Henry Bulwer,[578] who during the absence of Lord Granville from Paris was in charge of the embassy, was agreeably surprised at the calmness with which M. Thiers received the news of the conclusion of the treaty. At their first interview, after the arrival of Guizot’s despatch, he contented himself with expressing a pained astonishment that England should have treated her ally with so little consideration. The affair would, he feared, arouse the greatest indignation throughout the country and, for the present, he must beg him to observe the strictest secrecy about it.[579] A few days later, in the course of a long and confidential conversation with Louis Philippe, Bulwer was enabled to judge of the King’s opinion of the situation. Adopting the contention, which Thiers was instructing Guizot to urge in his conferences with Palmerston, that no definite proposals for settling the eastern question had ever been made to the French government, Louis Philippe complained of the secret manner in which the treaty had been negotiated. “Ah, Mr. Bulwer,” said he, “I know you wished to read me a lesson, I know it, but it may be a perilous one for all parties.” Assuming a more confidential tone, the King then proceeded to explain the difficulties by which he might be confronted. It would not be easy, he feared or affected to fear, to maintain peace. Thiers, he had reason to believe, would wish him to go to war, and in that case he might be placed in a very delicate position. “How do you think I should stand,” he asked plaintively, “were Thiers at the head of a large parliamentary party to announce that he had resigned, sooner than submit to the dishonour of France?” It was to be hoped that the coercion which the four Powers proposed to apply to Mehemet Ali would either at once prove effectual, or fail completely and be promptly abandoned. The sooner the affair could be settled the better. For his part, only this was a circumstance which Bulwer must never disclose to M. Thiers, he had taken steps to induce the Pasha to refrain from ordering Ibrahim to pass the Taurus mountains.[580] On August 3, before leaving Paris for the ChÂteau d’Eu, Louis Philippe discussed the situation in the same spirit with Lord Granville.[581]

The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was announced in London on the 25th, and two days later, the news was published in the Paris papers. The expectation of the King and of M. Thiers that it would arouse a dangerous excitement was fully realized. The bourse was panic-stricken and securities fell heavily. The Chambers were not sitting, but the press with one accord gave voice to the popular indignation. The decision of the four Powers to adopt, without consultation with France, hostile measures against her protÉgÉ Mehemet Ali, was denounced as a national insult which must be wiped out in blood. The tone of the Constitutionel, which was notoriously inspired by the President of the Council, was nearly as bellicose as that of the National, the organ of the republican and military party. M. Thiers, if he did not actually encourage, certainly did nothing to allay, the excitement, which was increased, on August 1, by the publication of a Royal ordinance decreeing substantial additions to both the army and the navy.

In London the affair only began to attract much public interest, when the extent of the resentment which it had aroused in Paris became known. The High Tories, who had always disliked the French alliance, were delighted to think that that combination was at an end. The more moderate members of the party, however, who followed the leadership of Wellington, Peel and Aberdeen, whilst agreeing as to the necessity of driving Mehemet Ali from Syria, regretted that means had not been found of inducing France to adhere to the treaty. The Times,[582] which was very antagonistic to Palmerston, supplied its readers, on August 3, with an article by Henry Reeve in which he expressed a sincere hope that relations with France “would not be imperilled for the sake of a desperado like Mehemet Ali,” and, at the same time, suggested that throughout the negotiations the Foreign Office had not improbably been the dupe of Russia. The Radicals adopted this view, and furthermore, deprecated any intervention in Turkish affairs. It was only in their quarter of the House that the policy of the government encountered any real hostility. But even their attack was not pressed with much spirit, and Palmerston, on August 6, a few days before the prorogation of Parliament, had no difficulty in repelling Joseph Hume’s allegation that the insurrection in the Lebanon had been fomented by British agents.[583]

Guizot, in the meanwhile, had had several conferences at the Foreign Office, and had discussed the situation with both Melbourne and John Russell. The position which the French government intended to assume was set forth in a memorandum which he was instructed to read to Lord Palmerston. No formal proposals for a treaty, M. Thiers contended, had ever been made to France. Various suggestions, it was true, for settling the Turco-Egyptian question had been put forward, with none of which she had been able to agree. She had always looked upon Mehemet Ali as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and considered his strength as necessary to the preservation of Turkey. Hence she had constantly opposed the idea of wresting Syria from him by force, and she was now disposed to think that the four Powers had scarcely realized the magnitude of the task upon which they had embarked so light-heartedly. “Treat Lord Palmerston,” wrote M. Thiers, “as he treated you. Read out to him this written declaration. Question him boldly. Ask him whether he has any plans for helping the rising in Syria, and what measures he proposes to adopt should the Pasha return a flat refusal to the Sultan’s demands? Press him hard. Place him in the position of having to confess that he has acted in a very foolhardy fashion. . . . Be careful, however, to frame your questions in such a way that, should he decline to answer them, you are not compelled to announce a rupture of relations. For the moment France must restrain herself.”[584]

