The Amount of Risk in Mining Investments.

From the constant reiteration of the risks and difficulties involved in every step of mining enterprise from the valuation of the mine to its administration as a going concern, the impression may be gained that the whole business is one great gamble; in other words, that the point whereat certainties stop and conjecture steps in is so vital as to render the whole highly speculative.

Far from denying that mining is, in comparison with better-class government bonds, a speculative type of investment, it is desirable to avow and emphasize the fact. But it is none the less well to inquire what degree of hazard enters in and how it compares with that in other forms of industrial enterprise.

Mining business, from an investment view, is of two sorts,—prospecting ventures and developed mines; that is, mines where little or no ore is exposed, and mines where a definite quantity of ore is measurable or can be reasonably anticipated. The great hazards and likewise the Aladdin caves of mining are mainly confined to the first class. Although all mines must pass through the prospecting stage, the great industry of metal production is based on developed mines, and it is these which should come into the purview of the non-professional investor. The first class should be reserved invariably for speculators, and a speculator may be defined as one who hazards all to gain much. It is with mining as an investment, however, that this discussion is concerned.

Risk in Valuation of Mines.—Assuming a competent collection of data and efficient management of the property, the risks in valuing are from step to step:—

As to the continuity of values and volumes through the estimated area, the experience of hundreds of engineers in hundreds of mines has shown that when the estimates are based on properly secured data for "proved ore," here at least there is absolutely no hazard. Metallurgical treatment, if determined by past experience on the ore itself, carries no chance; and where determined by experiment, the risk is eliminated if the work be sufficiently exhaustive. The risk of metal price is simply a question of how conservative a figure is used in estimating. It can be eliminated if a price low enough be taken. Risk of extension in depth or beyond exposures cannot be avoided. It can be reduced in proportion to the distance assumed. Obviously, if no extension is counted, there is nothing chanced. The risk of proper appreciation of costs is negligible where experience in the district exists. Otherwise, it can be eliminated if a sufficiently large allowance is taken. The risk of failure to secure good management can be eliminated if proved men are chosen.

There is, therefore, a basic value to every mine. The "proved" ore taken on known metallurgical grounds, under known conditions of costs on minimum prices of metals, has a value as certain as that of money in one's own vault. This is the value previously referred to as the "A" value. If the price (and interest on it pending recovery) falls within this amount, there is no question that the mine is worth the price. What the risk is in mining is simply what amount the price of the investment demands shall be won from extension of the deposit beyond known exposures, or what higher price of metal must be realized than that calculated in the "A" value. The demands on this X, Y portion of the mine can be converted into tons of ore, life of production, or higher prices, and these can be weighed with the geological weights and the industrial outlook.

Mines compared to Other Commercial Enterprises.—The profits from a mining venture over and above the bed-rock value A, that is, the return to be derived from more extensive ore-recovery and a higher price of metal, may be compared to the value included in other forms of commercial enterprise for "good-will." Such forms of enterprise are valued on a basis of the amount which will replace the net assets plus (or minus) an amount for "good-will," that is, the earning capacity. This good-will is a speculation of varying risk depending on the character of the enterprise. For natural monopolies, like some railways and waterworks, the risk is less and for shoe factories more. Even natural monopolies are subject to the risks of antagonistic legislation and industrial storms. But, eliminating this class of enterprise, the speculative value of a good-will involves a greater risk than prospective value in mines, if properly measured; because the dangers of competition and industrial storms do not enter to such a degree, nor is the future so dependent upon the human genius of the founder or manager. Mining has reached such a stage of development as a science that management proceeds upon comparatively well-known lines. It is subject to known checks through the opportunity of comparisons by which efficiency can be determined in a manner more open for the investor to learn than in any other form of industry. While in mining an estimate of a certain minimum of extension in depth, as indicated by collateral factors, may occasionally fall short, it will, in nine cases out of ten, be exceeded. If investment in mines be spread over ten cases, similarly valued as to minimum of extension, the risk has been virtually eliminated. The industry, if reduced to the above basis for financial guidance, is a more profitable business and is one of less hazards than competitive forms of commercial enterprises.

In view of what has been said before, it may be unnecessary to refer again to the subject, but the constant reiteration by wiseacres that the weak point in mining investments lies in their short life and possible loss of capital, warrants a repetition that the A, B, C of proper investment in mines is to be assured, by the "A" value, of a return of the whole or major portion of the capital. The risk of interest and profit may be deferred to the X, Y value, and in such case it is on a plane with "good-will." It should be said at once to that class who want large returns on investment without investigation as to merits, or assurance as to the management of the business, that there is no field in this world for the employment of their money at over 4%.

Unfortunately for the reputation of the mining industry, and metal mines especially, the business is often not conducted or valued on lines which have been outlined in these chapters. There is often the desire to sell stocks beyond their value. There is always the possibility that extension in depth will reveal a glorious Eldorado. It occasionally does, and the report echoes round the world for years, together with tributes to the great judgment of the exploiters. The volume of sound allures undue numbers of the venturesome, untrained, and ill-advised public to the business, together with a mob of camp-followers whose objective is to exploit the ignorant by preying on their gambling instincts. Thus a considerable section of metal mining industry is in the hands of these classes, and a cloud of disrepute hangs ever in the horizon.

There has been a great educational campaign in progress during the past few years through the technical training of men for conduct of the industry, by the example of reputable companies in regularly publishing the essential facts upon which the value of their mines is based, and through understandable nontechnical discussion in and by some sections of the financial and general press. The real investor is being educated to distinguish between reputable concerns and the counters of gamesters. Moreover, yearly, men of technical knowledge are taking a stronger and more influential part in mining finance and in the direction of mining and exploration companies. The net result of these forces will be to put mining on a better plane.