THE WAR

But a few weeks ago the author of this little book was in Germany studying the land and its institutions and full of admiration for its achievements in every field. Two days after he had taken ship for America Germany was practically at war with France and Russia. England soon joined in the conflict, and the splendid Hamburg liner on which the author was a passenger was a hunted thing on the ocean, owing her safety at last to a friendly fog. The great shipping company, with its nearly two hundred vessels, was out of the running as a commercial enterprise, a symbol of the paralyzed industries of the whole country.

To the ordinary observer the conflict came like a bolt from the blue, but to the historian and to the man who reads the foreign newspapers it was not unexpected. The historians recognized that it was the appointed time for a war between the great nations. The Franco-Prussian War took place forty-three years ago. When, since the days of the grandsons of Charlemagne, have the chief powers kept out of war for so long a time? In the ninth and tenth centuries the question of Lorraine was as troublesome as it has been in the nineteenth and twentieth; in the eleventh and twelfth an expedition against Italy was in the day’s work of almost every German emperor; and England and Sicily were conquered by the Normans; in 1215 took place the first general international battle; in 1250 the final expeditions against the Emperor Frederick II; in 1272 the Sicilian wars of the house of Anjou. The Guelphs and Ghibellines carry us on to the Hundred Years’ War; the Hapsburg struggles against Italy and the Turks bring us down to the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France, to the campaigns of Maximilian, to the Field of the Cloth of Gold, to the religious wars of Charles V. Close on the heels of the latter struggles came not only the French religious wars but the invasion of England by Philip II’s great armada. The Thirty Years’ War, Louis XIV’s war of conquest, the Spanish Succession, the Silesian and the Seven Years’ Wars fill the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the Napoleonic, Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars the nineteenth. Yes, it was time for a new struggle.

When a great and extraordinary event takes place it is easy, somewhere in the world, to point to omens and prophecies that have heralded it. But in the case of the present war we can see in the German newspapers how, from month to month of the present year, the struggle was felt to be more and more imminent and how Russia, the power that eventually precipitated the catastrophe, was felt to be the center of real danger. “In well-informed diplomatic circles,” writes the Magdeburger Zeitung in January, 1914, “the impression can not be concealed that in Russia at present there prevails a thoroughly hostile attitude to Germany and Austria-Hungary, and that the agitation in the czar’s realm is greater even than during the last Balkan crisis. … It looks as though Russia were preparing to make an extraordinarily great show of strength against a specific, not far distant date.” And the Deutsche Tageszeitung: “What is Russia’s purpose in building a mighty fleet of dreadnaughts for the Baltic? Surely not merely to coerce Sweden.” Again the Madgeburg paper: “The Russian government, which already owes French capitalists twelve billions, has received a new loan of two billions five hundred millions, of which five million are yearly to be issued in Paris. This whole gigantic sum is exclusively to be spent for building strategic railways along the German-Russian boundary. … France compelled Russia to do this. The French general staff thinks that Russia, because of her clumsiness in mobilizing, but especially for lack of tracks leading to the German frontier, will not be able, in a new war with Germany, to bring help to France in time. Russia has now fulfilled France’s wishes in this regard. Thus does the Franco-Russian alliance, which of late seemed to be falling into oblivion, celebrate its resurrection.”

In February the Hallesche Zeitung writes: “To keep friendship with Russia is one of the chief aims of our foreign policy, but it is sometimes made very hard for us indeed. … They keep the peace because it is to the advantage of the czar’s empire to do so; but they are to be had for every combination directed against Germany.” And the Dresdener Nachrichten: “The Russian-German relations leave very much to be desired at the moment. The Russian government fails to show the least approachableness in foreign questions and Russian society and the press are in an extremely anti-German mood. Evidences of the same thing are to be seen in their attitude to Austria. … The Russian policy lets itself be taken more and more in tow by the French desires, and has nothing but polite speeches left for Germany.” The Weser Zeitung finds the explanation of the hostility in Germany’s efforts to help the Turks reorganize their army, and declares, “Here we have touched one of the weakest spots in Russia’s world-policy, her endeavor to get to the Mediterranean.” The FrÄnkische Kurier thinks that Russia intends to form a protectorate over the Balkan states as a military weapon against Austria and her allies: “The soul of this endeavor is the Russian diplomacy and the Servian minister-president, Pasitsch.” The Dresdener Anzeiger observes that the influence of the Pan-Slavist party over the Russian government is steadily growing and that the extraordinary activity in military matters ill suits the constant peace assurances: “The measures are pointed against Austria-Hungary.”

