The Defences of Canada.

In February and March, 1865, I spoke in the House of Commons on the general question of the defences of Canada; and, also, on the special vote (carried by a majority of 235) of 50,000_l_. for the fortifications of Quebec. The first of these speeches was delivered on the 13th March, 1865; the second on the 23rd March. On the second occasion I was followed by Lord Palmerston; and I commend his speech, pithy and decisive as it was, to the statesmen who have to deal with our Imperial relations with Canada, and with her Canadian Pacific Railway.

"Hansard" reports that,—

"Mr. WATKIN said that having, like the right hon. gentleman the member for Calne, visited Canada not once but frequently, he felt unable to corroborate the description given of Quebec; nor could he agree as to what had been said of other places. The fortifications of Quebec were not those of the days of Wolfe; they had been systematically enlarged and strengthened. Quebec, naturally a position of enormous strength, was now most efficiently fortified, and so far from the nature of the surrounding country exposing it to attack, that country presented features enabling the speedy and easy construction of additional works rendering the fortress impregnable. In fact, it might easily be made the strongest work upon the continent. Nor was it fair to say, as the gallant member opposite had declared, that the guns were all antiquated and the gun-carriages rotten. It was true that many of the guns were old, but newer ordnance had been supplied; there were abundant stores of shot, shell, and rockets, and a considerable number of Armstrong guns had been received at the citadel very recently. Canada could be made capable of defence, without difficulty, though, of course, not without cost. No one would contend that the defence of Canada, if an Imperial duty, was simply an Imperial liability. Every one would admit that the colony should contribute, both in times of peace and of war, its fair share of the burden. Independence and defence were co-existent ideas, and Canada, desiring to be free of foreign control, should, and he hoped would, be ready to defray her just and honest share of the burden. He took this as admitted on all hands and on both sides of the Atlantic. His objection, then, to the proposal of the Government was that it was not worthy of that emergency which alone could justify the policy of the fortification of a frontier. But the question really before the House was not one of the extent of territory to defend, but plainly this—Was this House, was the country, ready to abandon—to alienate for ever from the British Crown—the vast expanse of territory lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans? There was no half-way house between 'cutting the painter,' as one or two hon. gentlemen near him now and then suggested, in conversation only, as regarded Canada, and severing all connection, now and for ever, with Prince Edward's Island, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Canada, on the east; British Columbia, one of the most thriving and hopeful of the British possessions, on the west; and that vast intermediate country known as the 'Hudson's Bay Territory,' which they were told contained within itself fertile land enough to sustain 50,000,000 of people—and holding on to the Queen's possessions. Hon. gentlemen near him should remember their geography a little, and they would cease to speak of Canada as more than a section of that northern continent over which the Queen of Great Britain ruled, and which comprised an area larger than that of the Federal and Confederate States put together. Now what was that great property? He could not describe it better than in the language of the United States. If the House would refer to the report on the Reciprocity Treaty laid before the House of Representatives at Washington in 1862 by Mr. Ward, they would find a glowing description of the vast extent, the wonderful means of internal navigation, the richness of mineral resources, the bracing healthiness of climate, and the immense extent of fertile soil which British North America contained. The report said:—'The great and practical value of the British North American Provinces and possessions is seldom appreciated. Stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, they contain an area of at least 3,478,380 square miles—more than is owned by the United States, and not much less than the whole of Europe, with its family of nations.' And, again, it said—'The climate and soil of these Provinces and possessions, seemingly less indulgent than those of tropical regions, are precisely those by which the skill, energy, and virtues of the human race are best developed. Nature there demands thought and labour from man as conditions of his existence, and yields abundant rewards to a wise industry.' Indeed, the warmth of language used irresistibly suggested the idea that the people of the United States, with whom the love of territory was a passion, were disposed to cast a covetous eye upon these possessions of old England. Now, knowing something of America, he must express his belief that there was no very imminent danger of war with the United States. The issues of peace and war, however, depended upon the attitude of that House and of the country. Weakness never promoted peace, and an uncertain and half- hearted attitude was provocative of war. This country had, he believed, the desire to preserve its power and influence on the American continent. It was for the good of mankind that the rule of the British Crown and the influence of the wisely-regulated liberty of Britain and of the British Constitution should continue. The way to prevent war was not to talk of severing the connection with Canada or of withdrawing our troops from Canada for fear they should be caught in a net, but to announce boldly but calmly, in language worthy of the traditions of that House, that these vast American possessions are integral parts of the great British Empire, and come weal, come woe, would be defended to the last. If that language were