The fleet legislation of 1898 for the first time looked ahead and established rules as to the future number of ships and the time-limit within which they should be built, and also laid down principles as to the tasks that the fleet was intended to accomplish. Two squadrons, of eight battle-ships each, were to be in constant readiness and were to have a flag-ship at their head. Six large and sixteen small cruisers were to act as scouts, three large and ten small cruisers as a “foreign fleet”; two battle-ships, three large cruisers and four small ones were to form the reserve, and the whole reorganization was to be completed in six years—that is, by 1904. It had heretofore been provided that in case of war each ship should give up half of its trained men as a nucleus for the new crews of the reserve ships. This greatly weakened the fighting power of the ships at the crucial moment, and the legislation of 1898 abolished the compulsion for one at least of the two squadrons.

Between 1898 and 1900 came events which greatly disquieted Germany: the Spanish-American and Boer Wars and disturbances in Samoa. Off Manila there were amenities between the German and American admirals which might have ended more creditably for the former had he been able to display more force. The legislation of 1900 was influenced by all these factors and has a wider perspective than any that had gone before. The preamble declared that “Germany must have a battle-fleet so strong that even for the most powerful naval opponent a war is connected with such dangers that that opponent’s own position as a power may be impaired.” And further: “For this purpose it is not imperative that the German battle-fleet be as strong as that of the greatest maritime power, for, as a rule, a great maritime power will not be in a position to concentrate its whole fighting force against us. But even though it should succeed in opposing us with greatly superior forces the subjection of a strong German fleet would so weaken an enemy that, in spite of any victory he may win, his fleet will no longer be sufficiently powerful to assure his own predominant position.” “For the first time,” writes Mittler, “the so-called risk idea which was henceforth to be a determining factor in our fleet development was clearly expressed.”

The legislation of 1900 amounted to a doubling of the fleet provided for only two years previously. Seventeen battle-ships, four large cruisers and sixteen small cruisers were to be in constant readiness, while exactly as many more ships of each of the three types were to be kept, partially manned, in reserve. In 1906, in addition to a number of submarines, six cruisers for the “foreign squadron” were provided for, and it was voted to raise the number of torpedo-boats and also to provide automatically for their renewal, the life of a torpedo-boat being estimated at twelve years. This meant that twelve torpedo-boats would have to be built each year. England’s example in building dreadnaughts necessitated greatly raising the appropriation for battle-ships and also influenced the legislation of 1908, by which the normal life of a battle-ship was declared reduced from twenty-five to twenty years. The legislation of 1912, finally, increased the number of active battle-ships by eight, of large cruisers by four and of small cruisers by six, not to mention that the number of submarines is to be brought up to seventy-two, fifty-four of which are to be always ready for service. But as the period for finishing all the new ships is 1920 they will play little part in the present war. The reserve ships, of course, will all now be called into action.

To resume, then, and to be more specific, the actual German fleet, counting ships expected to be ready in the course of 1914, numbers thirty-eight ships of the line, fourteen armored cruisers, thirty-eight protected cruisers, two hundred twenty-four torpedo-boats and thirty submarines. There are no torpedo-boat-destroyers as in other navies, the small cruisers being supposed to take their place. The battle-ships are ranged in classes. There are three of the “King class” (the KÖnig, the Grosser KurfÜrst and the Markgraf), which have a displacement of nearly 26,000 tons and are equipped with every possible modern improvement, such as net protection against torpedoes, turbine engines, provision for oil-fuel, torpedo tubes, etc. It is from these monsters, of which each carries ten of the largest guns, not to speak of the smaller ones, that we shall probably hear most in the course of the war, though not perhaps in the beginning, as they are not fully completed. They are to be joined in 1915 by a sister-ship, the Kronprinz.

