WASHINGTON CITY, February 1, 1860.

To the Senate of the United States:

On the last day of the last Congress a bill, which had passed both Houses, entitled "An act making an appropriation for deepening the channel over the St. Clair flats, in the State of Michigan," was presented to me for approval.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that during the closing hours of a session it is impossible for the President on the instant to examine into the merits or demerits of an important bill, involving, as this does, grave questions both of expediency and of constitutional power, with that care and deliberation demanded by his public duty as well as by the best interests of the country. For this reason the Constitution has in all cases allowed him ten days for deliberation, because if a bill be presented to him within the last ten days of the session he is not required to return it, either with an approval or a veto, but may retain it, "in which case it shall not be a law." Whilst an occasion can rarely occur when so long a period as ten days would be required to enable the President to decide whether he should approve or veto a bill, yet to deny him even two days on important questions before the adjournment of each session for this purpose, as recommended by a former annual message, would not only be unjust to him, but a violation of the spirit of the Constitution. To require him to approve a bill when it is impossible he could examine into its merits would be to deprive him of the exercise of his constitutional discretion and convert him into a mere register of the decrees of Congress. I therefore deem it a sufficient reason for having retained the bill in question that it was not presented to me until the last day of the session.

Since the termination of the last Congress I have made a thorough examination of the questions involved in the bill to deepen the channel over the St. Clair flats, and now proceed to express the opinions which I have formed upon the subject; and

1. Even if this had been a mere question of expediency, it was, to say the least, extremely doubtful whether the bill ought to have been approved, because the object which Congress intended to accomplish by the appropriation which it contains of $55,000 had been already substantially accomplished. I do not mean to allege that the work had been completed in the best manner, but it was sufficient for all practical purposes.

The St. Clair flats are formed by the St. Clair River, which empties into the lake of that name by several mouths, and which forms a bar or shoal on which in its natural state there is not more than 6 or 7 feet of water. This shoal is interposed between the mouth of the river and the deep water of the lake, a distance of 6,000 feet, and in its natural condition was a serious obstruction to navigation. The obvious remedy for this was to deepen a channel through these flats by dredging, so as to enable vessels which could navigate the lake and the river to pass through this intermediate channel. This object had been already accomplished by previous appropriations, but without my knowledge, when the bill was presented to me. Captain Whipple, of the Topographical Engineers, to whom the expenditure of the last appropriation of $45,000 for this purpose in 1856 was intrusted, in his annual report of the 1st October, 1858, stated that the dredging was discontinued on the 26th August, 1858, when a channel had been cut averaging 275 feet wide, with a depth varying from 12 to 15-1/2 feet. He says:

So long as the lake retains its present height we may assume that the depth in the channel will be at least 13-1/2 feet.

With this result, highly creditable to Captain Whipple, he observes that if he has been correctly informed "all the lake navigators are gratified." Besides, afterwards, and during the autumn of 1858, the Canadian Government expended $20,000 in deepening and widening the inner end of the channel excavated by the United States. No complaint had been made previous to the passage of the bill of obstructions to the commerce and navigation across the St. Clair flats. What, then, was the object of the appropriation proposed by the bill?

It appears that the surface of the water in Lake St. Clair has been gradually rising, until in 1858 it had attained an elevation of 4 feet above what had been its level in 1841. It is inferred, whether correctly or not it is not for me to say, that the surface of the water may gradually sink to the level of 1841, and in that event the water, which was, when the bill passed, 13-1/2 feet deep in the channel, might sink to 9-1/2 feet, and thus obstruct the passage.

To provide for this contingency, Captain Whipple suggested "the propriety of placing the subject before Congress, with an estimate for excavating a cut through the center of the new channel 150 feet in width and 4-1/2 feet deep, so as to obtain from the river to the lake a depth of 18 feet during seasons of extreme high water and 12 feet at periods of extreme low water." It was not alleged that any present necessity existed for this narrower cut in the bottom of the present channel, but it is inferred that for the reason stated it may hereafter become necessary. Captain Whipple's estimate amounted to $50,000, but Congress by the bill have granted $55,000. Now, if no other objection existed against this measure, it would not seem necessary that the appropriation should have been made for the purpose indicated. The channel was sufficiently deep for all practical purposes; but from natural causes constantly operating in the lake, which I need not explain, this channel is peculiarly liable to fill up. What is really required is that it should at intervals be dredged out, so as to preserve its present depth; and surely the comparatively trifling expense necessary for this purpose ought not to be borne by the United States. After an improvement has been once constructed by appropriations from the Treasury it is not too much to expect that it should be kept in repair by that portion of the commercial and navigating interests which enjoys its peculiar benefits.

