[Rabbinical authority and philosopher. He was born at the island of Majorca in 1361, and died in 1444. He lived for some time in Algiers. His literary activity was devoted to philosophy, Bible, and Talmud, and his best known work is Magen Abot (Shield of the Fathers), which is a theological-philosophical treatise.]

On the Problem Why the Wicked Prosper and the Righteous Are in Distress^[228]

Indeed the difficulty about the wicked man who is prosperous seems to be no difficulty at all. For God, who is blessed, is good, and bestows good upon all. He does not withhold good from the wicked, just as He does not withhold from the lions their claws wherewith they tear their prey, for they are needed for the acquisition of their food. In all this the philosopher and the theologian concur; there is no difference between them. The only difference between them is that the philosopher cannot believe that divine Providence should attach itself to an individual, to save him from evils for his righteousness, or to withhold bliss from him for his wickedness; while the theologian believes that Providence attaches itself to an individual just as it attaches itself to the entire species which is permanent. For an individual man’s intellect is as permanent as the species, and hence Providence attaches itself to him, just as it attaches itself to the species. There is a very subtle speculation in this. For it is known that the species exist only in the intellect, and that nothing but individuals actually exist. Aristotle, however, in his Metaphysics has explained that the matter is quite the reverse, that the individuals create the species in their intellects, through repetition.^[229] Now since the species have no actual existence, and Providence can only attach itself to that which has actual existence, what is the cause of their permanence according to the philosopher? For he is of the opinion that Providence attaches itself only to that which has permanence, and the species is the only thing that has permanence; but the species has no existence, and Providence cannot attach itself to that which has no existence. He therefore says that Providence is confined to the spheres, stars, and separate intelligences, and that the species are preserved through the influence that emanates from them to this mental existence. But as to individuals, all their affairs are abandoned to chance, there being no difference between individuals of the human race and the individuals of animals. The theologian, however, believes that divine Providence attaches itself to individuals on account of their intellect, although it has not the same permanence as the separate intelligences and as the intellect of the spheres. All that is found in this lower world was created for the use of man. Accordingly, from Providence that is attached to each individual man there emanates a Providence to the species of the animals, so that through their preservation the existence of man should be preserved. Upon this matter the philosophers are agreed; when they have investigated the functions of the limbs and the functions of the animals, vegetables, and minerals, they have found them all to be for the benefit of man, either for his food, raiment, sustenance, and dwelling-place, or for curing his diseases. For even in harmful things there may be found a cure and some benefit for man. If a pious man has sometimes been cured with the excrement of a devouring lion, or with the skin of a venomous snake, then that injurious thing was created for the benefit of man. Similarly, if one planted a vineyard, and made wine which a pious man has drunk when stung by a viper and has been cured thereby, then that wine was created for the benefit of that pious man. In a similar manner our saintly teacher^[230] said, when he was cured of an illness by apple-cider seventy years old that was in the possession of a Gentile: ‘Blessed be He who handed over His world to custodians.’ It is likewise for this reason that our sages of blessed memory said: ‘The Holy One, blessed be He, has only four cubits of the law in His world.’^[231] They likewise said: ‘The entire world was created to attend to man.’^[232] Ben Zoma said: ‘Blessed be He who created all these to serve me.’^[233] Concerning all this I have already written in a preceding chapter. Now it is impossible that all this is by mere chance, and is, therefore, due to divine Providence, as I shall, with the help of God, explain at full length, when treating of the soul.

A strong argument is urged by the theologian against the philosopher in this connection. Since man’s intellect is as permanent as the angels, divine Providence ought to attach itself to the intellect, as it attaches itself to the angels. Moreover, this fact made itself manifest to the senses, as Scripture relates of the punishment of the wicked, that some times hyperphysical and supernatural calamities befall them, having been forewarned by a man renowned as a prophet; at the same time the righteous are delivered from these calamities, and prosper against the laws of nature. This cannot be attributed to chance and accident, for it occurred very frequently, and the warning had been given by a man sent by God, who is blessed, whose message could not be doubted. With all these arguments the theologian establishes his belief that God, who is blessed, supervises every individual of the human race, giving a goodly reward to the righteous, and bringing calamities upon the wicked.

To this the philosopher replies and says that, had the affairs of the world been arranged in this manner, the contention of the theologians would have been justified. But we also see that supernatural calamities befall many righteous men, and, on the other hand, many of the wicked who deserve evil prosper in a manner contrary to natural reason. Had things been arranged by God, who is blessed, as the theologian maintains, the righteous man should have been delivered from the misfortunes which had befallen him, and prosperity should have been withheld from the wicked.

The theologian says with regard to the misfortunes that have come upon the righteous that it is a fallacious contention. The fallacy is due to one of two considerations: either on account of the subject, or on account of the object. As to the subject, it is possible that this man who, according to all appearances, is righteous, is not good at all; for He who understands his secrets knows that he is bad; men are deceived about him, and decide that he is good, but He who understands his thoughts knows him to be bad. Or he may have committed a crime for which he deserves this calamity. As to the object, it is possible that these occurrences which appear to be bad are not bad at all, but are for the good of the sufferer.

In this manner the theologian evades the philosopher’s objection with reference to the righteous upon whom misfortunes have come, and this ramifies into many details. As to the prosperity of the wicked, the theologian likewise says that there is a fallacy due to one of two considerations: either on account of the subject, or on account of the object. As to the subject, it is possible that this wicked man, although his deeds committed openly show him to be undoubtedly bad, must have performed a good deed for which he deserves this prosperity as a recompense. As to the object, it is possible that this prosperity is for his own harm. This, too, is a general argument having many ramifications with which the theologian evades the objection with reference to the wicked who is prosperous.