The KÖnig class is to be larger in dimension, in horse-power and in displacement, though not in speed or armament than the Kaiser class, of which there are five ships: The Kaiser, the Kaiserin, the Friedrich der Grosse, the Prinzregent Luitpold and the KÖnig Albert. Next come the Helgoland class (Helgoland, Ostfriesland, ThÜringen, Oldenburg) and the Nassau class (Nassau, Westfalen, Rheinland, Posen) after which, with the Deutschland class (13,200 tons), we are out of the region of the dreadnaughts.

There is a dreadnaught cruiser, the Derfflinger, just ready, with a greater displacement (28,000 tons), and of course, with far greater speed than any of the battle-ships. Next comes the Seydlitz (25,000 tons), then the Moltke and the Goeben (23,000 tons), and the Von der Tann (19,500 tons). The Goeben has already been practically captured, as has also the Breslau (4,550 tons). They are now in the Dardanelles, and the Turkish government is considering their purchase. Twenty-three of the protected cruisers bear the names of German cities (like the Breslau, Colberg, Dresden, KÖnigsberg), while the rest for the most part have such names as the Gazelle, the Medusa, the Niobe, the Undine.

Some fifteen of the largest and best-known passenger ships of the Hamburg and Bremen lines were to have served as auxiliary cruisers, but a number of these now are in foreign ports and far from the needed protection of their fleets. It remains to be seen what use will be made of the Imperator, which is still at Cuxhaven or Hamburg.

In concluding our list of ships in the German navy it may interest Americans to know that there is one called the Alice Roosevelt. It is not likely to influence the progress of the war or even to come into action. Its special title is Stationsjacht, and it is at the service of the general inspector of the navy, Prince Henry of Prussia.

Germany’s ally, Austria, although in May, 1914, she appropriated more than 400,000,000 kronen for her fleet, makes at present a very weak showing. She has fifteen ships of the line, of which three are dreadnaughts, two armored cruisers and seven protected cruisers.

England, Germany’s chief naval opponent, has sixty-three ships of the line as compared to her own thirty-eight, and of these twenty-four are dreadnaughts, as compared to seventeen. England has forty-four armored cruisers, of which ten are dreadnaughts; Germany has but fourteen armored cruisers, and but five of them are dreadnaughts. In protected cruisers the ratio is still more in England’s favor, while with torpedo-boats Germany is comparatively well provided—one hundred fifty-four as against one hundred ninety. It may be mentioned here, as a bit of interesting history, that the majority of great naval victories have been won over numerically superior fleets.

France has ten dreadnaught battle-ships, on paper, but no dreadnaught cruisers, and is said to have had difficulty in officering the ships that she has. Moreover, of the ten dreadnaughts six are only what are called half-dreadnaughts and only three of the others are ready for service. Russia is practically without a fleet, though she has four battle-ships and fourteen cruisers in the Baltic and four battle-ships and two cruisers in the Black Sea. Next year she expects to have ready for use in the Baltic four new dreadnaughts.

Naval warfare has been so far from our thoughts these many years, its terms have become so unfamiliar that it is worth dwelling for a while on the different types of ships and showing their special uses and their special tasks in battle.

Most important of all, with their supremacy unassailed by any of the newly invented types, are the battle-ships or ships of the line. They are called of the line because that is their natural position in battle, the position that renders the fire of their guns most effective. This does not mean that their bows are to be all in a line, though that position may sometimes have to be adopted; but rather that they are to string out, one behind the other at stated intervals, so as to be able to fire a vast broadside often miles in length. It may be that the line must be slanting or again that the position must be constantly changed as new exigencies arise. The ruling idea, of course, is to strike the right balance between the amount of surface presented as a target for the enemy’s guns and the ability to keep up the most effective running fire. All this is diligently practised in time of peace in the so-called maneuvers. The utmost exactness of calculation is required, for the nearer together the ships the more effective is their fire; indeed the great distinction between modern naval encounters and those of former times lies in this team work, if we may call it so. The great dreadnaughts, with their turbine engines and carefully adjusted steering apparatus, are much more manageable and can be brought much closer to one another than was the case with old-fashioned battle-ships. The distance between the bow of one ship and the stern of the next one is reckoned in practise at a hundred yards or less; one can see what an advantage it is to have the eight ships of a squadron all of about the same size and speed. This idea has been carried so far in the German fleet that, even after the superiority of the turbine engine had been demonstrated the ships required to complete a squadron were built in the old style. Single encounters like those which make up such thrilling pages in history are not likely often to occur again, and if they do, will not come to boardings and to hand-to-hand conflicts.

