Negociations for Purchase of the Hudson's Bay Property. In response to our demand for a large tract of land through the "Fertile belt" of the Hudson's Bay territory, the Governor answered, almost in terror, to the Duke of Newcastle:—"What! sequester our very tap-root! Take away the fertile lands where our buffaloes feed! Let in all kinds of people to squat and settle, and frighten away the fur- bearing animals they don't hunt and kill! Impossible. Destruction— extinction—of our time-honoured industry. If these gentlemen are so patriotic, why don't they buy us out?" To this outburst the Duke quietly replied: "What is your price?" Mr. Berens, the Governor, answered: "Well, about a million and a half." Finding that our demands for land alongside the proposed road and telegraph were not acceptable to the Governor and Court of the Hudson's Bay Company, we had nothing for it but either to drop the Pacific transit proposal, after many months of labour and trouble, or to take the bold course of accepting the challenge of those gentlemen, and negociating for the purchase of all their property and rights. Before making a decided move, however, I had many anxious discussions with the Duke as to who the real purchaser should be. My strong, and often urged, advice was, that whoever the medium of purchase might be, Great Britain should take to the bargain. I showed that at the price named there could be no risk of loss; and I developed alternative methods of dealing with the question:—That the fur trade could be separated from the land and rights, and that a new joint stock company could be organized to take over the trading posts, the fleet of ships, the stock of goods, and the other assets, rights, and privileges affecting trade, and that such a company would probably pay a rental—redeemable over a term of years, were that needful to meet Mr. Gladstone's notions—of 3 or 3-1/2 per cent, on 800,000_l_., leaving only 700,000_l_. as the value of a territory bigger than Russia in Europe. Such a company would have to raise additional capital of its own to modernize its business, to improve the means of intercourse between its posts, and to cheapen and expedite the transport to and fro of its merchandise. I carefully described the nature of these changes and all that they involved. The Duke seemed to favour this idea. Then I pointed out that, if desired, a land company could be organized in England, Canada, and the United States, which, on a similar principle of rental and redemption, might take over the lands—leaving a reserve of probably a fourth of the whole as the, unpaid for, property of the Government—at the price of 700,000_l_. If these proposals succeeded, then all the country would have to do was to lend 1,500,000_l_. on such security as could be offered, ample, in each case, in my opinion. But I said it must be a condition, if these plans were adopted, to erect the Hudson's Bay territory into a Crown Colony, like British Columbia, and to govern it on the responsibility of the Empire. I showed that this did not involve any large sum annually; and that, as in the case of British Columbia, the loss would be turned into a profit by sales of the one-fourth of the land to be given, in return for the responsibilities, taken, to our country. Again, the cost of government might be recouped by a moderate system of duties in and out of the territory, to be agreed with Canada and British Columbia on the one hand, and the United States on the other. This, in outline, was one plan. The next was, to sell a portion of the territory to the United States at the price, which I knew could be obtained, of a million. A third plan which I suggested was, to open up portions of the "Fertile belt" to colonization from the United States. To offer homes, in a bracing, healthy country—with fertile lands and long waterways—to the multitudes of men and women in Ohio, Kentucky, Maryland, and many other States, who desired to flee from war and conflict; whose yearning was for settled government and peace. These men and women had still resources, friends, and credit, and if our country opened its arms to them, they would flock to the old red flag, and bring their energies to bear on the industrial conquest of these vast regions to the West. But—if any man went, morally, down on his knees to another, I did to the Duke, to beg, beseech, implore,—that this great bargain, this purchase of purchases, of a Continent, should be made for our country, and should be untainted by even the suspicion of a mercantile adventure. In the end, I thought I had converted the Duke, well disposed always, to the wisdom of such a policy. Following this line, we discussed many details. He "would not sell," but he would "exchange;" and, studying the map, we put our fingers upon the Aroostook wedge, in the State of Maine—upon a piece of territory at the head of Lake Superior, and upon islands between British Columbia and Vancouver's Island—which might be the equivalent of rectification of boundary on many portions to the Westward along the 49th parallel of