held there would be no war in America. The only danger arose from impressions produced by speeches in that House and elsewhere, leading to the belief that we were indifferent to our duties or our interests on the American Continent; for we had duties as well as interests. Those who thus spoke—humanitarians by profession—could support the continuance of a war which, in his humble opinion, disgraced the civilization of our time; and, while professing to be Liberals, they were ready to thrust out from our Imperial home of liberty the populations of some of our most important possessions to satisfy some imaginary economical theory of saving. They spoke of the Empire as if it were this mere island, and they seemed enchanted with the idea of narrowing our boundaries everywhere. That was not a question of simple arithmetic, it was a question of empire; not a question of a single budget, but a question of the future destiny of our race. These gentlemen seemed to prefer to live in a small country. For his part, he hoped he should all his life live in a great one. No country could be stationary without becoming stagnant, or restrict its natural progress without inviting its decay. It was so in all human affairs; it was so even in ordinary business. Every man of business knew that if his enterprise ceased to grow bigger, it soon began to dwindle down; and so a country must grow greater or else must slide away to weakness, until at last it would be despised. Now the Government proposed to spend 50,000_l_. at Quebec; 50,000_l_., he repeated, was really nothing if it were necessary to carry out the fortification policy at all. He had two objections to make. One was, that Quebec was not the vulnerable point; that point was Montreal. Montreal was the key to Canada. Once holding that key, the enemy would cut Canada in two—would separate Upper and Lower Canada from each other. Yet the Government proposed to leave all that to the unaided resources of Canada—to do nothing, in fact, where, if action were necessary at all, that action was pressing and imperative. He should deplore to see this country commencing and carrying on a competition of expenditure on fortifications with the United States. The results must be, as he warned the House, excessive votes of money, of which this one was only the small beginning, and an entire change in the nature of those relations which had so happily subsisted between the United States and the British North American possessions. Let the House remember the case of France. England and France had for years been running a race of competition of this kind. If France raised a new regiment, or added a new ship of war, or built an ironclad, or erected a fortress, we must do the same. And thus it had been that the forces still remained on a measure of some sort of equality, notwithstanding a vast outlay, which had crippled the resources of both countries, and here at home had delayed fiscal reform and retarded, nay even prevented, the most obvious measures for the elevation and education of our people. Were we to play the same game over again with the States? Now, as regards the great lakes and water ways of America, possessing a coast line of above 3,000 miles, we had since 1817 neutralized these waters as regards armaments. Under that truly blessed arrangement, the sound of a hostile shot, or even of a shot fired for practice, had never been heard now for nearly half a century. Here was a precedent of happy history and worthy of all gratitude and of all imitation. Now, if they were to fortify, let it be done adequately, whatever the cost. That cost would, he repeated, be great and also uncertain. Now he would venture to make a suggestion to the Government. It was to try negociation. Place before the minds of American statesmen the neutralization of the lakes and ask if the frontiers could not be neutralized also. Was it not possible that if Her Majesty's Government took Brother Jonathan in a quiet mood, he might be disposed to save his own pocket and thereby to save ours, and unite with us to set a bright example to surrounding nations? The people of the United States had their faults and we had ours; but they were distinguished by their common sense. No people had more of it. This suggestion would, he thought, come home to it; for they would argue, if we lay out millions so will the British, and, after all, it is merely adding burdens to both and not really strength or dignity to either. Let the Government try. If they failed the trial would have shown them to be just and in the right. If they succeeded how happy would it be for us. Reference had been made by the right hon. gentleman to the fortifications at New York, Boston, and Portland; but no one had mentioned a very strong work within forty miles of Montreal itself. He had seen that work. It was called 'Fort Montgomery,' and there was a railway all the way from it to Montreal. It was now very strong. He believed it had embrasures for some 200 guns. All the time this war had been going on, this work had been going on also. Now this looked like menace. Our Government had been informed about it, but he failed to find that they had made any representation to Washington. Surely they might have said, and would have been justified in saying to a friendly nation—'If you must have 200 guns 40 miles from Montreal, we must have 250 at Montreal; and whatever you do, we must imitate—therefore, why should either of us lay out our money?' But Government had done nothing; and now, before attempting any negociation, they asked the House to agree to make fortifications. He had humbly offered a suggestion to the Government. Let them take one of two decided courses. Let them deal firmly and wisely with the question. Let them state, in no spirit of offence, to the United States that, as Canada was part of the British Empire, we would defend it at all cost; or let them endeavour to induce the Government of Washington to distinguish itself for ever by adopting the alternative—the neutralization of the lakes and the avoidance of hostile fortifications on both sides of the frontier."

