The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, is merely intended as an introduction to the analytical and far more detailed account of the negotiations and declarations of those days which the reader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine the narrative to a plain statement of the successive stages in the crisis, neither discussing the motives of the several Powers involved, nor distinguishing the fine shades of difference in the various proposals which were made by would-be mediators.

The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the old quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a visit of ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centre of the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the town, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot by assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (supra, p. 54), and who desired that these provinces should be united to Servia.

The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to the conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from a Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the Servian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who provided the pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed from Servia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian customs-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published no proof of these conclusions,[25] but, on July 23, forwarded them to the Servian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, it was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia within forty-eight hours.[26] This ultimatum included a form of apology to be published on a specified date by the Servian Government, and ten engagements which the Servian Government were to give the Austro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of these engagements is explained in the next chapter (pp. 103-7).

On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the other Powers of Europe,[27] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. It was therefore intended to be a public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the 'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power, could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia.[28]

Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with France and Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia could accept some of the Austrian demands.[29] To the Austro-Hungarian Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July 24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges against Servia.[30] On July 25 Russia told England[31] that Servia would punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed to arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy—the four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators.

On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the Servian Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austrian demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points, the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. The Austrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, and criticized its details in an official memorandum.[32] The Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia.

Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England's solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and after July 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France, England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[33] Germany, however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia consented to it.[34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase ordering mobilization,[35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[36] This offer was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[37]

No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28, the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July 29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and July 31.[40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military preparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim 'imminent state of war' (drohende Kriegsgefahr) as a counter measure to the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July 30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thus indicated.[43] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russia that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization against both France and Russia.[44] But on July 27, Russia had explained that her mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian frontier.[45] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to participate in the 'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose of mediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.[46] Germany in fact believed, or professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though not proclaimed, was already far advanced.[47]

On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still in progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31, Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany each took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to France asking what course she would take in the event of war between Germany and Russia.

Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir Edward Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made overtures to England, with the object of securing England's neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. On July 29 Germany offered, as the price of English neutrality, to give assurances that, if victorious, she would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France; but refused to give a similar assurance respecting French colonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality.[48] These proposals were refused by England on July 30.[49] On August 1 the German Ambassador unofficially asked England to remain neutral on condition that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey replied that England's hands were still free, and that he could not promise neutrality on that condition alone.[50]

Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that she would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia.[51] On July 31 the English Cabinet, being asked by France to declare definitely on her side, replied that England could give no pledge at present.[52] On the same day England asked France and Germany to engage to respect Belgian neutrality. France assented, Germany evaded giving a reply.[53] But, on August 2, German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; and England promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked by the German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea.[54] On August 4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed to King George announcing that Germany had demanded passage for her troops through Belgian territory, and appealing to England for help.[55] On the same day, August 4, England sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for assurance, before midnight, that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.[56] This demand was taken at Berlin as equivalent to a declaration of war by England against Germany.

June 28. Assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg.

July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern waters.

July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the Servian crime laid before the Emperor.

July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French army.

July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway Shares, especially by Berlin operators.

July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the Hungarian Chamber, describes war as a sad ultima ratio, 'but every state and nation must be able and willing to make war if it wishes to exist as a state and a nation.'

The Times leading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is commented on in Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia.'

July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule problem.

July 21. The Frankfurter Zeitung warns Austria-Hungary of the folly of its campaign against Servia.

July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving her 48 hours in which to accept.

July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The Austro-Hungarian demands considered as an indirect challenge to Russia.—Strike at St. Petersburg.

Failure of the conference on Home Rule.

July 25. Saturday. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory by Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave Belgrade.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of time-limit allowed to Servia.

Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg.—Serious riot in Dublin.

July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications.

Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered.

Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.

Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night.

July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a conference. German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a 'conference.'

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres.

Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning the attitude of Great Britain.

The Times Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser returned this afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam.

July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia.

Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the Servian reply.

The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar.

July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.

Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise territorial integrity of France, but will not extend the same assurance for French colonies.

Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not necessarily stand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace failed.

Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain indifferent.

The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser; the latter replies.

July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hungarian forces.

The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the gravity of the situation, and postpones discussion of the Home Rule Amending Bill.

The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser.

July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered.

Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect neutrality of Belgium.

France promises to respect Belgian neutrality; Germany is doubtful whether any answer will be returned to this request.

Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its ultimatum to Servia.

Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar.

Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her mobilization should cease within 12 hours.

Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define her attitude in case of a Russo-German war.

English bankers confer with the Government about the financial situation.

Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of English ships at Hamburg.

Orders issued for general mobilization of French army.

Orders issued for general mobilization of German army.

Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg.

Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet will protect the North Coast of France against the German fleet.

Germans enter French territory near Cirey.

Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other members of the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive war.

Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium.

Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of Commons.

Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory.

Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer by midnight.

The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, practically announcing war against Germany and explaining the British position.

Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.

Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his passport.

Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.

Notes:[Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in the German version of the German White Book (pp. 28-31) from an Austrian official publication of July 27. We print the extracts (the original not being accessible in this country) in Appendix IV.][Footnote 26: Full text infra in Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 18-23); more correctly in Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, No. 4, Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but the differences between the two versions are immaterial for our present purpose.][Footnote 27: See the communication to England in Correspondence, No. 4.][Footnote 28: Correspondence, No. 9, Note communicated by the German Ambassador, July 24.][Footnote 29: Correspondence, No. 6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.][Footnote 30: Correspondence, No. 13, Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.][Footnote 31: Correspondence, No. 17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 25.][Footnote 32: For text of Servian note see infra Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 23-32). The Austrian comments also are given there.][Footnote 33: Correspondence, No. 42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 27; ibid. No. 49, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.][Footnote 34: Correspondence, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.][Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46 (infra in Appendix I). The Tsar to His Majesty, July 30.][Footnote 36: Correspondence, No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey.][Footnote 37: Austria declined conversations on July 28 (Correspondence, No. 93); but for conversations of July 31 see Correspondence, No. III; of August I, see Appendix V.][Footnote 38: Correspondence, No. 70 (I). M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, July 28.][Footnote 39: Correspondence, No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 28.][Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43, 45 (in Appendix I, infra).][Footnote 41: Correspondence, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.][Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42, Exhibit 17 (infra, Appendix I).][Footnote 43: Correspondence, No. 105 (Enclosure 3), July 30.][Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7; the date of the warning seems to be July 27.][Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40, Exhibit II.][Footnote 46: Ibid. p. 9.][Footnote 47: Ibid. p. 10.][Footnote 48: Correspondence, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.][Footnote 49: Ibid. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.][Footnote 50: Correspondence, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 1.][Footnote 51: Ibid. No. 105. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30.][Footnote 52: Ibid. No. 119. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.][Footnote 53: Ibid. No. 114, 120, 122.][Footnote 54: Ibid. No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2.][Footnote 55: Ibid. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4.][Footnote 56: Ibid. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4]