near complete, his Royal Highness is of opinion you should cause them to encamp, not only that they may sooner be disciplined, but also to draw the attention of the French and keep them in suspense about the place you really design to attack. His Royal Highness does not doubt that the officers and captains of the several companies will answer his expectation in forming and disciplining their respective troops. The most strict discipline is always necessary, but more particularly so in the service you are engaged in. Wherefore his Royal Highness recommends to you that it be constantly observed among the troops under your command, and to be particularly careful that they be not thrown into a panic by the Indians, with whom they are yet unacquainted, whom the French will certainly employ to frighten them. His Royal Highness recommends to you the visiting your posts night and day; that your Colonels and other officers be careful to do it; and that you yourself frequently set them the example; and give all your troops plainly to understand that no excuse will be admitted for any surprise whatsoever.

“Should the Ohio expedition continue any considerable time, and Pepperell’s and Shirley’s regiments be found sufficient to undertake in the mean while the reduction of Niagara, his Royal Highness would have you consider whether you could go there in person, leaving the command of the troops on the Ohio to some officer on whom you might depend, unless you shall think it better for the service to send to those troops some person whom you had designed to command on the Ohio; but this is a nice affair, and claims your particular attention. Colonel Shirley is the next commander after you, wherefore if you should send such an officer he must conduct himself so as to appear only in quality of a friend or counsellor in the presence of Colonel Shirley: and his Royal Highness is of opinion that the officer must not produce or make mention of the commission you give him to command except in a case of absolute necessity.

“The ordering of these matters may be depended on, if the expedition at Crown Point can take place at the same time that Niagara is besieged.

“If after the Ohio expedition is ended it should be necessary for you to go with your whole force to Niagara it is the opinion of his Royal Highness that you should carefully endeavour to find a shorter way from the Ohio thither than that of the Lake; which however you are not to attempt under any pretense whatever without a moral certainty of being supplied with provisions, &c. As to your design of making yourself master of Niagara, which is of the greatest consequence, his Royal Highness recommends to you to leave nothing to chance in the prosecution of that enterprize.

“With regard to the reducing of Crown Point, the provincial troops being best acquainted with the country, will be of the most service.

“After the taking of this fort his Royal Highness advises you to consult with the Governors of the neighboring provinces, where it will be most proper to build a fort to cover the frontiers of those provinces.

“As to the forts which you think ought to be built (and of which they are perhaps too fond in that country), his Royal Highness recommends the building of them in such a manner, that they may not require a strong garrison. He is of opinion that you ought not to build considerable forts, cased with stone, till the plans and estimates thereof have been sent to England and approved of by the Government here. His Royal Highness thinks that stockaded forts, with pallisadoes and a good ditch, capable of containing 200 men or 400 upon an emergency, will be sufficient for the present.

“As Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence, who commands at Nova Scotia, hath long protracted the taking of Beau-Sejour, his Royal Highness advises you to consult with him, both with regard to the time and the manner of executing that design. In this enterprise his Royal Highness foresees that his majesty’s ships may be of great service, as well by transporting the troops and warlike implements, as intercepting the stores and succors that might be sent to the French either by the Baye FranÇoise, or from Cape Breton by the Baye Verte on the other side of the Isthmus.

“With regard to your winter quarters after the operations of the campaign are finished, his Royal Highness recommends it to you to examine whether the French will not endeavor to make some attempts next season and in what parts they will most probably make them. In this case it will be most proper to canton your troops on that side, at such distances, that they may easily be assembled for the common defence. But you will be determined in this matter by appearances, and the intelligence, which it hath been recommended to you to procure by every method immediately after your landing. It is unnecessary to put you in mind how careful you must be to prevent being surprised. His Royal Highness imagines that your greatest difficulty will be the subsisting of your troops. He therefore recommends it to you to give your chief attention to this matter, and to take proper measures relative thereto with the Governors and with your quartermasters and commissaries.