The last report made by Captain Whipple, dated on the 13th September last, has been submitted to Congress by the Secretary of War, and to this I would refer for information, which is, upon the whole, favorable, in relation to the present condition of the channel through the St. Clair flats.

2. But the far more important question is, Does Congress possess the power under the Constitution to deepen the channels of rivers and to create and improve harbors for purposes of commerce?

The question of the constitutional power of Congress to construct internal improvements within the States has been so frequently and so elaborately discussed that it would seem useless on this occasion to repeat or to refute at length arguments which have been so often advanced. For my own opinions on this subject I might refer to President Polk's carefully considered message of the 15th December, 1847, addressed to the House of Representatives whilst I was a member of his Cabinet.

The power to pass the bill in question, if it exist at all, must be derived from the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian tribes."

The power "to regulate:" Does this ever embrace the power to create or to construct? To say that it does is to confound the meaning of words of well-known signification. The word "regulate" has several shades of meaning, according to its application to different subjects, but never does it approach the signification of creative power. The regulating power necessarily presupposes the existence of something to be regulated. As applied to commerce, it signifies, according to the lexicographers, "to subject to rules or restrictions, as to regulate trade," etc. The Constitution itself is its own best expounder of the meaning of words employed by its framers. Thus, Congress have the power "to coin money." This is the creative power. Then immediately follows the power "to regulate the value thereof "—that is, of the coined money thus brought into existence. The words "regulate," "regulation," and "regulations" occur several times in the Constitution, but always with this subordinate meaning. Thus, after the creative power "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a navy" had been conferred upon Congress, then follows the power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces" thus called into being. So the Constitution, acting upon the self-evident fact that "commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian tribes" already existed, conferred upon Congress the power "to regulate" this commerce. Thus, according to Chief Justice Marshall, the power to regulate commerce "is the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." And Mr. Madison, in his veto message of the 3d March, 1817, declares that—

"The power to regulate commerce among the several States" can not include a power to construct roads and canals and to improve the navigation of water courses, in order to facilitate, promote, and secure such commerce, without a latitude of construction departing from the ordinary import of the terms, strengthened by the known inconveniences which doubtless led to the grant of this remedial power to Congress.

We know from the history of the Constitution what these inconveniences were. Different States admitted foreign imports at different rates of duty. Those which had prescribed a higher rate of duty for the purpose of increasing their revenue were defeated in this object by the legislation of neighboring States admitting the same foreign articles at lower rates. Hence jealousies and dangerous rivalries had sprung up between the different States. It was chiefly in the desire to provide a remedy for these evils that the Federal Convention originated. The Constitution, for this purpose, conferred upon Congress the power to regulate commerce in such a manner that duties should be uniform in all the States composing the Confederacy, and, moreover, expressly provided that "no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another." If the construction of a harbor or deepening the channel of a river be a regulation of commerce, as the advocates of this power contend, this would give the ports of the State within which these improvements were made a preference over the ports of other States, and thus be a violation of the Constitution.

It is not too much to assert that no human being in existence when the Constitution was framed entertained the idea or the apprehension that by conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce its framers intended to embrace the power of constructing roads and canals and of creating and improving harbors and deepening the channels of rivers throughout our extensive Confederacy. Indeed, one important branch of this very power had been denied to Congress in express terms by the Convention. A proposition was made in the Convention to confer on Congress the power "to provide for the cutting of canals when deemed necessary." This was rejected by the strong majority of eight States to three. Among the reasons given for this rejection was that "the expense in such cases will fall on the United States and the benefits accrue to the places where the canals may be cut."