There is no reason to suppose that Guizot displayed any lack of skill in the performance of his prescribed task. He was, however, unable to report that he had achieved the smallest measure of success. Palmerston, whilst expressing his deep regret that a divergence of opinion should have alienated the two Cabinets, and admitting the hope, which Guizot himself was convinced was sincere, that their separation would be of brief duration, was clearly determined to carry out the treaty to the letter. As regards the military situation in Syria—the point upon which M. Thiers laid the greatest stress—he was full of confidence. Ibrahim, surrounded by a hostile population and deprived of communication by sea with Egypt, would, he felt certain, be reduced to impotence. Melbourne, however, displayed far less confidence, and the Austrian and the Prussian ministers, with whom Guizot also conversed, adopted an almost apologetic tone. Indeed, throughout this affair, it would seem that the appellation of “time-serving dog” applied by Charles Greville to Neumann might with equal justice have been applied to BÜlow, his Prussian colleague.[585]

Whilst news from the East was eagerly awaited Guizot was summoned to the ChÂteau d’Eu, where he would be enabled to confer with both the King and M. Thiers. From the subsequent proceedings of the chief actors in these transactions, as well as from the somewhat meagre account of his visit which M. Guizot has given in his MÉmoires, it is not difficult to surmise the nature of the plan which it was resolved to adopt. France was to arm upon an imposing scale, and her representatives at the different Courts were to assume an attitude of dignified resentment. Such a course possessed a twofold advantage. Abroad, it could not fail to have a great effect upon the timid Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, and might even incline them to withhold their ratification of the treaty. At home, warlike preparations would be popular, and might prevent people from enquiring too closely into the policy which had resulted in the isolation of France. Moreover, M. Thiers was glad of the opportunity, which the crisis afforded him, of strengthening the army and of repairing the effect of many yeas of military neglect.

But, although the King and his minister were thus resolved to show a menacing front to Europe, Guizot was supplied with confidential instructions of a most pacific character. Palmerston, they were convinced, had grossly miscalculated the strength of Mehemet Ali, and it was to be hoped that the unexpected difficulties which the execution of the treaty could not fail to encounter would produce a great revulsion of feeling, not only at the continental Courts, but among the majority of the members of the British Cabinet. Should, therefore, M. Guizot perceive signs of a disposition to adopt a less uncompromising attitude towards Mehemet Ali and to draw nearer to France, he was to encourage it by all means in his power. Provided the Treaty of July 15 could be declared to be at an end, the French government would gladly join with the Powers in guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey, on the basis of the maintenance of the conditions of the Convention of Kiutayeh. M. Thiers, it will be seen, was thus ready to consent to restrict Mehemet Ali to the life government of both Syria and Egypt, a state of affairs to which he had always declared that it was useless to expect him to submit. As an alternative to this solution of the difficulty, France might be invited to mediate on behalf of the Pasha with the allied Powers. In that case the hereditary tenure of Egypt and the life government of Syria for Mehemet Ali would be the basis of the negotiation.[586] This was another arrangement which a few weeks before M. Thiers had rejected as altogether inadmissible. The Comte Walewski, a natural son of Napoleon, who had been sent upon a special mission to Egypt, on August 2, for the purpose of counselling the Pasha to refrain from beginning hostilities, was, accordingly, instructed to suggest to Mehemet Ali that he should defer his dispute with the four Powers and the Porte to the mediation of France.

But in addition to these instructions Guizot carried back with him to London a letter from Louis Philippe to his son-in-law, the King of the Belgians. Leopold was at Windsor Castle, consumed with anxiety at the thought of the dangers to which a European war must expose his newly established Kingdom. Louis Philippe’s letter of August 13 was plainly intended to be read by Queen Victoria, and was drawn up with the object of seriously alarming her, and of prejudicing her against Palmerston. “The situation in which France finds herself,” wrote the King, “is neither of her choice nor of her creation. It was said of the death of the Duc d’Enghien that it was worse than a crime, it was a blunder. I say now of the Treaty of July 15, that it is worse than a blunder, it is a misfortune of which the consequences are incalculable. The situation is particularly painful for me who have always scouted the notion that England could ever enter into an alliance without France. I find I am wrong. For the present we can only wait and see. But there is one thing we must do and that is to arm, and we are doing so vigorously. Our rÔle must be one of expectation. We must see what England means to do, before deciding what France shall do, either in the way of restoring or preserving the balance of power.”[587]

