AMERICAN EXPLORATION—MASSON (continued)

On Masson's return to Kabul he observed the first symptoms of active interest in Afghan politics on the part of the Indian Government, in the person of an accredited native agent (Saiad Karamat Ali) who had travelled with Lieut. Conolly to Herat. Colonel Stoddart was at that time detained in Bokhara, and was apparently under the impression that he was befriended by a "profligate adventurer," one Samad Khan, who had succeeded in establishing himself there as a pillar of the State after imposing on so astute a politician as the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan and on many of the leading Afghan Sirdars. Masson seems to have been better aware of the character of this Khan than the Indian Government, for he notes that "to be befriended by such a man is in itself calamitous."

It is quite comprehensible that the Indian Government should not duly appreciate the position of an adventurer like Masson and his intimate acquaintance with Afghanistan and its riotous rulers; but it was unfortunate; for it is not too much to say that Indian Government officials at that time were but amateurs in their knowledge of Afghan politics compared to Masson; and much of the horrors of subsequent events might have been avoided could Masson have been admitted freely and fully to their counsels. However, for a time he employed himself in collecting historical and scientific notes on Afghanistan, which we still regard as standard works for reference. No one has succeeded better in giving us an impression of the leading characteristics of the Afghan chiefs of his time, and probably there is not much improvement effected by a century of moral development. Steeped up to the eyes in treachery towards each other, debauchees, drunkards, liars, and murderers, one cannot but admire their extraordinary virility. It was truly a case of the survival of the fittest, and the fittest were certainly remarkable men.

The Amir Dost Mahomed Khan was one of the worst, and one of the best. One of the twenty-two sons of Sirafraz Khan, he worked his way upwards by truly Afghan methods; methods which in the early days of his career were utterly detestable, but which attained some sort of reflected dignity later, when there were not wanting signs that in a different environment he might have been truly great. He was illiterate and uneducated, but appreciated the advantages of elementary schooling in others. Into the strange welter of political intrigue which forms Afghan history during the period of his rise to power we need not enter; but it is necessary to note the extraordinary difference with which the stranger in the land, a Feringhi, was regarded throughout Afghanistan, then, as compared with his reception at present. It is even possible that the life of a Feringhi was then safer (i.e. deemed of more importance) than that of any ordinary Afghan chief. It is certain that there was a strong feeling that it was well to be on good terms with the representatives of a powerful neighbouring state. This feeling was greatly weakened by the results of the first Afghan war, and has never again been completely restored.

Although we are only dealing with Masson as an explorer, it is impossible not to express sympathy with his whole-hearted admiration for the country of the Afghan. His description of the beauties of the land, especially in early spring with the awakening of the season of flowers, the irresistible charm of the mountain scenery of the Kohistan as the gradual burst of summer bloom crept upwards over the hills—all this finds an echo in the heart of every one who has ever seen this "God granted" land; where, after all, the seething scum of Afghan politics is very much confined to a class, although it undoubtedly sinks deeper and reaches the mass of the people with more of the force of self-interest than is the case in India, where the historical pageant of kings and dynasties has passed over the great mass of India's self-absorbed people and left them profoundly unconscious of its progress.

In the year 1833 Masson resumed his researches in the neighbourhood of Kabul, commencing in the plains about 25 miles north-east from Kabul, and 8 or 10 from Charikar. These researches were continued for some years, until the failure of the mission to Kabul in 1838 obliged him to leave the country; and in his proposal to resume them again in 1840 he was opposed by "a miserable fraction of the Calcutta clique," who had recourse to "acts as unprecedented, base, and illegal as perhaps were ever perpetrated under the sanction of authority against a subject of the British Crown." So that apparently he claimed British nationality before he left Afghanistan. However that may be, it is certain that no subsequent explorer has added much that is of value to the extraordinary evidences of ancient occupation collected by Masson. Here, he maintains, once existed the city of Alexandria founded by Alexander on the Kabul plain; and a recent announcement from Kabul that the site of an ancient city has been discovered obviously refers to the same position at Begram near Charikar, and is a useful commentary on the rapidity with which the fame and name of an original explorer can disappear.