“I hope that the extraordinary supply put on board the fleet, and the 1000 barrels of beef destined for your use, will facilitate and secure the supplying of your troops with provisions.

“I think I have omitted nothing of all the points wherein you desired to be informed: if there should be any intricate point unthought of, I desire you would represent it to me now, or at any other time; and I shall readily take it upon me to acquaint his Royal Highness thereof, and shall let you know his opinion on the subject.

“I wish you much success with all my heart; and as this success will infinitely rejoice all your friends, I desire you would be fully persuaded that no body will take greater pleasure in acquainting them thereof, than him, who is, &c.”

If excuse is needed for offering in such detail these orders, it is that few men have ever suffered more heavily in reputation and in person because of the failures, misconceptions, and shortcomings of others than the man who received these orders and attempted to act upon them.

These instructions and the letter from the Duke of Cumberland make two things very clear: it is clear from the King’s instructions (item 12) that the campaign to the Ohio Valley from Virginia was to be the important coup of the summer; the documents mentioned were to acquaint Braddock “with what has hitherto happened of a hostile Nature upon the Banks of that River.” This is made more certain by one of the first sentences in the Duke of Cumberland’s letter, “that immediately after your landing, you consider what artillery and other implements of war it will be necessary to transport to Will’s Creek for your first operation on the Ohio.” It is also clear that Braddock was helplessly dependent upon the success with which the American governors carried out the royal orders previously sent to them. They had been ordered to raise money and troops, provide provisions, open the necessary roads, supply carriages and horses, and conciliate and arm the Indian nations on the frontier. How far they were successful it will be proper to study later; for the moment, let us consider the destination of the little army that set sail, after innumerable delays, from the Downs December 21, 1754, led by the famed “Centurian” whose figure-head adorns Greenwich Hospital today.

Sending Braddock and his army to Virginia against the French on the Ohio was a natural blunder of immeasurable proportions. It was natural, because all eyes had been turned to Virginia by the activity of the Ohio Company, Washington’s campaign of the preceding year, and the erection of Fort Cumberland on the farthest frontier. These operations gave a seeming importance to the Virginia route westward which was all out of harmony with its length and the facilities offered. “Before we parted,” a friend of Braddock wrote concerning the General’s last night in London, “the General told me that he should never see me more; for he was going with a handful of men to conquer whole nations; and to do this they must cut their way through unknown woods. He produced a map of the country, saying, at the same time, ‘Dear Pop, we are sent like sacrifices to the altar.’” This gloomy prophecy was fulfilled with a fatal accuracy for which the choice of the Virginia route was largely responsible. Braddock’s campaign had been fully considered in all its bearings in the royal councils, and the campaign through Virginia to Fort Duquesne seems to have been definitely decided upon. Even before Braddock had crossed half of the Atlantic his Quartermaster-General, St. Clair, had passed all the way through Virginia and Maryland to Fort Cumberland in carrying out orders issued to him before Braddock had reached England from Gibraltar. “Having procured from the Governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia and from other sources,” writes Mr. Sargent, “all the maps and information that were obtainable respecting the country through which the expedition was to pass, he [St. Clair] proceeded in company with Governor Sharpe of Maryland upon a tour of inspection to Will’s Creek.” He inspected the Great Falls of the Potomac and laid plans for their being made passable for boats in which the army stores were to be shipped to Fort Cumberland, and had made contracts for the construction of the boats. He laid out a camp at Watkin’s Ferry. It is doubtful whether Braddock had ever had one word to say in connection with all these plans which irrevocably doomed him to the almost impossible feat of making Fort Cumberland a successful base of supplies and center of operations against the French. Moreover the Virginia route, being not only one of the longest on which Braddock could have approached the French, was the least supplied with any manner of wagons. “For such is the attention,” wrote Entick, “of the Virginians towards their staple trade of tobacco, that they scarce raise as much corn, as is necessary for their own subsistence; and their country being well provided with water-carriage in great rivers an army which requires a large supply of wheel-carriages and beasts of burden, could not expect to be furnished with them in a place where they are not in general use.”[5] “Their Produce is Tobacco,” wrote one of Braddock’s army, of the Virginians, “they are so attached to that, and their Avarice to raise it, makes them neglect every Comfort of Life.” As has often been said, Carlisle in Pennsylvania would have made a far better center of operations than Fort Cumberland, and eventually it proved to be Pennsylvania wagons in which the stores of the army were transported—without which the army could not have moved westward from Fort Cumberland one single mile. “Mr. Braddock had neither provisions nor carriage for a march of so considerable a length, which was greatly increased and embarrassed by his orders to take the rout of Will’s Creek; which road, as it was the worst provided with provisions, more troublesome and hazardous, and much more about, than by way of Pennsylvania.”[6]