A few hours before M. Guizot departed from England to visit the King at Eu, a steamer left the Thames having on board Louis Napoleon, who, with some fifty followers, a tame eagle and a bundle of proclamations, purposed to overthrow the Orleans Monarchy. His destination was Boulogne, where a subaltern officer of the garrison had been drawn into the plot. On the morning of August 6, the Imperial Pretender disembarked at Vimereux and presented himself before the 42nd regiment upon the barrack square. But his appearance aroused no enthusiasm. Finding that their plans had miscarried, the conspirators attempted to regain their ship. Their flight was, however, intercepted by the police and the national guards, who captured the whole party and lodged them in the gaol. Four years before Louis Napoleon had made a similar attempt at Strasburg. On that occasion he had not been brought to trial, but had simply been placed on board a ship and sent off to America. This second offence, however, could not be treated with the same leniency. On September 28, he was arraigned before the peers and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment in the fortress of Ham. The affair excited little public interest and was generally treated with contemptuous indifference. Certain French newspapers, however, published accounts of meetings between the Pretender and Palmerston, and declared that his attempt must have been connived at by the British government. But at his first interview with Baron Bourqueney, who had come over to London to take charge of the embassy during the absence of Guizot, Palmerston was enabled to pledge his word of honour that, for “the past two years, neither he nor Lord Melbourne had set eyes upon Louis Bonaparte or upon any of the adventurers by whom he was surrounded.”[588] His assurance was readily accepted and the matter was quickly forgotten.

Upon his return to London, Guizot found awaiting him an invitation to Windsor. Among the party at the Castle were the King of the Belgians, Melbourne, Palmerston, and Wellington. Leopold, to whom Guizot at once delivered Louis Philippe’s letter, applied himself diligently to the task of extricating his father-in-law from his difficulties. With the view of terminating the isolation in which France was placed, he proposed that the convention of the four Powers for the pacification of the Levant should be merged in a larger instrument, to which she might be a party. But Palmerston, with whom he had a long conference, whilst acknowledging the advantages to be derived from a general agreement to uphold the integrity of Turkey, declared emphatically that no plan of that kind could be considered, until the Treaty of July 15 should have been executed in all its details. On August 20, at the termination of his visit, Guizot carried back with him to London the conviction that Leopold’s efforts had in no way modified the situation. He had, however, been able to derive some small consolation from the evident desire of the Queen and of Prince Albert to treat him with unusual consideration, whilst he had noted with satisfaction that Melbourne had appeared depressed and even Palmerston seemed out of spirits.[589]

From the French point of view the news from Syria was of a distinctly reassuring character. The insurrection in the Lebanon, upon the wide development of which Palmerston was supposed to have confidently depended for the realization of his plans, had been suppressed without difficulty by Ibrahim Pasha. This circumstance, combined with the efforts of King Leopold, revived the active opposition of those of Palmerston’s colleagues who disapproved of his eastern policy. They urged, accordingly, the expediency of making some friendly advances towards France. Palmerston consented with an unexpected alacrity to meet their wishes. He had not answered Thiers’ memorandum of July 21, and he now proposed that he should reply to it and thus re-open communications with the French government. But his long despatch of August 31, was scarcely so conciliatory as some of his fellow-ministers would have desired. It was in effect an amplification of the memorandum which, on July 17, he had read out and handed to M. Guizot. It gave a luminous account of the negotiations and set forth the British case with admirable clearness, but only in the concluding paragraphs was a vague hope expressed that, after the complete execution of the Treaty of July 15, France would once more resume her place in “the union of the five Powers.”[590] The document was intended for publication and, in drawing it up, Palmerston had been more concerned to convince his countrymen of the justice of his cause than to conciliate the French government. As the event was to prove, he had judged correctly in supposing that a lucid exposition of his policy would greatly strengthen his hand, and enable him to counteract the intrigues of the French party, in the Cabinet. When, about a month later, his despatch was communicated to the press, it silenced the opposition of all fair-minded persons.[591] Guizot, suspecting at once the real object which Palmerston had in view, lost no time in urging upon Thiers the necessity of presenting, no less skilfully, the French case to the public.[592]