The Masson collection of coins, which totalled between 15,000 and 20,000 in 1837, and which was presented to the East India Company, proved a veritable revelation of unknown kings and dynasties, and contributed enormously to our positive knowledge of Central Asian history. The vast number of Cufic coins found at Begram show that the city must have existed for some centuries after the Mahomedan invasion. Chinese travellers tell of a city called Hupian in this neighbourhood, but Masson is inclined to place the site of Hupian near Charikar, where there was, in his time, a village called Malek Hupian. He thinks that Begram had certainly ceased to exist at the time of Timur's expedition to India; or that conqueror would not have found it necessary to construct a canal from the Ghorband stream in order to colonize this favoured corner of the Kabul plain. The canal still exists as the Mahighir, and the people of the neighbourhood talked Turki in Masson's time. Three miles east of Kabul there is another ancient site known as Begram. This was probably the precursor of Kabul itself, and other "Begrams" are known in India. The term appears to be generic and to denote a famous site. Buddhist relics lie thickly round about the Afghan Begrams, groups of them being very abundant throughout the Kabul valley.

It was after his first visit to Begram that Masson became acquainted with M. Honigberger, whom he describes as a gentleman from Lahore bent on archaeological research; and at the close of the autumn Dr. Gerard, the companion of Lieut. Burnes, appeared at Kabul. Honigberger's researches, like those of Gerard, appear to have been confined to archÆology, and the results of them form an interesting story which was given to the world by Eugene Jacquet; but as neither of these gentlemen can be said to have contributed to the early geographical knowledge of the country, no further reference need be made to them, beyond remarking that Honigberger very narrowly escaped being murdered on his subsequent journey to Bokhara.

Masson's extraordinary capability of dealing with every class of people with whom he came in contact, and his consequent apparent immunity from the dangers which beset the ordinary unaccredited traveller, should not lead to the assumption that Afghanistan was a safe country to travel in at the time of our first political negotiations, in spite of there being less fanaticism at that time; whilst the trans-Oxus states were then almost unapproachable. There, at least, the gradual encroachment of Russian civilization has absolutely altered the conditions of European existence, and Bokhara has become quite a favourite resort for tourists.

Masson's story of Afghan intrigue, which is the substance of Afghan history at this period, is as interesting as are his archÆological investigations, for it affords us a view of events which occurred behind the scenes, shut off from India by the curtain of the frontier hills; but whilst he thus occupied his busy mind with the past and the present policy of Afghanistan, he did not lose sight of the opportunity for making fresh excursions into Afghan territory. His visits to the Kabul valley and Peshawar can hardly claim to be original explorations, though he undoubtedly acquired by them a local geographical knowledge far in advance of anything then existing on the Indian side of the border, and some of it ranks as authoritative even now. It must not be supposed that these visits and investigations were carried on without grave risk and constant difficulty, but by this time Masson had so wide and so varied a personal acquaintance with the leading chiefs and tribespeople of the country that he usually succeeded in distinguishing friend from foe, and extricated himself from positions which would have been fatal to any one less knowledgeable than himself.

During the year 1835 we learn that Masson was in Northern Afghanistan, chiefly at Kabul, gathering information; but there appears to be hardly a place which now figures in our maps with any prominence in the Kabul province which he did not succeed in visiting; and as regards some of them (Kunar, for instance) there was nothing added to his record for at least sixty years. He penetrated the Alishang valley to within 12 miles of Najil, a point which no European has succeeded in reaching since; but his sphere of observation was always too restricted to enable him to make much of his geographical opportunities. Najil is now somewhat doubtfully placed on our maps from native information gathered during the surveys executed with the Afghan campaign of 1878-80.

It was at this period in Masson's career (in 1835) that English political interest in Kabul began to take an active shape. About this time Masson accepted a proposal from the Indian Government (which reached him through Captain Wade, the political officer on the Punjab frontier) to act as British agent and keep the Government informed as to the progress of affairs in Kabul. It is rather surprising that Masson, who never misses an opportunity of asserting that he was not an Englishman, and was by no means in sympathy with the policy of the Indian Government towards Afghanistan, should have accepted this responsibility. However, he did so, for a time at least, though he subsequently requested that he might be relieved from the duties entailed by such an equivocal position. He negotiated the foundation of a commercial treaty between India and Kabul, but with scant success. This period of seething intrigue at Kabul (as also between Dost Mahomed Khan and the Sikhs) was hardly favourable to its inception. His efforts were duly acknowledged by the Government, but his position as agent became untenable when he found that it led to interference with the great object of his residence in Afghanistan, i.e. antiquarian research. We can only touch upon the political events of 1836-37 cursorily, in spite of their absorbing interest, in order to follow the sequence of Masson's career.