To say that the simple power of regulating commerce embraces within itself that of constructing harbors, of deepening the channels of rivers—in short, of creating a system of internal improvements for the purpose of facilitating the operations of commerce—would be to adopt a latitude of construction under which all political power might be usurped by the Federal Government. Such a construction would be in conflict with the well-known jealousy against Federal power which actuated the framers of the Constitution. It is certain that the power in question is not enumerated among the express grants to Congress contained in the instrument. In construing the Constitution we must then next inquire, Is its exercise "necessary and proper"?—not whether it may be convenient or useful "for carrying into execution" the power to regulate commerce among the States. But the jealous patriots of that day were not content even with this strict rule of construction. Apprehending that a dangerous latitude of interpretation might be applied in future times to the enumerated grants of power, they procured an amendment to be made to the original instrument, which declares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."

The distinctive spirit and character which pervades the Constitution is that the powers of the General Government are confined chiefly to our intercourse with foreign nations, to questions of peace and war, and to subjects of common interest to all the States, carefully leaving the internal and domestic concerns of each individual State to be controlled by its own people and legislature. Without specifically enumerating these powers, it must be admitted that this well-marked distinction runs through the whole instrument. In nothing does the wisdom of its framers appear more conspicuously than in the care with which they sought to avoid the danger to our institutions which must necessarily result from the interference of the Federal Government with the local concerns of the States. The jarring and collision which would occur from the exercise by two separate governments of jurisdiction over the same subjects could not fail to produce disastrous consequences. Besides, the corrupting and seducing money influence exerted by the General Government in carrying into effect a system of internal improvements might be perverted to increase and consolidate its own power to the detriment of the rights of the States.

If the power existed in Congress to pass the present bill, then taxes must be imposed and money borrowed to an unlimited extent to carry such a system into execution. Equality among the States is equity. This equality is the very essence of the Constitution. No preference can justly be given to one of the sovereign States over another. According to the best estimate, our immense coast on the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific, and the Ivakes embraces more than 9,500 miles, and, measuring by its indentations and to the head of tide water on the rivers, the distance is believed to be more than 33,000 miles. This everywhere throughout its vast extent contains numerous rivers and harbors, all of which may become the objects of Congressional appropriation. You can not deny to one State what you have granted to another. Such injustice would produce strife, jealousy, and alarming dissensions among them. Even within the same State improvements may be made in one river or harbor which would essentially injure the commerce and industry of another river or harbor. The truth is that most of these improvements are in a great degree local in their character and for the especial benefit of corporations or individuals in their vicinity, though they may have an odor of nationality on the principle that whatever benefits any part indirectly benefits the whole.

From our past history we may have a small foretaste of the cost of reviving the system of internal improvements.

For more than thirty years after the adoption of the Federal Constitution the power to appropriate money for the construction of internal improvements was neither claimed nor exercised by Congress. After its commencement, in 1820 and 1821, by very small and modest appropriations for surveys, it advanced with such rapid strides that within the brief period of ten years, according to President Polk, "the sum asked for from the Treasury for various projects amounted to more than $200,000,000." The vetoes of General Jackson and several of his successors have impeded the progress of the system and limited its extent, but have not altogether destroyed it. The time has now arrived for a final decision of the question. If the power exists, a general system should be adopted which would make some approach to justice among all the States, if this be possible.

What a vast field would the exercise of this power open for jobbing and corruption! Members of Congress, from an honest desire to promote the interest of their constituents, would struggle for improvements within their own districts, and the body itself must necessarily be converted into an arena where each would endeavor to obtain from the Treasury as much money as possible for his own locality. The temptation would prove irresistible. A system of "logrolling" (I know no word so expressive) would be inaugurated, under which the Treasury would be exhausted and the Federal Government be deprived of the means necessary to execute those great powers clearly confided to it by the Constitution for the purpose of promoting the interests and vindicating the honor of the country.

