[Physician and translator. He was born at Lunel about 1150, and died at Marseilles 1230. He continued the work of his father, and earned for himself the gratitude of Hebrew readers by translating Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed into Hebrew. He also compiled a glossary of the philosophic terms that occur in that book. He was an enthusiastic follower of Maimonides.]
On the Limitations of Man’s Intellect[156]
Know that there are objects of perception which are within the capacity and nature of the human intellect to grasp. There are in existence other things and objects which are not in its nature to perceive in any shape or form; indeed the gates of perception are closed against it. There are in existence still other things of which the intellect may grasp one part, while remaining ignorant of the other. Because the intellect has the power of grasping, it does not necessarily follow that it can grasp everything, just as there are objects of perception which the senses can perceive only at a certain distance, and no other. The same is the case with all other corporeal faculties. Thus, for instance, although a man is able to carry two kikkars, he is not able to carry ten. That individuals of the same species surpass one another in these sensations and other corporeal faculties is clearly manifest to every man; but there is a limit to individual superiority, which does not extend to every distance and degree. The same is the case with the perceptions of the human intellect. The individuals of the human species greatly surpass one another in this respect. This, too, is clearly manifest to the men of wisdom. For while one man can discover a certain thing by himself through his own speculations, another man is never able to understand it; even if he is taught by means of all possible expressions and examples, and during a long period, his intellect can in no way grasp it, the power of his mind being insufficient to understand it. This distinction is likewise not unlimited. Indeed, the human intellect undoubtedly has a boundary where it must stop. There are certain things which are manifestly inaccessible to the understanding of man, so that his soul does not even long to know them, being aware of the impossibility of such knowledge, as there is no opening through which he may enter to attain to it. For instance, we are ignorant as to the number of the stars of heaven, whether it is even or odd; nor do we know the number of the species of animals, minerals, plants, and similar things. There are, however, other things to comprehend which man entertains a strong desire, and mental efforts to seek and investigate the truth thereof are made by every thinking sect of men at all times. It is with regard to these things that opinions differ, and thinkers disagree, and confusions constantly arise, because the intellect is bent on comprehending them, that is to say, on account of the longing entertained for them: every one thinks that he has discovered a way by which he may know the truth of the thing, whereas it is not within the power of the human intellect to produce demonstrative proof on the matter. (For every proposition, the truth of which can be ascertained by proof, is not subject to dispute, contradiction, or rejection; none but the ignorant would join in a controversy which is known as the ‘controversy capable of demonstrative proof.’ Thus one finds that men disputed concerning the spherical form of the earth, or the circular revolution of the sphere, and the like. Such matters do not belong to this treatise). Now as to the subjects in which this confusion prevails, it is exceedingly frequent in metaphysical speculations, less so in matters relating to physics, and is entirely absent from the exact sciences. Alexander Aphrodisius says that there are three causes which bring about disputes on various subjects: firstly, love of authority and conquest which prevents a man from attaining to the exact truth; secondly, the subtlety, depth, and difficulty of the subject which is to be comprehended; thirdly, the ignorance of the investigator and the insufficiency of the power of his intellect to comprehend that which may be comprehended. That is what Alexander states. In our times there is a fourth cause which Alexander did not mention, because it did not exist at that time, namely, habit and training. For men naturally love and are attracted by that to which they have been accustomed. We thus see that villagers, although they seldom wash their heads and their bodies, and, missing all pleasures, lead a life of privation, nevertheless dislike the cities, and do not enjoy their pleasures; they prefer bad things to which they are accustomed to good things to which they are not accustomed. They derive no satisfaction from dwelling in palaces, from being clad in silk, and from indulging in baths, ointments, and perfumes. The same happens to a man with reference to his opinions to which he has been accustomed, and in which he has been brought up: he cherishes them, defends them, and shuns the opposite views. It is likewise through this cause that a man is prevented from attaining to truth, and clings to the things to which he has been accustomed. Such, for instance, is the case with the vulgar notions concerning God’s corporeality, and many other metaphysical questions, as we shall explain. This is due to long familiarity with scriptural verses, which, as a fixed dogma, were respected and believed in, and the literal sense of which implies corporeality of God and imageries in which there is no truth; these passages, however, were written as parables and allegories, for reasons which I shall mention below.
Do not think that that which we have said of the insufficiency of the power of the human intellect and of the limit where it must stop is an assertion made only in accordance with the Torah; in truth it is a matter which the philosophers have likewise asserted, and which they have comprehended in a true manner, without inclining to any doctrine or opinion. It is an established fact that can only be doubted by one who is ignorant of things that have been proved.
