The occupation of Messina by the Romans, 264, gave rise to this war. The defection of Hiero king of Syracuse from the side of Carthage, and his joining the Romans, first gave the latter the idea of expelling the Carthaginians from the island. The victory near Agrigentum, and capture of that city in 262, seemed to facilitate the execution of this project: it also convinced the Romans of the necessity of their having a naval power. We shall the less wonder at their forming a fleet in Italy, where wood was then plentiful, if we remember their previous experience in naval affairs; these were not the first vessels of war which they constructed, but only the first large ones which they built upon a Carthaginian model. The first naval victory of the Romans under Duilius, by the aid of grappling machines, 260. The project then conceived of carrying the war into Africa was one of the great ideas of the Romans, and from that time it became a ruling maxim of the state, to attack the enemy in his own territory. The second and very remarkable naval victory of the Romans, 257, opened the way for them to Africa, and shows their naval tactics in a very brilliant light: but the unfortunate issue of their expedition to Africa, restored the equilibrium; and the struggle for the dominion of the sea became the more obstinate, as success did not altogether favour one party. The result of the contest appears to have turned upon the possession of the eastern promontories of Sicily, Drepanum, and LilybÆum, which were in a manner the bulwarks of the Carthaginians, and seemed impregnable since Hamilcar Barca had taken the command of them, 247. The last naval victory of the Romans, however, under the consul Lutatius, 241, having cut off the communication between Sicily and Carthage, and the finances of both parties being completely exhausted, a peace was concluded upon the conditions: 1. That the Carthaginians should evacuate Sicily and the small islands adjacent. 2. That they should pay to Rome, by instalments in ten years, for the expenses she had been at in carrying on the war, the sum of 2,200 talents. 3. That they should not make war against Hiero king of Syracuse.

Origin and nature of the governments of the first Roman provinces, in part of Sicily and in Sardinia.

Commencement of the first Illyrian war, 230, which ended with the subjugation of Teuta, 226. The war, however, again broke out, 222, against Demetrius of Pharus, who conceived himself inadequately rewarded by Rome for the services he had rendered her in the preceding war. The Romans found him a much more dangerous adversary than had been expected, even after his expulsion and flight to Philip, 220, (see above, p. 282.) Throughout this war, Rome appeared as the deliverer of the Grecian states, which had suffered extremely from the plunder of these freebooters; Corcyra, Apollonia, and other cities placed themselves formally under her protection, while the AchÆans, Ætolians, and Athenians vied with each other in showing their gratitude.

From the first Gallic war to the burning of Rome, 390, the Gauls had repeated their attacks in 360 and 348, even to the conclusion of the peace in 336. But in the latter part of the Samnite war, a formidable confederacy having taken place among the Italian tribes, some of the Gauls enlisted as mercenaries in the service of the Etruscans, while others allied themselves to the Samnites. This led them to take part in these wars in 306, 302, and 292, until they were obliged, together with the Etruscans, to sue for peace in 284, before which time the Romans had sent a colony into their country, near Sena. This peace lasted till 238, when it was disturbed by the incursion of the transalpine Gauls; without, however, their coming to any war with Rome. But in 232, the proposition of Flaminius the tribune, (lex Flaminia), to divide the lands conquered from the Senones, became the cause of new disturbances. Upon this occasion, the Gauls entered into an alliance with their transalpine countrymen, the GÆsates on the Rhone, who had been accustomed to engage as mercenaries. These having crossed the Alps, the dreadful war of six years (226—220) began, in which, after defeating the Gauls near Clusium, 225, the Romans pursued them into their own territory, and encamped upon the Po, 223. The Gauls having been again completely overthrown by Marcellus, were obliged to sue for peace; when the Roman colonies of Placentia and Cremona were established. The number of men capable of bearing arms in all Italy subject to the Romans during this war amounted to 800,000.

The history of this war, 218—201, of which no later transaction has been able to destroy the interest, is divided into three parts: the history of the war in Italy; the contemporary war in Spain; and from 203, the war in Africa. Hannibal's invasion of Italy in the autumn, 218—engagement near the river Ticinus and the battle of Trebia, in the same year. Battle near the lake Thrasymenus in the spring, 217. Seat of the war transferred to Lower Italy, and the defensive system of the dictator Fabius until the end of the year. Battle of CannÆ, 216, followed by the conquest of Capua and the subjection of the greater part of Lower Italy. The defensive mode of warfare afterwards adopted by the Carthaginian, arose partly from his desire to form a junction with his brother Asdrubal and the Spanish army, and partly from his expectation of foreign support by means of alliances, with Syracuse, after the death of Hiero, 215, and with Philip of Macedon, 216. These hopes, however, were frustrated by the Romans.—Syracuse was besieged and taken, 214—212, (see above, p. 174.) and Philip kept employed in Greece, (see above, p. 282.) In addition to this, the Romans retook Capua, notwithstanding the audacious march of Hannibal towards Rome, 211, and he had now no succour left except the reinforcement which Asdrubal was bringing from Spain. The latter, however, was attacked immediately upon his arrival in Italy, near Sena, by the consuls Nero and Livius, and left dead on the field, 207. From this time the war in Italy became only of secondary importance, as Hannibal was obliged to act on the defensive in Bruttium.