Whilst the power over internal improvements, it is believed, was "reserved to the States respectively," the framers of the Constitution were not unmindful that it might be proper for the State legislatures to possess the power to impose tonnage duties for the improvement of rivers and harbors within their limits. The self-interest of the different localities would prevent this from being done to such an extent as to injure their trade. The Constitution, therefore, which had in a previous clause provided that all duties should be uniform throughout the United States, subsequently modified the general rule so far as to declare that "no State shall without the consent of Congress levy any duty of tonnage." The inference is therefore irresistible that with the consent of Congress such a duty may be imposed by the States. Thus those directly interested in the improvement may lay a tonnage duty for its construction without imposing a tax for this purpose upon all the people of the United States.

To this provision several of the States resorted until the period when they began to look to the Federal Treasury instead of depending upon their own exertions. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, with the consent of Congress, imposed small tonnage duties on vessels at different periods for clearing and deepening the channels of rivers and improving harbors where such vessels entered. The last of these legislative acts believed to exist is that of Virginia, passed on the 22d February, 1826, levying a tonnage duty on vessels for "improving the navigation of James River from Warwick to Rocketts Landing." The latest act of Congress on this subject was passed on the 24th of February, 1843, giving its consent to the law of the legislature of Maryland laying a tonnage duty on vessels for the improvement of the harbor of Baltimore, and continuing it in force until 1st June, 1850.

Thus a clear constitutional mode exists by which the legislature of Michigan may, in its discretion, raise money to preserve the channel of the St. Clair River at its present depth or to render it deeper. A very insignificant tonnage duty on American vessels using this channel would be sufficient for the purpose; and as the St. Clair River is the boundary line between the United States and the Province of Upper Canada, the provincial British authorities would doubtless be willing to impose a similar tonnage duty on British vessels to aid in the accomplishment of this object. Indeed, the legislature of that Province have already evinced their interest on this subject by having but recently expended $20,000 on the improvement of the St. Clair flats. Even if the Constitution of the United States had conferred upon Congress the power of deepening the channel of the St. Clair River, it would be unjust to impose upon the people of the United States the entire burden, which ought to be borne jointly by the two parties having an equal interest in the work. Whenever the State of Michigan shall cease to depend on the Treasury of the United States, I doubt not that she, in conjunction with Upper Canada, will provide the necessary means for keeping this work in repair in the least expensive and most effective manner and without being burdensome to any interest.

It has been contended in favor of the existence of the power to construct internal improvements that Congress have from the beginning made appropriations for light-houses, and that upon the same principle of construction they possess the power of improving harbors and deepening the channels of rivers. As an original question the authority to erect light-houses under the commercial power might be considered doubtful; but even were it more doubtful than it is I should regard it as settled after an uninterrupted exercise of the power for seventy years. Such a long and uniform practical construction of the Constitution is entitled to the highest respect, and has finally determined the question.

Among the first acts which passed Congress after the Federal

Government went into effect was that of August 7, 1789, providing "for the establishment and support of light-houses, beacons, buoys, and public piers." Under this act the expenses for the maintenance of all such erections then in existence were to be paid by the Federal Government and provision was made for the cession of jurisdiction over them by the respective States to the United States. In every case since before a light-house could be built a previous cession of jurisdiction has been required. This practice doubtless originated from that clause of the Constitution authorizing Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation ... over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." Among these "needful buildings" light-houses must in fact have been included.

The bare statement of these facts is sufficient to prove that no analogy exists between the power to erect a light-house as a "needful building" and that to deepen the channel of a river.

In what I have said I do not mean to intimate a doubt of the power of Congress to construct such internal improvements as may be essentially necessary for defense and protection against the invasion of a foreign enemy. The power to declare war and, the obligation to protect each State against invasion clearly cover such cases. It will scarcely be claimed, however, that the improvement of the St. Clair River is within this category. This river is the boundary line between the United States and the British Province of Upper Canada. Any improvement of its navigation, therefore, which we could make for purposes of war would equally inure to the benefit of Great Britain, the only enemy which could possibly confront us in that quarter. War would be a sad calamity for both nations, but should it ever, unhappily, exist, the battles will not be fought on the St. Clair River or on the lakes with which it communicates.

JAMES BUCHANAN.

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1860.