latitude. Further, at one of our many interviews a name for the new Crown Colony, if established, was mentioned—"Hysperia." Dr. Mackay had suggested it to me. The general answer of the Duke was—"Were I a minister of Russia I should buy the land. It is the right thing to do for many, for all, reasons; but ministers here must subordinate their views to the Cabinet." Still, he went so far, that I believed if the Hudson's Bay property were once bought, the Duke would manage to take the purchase over for the country. I was too sanguine. I had not measured the passive resistance of the inside of the Colonial Office to everything that inside had not initiated; though the fact that day by day objections, urged to the Duke from inside, were put to me, by him, and, I believe, always satisfactorily answered, might have warned me. I hope to live to find three conditions established at the Colonial Office:— (1) That no one, from the head down to the office boy, shall enter the doors without having passed in general and in British Empire, geography. (2) That no one shall be promoted who has not visited some one British Colony or Province; and (3) That no one shall be eligible for the highest offices who has not visited and studied, personally, every portion of the distant British Empire. With confident hope I went to work. It is true that Mr. Thomas Baring warned me. He said: "If the Duke wants these great efforts made he must make them on behalf of the Government: he must not leave private persons to take the risk of Imperial work." And, in this state of mind, Mr. Baring refused, afterwards, to be one of the promoters of the Pacific scheme, a refusal which led Mr. Glyn to hesitate to sign the legal papers without his friend and colleague. It was an anxious time for me; for on my head rested the main responsibility. One circumstance somewhat sustained me. On "the 10th December, 1862, at Thomas' Hotel, the Duke had read to me a private letter from Mr. Gladstone to him, containing these words. Words of which I was allowed to make a note" Your Pacific scheme would be one of the grandest affairs ever achieved, and I hope it will be completed in your time. It shall have my hearty support." Alas! however, Mr. Baring was right. The first official interview with the Governor and Court of the Hudson's Bay Company was at the "Hudson's Bay House," Fenchurch Street, on the 1st December, 1862. The room was the "Court" room, dark and dirty. A faded green cloth, old chairs almost black, and a fine portrait of Prince Rupert. We met the Governor, Berens, Eden Colville, and Lyell only. On our part there were Mr. G. G. Glyn (the present Lord Wolverton), Captain Glyn (the late Admiral Henry Glyn), and Messrs. Newmarch, Benson, Blake, and myself. Mr. Berens, an old man and obstinate, bearing a name to be found in the earliest lists of Hudson's Bay shareholders, was somewhat insulting in his manner. We took it patiently. He seemed to be astounded at our assurance. "What! interfere with his Fertile belt, tap root, &c.!" Subsiding, we had a reasonable discussion, and were finally informed that they would give us land for the actual site of a road and a telegraph through their territory, but nothing more. But they would sell all they had, as we "were, no doubt, rich enough to buy," for "about" 1,500,000_l_., as they had told the Duke. The offer of the mere site of a road and ground for telegraph poles was of no use. So, just as we were leaving, I said, "We are quite ready to consider your offer to sell; and, to expedite matters, will you allow us to see your accounts, charters, &c." They promised to consult their Court. And, gradually, it got to this, that I was put in communication with old Mr. Roberts, aged 85, their accountant, and with their solicitor, the able and honorable Mr. Maynard, of the old firm of Crowder and Maynard, Coleman Street, City. I had many interviews; and on the 17th March, 1863, I met the Governor, Mr. Ellice, jun. (son of Edward Ellice-the "old bear"), Mr. Matheson and Mr. Maynard. They showed me a number of schedules, which they called "accounts." Next day I had a long private interview with Mr. Maynard, but "could not see the 'balance-sheet.'" The same day I saw the Duke with Messrs. Glyn and Benson. Next day (19th) I spent the forenoon with Mr. Roberts, the accountant, and his son and assistant, at the Hudson's Bay House. Mr. Roberts told me many odd things; one was that the Company had had a freehold farm on the site of the present city of San Francisco of 1,000 acres, and sold it just before the gold discoveries for 1,000_l_., because two factors quarrelled over it. I learnt a great deal of the inside of the affair, and got some glimpses of the competing "North West" Company, amalgamated by Mr. Edward Ellice, its chief mover, many years agone with the Hudson's Bay Company. Pointing to some boxes in his private room one day, Mr. Maynard said: "There are years of Chancery in those boxes, if anyone else had them." And he more than once quoted a phrase of the "old bear": "My fortune came late in life." |