At the beginning of 1836 the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh were consolidating their position on the Western Punjab frontier, whilst Dost Mahomed Khan was working all he knew to secure men and money for military purposes. This led to a half-hearted renewal of correspondence between Masson and Wade. The commencement of the year 1837 was marked by active preparations on the part of Dost Mahomed for a campaign against the Sikhs, resulting in an equivocal victory for the Afghans near Jamrud under Akbar Khan, but no essential change in the relative position as regards the Peshawar frontier. Various were the projects set on foot at this time for the assassination of the Amir, and in the general network of bloody intrigue Masson was not overlooked; but he was discreetly absent from Kabul during the winter of 1836-37, having previously found it necessary to keep his house full of armed men. He returned to Kabul in the spring.

Towards the end of September 1837 Captain Burnes arrived in Kabul on that historical commercial mission which was to result in a disastrous misunderstanding between the Indian Government and the Amir. If we are to believe Masson, it would be difficult to conceive a more mismanaged and hopelessly bungled political function than this mission proved to be; but we must remember that in experience of the Afghan character and knowledge of intrigue the Indian Government and Council were by no means experts. It is difficult to believe that the mere fact of inadequate recognition of his services and consequent disappointment could have so affected a man of Masson's independence of character, natural ability, and clear sense of justice, as to lead him to misrepresent the position absolutely. As a commercial mission he regarded it as unnecessary.

Burnes was instructed to proceed first to Haidarabad (in Sind) for the purpose of opening up the Indus to commercial navigation, and thence to journey via Attok to Peshawar (held by the Sikhs), Kabul, and Kandahar, back again to Haidarabad, all in the interest of a trade which was already flourishing between Afghanistan and ports on the Indus already established. "The Governments of India and of England," says Masson, "as well as the public at large were never amused and deceived by a greater fallacy than that of opening the Indus as regards commercial objects."

The keynote of Masson's policy was non-interference, so long as interference either in trade or politics was not forced on the British Government. At that time such views were undoubtedly sound; but even then there was a stir in the political atmosphere which betokened much nervousness in high quarters on the subject of Persian and Russian intrigues with Afghanistan. So far, however, as Masson observes, "there was little notion entertained at this time of convulsing Central Asia, of deposing and setting up Kings, of carrying on wars, of lavishing treasure, and of the commission of a long train of crimes and follies." But with the arrival of Burnes at Kabul trade interests seem to have faded and those of a more active policy to have taken their place. The weak point in this change of policy appears to have been the want of definite instructions from the Government of India to their agent.

The appearance of a Russian officer (Lieut. Vektavitch) at Kabul from the Russian camp at Herat in December (he had, according to Masson, no real authority to support him, and could only have been acting as a spy on Burnes) was a source of much agitation; but nothing whatever appears to have eventuated from his residence in Kabul, except grave risk to himself. Masson never believed in the dangers arising from either Persian or Russian intrigue (and he was certainly in a position to judge), and he remarks about Vektavitch "that such a man could have been expected to defeat a British mission is too ridiculous a notion to be entertained; nor would his mere appearance have produced such a result had not the mission itself been set forth without instructions for its guidance, and had it not been conducted recklessly, and in defiance of all common sense and decorum." This, indeed, is the attitude assumed by Masson throughout towards the mission, although he was still in the service of the Indian Government and acting under Burnes.

Burnes certainly seems to have behaved with great want of dignity in the presence of the Amir and his Sirdars; making obeisance, and addressing the Amir as if he were a dependant. Nor can his private arrangements and his method of living in Kabul be commended as those of a dignified agent. European manners and customs were looser in those days in India than they are now, but with all latitude for the autres temps autres moeurs excuse for his conduct, his ideas of Eastern life seem to have been almost too oriental even for the approval of the dissolute Afghan. Certain it is that no proposal made by him on his own responsibility to the Amir (especially as regards the cession of Peshawar on the death of Ranjit Singh) was supported by his Government, and time after time he enjoyed the humiliation of being obliged to eat his own words. On these occasions it would appear that Masson seldom omitted the opportunity of saying "I told you so."

In the interests of geographical explorations, this mission of Burnes was important. Whatever else he was, there is no question that he was as keen a geographical observer as Masson himself, and even if the wisdom of the despatch of his assistants (Lieut. Leech to Kandahar, and Dr. Lord with Lieut. Wood to Badakshan) may be questioned on political grounds, it led to a series of remarkable explorations, some of which even now furnish authority for Afghan map-making.