On March second an article in the KÖlnische Zeitung aroused great excitement all over Germany. It declared that Russia was not yet in a position to supplement political threats by military action, however much France might “rattle with the Russian saber.” But in three years all the enormous preparations would be completed, and already “it is openly said even in official military periodicals, that Russia is arming for war against Germany.” There is no immediate danger, the article continued, but the legend of the historical German-Russian friendship had better be thrown to the dogs.

The papers took different attitudes toward this article, but there were not wanting those who considered the warnings of the KÖlnische Zeitung justified. General Keim, in the Tag, declares that the German-Russian boundary is one huge camp, that the underlying thought of the whole armament is an offensive war against Germany, that France had proceeded in the same way just before 1870 and that the recent visit to St. Petersburg of President PoincarÉ and his chief of staff Joffre had not been merely a pleasure jaunt. Had not a French general, only last summer, declared in a treatise published anonymously that the tension between Russia and Austria was ground for a European war “perhaps in the near future”? And had not this French officer even gone so far as to spread the legend that in case of war Germany would disregard the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg in order to be able to envelop the French left wing?

Several of the March newspapers bring the Russian hostility into connection with the commercial treaty that has only about two years more to run. Russia, by making a bold front, can gain from Germany better terms than she has had in the past. “Russia, with her military preparations,” writes the Pester Lloyd, “wishes to put Austria and Germany under military pressure in order to achieve diplomatic successes and harm her neighbors economically.” The idea that France is behind it all crops out repeatedly. The Neue Preussische Zeitung speaks of the pressure “ever stronger, that the French need for revenge is exercising on the Russian ally and debtor.” The HannÖverische Courier accuses the French press of having first caused the agitation of public opinion in Russia, on which it afterward comments as so remarkable. As far back as March 10th, 1913, the KÖlnische Zeitung had written: “Never was our relation to our western neighbor so strained as to-day, never has the idea of vengeance shown itself so openly and never has it been made so evident that in France the Russian alliance, the English friendship, are claimed only for the purpose of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine. In whatever corner of the world the flame starts up it is quite certain that we shall have to cross swords with France. When that will be, no one can tell.”

The Russian military preparations cause the German papers much concern in the month of April also. The Vossische Zeitung considers them a gigantic bluff, and declares that they have been worth millions to the Russian government. “For only because France thinks that in Russia she possesses an ally ready for war has she heaped billions and billions on her in the form of loans. … That the latest French loans to Russia were accompanied by instructions seriously to take up the anti-Austrian and anti-German preparations no one doubts. Just as little is it doubted that Pan-Slavism is not pleased with the latest changes in the Balkans or that the freedom of the Dardanelles and the seizure of Constantinople still present themselves as the goal of Russian policy. Hatred of the Germans is increasing. … One thing is certain: Russia is arming to a gigantic extent. She wishes to throw a heavy weight into the scale of the national quarrels. Germany and Austria have every reason to be on their guard.” The Allgemeine Zeitung, of Chemnitz, writes that “The goals of French and Russian policy are unattainable without world-shattering callings-to-account,” and the Weser Zeitung, after speaking of Pan-Slavism as threatening the existence of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, finally exclaims, “It neither can nor should be concealed that if—which God forbid!—this direction gain the upper hand in Russian politics it would mean the very war-danger against which we sought and found refuge in the Triple Alliance.”