To the Senate of the United States:

On the last day of the last session of Congress a resolution, which had passed both Houses, "in relation to removal of obstructions to navigation in the mouth of the Mississippi River" was presented to me for approval. I have retained this resolution because it was presented to me at a period when it was impossible to give the subject that examination to which it appeared to be entitled. I need not repeat the views on this point presented in the introductory portion of my message to the Senate of the 2d [1st] instant.

In addition I would merely observe that although at different periods sums, amounting in the aggregate to $690,000, have been appropriated by Congress for the purpose of removing the bar and obstructions at the mouth of the Mississippi, yet it is now acknowledged that this money has been expended with but little, if any, practical benefit to its navigation.

JAMES BUCHANAN.

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1860.

To the Senate of the United States:

I return with my objections to the Senate, for their reconsideration, the bill entitled "An act for the relief of Arthur Edwards and his associates," presented to me on the 10th instant.

This bill directs the Postmaster-General "to audit and settle the accounts of Arthur Edwards and his associates for transporting the United States through mail on their steamers during the years 1849 and 1853 and intervening years" between Cleveland and Detroit, between Sandusky and Detroit, and between Toledo and Detroit, and "to allow and pay them not less than $28.60 for each and every passage of said steamers between said places during the aforementioned time when the mails were on board."

I have caused a statement to be made at the Post-Office Department of the least sum which can be paid to Mr. Edwards and his associates under the bill should it become a law, and from this it appears the amount will be $80,405.23.

Mr. Edwards and his associates, in 1854, a short time after the alleged services had been rendered, presented a claim to the Postmaster-General for $25,180 as compensation for these services. This claim consisted of nine items, setting forth specifically all the services embraced by the present bill. It is fair to presume that the parties best knew the value of their own services and that they would not by an underestimate do themselves injustice. The whole claim of $25,180 was rejected by the Postmaster-General for reasons which it is no part of my present purpose to discuss.

The claimants next presented a petition to the Court of Claims in June, 1855, "for a reasonable compensation" for these services, and "pray the judgment of your honorable court for the actual value of the service rendered by them and received by the United States, which amounts to the sum of $50,000." Thus the estimate which they placed upon their services had nearly doubled between 1854 and 1855—had risen from $25,180 to $50,000. On the ———, after a full hearing, the court decided against the claim, and delivered an opinion in support of this decision which can not, I think, be contested on legal principles. But they state in the conclusion of the opinion that "for any compensation for their services beyond what they have received they must depend upon the discretion of Congress."

This decision of the Court of Claims was reported to Congress on the 1st of April, 1858, and from it the present bill has originated. The amount granted by it is more by upward of $55,000 than the parties themselves demanded from the Postmaster-General in 1854, and is more by upward of $30,000 than they demanded when before the Court of Claims. The enormous difference in their favor between their own original demand and the amount granted by the present bill constitutes my chief objection to it. In presenting this objection I do not propose to enter into the question whether the claimants are entitled in equity to any compensation for their services beyond that which it is alleged they have already received, or, if so, what would be "a reasonable and fair compensation." My sole purpose is to afford Congress an opportunity of reconsidering this case on account of its peculiar circumstances. I transmit to the Senate the reports of Horatio King, Acting Postmaster-General, and of A.N. Zevely, Third Assistant Postmaster-General, both dated on the 14th of April, 1860, on the subject of this claim.

JAMES BUCHANAN.

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1860.

To the Senate of the United States:

I return with my objections to the Senate, in which it originated, the bill entitled "An act to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain, and for other purposes," presented to me on the 20th instant.

This bill gives to every citizen of the United States "who is the head of a family," and to every person of foreign birth residing in the country who has declared his intention to become a citizen, though he may not be the head of a family, the privilege of appropriating to himself 160 acres of Government land, of settling and residing upon it for five years; and should his residence continue until the end of this period, he shall then receive a patent on the payment of 25 cents per acre, or one-fifth of the present Government price. During this period the land is protected from all the debts of the settler.

This bill also contains a cession to the States of all the public lands within their respective limits "which have been subject to sale at private entry, and which remain unsold after the lapse of thirty years." This provision embraces a present donation to the States of 12,229,731 acres, and will from time to time transfer to them large bodies of such lands which from peculiar circumstances may not be absorbed by private purchase and settlement.