Not to use superlatives, it would seem that the American colonial governors and St. Clair might have presented to Braddock the difficulties of the Virginia route as compared with the Pennsylvania route early enough to have induced the latter to make Carlisle his base for the Ohio campaign; but there is no telling now where the blunder was first made; a writer in Gentleman’s Magazine affirmed that the expedition was “sent to Virginia instead of Pennsylvania, to their insuperable disadvantage, merely to answer the lucerative views of a friend of the ministry, to whose share the remittances would then fall at the rate of 2½ per cent profit.”[7]

Even the suspicion of such treachery as sending Braddock to Virginia to indulge the purse of a favorite is the more revolting because of the suggestion in the letter from the Duke of Cumberland that Braddock, personally, favored an attack on Fort Niagara—which, it has been universally agreed, was the thing he should have done. “As to your design of making yourself master of Niagara”—the italics are mine—wrote Cumberland; and, though he refers at the beginning to their numerous interviews, this is the sole mention throughout the letter of any opinion or plan of Braddock’s. “Had General Braddock made it his first business to secure the command of lake Ontario, which he might easily have done soon enough to have stopt the force that was sent from Canada to Du Quesne, that fort must have been surrendered to him upon demand; and had he gone this way to it, greater part of that vast sum might have been saved to the nation, which was expended in making a waggon road, through the woods and mountains, the way he went.”[8] Yet Cumberland’s orders were distinct to go to Niagara by way of Virginia and Fort Duquesne.

Horace Walpole’s characterization of Braddock is particularly graphic and undoubtedly just—“desperate in his fortune, brutal in his behavior, obstinate in his sentiments, intrepid and capable.”[9] The troops given him for the American expedition were well suited to bring out every defect in his character; these were the fragments of the 44th and 48th regiments, then stationed in Ireland. Being deficient (even in time of peace), both had to be recruited up to five hundred men each. The campaign was unpopular and the recruits secured were of the worst type—“who, had they not been in the army, would probably have been in Bridewell [prison].” Walpole wrote, “the troops allotted to him most ill-chosen, being draughts of the most worthless in some Irish regiments, and anew disgusted by this species of banishment.”[10] “The mutinous Spirit of the Men encreases,” wrote an officer of Braddock’s army during the march to Fort Duquesne, “but we will get the better of that, we will see which will be tired first, they of deserving Punishments, or we of inflicting them ... they are mutinous, and this came from a higher Spring than the Hardships here, for they were tainted in Ireland by the factious Cry against the L— L— Ld G—, and the Primate; the wicked Spirit instilled there by Pamphlets and Conversation, got amongst the common Soldiers, who, tho’ they are Englishmen, yet are not the less stubborn and mutinous for that.”

Thus the half-mutinous army, and its “brutal,” “obstinate,” “intrepid,” and “capable” commander fared on across the sea to Virginia during the first three months of the memorable year of 1755. By the middle of March the entire fleet had weighed anchor in the port of Alexandria, Virginia.

The situation could not be described better than Entick has done in the following words: “Put all these together, what was extraordinary in his [Braddock’s] conduct, and what was extraordinary in the way of the Service, there could be formed no good idea of the issue of such an untoward expedition.”