CHAPTER VIII.

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ALLEN'S LETTERS TO THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, TO THE NEW YORK PROVINCIAL CONGRESS, AND TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONGRESS.

The Continental Congress, affected by sinister influences, favored the removal of the stores and cannon of Ticonderoga to the south end of Lake George. Allen wrote to Congress a vigorous remonstrance. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut protested, and the project was abandoned. On May 29th, 1775, from Crown Point, Allen addressed the Continental Congress as follows:

An abstract of the action of Congress has just come to hand: and though it approves of the taking the fortress on Lake Champlain and the artillery, etc., I am, nevertheless, much surprised that your Honors should recommend it to us to remove the artillery to the south end of Lake George, and there to make a stand; the consequences of which must ruin the frontier settlements, which are extended at least one hundred miles to the northward from that place. Probably your Honors were not informed of those settlements, which consist of several thousand families who are seated on that tract of country called the New Hampshire Grants. Those inhabitants, by making those valuable acquisitions for the Colonies, have incensed Governor Carleton and all the ministerial party in Canada against them; and provided they should, after all their good service in behalf of their country, be neglected and left exposed, they will be of all men the most consummately miserable....

If the King's troops be again in possession of Ticonderoga and Crown Point and command the Lake, the Indians and Canadians will be much more inclined to join with them and make incursions into the heart of our country. But the Colonies are now in possession and actual command of the Lake, having taken the armed sloop from George the Third, which was cruising in the Lake, also seized a schooner belonging to Major Skene at South Bay, and have armed and manned them both.... The Canadians (all except the noblesse) and also the Indians appear at present to be very friendly to us; and it is my humble opinion that the more vigorous the Colonies push the war against the King's troops in Canada, the more friends we shall find in that country. Provided I had but 500 men with me at St. John's (18th May) when we took the King's sloop, I would have advanced to Montreal. Nothing strengthens our friends in Canada equal to our prosperity in taking the sovereignty of Lake Champlain, and should the Colonies forthwith send an army of two or three thousand men and attack Montreal, we should have little to fear from the Canadians or Indians, and should easily make a conquest of that place, and set up the standard of liberty in the extensive province of Quebec, whose limit was enlarged purely to subvert the liberties of America. Striking such a blow would intimidate the Tory party in Canada, the same as the commencement of the war at Boston intimidated the Tories in the Colonies. They are a set of gentlemen that will not be converted by reason, but are easily wrought upon by fear.

By a council of war held on board the sloop the 27th instant, it was agreed to advance to the Point Aufere with the sloop and schooner, and a number of armed boats well manned, and there make a stand, act on the defensive, and by all means command the Lake and defend the frontiers. Point Aufere is about six miles this side of forty-five degrees north latitude, but if the wisdom of the Continental Congress should view the proposed invasion of the King's troops in Canada as premature or impolitic, nevertheless, I humbly conceive, when your Honors come to the knowledge of the before-mentioned facts, you will at least establish some advantageous situation toward the northerly part of Lake Champlain, as a frontier, instead of the south promontory of Lake George. Commanding the northerly part of the Lake, puts it in our power to work our policy with the Canadians and Indians. We have made considerable proficiency this way already. Sundry tribes have been to visit us, and have returned to their tribes to use their influence in our favor. We have just sent Capt. Abraham Ninham, a Stockbridge Indian, as our embassador of peace to the several tribes of Indians in Canada. He was accompanied by Mr. Winthrop Hoit, who has been a prisoner with the Indians and understands their tongue. I do not imagine, provided we command Lake Champlain, there will be any need of a war with the Canadians or Indians.

On June 2, 1775, Allen addressed the New York Provincial Congress:

The pork forwarded to subsist the army, by your Honors' direction, evinces your approbation of the procedure; and as it was a private expedition, and common fame reports that there are a number of overgrown Tories in the province, your Honors will the readier excuse me in not first taking your advice in the matter, but the enterprises might have been prevented by their treachery. It is here reported that some of them have been lately savingly converted, and that others have lost their influence. If in those achievements there be anything honorary, the subjects of your government, viz., the New Hampshire settlers, are justly entitled to a large share, as they had a great majority of numbers of the soldiery as well as the command in making those acquisitions, and as your Honors justify and approve the same.