To the actual settler this bill does not make an absolute donation, but the price is so small that it can scarcely be called a sale. It is nominally 25 cents per acre, but considering this is not to be paid until the end of five years, it is in fact reduced to about 18 cents per acre, or one-seventh of the present minimum price of the public lands. In regard to the States, it is an absolute and unqualified gift.

1. This state of the facts raises the question whether Congress, under the Constitution, has the power to give away the public lands either to States or individuals. On this question I expressed a decided opinion in my message to the House of Representatives of the 24th February, 1859, returning the agricultural-college bill. This opinion remains unchanged. The argument then used applies as a constitutional objection with greater force to the present bill. There it had the plea of consideration, growing out of a specific beneficial purpose; here it is an absolute gratuity to the States, without the pretext of consideration. I am compelled for want of time in these the last hours of the session to quote largely from this message.

I presume the general proposition will be admitted that Congress does not possess the power to make donations of money already in the Treasury, raised by taxes on the people, either to States or individuals.

But it is contended that the public lands are placed upon a different footing from money raised by taxation and that the proceeds arising from their sale are not subject to the limitations of the Constitution, but may be appropriated or given away by Congress, at its own discretion, to States, corporations, or individuals for any purpose they may deem expedient.

The advocates of this bill attempt to sustain their position upon the language of the second clause of the third section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which declares that "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." They contend that by a fair interpretation of the words "dispose of" in this clause Congress possesses the power to make this gift of public lands to the States for purposes of education.

It would require clear and strong evidence to induce the belief that the framers of the Constitution, after having limited the powers of Congress to certain precise and specific objects, intended by employing the words "dispose of" to give that body unlimited power over the vast public domain. It would be a strange anomaly indeed to have created two funds—the one by taxation, confined to the execution of the enumerated powers delegated to Congress, and the other from the public lands, applicable to all subjects, foreign and domestic, which Congress might designate; that this fund should be "disposed of," not to pay the debts of the United States, nor "to raise and support armies," nor "to provide and maintain a navy," nor to accomplish any one of the other great objects enumerated in the Constitution, but be diverted from them to pay the debts of the States, to educate their people, and to carry into effect any other measure of their domestic policy. This would be to confer upon Congress a vast and irresponsible authority utterly at war with the well-known jealousy of Federal power which prevailed at the formation of the Constitution. The natural intendment would be that as the Constitution confined Congress to well-defined specific powers, the funds placed at their command, whether in land or money, should be appropriated to the performance of the duties corresponding with these powers. If not, a Government has been created with all its other powers carefully limited, but without any limitation in respect to the public lands.

But I can not so read the words "dispose of" as to make them embrace the idea of "giving away." The true meaning of words is always to be ascertained by the subject to which they are applied and the known general intent of the lawgiver. Congress is a trustee under the Constitution for the people of the United States to "dispose of" their public lands, and I think I may venture to assert with confidence that no case can be found in which a trustee in the position of Congress has been authorized to "dispose of" property by its owner where it has been held that these words authorized such trustee to give away the fund intrusted to his care. No trustee, when called upon to account for the disposition of the property placed under his management before any judicial tribunal, would venture to present such a plea in his defense. The true meaning of these words is clearly stated by Chief Justice Taney in delivering the opinion of the court (19 Howard, p. 436). He says in reference to this clause of the Constitution: "It begins its enumeration of powers by that of disposing; in other words, making sale of the lands or raising money from them, which, as we have already said, was the main object of the cession (from the States), and which is the first thing provided for in the article." It is unnecessary to refer to the history of the times to establish the known fact that this statement of the Chief Justice is perfectly well founded. That it never was intended by the framers of the Constitution that these lands should be given away by Congress is manifest from the concluding portion of the same clause. By it Congress has power not only "to dispose of" the territory, but of the "other property of the United States." In the language of the Chief Justice (p. 437): "And the same power of making needful rules respecting the territory is in precisely the same language applied to the other property of the United States, associating the power over the territory in this respect with the power over movable or personal property; that is, the ships, arms, or munitions of war, which then belonged in common to the State sovereignties."