The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was known at Constantinople on August 3. The Porte, acting under the advice of the ambassadors of the four Powers, proceeded without loss of time to carry out its conditions. Rifat Bey, accompanied by Mr. Alison of the British embassy, was despatched to Egypt with the Sultan’s ultimatum, and measures were promptly taken for rendering effective aid to the Syrian insurgents.[593] At the same time as the documents relating to the treaty were sent to Constantinople, the instructions of the Admiralty were forwarded to Sir Robert Stopford, commanding the British Mediterranean Squadron. All communication by sea was to be cut off between Egypt and Syria. If the Pasha’s fleet should be discovered within the harbour of Alexandria, it was not to be allowed to leave. Should an Egyptian squadron be cruising off the Syrian coast, the admiral was to use his own discretion as to the means to be employed for carrying out the intentions of his government. Peaceful persuasion was to be tried in the first instance, but, should it prove ineffectual, force must be resorted to without hesitation. Five thousand stands of arms from the stores at Malta were placed at his disposal, for distribution among the insurgent mountaineers. Lastly, Stopford was warned to be on his guard against “any sudden movement of the French squadron, in consequence of orders which might be sent from Paris, under the first impulse of irritation which the French government would naturally feel at finding itself placed in a separate and isolated position.”[594]

The French naval force in the Mediterranean was at this time extremely efficient[595] and, in point of numbers, slightly superior to the British. Ever since the beginning of the year, Palmerston had made the strength of the Toulon fleet the subject of numerous representations to the French government.[596] Should, therefore, warlike counsels prevail in Paris the initial advantages of the naval situation would be on the side of France. But, as early as July 25, Palmerston was so satisfied that no danger of that kind was to be apprehended, that he desired that Stopford should be informed that the French government had clearly “no intention of opposing by force the measures which the allies had resolved to execute.”[597] That officer, on receipt of his instructions, had proceeded to Alexandria, both to support by his presence the demands which Rifat Bey was pressing upon the Pasha and to prevent the egress of the Egyptian fleet. A few days before his arrival, the squadron, which Mehemet Ali had recently sent to the coast of Syria,[598] had hastily returned to Alexandria, upon the advice, as it was believed, of the French admiral.

Whilst he was in these waters, Stopford was joined by Admiral Bandiera with two Austrian frigates, one of which was commanded by the Archduke Charles Frederick. Commodore Charles Napier, famous for his destruction of the Miguelite Meet, had at the same time been detached to the coast of Syria with five sail of the line and some smaller vessels. Arriving off Beyrout, on August 12, Napier found that the insurrection, which he had been informed was in full progress, had been suppressed. Nevertheless, two days later, he took up a position “abreast of the town” and sent an officer on shore to notify to the governor that the four Powers had decided to restore Syria to the Sultan, and to demand that the arms taken from the inhabitants of the Lebanon should be restored to them. Furthermore, he issued a proclamation calling upon the Syrians to return to their allegiance to the Sultan, and proceeded to detain a number of small vessels carrying provisions and military stores for the use of Ibrahim’s army. But, as the twenty days allowed Mehemet Ali for considering the demands of the Porte had not yet expired, he did not consider himself justified in beginning actual hostilities. Finding, therefore, that Soliman Pasha[599] was not disposed to comply with his summons and that his proclamation produced no effect, he withdrew his squadron to a better anchorage and employed his time in reconnoitring the coast.[600]

M. de Pontois, the French ambassador to the Sublime Porte, had, in the meanwhile, not been idle. On August 16, on receipt presumably of instructions from M. Thiers, he sent his dragoman to Reshid Pasha, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The message, of which M. Cor was the bearer, was to the effect that France was deeply offended at the action of the Ottoman plenipotentiary in signing the Treaty of July 15, and that she was resolved to support Mehemet Ali and actively to oppose the measures of coercion which the allies were proposing to apply to him.[601] M. de Pontois himself further declared to the Russian minister that he regarded war between France and England as inevitable. This threatening language was at once reported by the representatives of the Powers to their respective Courts and Lord Ponsonby, at the same time, sent to warn the British admirals that an outbreak of hostilities with France was to be seriously apprehended.[602] A few days later, however, the French ambassador, whether in consequence of fresh instructions from Paris, or whether because on considering the matter he was afraid he had said too much, saw fit to disavow the language imputed to him.[603] This was the attitude adopted by M. Thiers when, in due course, representations on the subject of M. de Pontois’ menaces were made to him by the Powers. The full brunt of his ill-humour fell, as was usual, upon the Austrian ambassador, who met with a very warm and disagreeable reception. “Vous pouvez dire À Reshid Pasha qu’il en a menti,”[604] was the only statement which Apponyi could extract from him. Guizot, but in more courteous terms, conveyed the same explanation to Lord Palmerston. No written communication having passed between M. de Pontois and Reshid Pasha, the matter was allowed to drop.[605] It was evident that whatever might have been the precise words used by M. Cor, the message of the French ambassador to the Reis-Effendi was a rather clumsy attempt to frighten the Sultan into withholding his ratification of the treaty.