The newspapers of May have a somewhat calmer tone than those of March and April. “There is, to be sure,” writes the Tag, “danger for peace in the possibility that the anti-German tendency in Russia may prove so strong that the government will not be able to check it. Another danger lies in the relations of Russia and Austria. … Although there is much talk to the effect that we shall once more be compelled to fight for our national existence, it is not absolutely necessary that such a war shall come.” On the other hand, Admiral Breusing, in the TÄgliche Rundschau of May the seventh, writes: “The striving of the Slavic and Mongolian races to extend their power and possessions will surely lead to an encounter with the German race.” The Rheinisch-WestphÄlische Zeitung declares of France that “public sentiment in military and political circles has long gone over from the defensive to the offensive. Apparently the aim is to create a situation where Germany will have to choose between receding or attacking.” The Dresdener Anzeiger, too, thinks that the “relations between Germany and France give the key to the grouping of the European powers,” and the Berliner Tageblatt says, “The future and salvation of Europe and its culture lies solely in a German-French-English rapprochement; that alone will guarantee the world-peace.” Toward the end of the month the Dresdener Anzeiger writes: “The German-Russian relations have latterly taken a remarkable change for the worse. Certainly the nationalistic elements in Russia are once more conspicuously active. … Should the whole mass of the Russian people once become conscious of its nationality the world will see the most mighty movement both as regards extent and elemental intensity. … For Russia, Pan-Slavism is the idea of the Russian leadership over all Slavs.”

Already in May, more than two months before there is a sign that the conflict is at hand, doubts begin to be expressed whether Italy’s alliance would be of any value in case of war. The Berlin Neueste Nachrichten has to acknowledge that as far as Austria is concerned the alliance is “more a matter of the intellect than of the heart;” while the Rheinisch-WestphÄlische Zeitung reports on May twelve that “in more than ten years such a senseless agitation against Austria has not been seen in Italy. … The Italian government is by no means master of the difficult situation in which it is placed by the demonstrations of protest against Austria-Hungary. … Were war to break out to-day the easily excited Italian people would compel any government of theirs, however friendly to the Triple Alliance, to declare against Austria-Hungary.”

The nearer we approach to the crisis the more serious is the situation regarded by the better newspapers. The Neue Preussische Zeitung in June tells of the surprising spirit of sacrifice there is in France and of the quiet efforts that are being made to strengthen the army: “If the revenge cries have almost ceased that does not in the least mean that the idea has been given up; on the contrary, they already reckon on the war as on a sure thing.” Of the Russian military preparations, the Vienna Neue Freie Presse writes on June twelve: “About two months ago it became known that Russia had set aside two hundred sixteen million kronen (a krone is about a franc) for military exercises and especially for a ‘mobilization.’ The great amount of this sum will be realized when one remembers that Austria spends about ten millions for all of its military exercises put together. Under the harmless title of ‘trial-mobilization’ and the still more harmless one of ‘exercises for the reserves’ Russia, then, for a period of six weeks, is placing its giant army practically on a war-footing. Think of 1,800,000 men holding military exercises at a time when Austria has 200,000, Germany from 300,000 to 400,000 trained men at her immediate disposal! Whether it be intentional or not this implies so imminent a threat that the neighbors will need the greatest ‘cold-bloodedness’ to allow these ‘military exercises’ to pass without friction. These exercises signify the most colossal endangering of the peace that was ever attempted under the form of a periodically recurring measure of organization, and it would not be surprising if all those who long for a peaceful turn of political affairs were to be completely embittered…. To add to this dark aspect comes the relatively enormous credit demanded by the Servian military administration—123,000,000. It is as much in proportion as though Austria were to demand a billion and a half. Since 1908 Servia has been arming uninterruptedly, and now again spends this sum on military purposes the tendency of which practically amounts to a direct threatening of her neighbors.” The Hallesche Zeitung on the twenty-third of June discusses the various alliances: “Originally the Russian-French alliance was a military convention, in the last few months there has been added a naval agreement. It is desired to enter with united forces into the great decisive struggle for the division of the world. Russia wants elbow-room as far as the North Atlantic Ocean and the Southern Baltic, besides free entry into the Mediterranean.”

I have quoted all these newspaper extracts because they seem to me absolutely indicative of the sentiment that prevailed in Germany just before the war broke out, whether that sentiment be based on correct impressions or not. We have the Russian side of it in an article written by Professor Maxim Kowaleski, for the Frankfurter Zeitung: “In Russia people believe that Germany and Austria are arming against Russia, in Germany and Austria they take for granted that the opposite is the case.”