The question is still clearer in regard to the public lands in the States and Territories within the Louisiana and Florida purchases. These lands were paid for out of the public Treasury from money raised by taxation. Now if Congress had no power to appropriate the money with which these lands were purchased, is it not clear that the power over the lands is equally limited? The mere conversion of this money into land could not confer upon Congress new power over the disposition of land which they had not possessed over money. If it could, then a trustee, by changing the character of the fund intrusted to his care for special objects from money into land, might give the land away or devote it to any purpose he thought proper, however foreign from the trust. The inference is irresistible that this land partakes of the very same character with the money paid for it, and can be devoted to no objects different from those to which the money could have been devoted. If this were not the case, then by the purchase of a new territory from a foreign government out of the public Treasury Congress could enlarge their own powers and appropriate the proceeds of the sales of the land thus purchased, at their own discretion, to other and far different objects from what they could have applied the purchase money which had been raised by taxation.

2. It will prove unequal and unjust in its operation among the actual settlers themselves.

The first settlers of a new country are a most meritorious class. They brave the dangers of savage warfare, suffer the privations of a frontier life, and with the hand of toil bring the wilderness into cultivation. The "old settlers," as they are everywhere called, are public benefactors. This class have all paid for their lands the Government price, or $1.25 per acre. They have constructed roads, established schools, and laid the foundation of prosperous commonwealths. Is it just, is it equal, that after they have accomplished all this by their labor new settlers should come in among them and receive their farms at the price of 25 or 18 cents per acre? Surely the old settlers, as a class, are entitled to at least equal benefits with the new. If you give the new settlers their land for a comparatively nominal price, upon every principle of equality and justice you will be obliged to refund out of the common Treasury the difference which the old have paid above the new settlers for their land.

3. This bill will do great injustice to the old soldiers who have received land warrants for their services in fighting the battles of their country. It will greatly reduce the market value of these warrants. Already their value has sunk for 160-acre warrants to 67 cents per acre under an apprehension that such a measure as this might become a law. What price would they command when any head of a family may take possession of a quarter section of land and not pay for it until the end of five years, and then at the rate of only 25 cents per acre? The magnitude of the interest to be affected will appear in the fact that there are outstanding unsatisfied land warrants reaching back to the last war with Great Britain, and even Revolutionary times, amounting in round numbers to seven and a half millions of acres.

4. This bill will prove unequal and unjust in its operation, because from its nature it is confined to one class of our people. It is a boon exclusively conferred upon the cultivators of the soil. Whilst it is cheerfully admitted that these are the most numerous and useful class of our fellow-citizens and eminently deserve all the advantages which our laws have already extended to them, yet there should be no new legislation which would operate to the injury or embarrassment of the large body of respectable artisans and laborers. The mechanic who emigrates to the West and pursues his calling must labor long before he can purchase a quarter section of land, whilst the tiller of the soil who accompanies him obtains a farm at once by the bounty of the Government. The numerous body of mechanics in our large cities can not, even by emigrating to the West, take advantage of the provisions of this bill without entering upon a new occupation for which their habits of life have rendered them unfit.

5. This bill is unjust to the old States of the Union in many respects; and amongst these States, so far as the public lands are concerned, we may enumerate every State east of the Mississippi with the exception of Wisconsin and a portion of Minnesota.

It is a common belief within their limits that the older States of the Confederacy do not derive their proportionate benefit from the public lands. This is not a just opinion. It is doubtful whether they could be rendered more beneficial to these States under any other system than that which at present exists. Their proceeds go into the common Treasury to accomplish the objects of the Government, and in this manner all the States are benefited in just proportion. But to give this common inheritance away would deprive the old States of their just proportion of this revenue without holding out any the least corresponding advantage. Whilst it is our common glory that the new States have become so prosperous and populous, there is no good reason why the old States should offer premiums to their own citizens to emigrate from them to the West. That land of promise presents in itself sufficient allurements to our young and enterprising citizens without any adventitious aid. The offer of free farms would probably have a powerful effect in encouraging emigration, especially from States like Illinois, Tennessee, and Kentucky, to the west of the Mississippi, and could not fail to reduce the price of property within their limits. An individual in States thus situated would not pay its fair value for land when by crossing the Mississippi he could go upon the public lands and obtain a farm almost without money and without price.

