1. Sirdar Sher Ali Khan Kandahari, Governor of Candahar, assured Sir Donald Stewart that Yakub Khan, from the first, never intended to pardon the chiefs who had aided us. Such a course of policy would have seemed madness in the eyes of every Afghan, said the Sirdar; not a man would have understood it.

2. This telegram is of some importance, as showing the quickness with which the Viceroy and the military authorities recognized the necessity of seizing the Shutargardan before the Cabul troops or the local tribesmen could occupy the Pass in strength.

3. On October 14th, at Cabul, the returns were:—Mules, 1,973; camels, 675; bullocks, 604; and 230 yabus (ponies purchased in Cabul).

4. Breastworks built with stones, greatly in vogue in Afghanistan.

5. Received a commission for this and other acts of bravery.

6. This expectation was a very fair one at the time, but the inevitable transport difficulties occurred and the halt had to be called.

7. A son of Dost Mahomed Khan, and therefore uncle of Yakub Khan.

8. The Shutargardan was held by the 3rd Sikhs and 21st Punjab Infantry with four guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery. Colonel Money of the 3rd Sikhs was in command.

9. This will show the difficulties General Roberts had to contend with, even in the few marches from Kushi to Cabul. The transport train was, as usual, the weakest link in the chain, and everything had to be made subservient to it.

10. Forty daughters.

11. It should be noted that no cavalry accompanied General Baker. A similar mistake was made on several other occasions later on. Our infantry lacked the immediate support of cavalry to make defeats decisive.

12. As I have, perhaps, scarcely done justice to this incident in my letter, I now quote the General’s despatch on the subject:—“One party, bolder than the rest, caused so much annoyance to a picquet of the 92nd Highlanders, that it became necessary to dislodge them, and this difficult service was performed in a most gallant manner by a small party of the 92nd under Lieutenant R. A. Grant. Colour-Sergeant Hector Macdonald, a non-commissioned officer, whose excellent and skilful management of a small detachment when opposed to immensely superior numbers in the Hazara-Darukht defile, was mentioned in my despatch of the 15th instant, here again distinguished himself.” Colour-Serjeant Macdonald afterwards received a commission in the 92nd.

13. Seven of the wounded men afterwards died.

14. General Massy’s withdrawal of his patrols was severely criticized, and capital was afterwards made out of it by the military authorities in India. As showing how utterly helpless the troopers would have been in the darkness to check an enemy, I may quote my own experience. On the morning of the 9th I rode from General Massy’s force to join General Baker, taking an Afghan guide and two sowars as escort. Innumerable watercourses had to be jumped, and both sowars were left behind in the ditches. My horse had nearly to swim one stream, and the strain and toil of climbing up the banks were such that I lost even the felt numdah from under my saddle. The willow-trees lining the stream were also great obstacles to horses and men, even in daylight.

15. It was not made known until afterwards that Yakub Khan had placed his resignation in the hands of Sir F. Roberts.

16. Literally, “Red-heads,” from the colour of their turbans.

17. The casualties were proved to be eventually twelve killed and seven wounded: among the former were the subadar-major and the four pay-havildars.

18. This intention was, unfortunately, never carried out owing to the outbreak in December.

19. The members of the Commission were Brigadier General Massy (President), Major Moriarty, Bengal Staff Corps, and Captain Guinness, 72nd Highlanders.

20. This expectation proved only too well-founded.

21. An officer wrote at the time:—“In the evening the enemy sent in five confidential men to say that, of course, we must now give in, that two regiments could not hold out an hour, but they were willing to allow us to leave the Shutargardan and to provide us with carriages and hostages; we to be at liberty to retire to Ali Kheyl or to Cabul, and for this consideration we were to pay them two lakhs. Poor Allahaddin Khan was at his wits’ end.”

22. It has since been ruled that the treasure is not to be considered prize-money. Abdur Rahman, upon his accession to the Amirship, was given 19½ lakhs of rupees, of whichwhich 9½ will appear in the accounts as “refunded to the Afghan Government.” This was the sum found in Cabul as detailed above.

23. The word “Kotal” is applied usually where the road passes over a hill, instead of through it; “Pass” being used in the latter case.

24. One maund = 40 seers = 80 lbs.

25. Afterwards killed on the Asmai Heights on December 14th.

26. Contrary to expectation, no such narrative has ever been published.

27. This is a plain statement of the foray in the Darra Narkh, and our indignation was greatly aroused afterwards by seeing sensational articles in English papers describing how old men, women, and children were turned out to die in the snow. There were no old men, women, and children seen, and no snow. There were forty or fifty other villages in which they had taken refuge long before we arrived.

28. I may here state that Yakub Khan made the journey to Peshawur without incident; the rapidity of his movements preventing any tribal combination being formed with the object of attempting his rescue.