The Course of Hannibal over the Alps ascertained, by J. Whittaker. London, 1794, 2 vols. 8vo. The author endeavours to prove that the passage of Hannibal was over the great St. Bernard, and criticises the opinions of other writers.

[We may likewise mention the learned treatise:—

A Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal over the Alps. By H. L. Wickham, M. A. and the Rev. J. A. Cramer, M. A. second edition, Oxon.]

The war in Spain began nearly about the same time between Asdrubal and the two brothers, Cn. and P. Cornelius Scipio, and was continued, with various success, till the year 216, the issue depending much upon the disposition of the Spaniards themselves. The plan of Carthage after the year 216, was to send Asdrubal with the Spanish army into Italy, and to supply its place by an army from Africa; two victories, however, gained by the Scipios near the Ebro, 216, and the Illiberis, 215, prevented this from being effected, till at last both fell under the superior power and cunning of the Carthaginians, 212. But the arrival of the youthful P. Cornelius Scipio, who did not appear merely to his own nation as an extraordinary genius, entirely changed the face of affairs, and the fortunes of Rome soon became attached to his name, which alone seemed to promise victory. During his command in Spain, 210—206, he won over the inhabitants while he defeated the Carthaginians, and for the furtherance of his great design, contracted an alliance with Syphax in Africa, 206. He was unable, however, to prevent the march of Asdrubal into Italy, 208, which nevertheless rendered it an easy task for him to subdue all Carthaginian Spain as far as Gades, 206, and thus procured him the consular dignity at his return, 205.

The carrying of the war into Africa by Scipio, notwithstanding the opposition of the old Roman generals, and the desertion of Syphax, who at the persuasion of Sophonisba again went over to the Carthaginians (whose loss however was well repaid by Masinissa, whom Scipio had won over to his side in Spain), was followed by an important consequence; for after he had gained two victories over Asdrubal and Syphax, 203, and taken the latter prisoner, the Carthaginians found it necessary to recall Hannibal from Italy, 202; and the battle of Zama terminated the war, 201. The following were the conditions of peace: 1. That the Carthaginians should only retain the territory in Africa annexed to their government. 2. That they should give up all their ships of war, except ten triremes, and all their elephants. 3. That they should pay, at times specified, 10,000 talents. 4. That they should commence no war without the consent of Rome. 5. That they should restore to Masinissa all the houses, cities, and lands that had ever been possessed by himself or his ancestors.—The reproach usually cast upon the Carthaginians, of having left Hannibal unsupported in Italy, in a great measure vanishes, if we remember the plan formed in 216, to send the Spanish army into Italy, and to replace it by an African one: a plan formed with much ability, and followed with as much constancy. We may add to this, that the Barcine faction maintained its influence in the government even to the end of the war. But why they, who by the treaty of peace gave up five hundred vessels of war, suffered Scipio to cross over from Sicily, without sending one to oppose him, is difficult to explain.

View of the political state of the world at this period. In the west, Sicily (the whole island after 212), Sardinia, and Corsica, from the year 237, and Spain, divided into citerior and ulterior (the latter rather in name than in fact), had become Roman provinces 206; the independence of Carthage had been destroyed by the last peace, and her subordination secured by the alliance of Rome with Masinissa; Cisalpine Gaul, formed into a province, served as a barrier against the inroads of the more northern barbarians. On the other side, in the east, the kingdom of Macedonia, and the free states of Greece, forming together a very complicated system, had opened a connection with Rome since the Illyrian war, 230, and Philip's alliance with Hannibal, 214. Of the three powers of the first rank, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt, the two former were allied against the latter, who, on her part, maintained a good understanding with Rome. The states of secondary rank were, those of the Ætolian league, the kings of Pergamus, and the republic of Rhodes, with some smaller, such as Athens: these had allied themselves to Rome since the confederacy against Philip, 211. The AchÆan league, on the contrary, was in the interests of Macedonia, which Rome always endeavoured to attach to herself, in order to make head against those of the first rank.