The second speech is reported as follows:

"Mr. WATKIN, member for Stockport, said, that he felt concerned to hear the United States so often spoken of in the debate as 'the enemy;' and if he thought that the vote before the committee would in any manner increase international irritation, he should regret his vote in favour of the proposition of the Government. As it was, he felt that he could not quite agree with the policy the vote indicated. That policy was one of armament against an enemy. The proposition, in his opinion, went either too far or not far enough. It did not go far enough to inspire undoubted confidence and to deter attack by providing for absolute defence; and still it went far enough to raise suspicion and to excite or to aggravate a frontier feeling. But he thought that our actual relations with the United States were guiding considerations in reference to the policy of this vote. Government ought, therefore, to tell the House how far they could repeat the peaceful assurances of a former debate. Did the despatches by the mail just arrived tend towards peace or misunderstanding? Was it true, on one side, that formal notice had a few days ago been given to our Government by the United States to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty? and was it true that that notice had been entirely unaccompanied by any overture or suggestion for a re- discussion of the question? On the other and more friendly side, was it true that the vexatious passport system had been abrogated? and, above all, was it also true that the Government of Washington had expressed to Her Majesty's Government their intention to revoke the notice to terminate the arrangement of 1817, and to place gunboats on the great American lakes? If this was true, and if it should also appear that the notice to put an end to the Reciprocity Treaty had either not yet been given or had been accompanied by some friendly declaration of a desire to negociate anew, the House must receive the intelligence with satisfaction; but should it, unfortunately, be the fact that non- intercourse regulations were maintained, that the lakes were to be covered by armaments, and that international trade was to be interfered with, then he thought the House would consider the question as one affecting a hostile neighbour, whose unfriendly designs had to be met by preparation. He hoped, therefore, that the right hon. gentleman would give the House all the information at his command. Had he been in possession of all the facts, he should have been disposed to move as an amendment that it was inexpedient to consider a vote of money for the construction of fortifications adjoining the United States frontier until negociations had been undertaken and had failed, with a view to the suspension of such works under treaty obligation. He was strongly in favour of negociation. There was an example and precedent in the arrangement of 1817 for the neutralization of the lakes. That peaceful compact had endured for fifty years, and had alike saved the expense and obviated the dangers attending rival navies on the great internal waters of America. It was self-evident that we must either fortify efficiently or let it alone. The United States could not fail to see that if they laid out large sums on permanent works of defence, we must do the same; while if we voted money, they must follow us. And thus while both countries made themselves poorer in the process, neither became much stronger, because a sort of equilibrium of forces would after all be maintained. The Government at Washington surely had no present desire to enter upon a race of expenditure for military works on both sides of the frontier. If they had, the sooner we knew it the better, for then the House would only have one course, however they might deplore it, to pursue. But here was a case where the common sense of the American people could, he thought, be appealed to not in vain. Instead of fortifying, let us neutralize the frontier—let us agree to do away with the expenditure. [Mr. BRIGHT: On both sides the frontier?] Yes, on both sides. If the American people were appealed to as the hon. member for Rochdale appealed to the Emperor of the French in favour of the French treaty, he believed that similar earnestness and tact could bring about an arrangement. The Government at Washington would thereby set an example to all countries having long frontier lines, and a precedent would be established of inestimable value to the world. What could be more deplorable than to substitute for neutrality and the operation of the Reciprocity Treaty an armed frontier and practical non-intercourse? He had before stated, from much personal observation on the spot, that border feeling and jealousy had hardly an existence as between the people of our possessions, and of the United States; but so soon as rival fortresses, frowned at each other on both sides of the line, and an armed truce were, so to speak, established, all the feelings and prejudices of separate nationality would grow up in abundance. The free exchanges of industry would, perhaps, be at the same time arrested, and war itself might not be impossible. The Reciprocity Treaty practically made the people of the United States and of the British North American possessions, each living under a totally different form of government, one for all purposes of trade and intercourse. Why should they be separated? But unfortunately our Government did not appreciate the value of, or they did not appear disposed to undertake, negociations. Instead of endeavouring to come to some friendly understanding first, they came down to the House and asked for a vote of money, enough to change the aspect of discussion with the United States, but not enough to effectually protect from danger. They would spend money first, he supposed, and then negotiate; they would allow some great evil to happen, and remonstrate afterwards. The difficulties in Canada might have been avoided by previous precaution. The threatened notice to put an end to the treaty, which grew out of those difficulties, might have been avoided by a renewal of the engagement two years ago. But the Government had done nothing. They had been—how many months?