France meanwhile was arming in most ostentatious fashion. On September 13 the fortification of Paris was decreed by a Royal ordinance. This was a measure which had been under consideration for some time past, but which had always been set aside on account of the difficulty of inducing the Chambers to consent to the required expenditure. Thiers, as a student of the campaign of 1814, had constantly advocated it, whilst Louis Philippe was also in favour of it because, as was generally believed, he hoped that a circle of forts round the capital would greatly facilitate the suppression of any revolutionary movement. M. Thiers gave his closest personal attention to the military preparations. With the journalists and stock-jobbers, by whom he was surrounded,[606] his conversation turned on war unceasingly. In the early days of August he had hinted at a campaign upon the Rhine, whilst the papers which he inspired denounced the treaties of 1815 and talked of “natural frontiers.” But his thoughts soon assumed a new direction. The dÉbordement,[607] when it came, would be in Italy, where Austria was to be assailed at her most vulnerable point. Lying on the floor, with his maps spread out before him, like the great man about whom he had written so much, he planned vast military and diplomatic combinations.[608]

Nor was Louis Philippe less warlike than his minister. All Paris heard of the indignant and threatening language which he had used to the Prussian and Austrian ambassadors. Taking them aside at the Tuileries, he had bitterly reproached them for the ingratitude which their Courts had displayed towards him. For ten years he had held the revolution in check and his reward had been the Quadrilateral Treaty of July. But, and at this point his voice could be heard far beyond the confines of the room in which the interview took place, “they had better not provoke him too far. He had discarded the red cap. Some day, perhaps, they might be disagreeably surprised to find that he had resumed it.”[609] This threat, which was uttered as though it had escaped him in the heat of passion, was well calculated to give Metternich much cause for uneasy reflection. At the same time the King’s eldest son, the Duc d’OrlÉans, a keen and ambitious soldier, loudly proclaimed that France had been insulted. With perfect sincerity he declared his belief in the necessity of war. “If the worst came to the worst,” he told his friends, “he had rather be killed in action upon the Rhine, than be shot in a street fight and die in the gutter.”[610]

Under the influence of the revolutionary recollections evoked by the anti-dynastic press, and of the threats of war to be waged upon Jacobinical principles,[611] indulged in by the organs of M. Thiers, public excitement in Paris rose to an alarming pitch. The situation was complicated by a series of strikes in different trades. Bands of men deprived of their employment marched through the streets singing the Marseillaise. The secret republican societies fomented the discontent of the working classes and fanned the flame of war. Disturbances took place, and the authorities were apprehensive of an attack by the mob upon the British embassy.

Towards the middle of September the news reached Paris that, in consequence of the Sultan’s demands, conveyed to him by Rifat Bey, Mehemet Ali had invoked the protection and mediation of France.[612] Furthermore, at the instance of the Comte Walewski, he had declared his readiness to restore to the Sultan the island of Crete, the Holy Cities and the province of Adana. Although maintaining his claim to the hereditary tenure of Egypt, he had announced that he would be satisfied, as regards Syria, were the government of Tripoli, Damascus and Aleppo to be conferred upon his son Ibrahim for his life. Thiers perceived, at once, that in these proposals lay his last chance of preventing without war the full execution of the Treaty of July 15. Notwithstanding that he still derided the notion that a blockade of the coast would suffice to make Mehemet Ali relax his hold upon Syria, in his heart he was, doubtless, beginning to suspect that he had overestimated the military power of the Pasha. Napier’s proceedings at Beyrout and his detention of the Egyptian store ships and transports had not been followed by that vigorous offensive, which, he had always predicted, Ibrahim would assume the moment any act of war was committed against him.

Hitherto M. Thiers, in his intercourse with the British chargÉ d’affaires, with whom he was in private life on very friendly terms, had never made use of those asperities of language and warlike threats which he had sometimes indulged in with Werther and Apponyi. But, on the morning of September 18, when Mr. Bulwer called upon him, he resolved to adopt new tactics. As they paced up and down a long gallery in his house at Auteuil, M. Thiers declared emphatically that he considered the Pasha’s last proposals both just and reasonable. If England would agree to join with France in pressing their acceptance upon the Porte and the Powers, there would once more be established the intimate relations between the two governments which the Quadrilateral Treaty had interrupted. But if not, then seeing that Mehemet Ali had made these concessions at the instance of France, she would “be bound to support him.” As he concluded he looked Bulwer full in the face and asked him whether he realized the full import of these words. “Perfectly,” replied he imperturbably, “you mean to declare for the Pasha and go to war with us in his favour.” Before they parted, however, M. Thiers somewhat modified the gravity of his statement, by saying that he had spoken as a private individual, not as the President of the Council.