The range at which the great naval battles of the future will be fought will be very great, all the way up to ten thousand yards. The great guns can easily shoot that distance, while a reason for not coming nearer until, at least, the heavy ammunition is gone, is that at that range each fleet will be practically safe from the torpedoes of the other. The German fleet often practises at that range, firing at a moving target which is dragged along by another boat. On each modern gun is a telescope, and there are instruments for determining the distance at any given moment, as well as complicated adjustments for sighting and aiming. The projectiles used in the biggest guns weigh each nearly a ton and cost well up into the thousands, so every precaution is taken not to waste them. We can no longer speak of a cannon-ball, for the modern charges are cylindrical, pointed and filled with explosives so as to inflict the utmost damage for the money. Experience has shown that at very close range they will pass through blocks of steel more than a yard thick!

The bore of the greatest guns in the German navy has hitherto been a little over thirty centimeters, but is fast reaching the forty centimeter mark; the guns themselves are from forty-five to fifty-eight feet long and weigh correspondingly. The best are from the foundries of Krupp, who, when he died, left his daughter the richest woman in Germany. The Krupps have a special steel of the utmost toughness and resistance. The gun-barrel is made of a single block, which is regularly excavated or bored; it is then protected by innumerable rings, which are put on when red-hot, and sit firmly ever after. The “kick” of the gun has been entirely eliminated by an ingenious contrivance. Altogether the cannon of to-day have become so complicated and so perfect as instruments that it takes longer to manufacture them than it does to construct the ship, and the English navy gives its orders for them about six months before even the keel is laid. And the life of such a gun is short. It is said that some of the guns on the new English, Japanese and Italian ships will be useless after they have fired eighty shots; on the American, French and German after from one hundred and fifty to two hundred. The difference lies in the construction of the gun-barrel, and there are controversies and rivalries over which methods are the best, just as there are over almost everything else that pertains to warfare: over the best shells, the best powder, the best mechanical contrivances for loading, for getting the range, etc. Dreadnaughts have scarcely yet been tried in actual warfare, and the nation that has made mistakes in theory may live to rue them bitterly in practise.

The guns are placed, two and two, in turrets on the battle-ships, and can be turned in any direction; if need be they can fire a whole broadside; while, as two turrets are elevated above the rest, a volley can be fired of four guns direct from the bow or stern. The turrets are armored with tough hard steel and their surface is curved so that a shot will glance off. The King and the Kaiser classes carry ten great guns, the Helgoland and Nassau classes even twelve, but the latter are no more effective, as they have not the two elevated turrets for shooting over the other guns. Some of the new French and American ships are to have three and even four guns to a turret, but the German navy is conservative enough not to wish to try the experiment.

Theoretically at least a great dreadnaught is almost unsinkable. Not only is its hull divided into a great number of cells and compartments but many of the cells themselves are armored, so that even if a torpedo penetrates to them it will not have things all its own way. All vulnerable places, too, are heavily armored with plates that extend away below the water line; while the powder magazines and torpedo tubes are well down in the depths of the ship.

It is the heavy armament that has conditioned the size of the ships, for they have few other advantages than the ability to carry the extra weight, and they have increased the cost of navies enormously. The appropriations of eight great powers for 1914–1915 come to not far from three billion five hundred million marks, England leading with more than one billion. And the expenses do not cease with the building of the ships, for docks, dry docks, canals, etc., have to be enlarged accordingly. The Kaiser Wilhelm canal, built between the years 1887 and 1895, at a cost of one hundred fifty-six million marks, had already outgrown its usefulness ten years after its opening. Its widening, which will not be fully completed until 1915, is to cost two hundred twenty-three millions in addition.

