And now began our labors at the Legation, increasing from day to day, until we had thirteen distinct nationalities under our charge, European and South American. Nor was this all. The citizens of other countries—countries which had not formally asked our protection—came to us for assistance. This was particularly the case with Mexico and Roumania. There was a large colony of Mexicans in Paris, and Mexico had no representative in France. The diplomatic relations which were suspended by the Mexican war are still unrenewed, notwithstanding the friendly efforts of our Government. As regards Roumania, its position is peculiar. Nominally it is under the suzerainty of Turkey, and the Turk claims to represent it abroad. But Roumania does not acquiesce in this claim, and appoints its own agents, who are quasi-recognized by the powers to whom they are accredited. There was a large number of Roumanian students in Paris at the outbreak of the war. These young men were left quite destitute during the siege. The French Government behaved very generously by them. At Mr. Washburne's suggestion, it made them a monthly allowance, sufficient for their support.

The French Government had at first decided that no German should leave France to return home. The reason given for this harsh measure was that every German was a soldier, and would go to swell the enemy's ranks. It was very hard on the Germans in France. They were thrown out of employment, insulted, liable to violence, and sometimes assaulted, and, in addition to all this, were treated as insoumis at home, and subject to severe punishment for neglect of military duty. Mr. Washburne remonstrated against this measure, and wrote an able dispatch to the Duke de Gramont, claiming the right of the Germans, under all recognized international law, to leave France if they wished to do so. It was in vain. But now came a change of ministry. The Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Government took precisely the opposite course, and decided to expel the Germans. Again Mr. Washburne intervened, claiming that this was as much a violation of international law as the other course. All he could obtain was, that the decree should be executed with leniency, and that liberal exceptions should be made in individual cases of special hardship. But the French press called for the expulsion of the Germans, and the Corps LÉgislatif passed a resolution that they should be expelled en masse.

As soon as the decree was published in the Journal Officiel, and placarded on the walls of Paris, they came in shoals to the Legation. From seven o'clock in the morning till five in the afternoon, when we closed the office, they fairly besieged us. Five hundred often collected in the street at once. We were compelled, though reluctantly, to ask for the aid of the police, both as a protection to the Germans themselves against the mob, and for our own convenience. We had six gendarmes constantly on duty. It was almost impossible to get up our own stairs, and Americans who had business at the Legation complained of the impossibility of getting in. I found a side-entrance through a neighbor's apartment, of which I revealed the secret to some of my countrymen.

The French Government required that every German leaving Paris should be furnished with a pass from us. At Mr. Washburne's request they dispensed with the police visa, and so simplified matters. But there were forty thousand Germans in Paris; of these about thirty thousand went away. Allowing three persons to each pass, for many had families, we issued about three thousand passes in six weeks. Many needed assistance to enable them to leave Paris. The Prussian Government, with great liberality, put fifty thousand thalers (thirty-seven thousand five hundred dollars) at our disposition, and this sum they afterward increased. We gave those who needed them railroad tickets to the frontier of Germany and Belgium; there the German Government took charge of them, or rather a charitable organization under the presidency of the Empress Augusta, who showed the most unwearying devotion in good works during the whole war. Eight or ten thousand remained in Paris during the siege. Of those at least one-third came upon the Legation for support, unwillingly in most cases, and driven by necessity.

But while the Germans thus thronged our office, our own countrymen were not wanting. In six weeks we issued eleven hundred passports. Allowing an average of three persons to a passport, thirty-three hundred Americans passed through Paris in those six weeks. To these may be added another thousand who had passports from the State Department. The question has often been asked me, How many Americans do you suppose are in Europe? If to the above forty-three hundred we add seventeen hundred for those who remained quietly where the war found them, or procured their passports at other legations, we have six thousand souls. At that time this was the average number of our people temporarily in Europe. There are fewer now.