29. General Baker nearly fell a victim to Afghan treachery at Beni-Badam. He visited the village with twenty or thirty troopers of the 9th Lancers, leaving his infantry on the Ghazni Road, 2½ miles away. The villagers brought out milk and fruit for the officers, and provided corn and forage for the horses, protesting their friendship loudly. General Baker noticed that only old men seemed in the village, but did not suspect treachery until suddenly two large bodies of armed men, with banners flying, were seen rushing down the hill to cut off his retreat. The troopers had to skirmish on foot with their carbines, and after a sharp fight the General managed to rejoin his infantry. The next day he destroyed the village.

30. These were Sergeant-Instructor of Musketry Salmond, Sergeant Cox, Private McIveen and Private Bonar.

31. The Chaplain of the Force, the Rev. —— Adams, was recommended for the Victoria Cross for extricating one man, under a heavy fire.

32. For this he was strongly recommended for the Victoria Cross.

33. Missing.

34. One missing.

35. This was the view taken by Colonel Macgregor, Chief of the Staff.

36. The plan here suggested was afterwards carried out.

37. I may here state that both these expeditions were afterwards carried out, and their object attained.

38. I have not gone at length into the question of General Massy’s recall, as there were too many points involved for the case to be treated in a work of this kind, which is only a diary of the war. I may state, however, that General Massy was given a brigade command in India, which he still retains.

39. At Abdur Rahman’s request all the forts, &c., were left intact when Sir Donald Stewart left Cabul in August.

40. This was the policy Lord Lytton intended to carry out.

41. The Afghans cannot, of course, be expected to understand the principle of party-government at home; the defeat of the Conservative party and the recall of Lord Lytton put an end to such ideas as the retention of Candahar and the maintenance of the scientific frontier. Our change of policy was misunderstood generally in Afghanistan, where, to this day, it is believed we were too weak to carry out our original plans.

42. 1 Co. 2-60th and 1 Co. 25th P.N.I. were on left of G-4, I Co. 19th P.N.I. between G-4 and A. H., R.H.A.

43. The fine was never levied.

44. It will be seen from this that the evacuation of Cabul was decided upon long before the Maiwand disaster was made known.

45. General Gough’s brigade had moved into Koh-Daman in consequence of the turbulence of the Safis.

46. The news of the Maiwand disaster reached Sir Donald Stewart on July 29th, the first telegram speaking of the “annihilation” of General Burrows’ brigade. Later telegrams showed that the defeat, while serious enough, was not so terrible as at first reported. The news was kept as secret as possible, as it was feared that the negotiations with Abdur Rahman might be delayed if the new complications in Southern Afghanistan were made known.

47. The old moollah kept his word and took a prominent part in the ceremonies attending Abdur Rahman’s coronation.

48. Major White was recommended for the Victoria Cross for his gallantry on this occasion.

49. Six hundred and forty-nine bodies were afterwards buried on the Candahar side of the Pir Paimal Ridge. The enemy’s total loss must have been about 1,200 killed, and a large number wounded.

50. On August 3rd General Primrose informed Colonel St. John that, acting under the advice of his brigadiers, he assumed chief political authority.

51. The withdrawal of the original supports before General Brooke’s party had left the village was the fatal mistake of the day.

52. This, according to the statement of Ayub’s colonel of artillery (now a prisoner in our hands), was really Ayub’s plan. He meant to reach Sinjuri by forced marches.

53. In justice to Colonel St. John, I must say that I have since learned that he reported later in the day, to General Burrows, that the whole of Ayub’s army was at Sangbur. This report was disregarded for the following reason: A British officer of the 3rd Scind Horse stated that he had visited Sangbur that day with a cavalry patrol, and that only a few irregulars were found there. Colonel St. John’s information was quite correct, as our prisoners told us after the battle of Candahar. What village did the officer really reconnoitre?

54. Major-General Greaves, Adjutant-General in India, in his remarks upon General Burrows’ despatch, points out how fatal it was to form up with both flanks en l’air before an enemy vastly superior in numbers.

55. Brigadier Nuttall commanding the cavalry says in his despatch: “I ordered the cavalry to form line, and by a charge stem the rush of ghazis on the infantry; but I bitterly regret to have to record that although I was most ably seconded by the officers, only portions of the 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Scind Horse formed up, and we charged, but the men bearing away to the right and rear, the charge was not delivered home, and was but of little effect. All subsequent attempts made at this time by myself and the officers to induce the men to rally and face the enemy failed. The men seemed totally demoralized by the combined effects of the very heavy artillery fire which had, during the action, killed and wounded 149 of the horses, and about fourteen per cent. of the men engaged in the front. There was now nothing left but to fall back on the rearguard, which had advanced a short way towards us, but it was not till we reached the four guns Royal Horse Artillery, brought out of action by Captain Slade, that the men, through the exertions of the officers, staff and myself, were formed up facing the enemy.”

56. The 3rd Scind Horse only lost fourteen men killed and five wounded out of 260 men: they had forty-nine horses killed and wounded. There were thus always over 200 sabres available for a charge in this regiment alone, but the men were out of hand.