A few hours later Bulwer returned to Auteuil. Before leaving M. Thiers he had told him that he would like him to see the account of their conversation which he proposed to send to London. The despatch which he, accordingly, placed in his hands began by stating that, in the writer’s opinion, the moment had come when M. Thiers purposed saying to the King, “You must follow me even to war, or I will leave you exposed to public opinion as expressed by the newspapers.” It was certain, however, that the King would not accept such a programme, and that, were M. Thiers to place his resignation on those grounds, it would be unhesitatingly accepted. This was very far from the kind of message which Thiers wished conveyed to Lord Palmerston. “My dear Bulwer,” he said, “you are greatly mistaken, you will ruin your promising career. The King is far more warlike than I am.”[613] Bulwer saw no occasion to argue that point, and, having produced the desired effect, he readily agreed merely to relate to his chief the substance of their morning’s conversation. In a private and confidential despatch, however, he stated that this interview had left a strong impression upon his mind that M. Thiers had, in reality, an earnest desire to maintain peace.[614]

These so-called concessions of Mehemet Ali were, Lord Palmerston declared, unworthy of serious consideration. Whether Syria were governed by Ibrahim or by Mehemet Ali was a matter of very little importance. The object with which the treaty had been concluded must be relentlessly pursued. Syria must be replaced under the direct rule of the Porte. Until the Egyptian desert should intervene between the territories of the Sultan and those administered by his too-powerful vassal, there could be no permanent peace in the East. No arguments of M. Guizot could induce him to adopt a less uncompromising attitude. The Pasha’s proposals indicated, he maintained, that he already perceived the necessity of bowing to the inevitable, and that he would, before long, yield to all the demands of the Powers.[615] Certain of his colleagues, however, altogether dissented from this view of the case. Mehemet Ali’s concessions, they contended, had created an opportunity for terminating the differences with France and for drawing her into the negotiations.

The French party in the Cabinet had recently received a great accession of strength. Lord John Russell, the Colonial Secretary and the leader of the House of Commons, had cordially approved of the Treaty of July 15. Nevertheless, early in September, he appears to have been seized with grave misgivings as to the wisdom of carrying out its provisions. A letter from Lord Spencer to his brother the Duke of Bedford, expressing the fear that Palmerston’s policy would lead to a war with France, seems to have made a great impression upon him.[616] Moreover, “Bear” Ellice[617] was actively engaged in propagating alarmist rumours and in discoursing upon the indignation which the Anglo-Russian alliance had aroused in France. There are grounds for believing that the intrigue, of which he was the soul, aimed at driving Palmerston to resign, in order that Clarendon might replace him at the Foreign Office.[618] Be that as it may, the inspiration of M. Thiers can plainly be discerned in the correspondence of Mr. Ellice with both Russell and with Melbourne.[619] Charles Greville also appears to have spent much time with Guizot in inveighing against the presumptuous recklessness of Palmerston and in discussing the votes and opinions of different members of the Cabinet.[620] But the French ambassador could listen to even more congenial sentiments in the social circle presided over by Lord and Lady Holland. M. Thiers, a few weeks after Holland’s death, openly declared in the Chamber that, throughout this crisis, he had always been able to depend upon the support of that statesman.[621] It is impossible to say how far he was justified in making such a statement. It is undeniable, however, that matters, which should have been treated as Cabinet secrets, were known in Paris. In commenting upon M. Thiers’ amazing indiscretion, The Times,[622] which cannot be charged with partiality to Palmerston, positively asserted, as a notorious fact, that “every transaction within the doors of the British council-chamber were as well known upon the bourse as in the deepest recesses of Downing Street or Whitehall.” This statement is to a great extent confirmed by Bulwer, who relates that, in consequence of certain information which he had acquired in Paris, he was enabled to warn Palmerston of an attack which was to be made upon him in the Cabinet.[623] “The talking at Holland House,” wrote Lord Melbourne, “is irremediable. They cannot help it, and they are not themselves aware how much they talk.”[624] It was always a subject of complaint against Palmerston that he would come to important decisions and would embark upon grave measures of policy, without reference to his colleagues. The conduct of certain of his “Whig friends and grandees”[625] upon this occasion was, it must be admitted, calculated to dispose him to confide in them as seldom as possible.