We have thus far spoken only of ships of the line, and, although we shall have to return to them in a moment, a few words must first be said as to the use of the other categories of ships in actual warfare. Armored cruisers in themselves are nothing new. England has forty-four of them, France nineteen, Japan fifteen and Germany and the United States each fourteen. But great armored battle-cruisers have existed only since 1907 and are possessed as yet by only three powers: England has ten; Germany has, or had, five (for the Goeben is out of the running), and Japan has two.

The big battle-cruiser is as long as a battle-ship, or even longer; it, also, is called a dreadnaught. It has guns as large, but fewer of them; eight instead of ten. Where, then, is the difference? The difference is in the lines, which are long and slender, like those of a yacht, and in the speed, which is from twenty-eight to thirty knots instead of twenty-two or twenty-three. The cruiser has been described as a sort of naval cavalry that can fly to any weak point of the enemy, can chase a single ship or can outflank a line of ships, bring them between two fires, thus deciding the battle. The cruisers can also fight each other. A new instrument of war has thus been introduced that may, after all, once more make naval contests thrilling and dramatic instead of being mere pounding competitions.

The small cruiser, in contradistinction to the large armored one, has but a light iron belt and carries only light guns and deck torpedo tubes. Its purpose is not to engage in battle, unless it be with a torpedo-boat, but rather to avoid it. It combines the qualities of scout and of torpedo-boat-destroyer, which latter type is altogether lacking in the German navy. Its chief quality is swiftness, and a swarm of small cruisers accompanies the fleet when it puts to sea, darting here and there to make sure that none of the much-dreaded little enemies is approaching.

Of large torpedo-boats the German fleet has one hundred fifty-four, all of its own special type. The value of the type has at times been overestimated, at times underestimated, but the recent gains in speed and in seaworthiness have made it no contemptible adversary. Practically its only weapon is the torpedo, for projecting which it carries four tubes on deck; its small guns are merely for use against other torpedo-boats. Its chief defense is its extreme swiftness, for some of the boats have a speed of thirty-eight miles an hour. It can turn, too, incredibly quickly, for it has a rudder in the bow as well as in the stern. It is unarmored, but is painted black for its protection. For it is a creature of the night, stealing up in the darkness with its deadly weapon and scarcely ever exposing itself to the enemy’s guns by the light of day. It has one enemy, to be dreaded above all others, the search-light.

There are hundreds of the little black devils in the navy, and they have every sort of trick for concealment and escape. By running very swiftly they can keep the smoke from rising vertically from their funnels and thus betraying their presence. They often go forth in flotillas and if an enemy start to chase them they scatter, having previously arranged where they are to meet again. They come bow on to the ship they mean to injure, for the distance between them will then increase more rapidly. If brought to bay a torpedo-boat turns its own search-light on the commander of the other vessel and tries to blind him with its glare. It is a risky business, that of torpedo-boat commander, and requires men of the very highest training and courage. The reason there are such numbers of the little craft is that many are sure to go to the bottom in the course of a campaign. Germany expects that her flotilla will be of great help in a war with England, for when a torpedo hits the damage is apt to be severe. Dynamite is mild compared to the new melanite and lyddite that are used in charging.

If the torpedo-boat is a fiend that works mainly at night, its sister, the submarine, works only by day. If the submarine has not, as was at one time expected, completely revolutionized naval warfare, it has at least so far asserted itself that it can never be left wholly out of the reckoning. Its improvement has kept pace with that of the torpedo-boat in stability, in size and in manageableness. The newest boats have a displacement of a thousand tons, and long sea voyages are now possible. Germany has far fewer torpedo-boats than has England, but claims that hers are much stronger and much better adapted for service in rough weather and on the high seas.