On the 28th of July the Emperor started for the seat of war. He took with him his Centgardes and a numerous staff. Nothing can be worse for an army than to be encumbered with a large head-quarters staff. It involves an immense amount of transportation, blocking up the roads, and interfering with the march of the troops. Every thing must give way to head-quarters trains, even supplies for the soldiers and ammunition for the guns. This naturally breeds discontent, and interferes with the efficiency of the army. A staff should consist of the fewest possible number of working men, and they should be restricted, like the line, to a limited amount of baggage. Sherman gave an example of what a staff should be in this respect, on his famous march to the sea.

Meantime rumors of disaster came thick and fast from the front. The French had fought the battle of Wissembourg with great gallantry, but they were outnumbered and outgeneraled. Indeed, it was their misfortune in this war to have no great generals. I was reminded of our own experience when our war broke out, and when we appointed to high command men who had "the Spirit of the Lord, and a disposition to storm works," which Mr. Stanton then declared to be all that was necessary. He lived to change his mind, and to become one of the strongest advocates of trained military talent. Happily for us, the war lasted long enough to enable us to sift the wheat from the chaff. Its close found in high command the very men best fitted to be there. The good sense of our rulers and the tenacity of our people had enabled us to effect this vital change. The French were not so fortunate. Their generals in high command when the war broke out were not equal to the situation, and their armies were defeated and overwhelmed before the officers of ability, who were undoubtedly to be found among them, but in inferior positions, had had the opportunity to show what was in them. For the system of advancement under the Empire was not calculated to bring the best men to the front. I was told during the siege by General Berthaut, now Minister of War, that an officer who studied was looked upon as a republican, and passed over. The road to promotion lay through the cafÉ.

There were bitter rivalries, too, between the corps commanders. It was stated, I do not know with what truth, that repeated messages failed to bring up the supporting corps to MacMahon's assistance. The same thing had happened at Solferino, where, as it was alleged, the battle was nearly lost, because Canrobert would not support Niel. A challenge passed between them, and nothing but the imperative intervention of the Emperor prevented the scandal of a duel.

The defeat at Wissembourg was not published in Paris till several hours after it had appeared in the London morning papers. The press was muzzled. The depression produced was very great. Certain Bourse operators took advantage of the inflammable state of public opinion. One day a man in the uniform of a Government courier rode up to the Bourse, and, calling out his confederate, delivered a dispatch purporting to come from the front: "Great victory; total defeat of the Prussians; capture of the Crown Prince; French army in full march for Berlin!" Up went stocks. The crowd shouted, sung, wept for joy, threw themselves into each other's arms, embraced, and kissed. Popular actors and singers were recognized as they drove through the streets, stopped, and compelled to sing or recite the "Marseillaise." Paris was drunk with joy. Then came the reaction. The truth was soon known. As they had been extreme in their joy, they were now extreme in their grief. They were not only despondent, they were in despair. As the poor Empress said at the time to Mr. Washburne, "They have no for-ti-tude." The crowd collected in the streets, inveighed against the Government, and, in a pouring rain, marched to Ollivier's residence, in the Place VendÔme, and insisted upon his addresing them. Ollivier was then the head of the Government. He had not much to say, but he was an eloquent speaker, and partially pacified them.

But the defeats of the French and their consequent exasperation reacted upon the Germans under our protection. Employers discharged their workmen; those who would gladly have kept them dared not. They lived in constant dread, and the number of those thronging to the Legation to obtain the means of departure increased daily. The suffering, both moral and physical, was very great. It must be borne in mind that many of these people had been settled for years in Paris; that they had married there; their children had been born and had married there; their property and their business interests all lay there. Yet they were pitilessly expelled, and not only their business interests ruined, but the dearest family ties dissevered. We have heard much in history and romance of the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, and of the Huguenots from France, and our sympathies are deeply stirred as we read of the misery endured by those poor exiles. I do not see why the expulsion of the Germans does not rank with these touching episodes, both in the suffering of the victims and the pathos of their departure.

Of course the French Government did not expel these poor people with the coeur lÉger. They had their reasons. They said that in case of siege there would be additional mouths to feed, and that it would be a constant source of danger to have so many Germans residing in their midst. But at that time a siege was not anticipated; and, except in this case, there surely could have been no danger in their stay.