Negotiations, John Russell insisted, must be opened with France on the basis of the Pasha’s last proposals. If this course were not adopted, he announced his intention of retiring from office. His resolution was not to be shaken either by the remonstrances of Melbourne that his resignation must destroy the government, or by Palmerston’s representations that his present conduct was inconsistent with his former approval of the treaty.[626] The French party seemed to be on the point of triumphing. Palmerston appeared to be placed between two alternatives—he must either retire, or consent to suspend coercive measures against Mehemet Ali and make conciliatory advances to France. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, a crisis was averted. Lord John agreed greatly to modify his demands and Palmerston consented to a slight compromise. “Russell,” records Greville, “has disappointed me. He is not the man I took him for.”[627] But in point of fact an influence, unsuspected by Greville, had been brought to bear upon him. Melbourne had conveyed to him a message from the Queen that she was not in a condition[628] to bear, without danger, the anxiety to which she must be subjected by the course he threatened to pursue. But Her Majesty placed her chief objection to anything in the nature of a Cabinet crisis, at this particular moment, on other grounds than those of her own state of health. She desired Lord John to reflect most seriously upon the injury, which the country must suffer in the eyes of foreign Powers, from so public an exhibition of ministerial weakness and vacillation at a time of national emergency.[629]

Metternich had been greatly alarmed by the threatening aspect of affairs, and had, some weeks before, submitted a paper to King Leopold, for transmission to Louis Philippe, defining the attitude which, in his opinion, the French government should adopt. Whilst signifying her dissent from the policy of coercing Mehemet Ali, she might, he suggested, declare her adherence to the main principle of the treaty—the necessity of preserving the integrity of Turkey. Should the event prove that the Pasha was not to be subdued by force, she might announce her readiness to discuss with the Powers the means by which, in the future, the security of the Ottoman Empire might be maintained.[630] Palmerston, who was in possession of a copy of this document, expressed himself as willing to make an overture to the French government on the basis of Metternich’s suggestions. At a Cabinet Council, on October 1, this solution of the difficulty was agreed to unanimously.[631] It was a small concession which Palmerston could well afford to make. Before the French government could be approached on the subject, the consent of the Powers, which were parties to the Quadrilateral Treaty, would have to be obtained. Brunnow, without doubt, would at once declare that he must refer the matter to his Court, and long before an answer could be received from St. Petersburg, the guns would have spoken in the East and the whole situation would be altered. Nor was this expectation falsified. The representatives of the Powers, following the lead of Brunnow, announced that they were without instructions and must submit the proposal to their Courts. But already the news had arrived of the success with which hostilities had been opened in Syria.[632]

At Constantinople Mehemet Ali’s reply to the demands made to him by Rifat Bey was held to be unsatisfactory, and, with the full approval of the ambassadors of the allied Powers, the Porte decided to treat his counter-proposals in the light of a rejection of the Sultan’s ultimatum. He was, accordingly, declared deposed from the governorship of Egypt and of the other territories which he ruled, and a blockade was proclaimed both of the Syrian and Egyptian coasts. The representatives of the Powers at the same time recalled the consuls from Alexandria, and every effort was made to carry out promptly the stipulations of the Treaty of July 15.[633] Sir Robert Stopford, leaving a portion of his command to watch the Egyptian fleet, sailed with the remainder of his force and the Austrian squadron to join Napier off Beyrout, where Captain Walker, who had been placed in command of the Turkish fleet, had already arrived. On September 11, the governor of Beyrout having been ineffectually summoned to surrender, fire was opened upon the forts. After sustaining a heavy bombardment, Soliman Pasha withdrew the garrison into the hills. Two days before, a Turkish division and detachments of British and Austrian marines had landed at JouniÉ Bay. Commodore Napier, under whose direction these operations were carried out, entrenched his force securely and proceeded to distribute arms and ammunition to the mountaineers, who flocked into his camp in large numbers. Meanwhile, Ibrahim, who with the main Egyptian army was not far distant, looked on helplessly, and appeared to be incapable of offering any serious resistance to the operations of the allies.[634]

The news from the East created a profound sensation in Paris. “The cannon of Beyrout,” wrote Heine,[635] “re-echoes painfully in the heart of every Frenchman.” Young men eagerly proffered their services at the recruiting offices. At the opera and at the theatres excited audiences insisted on singing the Marseillaise. On the question of peace or war the Cabinet was supposed to be nearly equally divided. M. Thiers was reported to have urged the necessity of energetic action, but it was notorious that General CubiÈres, the Minister of War, and Roussin, the Minister of Marine and the former ambassador at Constantinople, were in favour of pacific measures. Henry Reeve, the friend of Greville and the future editor of his famous journals, was at this time in Paris. Politically he was in complete accord with Lord Holland and the French party, and, during his stay in Paris, was in regular correspondence with Lord Lansdowne, a member of the Melbourne Cabinet, who, although not actively opposed to Palmerston, only gave him a half-hearted support. Reeve was well acquainted with most of the French ministers, and was on very friendly terms with LÉon Faucher and several other prominent journalists and politicians. In fact, during these critical days, he may be said, in his own words, “to have had his board and lodging in the Cabinet.” He was in constant communication with M. Thiers, “who was everything that he could wish.”[636] Consequently, he would ingenuously convey to his patron[637] those opinions, which the crafty French minister considered might with advantage be disseminated in governmental circles in London.