The negotiations between Rome and Macedonia, from the year 214, give the first striking examples of the ability and address of the Romans in foreign policy; and they are the more remarkable, as the treaty with the Ætolians and others, 211 (see above, p. 283), was the remote cause of the transactions which afterwards took place in the east. The peculiar system adopted by the Romans, of taking the lesser states under their protection as allies, must always have given them an opportunity of making war on the more powerful whenever they chose. This in fact happened in the present case, notwithstanding the peace concluded with Philip, 204. The chief object of the Romans in this war, both by sea and land, was to drive Philip completely out of Greece. The allies on both sides, and the conditions of peace, were similar to those concluded with Carthage (see above, p. 284). The destruction of the naval power of her conquered enemies became now a maxim of Roman policy in making peace; and she thus maintained the dominion of the seas without any great fleet, and without losing the essential character of a dominant power by land.

Liberty was expressly granted to the state which had taken the part of Philip, namely, to the AchÆans; to the others it was naturally understood to belong. It was nevertheless three years, 194, before the Roman army evacuated Greece and withdrew from the fortified places. The conduct of T. Quintius during this period fully shows what he was. The Greeks indeed had much want of such a guardian if they wished to remain quiet: his conduct, however, in the war against Nabis, 195, shows that he had not really at heart the tranquillity of Greece.

The first cause of contention between Rome and Antiochus was the liberty of Greece, which the former wished to extend to the Grecian cities of Asia, and to those in particular which had belonged to Philip, and afterwards to Antiochus; while the latter contended, that Rome had no right to intermeddle with the affairs of Asia. The second cause of dispute was the occupation of the Thracian Chersonesus by Antiochus, 196, in right of some ancient pretensions; and Rome, on her part, would not tolerate him in Europe. This quarrel therefore commenced as early as 196, but did not become serious till the year 105, when in consequence of Hannibal's flight to Antiochus, together with the turbulence and excitement of the Ætolians, whose object it was to embroil the rival powers, the political horizon was completely overcast. What a fortunate thing it was for Rome that such men as Hannibal and Antiochus could not understand each other!

Heyne, de foederum ad Romanorum opes imminuendas initorum eventis eorumque causis; in Opusc. vol. iii.

During this contest in the east, a sanguinary war was going on in the west; from the year 201 in Spain, where the elder Cato commanded; and from 193 in Italy itself, against the Ligurians. Whatever may be said upon the means made use of by Rome to increase the number of her citizens, it will always be difficult to comprehend, not only how she could support all these wars without being thereby weakened, but how at the same time she could found so many colonies!

Although the policy of Rome extended itself everywhere by means of her commissioners, or ambassadors, yet she kept a more particular guard against Carthage by favouring Masinissa at her expense, against the AchÆan league by favouring the Spartans, and against Philip of Macedon by favouring every one who brought any complaint against him (see above, p. 285).

Voluntary exile of Scipio Africanus to Linternum, 187. He dies there, 183, the same year in which Hannibal falls under the continued persecution of Rome. His brother Scipio Asiaticus is also unable to escape a trial and condemnation, 185. One would have expected a sensible effect from the exile of these two great men; but, in a state where the ruling power is in the hands of a body like what the Roman senate was, the change of individuals is but of little consequence.

The first circumstance which gave umbrage to Philip was the small portion they permitted him to conquer in Athamania and Thessaly during the war against Antiochus. But what sharpened his animosity, much more than the object in dispute, was the conduct of the Roman commissioners, before whom he, the king, was called upon to defend himself as an accused party, 184. The exclamation of Philip, that "the sun of every day had not yet set," showed his indignation, and at the same time betrayed his intention. The interval previous to the breaking out of the war was anything rather than a time of peace for Rome; for besides that the Spanish and Ligurian wars continued almost without intermission, the revolts which broke out in Istria, 178, and in Sardinia and Corsica, 176, produced much bloodshed.

Beginning of the Macedonian war, 171, before Rome was prepared; a deceitful truce, which raised the indignation even of the elder senators, was the means resorted to for gaining time. Notwithstanding this, the war at first, 170 and 169, was favourable to Perseus; but he wanted resolution and judgment to enable him to turn his advantages to account. In 168, Paulus Æmilius, an old general, against the usual custom of the Romans, took the command. Bloody and decisive battle near Pydna, June 22, 168. So completely may one day overturn a kingdom which has only an army for its support! Contemporary with this war, and highly fortunate for Rome, was the war of Antiochus Epiphanes with Egypt. No wonder that Rome did not, till 168, through Popilius, command peace between them! (See above, p. 261.)

The republican constitution given to the already ruined and devastated Macedonians (see above, p. 288.) and Illyrians, and which, according to the decree of the senate, "showed to all people that Rome was ready to bestow liberty upon them," was granted upon such hard conditions, that the enfranchised nation soon used every endeavour to procure themselves a king. Greece however suffered still more than Macedonia. Here, during the war, the spirit of faction had risen to the highest pitch; and the arrogant insolence of the Roman party, composed for the most part of venal wretches, was so great, that they persecuted not only those who had espoused an opposite faction, but even those who had joined no faction at all. Rome nevertheless could not believe herself secure, until she had destroyed, by a cruel artifice, all her adversaries (see above, p. 288).