There were touching scenes at the Legation among the weeping crowd of women. Some left children and grandchildren married to Frenchmen. Some were not in a fit condition to travel, but required the comforts of a home, and tender care. A child was born upon a bench in the street in front of the Legation. (It was suggested to name it after a distinguished American diplomate.) Every thing that energy and kindness of heart could do to facilitate the departure of those poor people, and to mitigate its severity, was done by our minister.

And here let me remark that no one could have been better fitted for the difficult task he was suddenly called upon to undertake than Mr. Washburne. He trusted to the dictates of a sound judgment, a kind heart, and a fearless temperament; and these are pretty safe guides in the long run. Had he been brought up in diplomacy, he would have hesitated and read up for precedents which did not exist, and so let the propitious moment pass. The result of my observation in Europe during ten years of pretty active service is this: that while there should be a permanent officer in every embassy—a chancellier, as he is called in Paris—who can turn promptly to any page of the archives, and is posted in the history of the relations of the country in which he resides with his own; who knows the court ceremonial, and is intimate with the court officials; in short, "who knows the ropes"—it is quite as well that the head of the embassy should be a new man. He will attach much less importance to trifles, and act more fearlessly in emergencies. Great Britain and France have pursued this plan in several instances lately. The old diplomates grumble, but it is clearly for the advantage of the country.

News of reverses now poured in upon us, until they culminated in the great disaster of Sedan. That this should have been so great a calamity—a capitulation instead of a defeat—appears to have been the fault of MacMahon. He was compelled by imperative orders from Paris, and entirely against his own judgment, to go to the relief of Bazaine, and to fight against overwhelming odds. But for the tactical disposition of his forces, by which they were penned up in a cul-de-sac from which they had no line of retreat, he, as commander-in-chief, is apparently responsible. But the French armies seem from the beginning to have been badly organized, badly led, and conscious that they were so, and discouraged accordingly. I have General Sheridan's authority for saying that the position of the French at Sedan was a very strong one; and while it was inevitable that they should be defeated by superior numbers, they ought to have held their ground for three days. I have no doubt that our troops under Sheridan would have done so. He spoke in the highest terms of the gallantry of the French cavalry, which was sacrificed to encourage the infantry. The remark of a distinguished French general upon the Charge of the Six Hundred, "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre," would have applied equally well to the charge of the cuirassiers at Sedan.

Sheridan accompanied the King's head-quarters. We had asked officially, at the commencement of the war, that he might be permitted to accompany the French army, and been refused. The Emperor subsequently told Dr. Evans that he had never heard of the application. General orders had been issued that no foreign officer should go with the army; but there was surely some difference between the application of an officer for this permission on his own account, and the request of a friendly Government that the Lieutenant-General of its armies might be permitted to accompany the Emperor. The application probably never got beyond the chef du cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nowhere in the world is bureaucracy carried to the extent it is in France. A minister can scarcely appoint a clerk in his office. The chef du bureau is omnipotent in his own department. The Republic promised to change all this; but its ministers, after a gallant effort, have fallen in the struggle, and things move on in the same old groove.

At the battle of Sedan, Sheridan stood near Count Bismarck. Toward its close he shut up his glass, and, turning to Bismarck, said, "The battle is won." The Count replied that he should be glad to think so, but saw no signs of it yet. In a minute or two more the French gave way. Turning his glass toward Sedan, Sheridan observed, "The Emperor is there." Bismarck answered that it could not be; that the Emperor was not such a fool as to place himself in that situation. Looking again, Sheridan said, "He is there, anyhow." He had drawn his conclusions from the immense staff he saw, and the confusion reigning among them.

Sheridan was right. The Emperor and his staff were prisoners of war. The Emperor had behaved with the greatest personal courage, and subsequently, when dissensions arose between the French generals as to who was responsible for the great disaster, he behaved with the greatest generosity. But he should not have been at Sedan. The post of usefulness and of danger for him was at Paris, and not with the army.