In May 1837, Lieut. Eldred Pottinger arrived on leave from India (with the interest of his father Sir Henry Pottinger to back him), and immediately made secret preparations for his adventurous journey through the Hazarajat from Kabul to Herat, which terminated in his participation in the defence of Herat against the Persians. Thus was the first authentic account received of the nature of that difficult mountain region which has subsequently been so thoroughly exploited. Afghanistan was just beginning to be known.

Masson naturally disapproved of Pottinger's exploit, for he found himself in hot water owing to the suspicion that he connived at it. He says: "I have always thought that however fortunate for Lieut. Pottinger himself, his trip to Herat was an unlucky one for his country; the place would have been fought as well without him; and his presence, which would scarcely be thought accidental, although truly it was so, must not only have irritated the Persian King, but have served as a pretext for the more prominent exertions of the Russian staff. It is certain that when he started from Kabul he had no idea that the city would be invested by a Persian army." Colonel Stoddart was then the British agent in the Persian Camp.

Incidentally it may be useful to note the results of the occupation of Seistan about this time by an Afghan army under Shah Kamran, Governor of Herat and brother to Dost Mahomed; the one brother, in fact, whom he feared the most. Kamran's army had threatened Kandahar in the early spring and had spread into Seistan. Here the cavalry horses perished from disease, and the finest force which had marched from Herat for years was placed absolutely hors de combat. Unable to obtain the assistance of the army in the field, the frontier fortress of Ghorian surrendered, and thus reduced Kamran to the necessity of retirement on Herat and sustaining a siege. The destructive climate of Seistan has evidently not greatly changed during the last century.

Masson's view of the policy best adapted to the tangled situation was the surrender of Peshawur to Sultan Mahomed Khan (the Amir's brother), who already enjoyed half its revenues, which would have been an acceptable proposition to the Sikh chief, Ranjit Singh (who found the occupation of Peshawar a most profitless undertaking), and would at the same time have reconciled the chiefs at Kandahar. The Amir Dost Mahomed would have reconciled himself to a situation which he could not avoid and the Indian Government would have enjoyed the credit of establishing order on their frontiers on a tolerably sure basis without committing themselves to any alliance, for (he writes) "my experience has brought me to the decided opinion that any strict alliance with powers so constituted would prove only productive of mischief and embarrassment, while I still thought that British influence might be usefully exerted in preserving the integrity of the several states and putting their rulers on their good behaviour." Subsequent events proved the soundness of these views, but we must remember that Masson wrote "after the event." That he did, however, strongly counsel Burnes to make no promise in the name of his Government of the cession of Peshawar to the Amir on the death of Ranjit Singh, is clear, and it is impossible to say how far the disappointment felt by the Amir at the refusal of the Indian Government to ratify this promise may have affected his subsequent actions. Masson thinks that Burnes should have been recalled, but he admits the difficulty that beset him owing to want of instructions. "The folly of sending such a man as Captain Burnes without the fullest and clearest instructions was now shown," etc. etc. It is surprising that with his confidence in the ability of his immediate Chief so absolutely destroyed, he should have continued to serve under him.

Finally, on April 26, Burnes and Masson left Kabul together in a hurry and were subsequently joined by Lord and Wood, and "thus closed a mission, one of the most extraordinary ever sent forth by a Government, whether as to the singular manner in which it was conducted, or as to the results." Shortly after Masson resigned an appointment under the Government of India which he stigmatises as "disagreeable and dishonourable." It was a pity that he held it so long.

When Masson reached India he found that the Government had already decided to restore the refugee Shah Sujah to the throne of Kabul, and that a military expedition to Kandahar had been arranged. What he has to say about the manner of this arrangement and the nature of the influence brought to bear on Lord Auckland to bring it about is not more pleasant reading than is his story of the Kabul Mission. This tale, indeed, does not belong to the history of exploration any further than to indicate under what conditions the first military geographical knowledge of Farther Afghanistan was gained by such true explorers as Pottinger, Lord, and Wood; and what amount of actually new information was attained by Burnes' mission. This was very considerable, as we shall see when we follow Burnes' assistants into the field. Meanwhile we have not quite done with Masson.