Cato was chief of the party which sought the destruction of Carthage, both from a spirit of envy against Scipio Nasica, whom he hated for his great influence in the senate; and because, when ambassador to Carthage, he thought they did not treat him with sufficient respect. But Masinissa's victory, 152 (see above, p. 88), and the defection of Utica, brought this project into immediate play. Beginning of the war, 150, the Carthaginians having been previously inveigled out of their arms. The city, however, was not captured and destroyed till 146, by P. Scipio Æmilianus. The Carthaginian territory, under the name of Africa, was then made a Roman province.

It might have been expected, that the destruction of the two first commercial cities in the world, in the same year, would have been followed by important consequences to the course of trade; but the trade of Carthage and Corinth had already been drawn to Alexandria and Rhodes, otherwise Utica might, in some respects, have supplied the place of Carthage.

The war against the Spaniards, who of all the nations subdued by the Romans defended their liberty with the greatest obstinacy, began in the year 200, six years after the total expulsion of the Carthaginians from their country, 206. It was exceedingly obstinate, partly from the natural state of the country, which was thickly populated, and where every place became a fortress; partly from the courage of the inhabitants; but above all, owing to the peculiar policy of the Romans, who were wont to employ their allies to subdue other nations. This war continued, almost without interruption, from the year 200 to 133, and was for the most part carried on at the same time in Hispania Citerior, where the Celtiberi were the most formidable adversaries, and in Hispania Ulterior, where the Lusitani were equally powerful. Hostilities were at the highest pitch in 195, under Cato, who reduced Hispania Citerior to a state of tranquillity 185—179, when the Celtiberi were attacked in their native territory; and 155—150, when the Romans in both provinces were so often beaten, that nothing was more dreaded by the soldiers at home than to be sent there. The extortions and perfidy of Servius Galba placed Viriathus, in the year 146, at the head of his nation, the Lusitani: the war, however, soon extended itself to Hispania Citerior, where many nations, particularly the Numantines, took up arms against Rome, 143. Viriathus, sometimes victorious and sometimes defeated, was never more formidable than in the moment of defeat; because he knew how to take advantage of his knowledge of the country, and of the dispositions of his countrymen. After his murder, caused by the treachery of CÆpio, 140, Lusitania was subdued; but the Numantine war became still more violent, and the Numantines compelled the consul Mancinus to a disadvantageous treaty, 137. When Scipio, in the year 133, put an end to this war, Spain was certainly tranquil; the northern parts, however, were still unsubdued, though the Romans penetrated as far as Galatia.

Till nearly the end of this period, prÆtors were expressly appointed to each province. It was not till after the origin of the quÆstiones perpetuÆ, that it became the custom for the prÆtors who had vacated office, to succeed to the provinces (proprÆtores), a principal cause of the degeneracy of the Roman constitution.

C. Sigonius, de Antiquo jure provinciarum in GrÆvii Thes. Antiq. Rom. vol. ii.

Sources of the Roman revenue (vectigalia) were: 1. Tribute a. from the Roman citizens; that is to say, a property-tax imposed by the senate according to the urgency of the case (which, however, was remitted, for a long time, after the war with Perseus, 168, being no longer necessary). b. Tribute of the allies (socii) in Italy: which seems also to have been a property-tax; differing in different places. c. Tribute of the provinces: in some a heavy poll-tax, in others taxes on property; in all, however, they were paid in natural productions, mostly ordinary, though sometimes extraordinary, as well for the salary of the governor as for the supply of the capital. 2. The revenue from the national domains (ager publicus), both in Italy (especially Campania) and in the provinces; the tythes (decumÆ) of which were paid by means of leases for four years, granted by the censors. 3. The revenue from the customs (portoria), collected in the seaports and frontier towns. 4. The revenue arising from the mines (metalla), particularly the Spanish silver mines; the proprietors of which were obliged to pay a duty to the state. 5. The duty upon enfranchised slaves (aurum vicesimarium). All receipts flowed into the national treasury, the Ærarium; all outgoings were exclusively ordered by the senate; and the people were consulted as little with regard to them as they were respecting the imposts. The officers employed were the quÆstores, under whom were the scribÆ, divided into decurias, who, though certainly subordinate, had nevertheless great influence. Their services, as they were not yearly changed, must have been indispensable to the quÆstores for the time being; and the whole management of affairs, at least in detail, must have fallen into their hands.

Upon the finances of Rome, the best work at present is:—

P. Burmanni, Vectigalia Populi Romani. Leyden, 1734, 4to.

Two excellent treatises have since appeared in German upon this subject:—

† D. H. Hegewisch, Essay upon Roman Finances. Antona, 1804, and

† R. Bosse, Sketch of the System of Finance in the Roman State. Brunswick, 1803, 2 parts. Both include the periods of the republic and the monarchy.