When there is no enemy in the immediate vicinity the submarine rides the waves like any other boat; when there is danger she dives like a duck. Just before firing her torpedo she comes to the surface for an instant to get one last good look. She is helpless at that moment, of course, but trusts to not being seen in time. When under water her speed is only about ten miles an hour, as the pressure is very great; on the surface she can travel about sixteen. Her slowness is a disadvantage, for she can only lurk for and intercept a fleet, not pursue and overtake it. She labors under another disadvantage, too, for she has to carry two motors and can not use the same one above and under water. Why? Because the one is an oil motor and generates gases which would be fatal when all outlets are closed. The other is run by an electric storage battery, the filling of which requires time and patience.

How can the submarine communicate with its own fleet? It has wireless telegraphy and also deep-water signals, but these do not work so well as might be desired. It has one other connection with the visible world as wonderful as anything described by Jules Verne in his Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, the periscope, or literally the “looker round.” I can not do better than describe it in the words of a naval officer, Count Ernest zu Reventlow:

Roughly speaking, the apparatus consists in this: If the boat is under water and yet wishes to see what is going on above, it pushes up a long thin pipe until the surface is reached and a little beyond. At the farther end of this pipe is a contrivance with glass prisms, or mirrors and lenses. This throws down the image reflected from the surface of the water, through the vertical pipe, into the interior of the boat. The image is caught on a plate and the commander of the submarine, although he may be several yards under water, can see everything that is floating and happening on the surface and consequently can make his attack with the sole guidance of this image and steer the boat until it is at the right distance for firing the torpedo.

It sounds like magic, and indeed the witches were not in it when it comes to the achievements of modern science. But Reventlow has to confess that in practise the periscope is not so wonderful as it sounds in theory. The splashing of the salt water, unless the sea be perfectly calm, which it seldom is, soon dims and even effaces the image. It was long before the inventors could bring the periscope to reflect more than a small section of the horizon, but that difficulty seems to have been overcome.

It is possible, with map, clock and compass, to take reckonings and keep on a course even when deep down under water. Deeper than ninety feet the submarine seldom goes. It has found a new and unexpected enemy in the air-ship or aeroplane, for it is a well-known fact that from a height on a clear day, at least, you can see very far into the water. But what, one will ask, can the aeroplane do about it even if it sights a submarine far down beneath the surface? Projectiles would not be likely to do much damage. At the same time it can warn ships and can pursue and worry the submarine.

That the latter is not a perfect instrument goes without saying; indeed, when it darts about blindly it becomes a menace to its own ships. Its arrangements are so complicated, too, with all the letting in and out of water, the diving and coming up, the changing of motors and providing artificial air that things are very apt to go wrong. The service is extremely exhausting for the men and extremely dangerous.

Yet all the same the value of submarines is universally acknowledged and every great navy has them. They will probably prove useful in planting that new instrument of destruction, the floating mine, about which a few words must be said here: “It is to be presumed,” writes Reventlow, “that in the next naval war [how little he dreamed in November, 1913, that that war was so close at hand!] mines will play an important part not merely in coast defense but also in sea fights as a weapon with the same justification as artillery and torpedoes and that their use will materially influence the tactics to be employed.” As such a weapon of attack mines were first used in the Japanese-Russian War.

A mine, as the reader probably knows, is a cask filled with high explosives and fastened by means of weights and anchors so that it floats some feet below the surface. Mines can be planted in fields, as it were, by torpedo-boats or submarine and then a hostile fleet can be lured or chased in among them. The North Sea, as we know, is at present thickly strewn with them and fatal results have already been chronicled. Air-ships and aeroplanes can help by finding the whereabouts of the hostile fleet and designating by wireless the spots where the mines should be planted.

Air-ships and aeroplanes will possibly find their chief use as coast-defenders. They need refuges to which they can retire, which limits their use on the high seas. But along the shore they can scout for hostile ships and also can detect submarines and mines. They can throw down explosives and, if they are near enough to the enemy’s harbors, can destroy docks and demoralize shipping. Already there is talk of specially armored decks and of great iron grills for protecting the openings of funnels.