—without a Minister at Washington at the most critical period of our relations with the United States. Now it was proposed to send out a gentleman of many attainments, but who certainly was not of the first order of diplomatists. Was he gone? [Mr. BRIGHT: They say he goes to-morrow.] His hon. friend the member for Birmingham said he was to leave to-morrow. Hitherto all the interests of this country had been left in the hands of Mr. Burnley, who, if only from his position, was not able to meet on equal terms the able men of whom Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet was composed. Ever since the 17th December a vexatious system of passports and consular regulations as to merchandize had been in force. These regulations were probably in force now. They had seriously impeded trade, produced uncertainty and alarm, and great losses to individuals. They had also created great exasperation; yet during all this time we had no ambassador at Washington. Since he entered the House, a letter, by the mail just in, had been placed in his hands, and he would, with the permission of the House, read an extract from it. The writer, under date Portland, March 11th, says:—'Some eighteen passengers, per "Belgian," arrived here without passports for Canada. The United States Government, by order of General Dix, has detained them, and sent a squad of soldiers to guard them on board the "Belgian." At this time of writing they are still in custody, one of them being a clergyman. Only fancy, United States soldiers taking charge of an English ship and English subjects! This is carrying the matter with a high hand.' Now, he did not believe that the Government of the United States had purposely and of malice aforethought committed this outrage, nor did he speak of it to increase irritation; but did it not show how wrong the Government had been in leaving the interests of this country so long without representation? What, in fact, was the use of an embassy at all if our ambassador was not at his post? The Embassy at Washington was now the most important of our diplomatic establishments abroad. We ought to place there the ablest man we could find, regardless of all party or personal considerations. The people of the United States knew our own estimate of our own officials well, and they took it as a slight if we did not send to Washington a man of the first rank as a diplomatist. He would appeal to the noble lord at the head of the Government to consider the suggestion he had ventured to make, and not to allow the country to embark, without any attempt at negociation, in an expenditure of which this was but the first beginning if the policy of it should be forced upon the House. Our fellow-subjects in Canada ought to be assured that, if an unjust war broke out, this country would stand by them at all hazards; but that assurance was quite consistent with the attempt which, he hoped, would be made after all, to neutralize the frontier and the lakes and to re-establish the Reciprocity Treaty. The House would, he felt assured, do nothing to raise up bitter feelings between the British Provinces and the United States, nor to alienate still further two peoples of common origin, who, for the sake of civilization itself, ought, as far as possible, to be one and united in the interests of commerce and of peace."

"Lord PALMERSTON: Sir, this is not a Canadian question, it is not a local question, it is an Imperial question. It is a question which affects the position and character, the honour, the interests, and the duties of this great country; and I hold it to be of the utmost importance to the character of the nation in a case like this, and when the great majority of the House seem to be of the same opinion, that it should not go forth to the world that there has been a difference of opinion on this motion; but that it should be seen to have been accepted by a unanimous House of Commons. Sir, there are one or two points with regard to which I think it right to express my dissent from some doctrines which have been laid down. Many gentlemen have argued this question as if there was a general impression and belief that war with the United States was imminent, and that this proposal of ours was for the purpose of meeting a sudden danger which we apprehended to be hanging over us. Now, I think there is no danger of war with America. Nothing that has recently passed indicates any hostile disposition on the part of the United States towards us; and, therefore, I do not base this motion on the ground that we expect war to take place between this country and America. But is it necessary that when you propose to put a country in a state of defence you should show that war with some powerful neighbour is imminent and likely soon to take place? Why, the whole practice of mankind is founded on an entirely different assumption. Every country which is able to do so fortifies its frontier if its neighbour is a powerful state, which might, if it thought fit, attack it. But it is said that you cannot defend Canada. Now, I utterly deny that proposition. I think that is assuming a conclusion which no man is entitled to assume. Does the example even of the war now going on tend to justify that conclusion? The territory of the Confederates is vast and extensive; have they attempted to defend every portion of that territory? They have fortified certain important points, and those important points, although the rest of the country may have been overrun, have resisted attack—some of them even to this day and others for three or four years of the contest. Look at Richmond; is Richmond taken? Has not Richmond been attacked for a great length of time? And what are its defences? Why, chiefly earthworks, with a force behind them; and, though that force is inferior in numbers to the force which threatens it, it has hitherto remained in Confederate hands. The mere occupation of territory by an army that traverses through it without reducing its