Source.—The Greville Memoirs, edited by Henry Reeve, C.B., vol. viii., pp. 290–292, 293, 294. (Longmans, Green and Co., 1888.) January 24.—Clarendon called on me yesterday and told me various things more or less interesting about passing events, about Cobden and the Commercial Treaty. Cobden went over to Paris with letters from Palmerston to Cowley, begging Cowley would give him all the aid he could in carrying out his object of persuading the leading people there to adopt Free Trade principles, saying he went without any mission and as “a free lance.” Cowley did what he could for him, and he went about his object with great zeal, meanwhile putting himself in correspondence with Gladstone, who eagerly backed him up, but all this time nothing was said to the Cabinet on the subject. At length one day Walewski sent for Cowley, and asked him whether he was to understand that Cobden was an agent of the British Government, and authorised by it to say all he was saying in various quarters. Cowley denied all knowledge of Cobden’s proceedings, but wrote a despatch to John Russell stating what had occurred, and at the same time a private letter, saying he did not know whether he would wish such a despatch to be recorded, and therefore to number it and place it in the Foreign Office, or put it in the fire as he thought fit. John Russell accepted the despatch, and at the same time told him he might endorse whatever Cobden did in the matter of commercial engagements. Clarendon said that when he was at Paris four years ago for the Congress, the Emperor one day said to him: “I know you are a great Free Trader, and I suppose you mean to take this opportunity of advancing Free Trade principles here as far as you can.” Clarendon said certainly such was his intention, when the Emperor said he was happy to be able to take the initiative with him on this subject, and that he would tell him that it had just been settled in the Council of State that a great change in their commercial and prohibitive system should be January 27.—There is apparently a strong feeling of doubt and quasi-hostility getting up against the Commercial Treaty, and it looks as if both the English and French Governments would have great difficulties in the matter. Public opinion here remains suspended till the Treaty is produced, and till we are informed what the immediate sacrifices may be that we shall have to make for it, and what are the prospective advantages we obtain in return. The French Protectionists are more impatient, and have begun to pour out their complaints and indignation without waiting to see the obnoxious Convention. Thiers is said to be furious. So far from any Commercial Treaty like this cementing the alliance, and rendering war between the two countries more difficult, it is much more likely to inflame the popular antipathy in France, to make the alliance itself odious, and render the chances of war between the two countries more probable. In maturing his scheme Louis Napoleon has given it all the appearance of a conspiracy, which is in accordance with his character and his tastes. The whole thing was carried on with the most profound secrecy, and the secret was confined to a very few people, viz. the Emperor himself, Fould, Rouher (Minister of Commerce), Michel Chevalier, and Cobden. All the documents were copied by Madame Rouher, and Rouher was so afraid that some guesses might be made if he was known to be consulting books and returns that were preserved in the Library of the Council of State, that he never would look at any of them, and made Chevalier borrow all that he had occasion to refer to. Now the Emperor springs this Treaty upon his reluctant |