More than six months ago a thoughtful German, Rudolf Troetsch, wrote a book called Germany’s Fleet in the Decisive Struggle, in which he weighs the different tasks the fleet will be called upon to perform in case of war, and comes ever and again to the conclusion that a battle on the high seas is the only possible option—a battle im grossen Stile, in the grand style. Even if the enemy’s fleet is not conquered it can be greatly weakened and strategy and tactics will go far to make up for want of numbers.

Troetsch begins by showing the different methods an enemy will be likely to pursue; and one sees throughout that he has England in mind. First of all will come—as has already happened—the so-called cruiser war or attempt to destroy the country’s commerce by snapping up her merchant ships. This can eventually end the war by the starvation process; that is, by cutting off all food and other supplies. According to the Paris international agreement of 1856 there shall be no privateering, which means that individuals may not fit out ships and take prizes, but does not mean that the property of individuals, if they are subjects of one or other of the warring powers, may not be seized. Prizes of war may either be towed into the nearest port or, after the crews and passengers have been taken off, may be sent to the bottom with all their cargo. To be effective, however, this method of warfare must be methodically pursued, which means regularly employing a force of swift cruisers. The method had its warm advocates in naval circles, especially in France about thirty years ago. There is a strong feeling at present that the game is not worth the candle and that there are other tasks for the cruisers to perform which are of more importance. For a country which has few foreign coaling stations into which the prizes can be towed but very little is to be gained; while a naval battle is greatly to be preferred to having an enemy try these tactics.

Another method that may be applied against Germany is the blockading of her North Sea coast. A blockade, according to the Paris declaration of 1856 and again according to the London conference of 1908, must be effective in order to be binding; a country may not, in other words, simply declare an enemy’s coasts in a state of blockade, but must have enough ships there to enforce the regulations. A successful blockade hinders even neutral ships from landing and is the best way of preventing the entry of contraband of war and of paralyzing all commerce. The form of Germany’s coast line fairly invites to a blockade, much more than do the coasts either of England or France. A line drawn from Holland to Denmark would form the hypothenuse of a triangle including the mouths of Germany’s chief rivers, her main seaports as well as all her North Sea islands. The Baltic, too, could be easily shut off from the ocean, and with the enemy’s ships all bottled up there would be no fear of a descent on the coasts of England.

This sounds well in theory, but in practise the difficulties will be well-nigh insuperable. Those who know the coast will remember the miles and miles of shallows—the so-called Wattenmeer so difficult to navigate. In time of war all lighthouses and buoys are removed and, if they approach the shore, the English ships will inevitably run aground, while the German torpedo-boats and submarines will be in their very element. Floating mines, too, will get in their deadly work, as will also the strings of fixed mines which are ignited not by percussion but by means of an electric current controlled from the shore. The German fleet can retire well up the great streams and menace the enemy there; while it must not be forgotten that the great cannon of the coast defenses can shoot fifteen kilometers (nine and three-eighths miles) or more. Finally the islands in the neighborhood, notably Borkum and Wangerood, are fortified, and last but not least, there is Helgoland far out in the sea. A whole fleet could not take this Gibraltar of the North. The rocky walls are very hard; indeed, with true German thoroughness, they have been tested to see if they would successfully withstand bombardment. Under their shelter a harbor for torpedo-boats and submarines has been built at a cost of thirty million marks. From here they can issue forth and here, protected from afar by the great guns, they can take refuge and form new projects.

Troetsch considers it more than likely that England will proceed to a blockade, but a blockade not in the narrow but in a broader sense. One objection to the narrower blockade would be that her naval bases, necessary for repairs, fuel and ammunition, would be very far away. But this can be obviated if the blockading line begin somewhere between Dover and Calais, extend along the east coast of Scotland, with bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, and end near the southernmost point of Norway, Cape Lindesnaes. This would shut every exit from the North Sea to the Atlantic and at the same time encircle all the exits from the Baltic: the Skager Rak and Cattegat and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. Here England could carry on what is known as an “observation blockade,” biding her time to fall upon the enemy’s fleet.