To the unprejudiced observer it looks very much as though Servia, thinking her hour had come and feeling sure of Russia’s support, had instigated the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne with the deliberate intention of starting a great conflagration. The preliminary inquiry into the matter, which was carried on very deliberately by Austria, with no sensational charges or accusations, revealed a great plot reaching to the very steps of the Servian throne. Around that throne, as the world well knows, were the men who had deliberately murdered their own previous king and queen and who had been rewarded with high positions for their share in that dark transaction. It was proved to Austria’s satisfaction—and she had so much to lose by a war of aggression that no ulterior motive could have influenced her—that the royal Servian arsenal had provided the weapons of death and that a high official in the army had been directly concerned. Servia’s attitude during the preliminary investigation had been provocative. Then Austria hurled her ultimatum.

It was an unheard-of ultimatum—that much an Austrian friend acknowledged to me at the time. But, he added, the whole situation was equally unheard of. In Germany, except in the ranks of the social democrats, who glory in having no national sentiments, Austria’s act met with the most complete approval. Truth to tell, no one had expected such firmness and decision. The seriousness of the matter was not for a moment overlooked. In my own immediate neighborhood and, I imagine, from end to end of Germany, the first impulse on hearing the news was to sing national hymns. One heard them throughout that whole night—especially the solemn “Gott erhalte Franz den Kaiser” and “Deutschland, Deutschland Über alles.” There was a resigned feeling, too, a feeling that Servia had been such a menace since 1908 that the time had come when something must be done. My Austrian friend believed that the powers would sympathize with his country’s desire to chastise a band of assassins; that the Russian czar especially would never take sides with regicides; that England would see fair play.

To blame the German emperor for what followed is the attitude of the uninformed. Germany has foreseen the struggle, as our extracts from the newspapers show, but her one idea has been self-defense. The worst that can be said of her is that her wonderful prosperity has made her a little boastful and that she has talked too much about her share in world politics and her own “place in the sun.” That indeed was an unfortunate remark of his imperial majesty. In general, however, he has honestly tried to keep the peace, and that Germany, with her blooming trade, her model educational system and her splendid fleet and army should have a larger voice in the affairs of nations was not an unreasonable aim. Those who accuse her of greed for territory should look at the history of their own country and see if they are entitled to throw stones. Nor should they attribute her recent army-increase to a mere spirit of aggression. So hemmed in is Germany, so exposed are her frontiers in every direction, that she can not help taking alarm at the movements of her neighbors. Actually touching her borders are nations with a total population more than doubling her own, not to speak of England with her enormous fleet.

England of late has stood for the restriction of armaments provided her own naval superiority be preserved in the present proportions. Germans believe, probably falsely, that before making such a proposition England hastily ordered the laying of the keels of three new battle-ships which in the ordinary course of events would not have been begun until later. At any rate England leads in the matter of supplying other countries with deadly instruments of war and her attitude is not unlike that of her own rich beer-brewing families to the temperance question. They preach against the use of alcohol, but go on deriving their income from it. The largest factory of Whitehead torpedoes is at Fiume, in Austria; Armstrong and Vickers have branches in Italy and supply that government with naval guns; while the British Engineers’ Association, with a capital of $350,000,000, is endeavoring to corner the trade of the world in firearms. England introduced dreadnaughts and not only builds them for herself but also furnishes them on demand to Japan and South America. With a cannon factory on the Volga and an arsenal equipped by Armstrong and Vickers on the Golden Horn, England has fairly fattened of late on war. By building the first dreadnaught, indeed, she did herself a poor service. Previously Germany was out of the running as regards the number of ships; now, where only dreadnaughts count, she is becoming a good second. Was there not something more than naÏvete in Sir Edward Grey’s serious proposal that Germany and England should restrict the number of their battle-ships but always preserve the proportion of ten to six in England’s favor? We have here, I think, the whole gist of the differences between the two countries. England has steadily preserved her attitude of superiority everywhere its basis was disappearing. She has been jealous of Germany’s commerce, of her colonial progress. These Germans are to England upstarts who need to be kept in their place and are not to be allowed to have a word in the larger world-policies. Almost every Englishman feels that a German is his social inferior. Such assumptions provoke bumptiousness and self-assertion, which, I do not deny, have at times been evidenced. Just before this war broke out, indeed, the feeling of mutual antagonism seemed to be lessening. The English fleet was welcomed at Kiel, the English trade delegation in Berlin. The press of both countries had softened and sweetened.