I desire and expect your Honors have, or soon will lay before the Grand Continental Congress, the great disadvantage it must inevitably be to the Colonies to evacuate Lake Champlain, and give up to the enemies of our country those invaluable acquisitions, the key of either Canada or our country, according as which party holds the same in possession and makes a proper improvement of it. The key is ours as yet, and provided the Colonies would suddenly push an army of two or three thousand men into Canada, they might make a conquest of all that would oppose them in the extensive province of Quebec, except a reinforcement from England should prevent it. Such a diversion would weaken General Gage or insure us of Canada.

I wish to God America would at this critical juncture exert herself agreeable to the indignity offered her by a tyrannical ministry. She might rise on eagle's wings, and mount up to glory, freedom, and immortal honor if she did but know and exert her strength. Fame is now hovering over her head. A vast continent must now sink to slavery, poverty, horror, and bondage, or rise to unconquerable freedom, immense wealth, inexpressible felicity, and immortal fame.

I will lay my life on it, with fifteen hundred men and a proper train of artillery I will take Montreal. Provided I could be thus furnished and if an army could command the field, it would be no insuperable difficulty to take Quebec. This object should be pursued, though it should take ten thousand men to accomplish the end proposed; for England cannot spare but a certain number of her troops, anyway, she has but a small number that are disciplined [this was months before the Hessians and other mercenaries were hired], and it is as long as it is broad the more that are sent to Quebec, the less they can send to Boston, or any other part of the continent.

Our friends in Canada can never help us until we first help them, except in a passive or inactive manner. There are now about seven hundred regular troops in Canada. I have lately had sundry conferences with the Indians; they are very friendly. Capt. Abraham Ninham, a Stockbridge Indian, and Mr. Winthrop Hoit, who has sundry years lived with the Caughnawgoes in the capacity of a prisoner and was made an adopted son to a motherly squaw of that tribe, have both been gone ten days to treat with the Indians as our embassadors of peace and friendship. I expect in a few weeks to hear from them. By them I sent a friendly letter to the Indians which Mr. Hoit can explain to them in Indian. The thing that so unites the Indians to us is our taking the sovereignty of Lake Champlain. They have wit enough to make a good bargain, and stand by the strongest side. Much the same may be said of the Canadians.

It may be thought that to push an army into Canada would be too premature and imprudent. If so, I propose to make a stand at the Isle-aux-Noix which the French fortified by intrenchment the last war, and greatly fatigued our large army to take it. It is about fifteen miles this side St. John's. Our only having it in our power thus to make incursions into Canada, might probably be the very reason why it would be unnecessary to do so, even if the Canadians should prove more refractory than I think for.

Lastly, with submission I would propose to your Honors to raise a small regiment of Rangers, which I could easily do, and that mostly in the counties of Albany and Charlotte, provided your Honors should think it expedient to grant commissions and thus regulate and put the same under pay. Probably your Honors may think this an impertinent proposal: it is truly the first favor I ever asked of the Government, and if it be granted, I shall be zealously ambitious to conduct for the best good of my country and the honor of the Government.

On June 9th Allen addressed the Massachusetts Congress:

These armed vessels are at present abundantly sufficient to command the Lake. The making these acquisitions has greatly attached the Canadians, and more especially the Indians, to our interest. They have no personal prejudice or controversy with the United Colonies, but act upon political principles, and consequently are inclined to fall in with the strongest side. At present ours has the appearance of it; as there are at present but seven hundred regular troops in all the different parts of Canada. Add to this the consideration of the imperious and haughty conduct of the troops, which has much alienated the affections of both the Canadians and Indians from them. Probably there may soon be more troops from England sent there, but at present you may rely on it that Canada is in a weak and helpless condition. Two or three thousand men, conducted by intrepid commanders, would at this juncture make a conquest of the ministerial party in Canada with such additional numbers as may be supposed to vie with the reinforcements that may be sent from England. Such a plan would make a diversion in favor of the Massachusetts Bay, who have been too much burdened with the calamity that should be more general, as all partake of the salutary effects of their valor and merit in the defence of the liberties of America. I hope, gentlemen, you will use your influence in forwarding men, provisions, and every article for the army that may be thought necessary. Blankets, provisions, and powder are scarce.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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