Source.—Sir Theodore Martin’s Life of the Prince Consort, vol. iv., pp. 471, 472.

Letter from Lord Cowley (English Ambassador at Paris) to Lord J. Russell.

August 7, 1859.

More than once, in the course of the evening, His Majesty [Napoleon III.] referred to the state of public opinion in England with regard to himself. He asked whether there was any change for the better, observing that he could not comprehend the suspicions entertained of him—that he had done nothing to provoke them, and that they were most unjust. The idea of his invading England was, he said, so preposterous that he could laugh at it, were it not evident to him that there were people in England who seriously believed it.

I replied, that an agent must never shrink from telling the truth, however disagreeable, and I must admit, therefore, the existence in some minds of the suspicions to which his Majesty had referred! nor could I say that I saw much diminution of them as yet. There were many causes that had given rise to them: His Majesty’s sudden intimacy with Russia after the Crimean War; his sudden quarrel with Austria; the equally sudden termination of the war which made people suppose that he might wish to carry it elsewhere; the name he bore with its antecedents; the extraordinary rapidity with which the late armaments had been made; the attention devoted to the Imperial Navy; its increase; the report of the Naval Commission of 1848, which showed plainly that the augmentation of the navy was directed against England. All these matters had made people look about them, and their eyes had been suddenly opened to the fact that within easy reach of the British shores were 500,000 men, with a steam fleet as powerful, or more powerful than any that could be brought against them. This state of things had created a great deal of alarm; more perhaps than was necessary. But a great nation could not leave her fate to the chapter of accidents, and we were in fact merely resuming that place by sea which we had before the invention of steam. “In fact, Sire,” I said, “the whole question lies in a very narrow compass. England and France are the two most powerful nations of the world. Neither can, nor will submit to the supremacy of the other. France is a military Power. England, as compared with France, is not. England is a naval Power. So is France. If the balance of power between them is to be preserved, England must be the stronger by sea, as France is by land, otherwise England would be at the mercy of France.” The Emperor somewhat disputed the justice of these remarks, observing that his 500,000 men were required to hold his position upon the Continent, and that I had not taken into account the insular position of Great Britain, which made her, as it were, a large fortress. But upon my observing that an insular position was of little value unless there was a fleet to keep off marauders, His Majesty said he would not dispute the point any longer; but all he hoped was that our Press would not pervert facts, and say that the extra armaments of England were called for by the armaments of France, for it was not true that France had armed.

I did not pursue this delicate matter further, but I said I was convinced that it was in His Majesty’s power, if he desired it, to recover the confidence of England. Let him appeal to the common sense of the English people by facts rather than by words, and he would soon see common sense get the better of suspicions. The Emperor replied that he desired no more, and that, if he had spoken on the subject, it was because he was afraid that the feelings of the British people would arouse the corresponding sentiments in France, and this was not desirable.

“I defy anyone to listen to the Emperor,” Lord Cowley adds, “when he is speaking of the English Alliance, without attaining the conviction that the preservation of it is that which he has most at heart. I feel equally certain that he does not dream of a war with England, and that his amour propre is wounded by our suspicions of his intentions; but, as I observed to him, no man can tell what unforeseen circumstances may produce, and that it is not so much with the events of the day, as with the possible contingencies of the future, that we have to deal.”