As for England’s present alliance with Russia against Germany, it is the most monumental act of folly in modern history. Has Britannia been attacked by sclerosis? At home a maudlin sentiment keeps her from enforcing obedience to her laws and abroad she allows her real enemies to pull her about by the nose. It is as though in the middle ages a Henry or an Edward had joined hands with a Genghis Khan or a Timour the Tartar. Can England gain anything whatever by humiliating Germany and furthering Pan-Slavism? A little commercial advantage, possibly, though America will be correspondingly strengthened and the final result will be no better. Britannia, wake up! It is less far from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic than it is from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Gibraltar will soon be as irksome to Pan-Slavism as are now the forts on the Dardanelles. Your own race is made up mainly of Angles and Saxons—all your ideals, all your real interests are far closer to those of the Germans than they are to those of the Russians. The time may come, and very soon, when you are only too glad to throw yourself around Germany’s neck and beg her aid in opposing the hordes from the East. In Russia’s wake are your allies, the Japanese, who now for the first time have taken a hand in European affairs. Japan has been likened by a bright American girl to a man who has never been invited to dinner in certain circles but who at last has invited himself and simply can not be turned out of the house.

Germany, though drawn into the matter merely by the plain terms of her alliance with Austria, stands virtually alone, for Italy is faithless and Austria, as usual, is only half prepared. We may see a recurrence of those exciting days when for seven years Frederick the Great of Prussia—of a Prussia less than half the size that it is now—held his own not only against the great powers of Europe but against the rest of Germany as well. The help that he had from England was not greater than may be expected from Austria to-day, and even the English deserted him at last. Again and again Frederick risked, even as our contemporary Hohenzollern is likely to do, le tout pour le tout. And like Frederick, I think that William, because of better equipment, better discipline and better strategy, is likely to prevail even over the many millions arrayed against him.

England to-day throws the whole blame for the terrible war on Germany, who was lukewarm, so England declares, in counseling Austria not to let her strained relations with Servia develop into war; and in the English press at least there are no words too scathing for the violation by Germany of Belgium neutrality. The average Englishman, I am sure, considers that the reason for England joining in the struggle. Yet what are we to think of Sir Edward Grey’s own words in the “Correspondence respecting the European Crisis” laid before the Houses of Parliament and received here from London August twenty-fifth.

So England, directly from the first, took sides with Servia in a matter that concerned only Servia and Austria. She “could not see how Russia could be urged to suspend preparations” and would not, even for the sake of Belgium, state the terms on which she would agree to remain neutral in the new German-Russian mobilization dispute. Why Germany finally did violate Belgian neutrality is explained by a telegram from the German foreign office to the German ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, on August four. … “Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.”

All eyes then are likely for the next few months to be fixed on the German army and it has seemed worth while to me hastily to collect and publish all the items concerning the land, naval and aerial forces that will be of general interest in America. No one will look, I hope, for much originality in a work of this kind. My information is taken from Major von Schreibershofen’s excellent book Das deutsche Heer, from Colonel von Bremen’s Das deutsche Heer nach der Neuordnung von 1913; from Lieutenant Neumann’s Luftschiffe and his Flugzeuge; from Count Reventlow’s interesting Deutschland zur See; Troetsch’s Deutschland’s Flotte im Entscheidungskampf and Toeche-Mittler: Die deutsche Kriegsflotte. The three last mentioned works, and also Von Bremen’s, are absolutely new, having been published in 1914; Schreibershofen’s dates from 1913. The two others have no date but one can see that they have appeared very recently. The large new works Das Jahr 1913, Deutschland unter Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the Handbuch der Politik have also been of use to me. For the last six months I have followed very carefully in the Zeitungs-Archiv all the newspaper extracts bearing on our subject. The war has doubtless interrupted the publication of the Archiv, so that I shall remain “up to date” for some little time to come.