fortresses is no conquest. The conquest is limited to the ground that the invading army occupies, and when that army passes to another part of the country its conquest passes away with it. But all countries fortify particular points, and when those points are secure they trust that the general bulk of the territory is safe from any permanent occupation or conquest by any enemy who may attack it. It is urged that Canada has an extended frontier; but are no other States similarly placed in that respect? What country has the largest frontier? What is the extent of our own frontier? Why, the whole coast of the United Kingdom; and we might as well say that it would be necessary for the security of this country that we should line our whole coast with defensive works because we may be attacked at any point of that great and extensive frontier. I maintain, therefore, that there is nothing that has passed—nothing that is now passing—between the Government of the United States and our Government which justifies any man in saying that the relations between the two countries are likely, as far as present circumstances go, to assume a character of hostility leading to war. But, then, the hon. member for Birmingham says that any danger which might threaten Canada and our North American Provinces must arise from political disputes between England and the United States. And, therefore, the hon. gentleman says the Canadians will find that their best security is, not in fortifications or in British support, but in separating themselves from Great Britain. Now, in the first place, that happens not to be the wish or inclination of the Canadians. The Canadians are most anxious to maintain the connection with this country. They are proud of that connection; they think it for their interest; they are willing to make every exertion that their population and resources enable them to achieve, and, in conjunction with the efforts of this country, to preserve that connection, and prevent themselves from being absorbed by a neighbouring power. Is it not, therefore, alike the duty and interest of this country, for the sake of that reputation which is the power and strength of a nation, when we find the Canadas and our other Provinces desirous of maintaining the connection, to do that which we may have the means of doing in assisting them to maintain that connection and remain united with Great Britain? But, sir, is it true that the only danger which a smaller colonial state runs from a more powerful and larger neighbour arises from quarrels that may exist between the Mother Country and the foreign state? I say that is a total fallacy. Suppose these provinces separated from this country—suppose them erected into a monarchy, a republic, or any other form, of Government, are there not motives that might lead a stronger neighbour to pick a quarrel with that smaller state with a view to its annexation? Is there nothing like territorial ambition pervading the policy of great military states? The example of the world should teach us that as far as the danger of invasion and annexation is concerned, that danger would be increased to Canada by a separation from Great Britain, and when she is deprived of the protection that the military power and resources of this country may afford. If these American Provinces should desire to separate, we should not adopt the maxim that fell unconsciously from the hon. member for Birmingham, who maintained that the North was right in suppressing the rebellion of the South; we will not adopt his maxim, and think that we have a right to suppress the rebellion of the North American Provinces. We should take a different line, no doubt, and if these Provinces felt themselves strong enough to stand upon their own ground, and if they should desire no longer to maintain their connection with us, we should say, 'God speed you and give you the means to maintain yourselves as a nation!' That has not happened; but, on the contrary, they much dislike the notion of annexation to their neighbours and cling to their connection with this country. And I say that it will be disgraceful to this country—it would lower us in the eyes of the world—it would weaken our power and leave consequences injurious to our position in the world if, while they desire to maintain their connection with us, we did not do what we could to assist them in maintaining their position. I think that the Government are perfectly right in proposing this vote to the House. We are of opinion that all those examples which my right hon. friend behind me (Mr. Lowe) has adduced are not applicable. We all know that in winter the snow is so deep in Canada that if an army should march it could only be in one beaten track, and that it would be impossible to carry on siege operations in winter. We know that warlike operations must be limited to the summer months, and we think that we can, by the fortifications now proposed—some to be made by the Canadians and some by this country—put Canada into such a state of defence that, with the exertions of her own population, and assisted by the military force of this country, she will be able to defend herself from attack. My right hon. friend the member for Calne argued in a manner somewhat inconsistent with himself, for what did he say? He says that you cannot defend Canada because the United States can bring a military force into the field much superior to that which you can oppose to them. Yet the right hon. gentleman says we ought to defend Canada. You ought not to relinquish the connection, he says, but you should defend Canada elsewhere. Where? Why, as you are not able to cope with the United States in Canada, where you have a large army, and where you can join your forces to those of the Canadians, you should send an expedition and attack the people of the United States in their own homes and in the centre of their own resources, where they can bring a larger force to repel our invasion. If we are unable to defend Canada, we shall not have much better prospects of success if we land an army to attack New York or any other important city."