The great disadvantage is that the blockading line will have to be so very long. The surface of the North Sea is about equal to that of the whole German Empire, and such a line as we have traced would extend for two hundred fifty or three hundred miles. It is a question if even England’s enormous fleet can spare the requisite number of ships. Such a blockading fleet consists not only of a long chain of vessels close together but also of a supporting fleet and, behind that, of the real battle squadrons. The whole force must be nearly double that of the enemy, as it operates on a much broader line. The foggy stormy weather that is apt to prevail in the North Sea will also render the blockade less efficient.

Germany is likely to attempt to break it and to bring about a great naval battle at the earliest opportunity. But that opportunity may not come so very soon. Reventlow, speaking indeed of a hypothetical war, declares that such a blockade may last a year or longer. Germany has too much at stake to risk her small but excellent fleet before the tactical moment has come. Will her Zeppelins help her to victory? That is the question that all are asking now. They are but fragile toys in a stormy sea, but, with circumstances in their favor, may achieve wonderful results.

When it does come to the battle on the high seas into which Germany will surely force England, we shall see modern tactics put to their supreme test, for only by tactical superiority can Germany hope to win. In an old-fashioned battle in which the ships rushed at each other pellmell, or in one in which the rival fleets simply lie to and pound each other she would be sure to lose. A modern battle is much more a game of skill in which the victory is not to the strongest but to the cleverest.

In a modern battle the ships are ever and always moving. Not that the maneuvers are necessarily complicated, but there goes on the whole time a constant thrust and parry. There are different kinds of encounters. First there is the running fight, in which the two fleets, the vessels one behind the other, run in the same direction, firing all the while. Here the strength of the ships, the power of the guns and the quickness of the gunners play the decisive part. The more turrets, funnels, engine-rooms and stearing gear put out of commission, so much the better. The so-called passing fight, where the fleets run not in the same but in opposite directions, is apt to be preferred by a fleet that is numerically weaker. The agony is less prolonged and escape is easier. Then there is the circular fight, in which the fleets are like great serpents trying to catch one another’s tails. The circular fight can follow directly after the passing fight when the fleets have not been seriously crippled.

But the crown and acme of all fleet maneuvers is the so-called crossing of the T.

“The maneuver of the crossing of the T,” writes Troetsch, “consists in endeavoring to bring one’s own line at right angles across the head, or also across the tail, of the hostile line—of enfilading it, as the expression goes, so that the opposing lines come into the relative positions of the two bars of the Latin T…. Such a movement renders it possible to concentrate the entire fire of one’s own broadsides on the ship that is at the head of the enemy’s fleet. In this way [Pg 94] one increases the effectiveness of one’s own fire to the very highest degree, inasmuch as all the shots which go too far to one side will strike the hinder ships of the long hostile line. The ships at its head must gradually succumb to the concentrated fire, while one’s own line is exposed only to the guns in the opponent’s bow and to the fire of the few guns which can be pointed from the sides at such an angle as still to reach the enfilading ships. This position signifies for the fleet that succeeds in shoving itself across the head of the enemy’s line the most effective application of the principle of the concentration of power, which is based on the endeavor always to bring into play when attacking the enemy a greater number of guns than he in his momentary position has at his disposal. If one can open fire in this position it may prove of the greatest significance for the whole battle. … There are cases where the advantage of this position is gained by mere chance, as when the two fleets come upon each other in that formation in thick or foggy weather. … It is difficult to assume the position of crossing the T when the fighting is already in progress. …

The fleet against which the crossing of the T is attempted can seek to lessen its effect by various counter maneuvers. It can turn in the same direction and take a parallel course with the enveloping fleet, whereby if it be swift enough it has the advantage of being on the inner or shorter line: the battle then becomes a simple running fight, or it can simply turn and follow the tail of the hostile line or engage with the head of the line in a passing fight.”