6. This bill will open one vast field for speculation. Men will not pay $1.25 for lands when they can purchase them for one-fifth of that price. Large numbers of actual settlers will be carried out by capitalists upon agreements to give them half of the land for the improvement of the other half. This can not be avoided. Secret agreements of this kind will be numerous. In the entry of graduated lands the experience of the Land Office justifies this objection.

7. We ought ever to maintain the most perfect equality between native and naturalized citizens. They are equal, and ought always to remain equal, before the laws. Our laws welcome foreigners to our shores, and their rights will ever be respected. Whilst these are the sentiments on which I have acted through life, it is not, in my opinion, expedient to proclaim to all the nations of the earth that whoever shall arrive in this country from a foreign shore and declare his intention to become a citizen shall receive a farm of 160 acres at a cost of 25 or 20 cents per acre if he will only reside on it and cultivate it. The invitation extends to all, and if this bill becomes a law we may have numerous actual settlers from China and other Eastern nations enjoying its benefits on the great Pacific Slope. The bill makes a distinction in favor of such persons over native and naturalized citizens. When applied to such citizens, it is confined to such as are the heads of families, but when applicable to persons of foreign birth recently arrived on our shores there is no such restriction. Such persons need not be the heads of families provided they have filed a declaration of intention to become citizens. Perhaps this distinction was an inadvertence, but it is, nevertheless, a part of the bill.

8. The bill creates an unjust distinction between persons claiming the benefit of the preemption laws. Whilst it reduces the price of the land to existing preemptors to 62-1/2 cents per acre and gives them a credit on this sum for two years from the present date, no matter how long they may have hitherto enjoyed the land, future preemptors will be compelled to pay double this price per acre. There is no reason or justice in this discrimination.

9. The effect of this bill on the public revenue must be apparent to all. Should it become a law, the reduction of the price of land to actual settlers to 25 cents per acre, with a credit of five years, and the reduction of its price to existing preemptors to 62-1/2 cents per acre, with a credit of two years, will so diminish the sale of other public lands as to render the expectation of future revenue from that source, beyond the expenses of survey and management, illusory. The Secretary of the Interior estimated the revenue from the public lands for the next fiscal year at $4,000,000, on the presumption that the present land system would remain unchanged. Should this bill become a law, he does not believe that $1,000,000 will be derived from this source.

10. This bill lays the ax at the root of our present admirable land system. The public land is an inheritance of vast value to us and to our descendants. It is a resource to which we can resort in the hour of difficulty and danger. It has been managed heretofore with the greatest wisdom under existing laws. In this management the rights of actual settlers have been conciliated with the interests of the Government. The price to all has been reduced from $2 per acre to $1.25 for fresh lands, and the claims of actual settlers have been secured by our preemption laws. Any man can now acquire a title in fee simple to a homestead of 80 acres, at the minimum price of $1.25 per acre, for $100. Should the present system remain, we shall derive a revenue from the public lands of $10,000,000 per annum, when the bounty-land warrants are satisfied, without oppression to any human being. In time of war, when all other sources of revenue are seriously impaired, this will remain intact. It may become the best security for public loans hereafter, in times of difficulty and danger, as it has been heretofore. Why should we impair or destroy the system at the present moment? What necessity exists for it?

The people of the United States have advanced with steady but rapid strides to their present condition of power and prosperity. They have been guided in their progress by the fixed principle of protecting the equal rights of all, whether they be rich or poor. No agrarian sentiment has ever prevailed among them. The honest poor man, by frugality and industry, can in any part of our country acquire a competence for himself and his family, and in doing this he feels that he eats the bread of independence. He desires no charity, either from the Government or from his neighbors. This bill, which proposes to give him land at an almost nominal price out of the property of the Government, will go far to demoralize the people and repress this noble spirit of independence. It may introduce among us those pernicious social theories which have proved so disastrous in other countries.

JAMES BUCHANAN.