The closing incidents of the career of this remarkable man, as an explorer, call for little more comment. Once again, in the year preceding the disastrous termination to our first occupation of Kabul, did he make Karachi and Sonmiani his base of departure for a fresh venture in behalf of archÆological research in Afghanistan. It was his intention to proceed to Kandahar and Kabul, but his plans were frustrated by as remarkable a series of incidents as could well have barred the progress of any traveller. The Government of India, instigated by reports which (according to Masson) were the results of local intrigue and were palpably false, considered itself justified in an expedition to Kalat and the deposition of its Brahui chief, Mehrab Khan. This expedition was successfully carried out by General Wiltshire, and Mehrab Khan was killed in the defence of his citadel. Subsequently a British agent, Lieut. Loveday, was appointed to Kalat, and Masson found him there on his arrival from Sonmiani. Masson's description of him and of his crude political methods is not flattering, and his weak surrender of Kalat to the badly armed Brahui rabble who attacked the place in the interests of the late Khan's son was certainly disgraceful. That surrender, which was only wiped out by Nott's advance on Kalat, and the final suppression of the Brahui revolt, cost Loveday his life, and placed Masson in deadly peril. He, however, succeeded in reaching Quetta, where Captain Bean was in political charge; but this officer not only put him into confinement but treated him with positive barbarity.

It is difficult to understand the political view of Masson's existence in Baluchistan. If any man was capable of unriddling the network of intrigue that occupied all the Baluch chiefs at this time, or could bring anything of personal influence to bear on them, it was undoubtedly Masson, and something of his history was at any rate known. But he had resigned service under the Indian Government as "disagreeable and dishonourable," and his reappearance at a time when all Baluchistan was in the ferment of seething revolt was perhaps regarded with suspicion. It is also quite conceivable that the local political officer regarded him simply as an interloping loafer, and, until he became better acquainted with Masson's character and ability, would be no more likely to pay him attention than would any political officer on the frontier to-day who suddenly found himself confronted with a European in native dress with no valid explanation of his appearance under very ambiguous circumstances. The days were not long past when European loafers of any nationality whatsoever could, and did, find not only service, but distinction, in the courts and armies of native chiefs who were hostile to British interests. One can only gather from Masson's strange story that there was no officer in the British political service at that time with intuition sufficient to enable him to appraise the situation correctly, or make use of other experience than his own.

Here, however, we must leave Masson. As an explorer in Afghanistan he stands alone. His work has never been equalled; but owing to the very unsatisfactory methods adopted by all explorers in those days for the recording of geographical observations it cannot be said that his contribution to exact geographical knowledge was commensurate with his extraordinary capacity as an observant traveller, or his remarkable industry.

It is as a critic on the political methods of the Government of India that Masson's records are chiefly instructive. Hostile critics of Indian administrative methods usually belong to one of two classes. They are either uninformed, notoriety-seeking demagogues playing to a certain party gallery at home, or they are disappointed servants of the Government, by whom they consider that their merits have been overlooked. To this latter class it must be conceded that Masson belonged, in spite of his expressed contempt for government service. Thus the virulence of his attacks on the ignorance and fatuity of the political officials with whom he was brought in contact must be freely discounted, because of the obvious animus which pervades them. Still it is to be feared there is too much reason to believe that private interest was the recommendation which carried most weight in the appointment of unfledged officers, both civil and military, to political duty on the Indian frontier. These gentlemen took the field without experience, and without that which might to a certain extent take the place of experience, viz. an education in the main principles both social and economical which govern the conditions of existence of the people with whom they had to deal. A knowledge of political economy, law, and languages is not enough to enable the young administrator to take his place on the frontier, if he knows not enough of the characteristics of the frontier tribes-people to enable him to maintain the dignity of his position. Even physically there are qualifications which are not always regarded as useful, which make for strong influence and good government. A man may be physically powerful enough to use his strength in fair contest to the immense enhancement of his personal prestige, but he must not strike a blow where the blow cannot be returned; and above all he must not endeavour to conciliate by a silly display of obsequious attention, unless he is prepared to sacrifice all his personal influence and destroy the respect due to his office.

Setting aside Masson's sentiments of disgust and horror (which he really felt) that the fate of men should have been placed at the mercy of the political officers in whom, at that time, Lord Auckland was pleased to repose confidence, and his assertions that "on me developed the task to obtain satisfaction for the insults some of these shallow and misguided men thought fit to practise," his own account of the extraordinary complexity of intrigue, and the unfathomable abyss of deceit and crime which distinguished the political field of native Baluchistan, is quite enough to account for much of their failure to deal with the situation. At the same time, it is a strong indication of the necessity for a sounder system of political education than any which now exists. Possibly a time may come when we shall cease to see systems of administration suitable to the plains applied to frontier mountaineers, or, for that matter, the foreign methods of India hammered into the nomadic pastoral peoples of other continents than Asia, where they are wholly inapplicable.