The history of war teems with occasions where the interception of dispatches and orders written in plain language has resulted in defeat and disaster for the force whose intentions thus became known at once to the enemy. For this reason, prudent generals have used cipher and code messages from time immemorial. The necessity for exact expression of ideas practically excludes the use of codes for military work although it is possible that a special tactical code might be useful for preparation of tactical orders.

It is necessary therefore to fall back on ciphers for general military work if secrecy of communication is to be fairly well assured. It may as well be stated here that no practicable military cipher is mathematically indecipherable if intercepted; the most that can be expected is to delay for a longer or shorter time the deciphering of the message by the interceptor.

The capture of messengers is no longer the only means available to the enemy for gaining information as to the plans of a commander. All radio messages sent out can be copied at hostile stations within radio range. If the enemy can get a fine wire within one hundred feet of a buzzer line or within thirty feet of a telegraph line, the message can be copied by induction. Messages passing over commercial telegraph lines, and even over military lines, can be copied by spies in the offices. On telegraph lines of a permanent nature it is possible to install high speed automatic sending and receiving machines and thus prevent surreptitious copying of messages, but nothing but a secure cipher will serve with other means of communication.

It is not alone the body of the message which should be in cipher. It is equally important that, during transmission, the preamble, place from, date, address and signature be enciphered; but this should be done by the sending operator and these parts must, of course, be deciphered by the receiving operator before delivery. A special operators’ cipher should be used for this purpose but it is difficult to prescribe one that would be simple enough for the average operator, fast and yet reasonably safe. Some form of rotary cipher machine would seem to be best suited for this special purpose.

It is unnecessary to point out that a cipher which can be deciphered by the enemy in a few hours is worse than useless. It requires a surprisingly long time to encipher and decipher a message, using even the simplest kind of cipher, and errors in transmission of cipher matter by wire or radio are unfortunately too common.

Kerckhoffs has stated that a military cipher should fulfill the following requirements:

• 1st. The system should be materially, if not mathematically, indecipherable.
• 2d. It should cause no inconvenience if the apparatus and methods fall into the hands of the enemy.
• 3d. The key should be such that it could be communicated and remembered without the necessity of written notes and should be changeable at the will of the correspondents.
• 4th. The system should be applicable to telegraphic correspondence.
• 5th. The apparatus should be easily carried and a single person should be able to operate it.
• 6th. Finally, in view of the circumstances under which it must be used, the system should be an easy one to operate, demanding neither mental strain nor knowledge of a long series of rules.

A brief consideration of these six conditions must lead to the conclusion that there is no perfect military cipher. The first requirement is the one most often overlooked by those prescribing the use of any given cipher and, even if not overlooked, the indecipherability of any cipher likely to be used for military purposes is usually vastly overestimated by those prescribing the use of it.

If this were not true, there would have been neither material for, nor purpose in, the preparation of these notes. Of the hundreds of actual cipher messages examined by the writer, at least nine-tenths have been solved by the methods to be set forth. These messages were prepared by the methods in use by the United States Army, the various Mexican armies and their secret agents, and by other methods in common use. The usual failure has been with very short messages. Foreign works consulted lead to the belief that many European powers have used, for military purposes, cipher methods which vary from an extreme simplicity to a complexity which is more apparent than real. What effect recent events have had on this matter remains to be seen. It is enough that the cipher experts of practically every European country have appealed to the military authorities of their respective countries time and again to do away with these useless ciphers and to adopt something which offers more security, even at the expense of other considerations.

The cipher of the amateur, or of the non-expert who makes one up for some special purpose, is almost sure to fall into one of the classes whose solution is an easy matter. The human mind works along the same lines, in spite of an attempt at originality on the part of the individual, and this is particularly true of cipher work because there are so few sources of information available. In other words, the average man, when he sits down to evolve a cipher, has nothing to improve upon; he invents and there is no one to tell him that his invention is, in principle, hundreds of years old. The ciphers of the AbbÉ Tritheme, 1499, are the basis of most of the modern substitution ciphers.

In view of these facts, no message should be considered indecipherable. Very short messages are often very difficult and may easily be entirely beyond the possibility of analysis and solution, but it is surprising what can be done, at times, with a message of only a few words.

In the event of active operations, cipher experts will be in demand at once. Like all other experts, the cipher expert is not born or made in a day; and it is only constant work with ciphers, combined with a thorough knowledge of their underlying principles, that will make one worthy of the name.