Amidst all this excitement, whilst in Paris the bourse was panic stricken and in London the funds were falling, Palmerston remained perfectly calm. He had never believed in the danger of a conflict with France, and, in his opinion, the progress of events in the East had rendered still more remote the chances of war.[638] He could not admit that the French people or the French King would ever allow any government to embark upon hostilities with the whole of Europe, in order to preserve Syria for Mehemet Ali. He wrote reassuringly to the Queen[639] to this effect, and strove to calm the apprehensions of his colleagues and to instil into them some of his robust common sense. But the edict of the Porte, by which Mehemet Ali had been deprived of the government of Egypt, had once more stirred his opponents to action. According to Lord John Russell, it was a measure which had never been contemplated by the treaty and had clearly been adopted in consequence of the violent counsels of Lord Ponsonby. Palmerston, although he personally approved of the deposition of the Pasha, had, nevertheless, immediately instructed Granville to inform M. Thiers that it was merely a measure of coercion, and was not intended to prejudge any arrangement which the Sultan might, hereafter, be disposed to make in favour of Mehemet Ali, should he, “at an early moment, accept the conditions of the treaty.”[640] Lord John, however, was not to be pacified. War, he asserted, appeared to be imminent, and he insisted upon the necessity of holding a meeting of the Cabinet.[641] Grave consequences, wrote Melbourne to the Queen, were to be apprehended from the Council which he had called for October 10.[642]

But once again a crisis was averted. On the morning of the day on which the meeting of the Cabinet was to take place, Guizot presented himself at the Foreign Office with two despatches from M. Thiers. The first, dated October 3, purported to be an answer to Lord Palmerston’s despatch of August 31. It was a long and rambling statement of the French case. The chief argument consisted in an attempt to show that France, throughout the negotiations, had never departed from the principle embodied in the collective note of July 27, 1839. Then, as now, France considered that that instrument had been drawn up for the purpose of guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Turkey. She had always believed that the object which it had in view was to enable the Sultan to escape from the exclusive protection of a certain great Power. She had never understood that the policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire was bound up with any question of “territorial limitations, more or less advantageous, between the Sultan and the Viceroy.”[643] The second, and more important, despatch bore the date of October 8, and dealt with the firman of the Sultan deposing Mehemet Ali from the government of Egypt. France, declared M. Thiers, was prepared to leave the question of Syria to the chances of the war, which had actually begun. But the edict expelling the Pasha from Egypt was a different matter. It threatened to disturb the balance of power in the East, and France could, therefore, not consent to see it carried into execution.[644] Certain writers have pompously asserted that, on this occasion, M. Thiers “formulated the casus belli.” It must be borne in mind, however, that he had already been informed by Lord Granville of the light in which the British government regarded the Porte’s decree of deposition. Hence many of his contemporaries treat his despatch of October 8 with derision. That famous document, they contend, merely “forced an open door.”[645]

The extreme moderation with which M. Thiers had expressed himself came as a great surprise to the British government. M. Guizot, sincerely as he desired to see peace maintained, was strongly of opinion that so mild an exposition of the French case was strangely inconsistent with the warlike attitude which his government had adopted, since the beginning of the crisis. He contented himself, in consequence, with placing M. Thiers’ despatches in Lord Palmerston’s hands, and made no attempt to discuss or to defend the opinions expressed in them.[646] Their contents, when communicated to the assembled British ministers, removed at once the danger that acute differences of opinion might lead to a disruption of the government. At the Cabinet Council of October 10, it was simply decided that Lord Ponsonby should be directed to urge the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the governorship of Egypt and to make the appointment hereditary in his family, provided he would consent to make an early submission to the Sultan. At the same time, it was agreed that a copy of these instructions should be sent to Lord Granville for communication to the French government.[647]

But, in spite of the pacific language used by M. Thiers in his despatches, the situation still gave cause for anxiety. The lower classes in Paris had been greatly stirred by the Jacobinical declamations of the Radical press. On October 15, as Louis Philippe was entering the Tuileries, he narrowly escaped the bullet of an assassin. The would-be regicide, an individual named DarmÈs, when arrested and questioned, declared that he was by profession “a conspirator and an exterminator of tyrants.” This outrage and other anarchical symptoms were not without effect upon the bourgeoisie.[648] The signs of the times pointed clearly to the probability that war abroad would be followed by a revolution at home. Meanwhile, rumours were current that the government was preparing some sudden act of aggression—an “Anconade”[649] as it was called. It was said that the military occupation of some position in Turkey was contemplated. The sudden recall, however, to Toulon of the French fleet, which had been cruising in Greek waters, seemed to prove, not only that the government could have no such intention, but that it was desirous of avoiding the danger of any chance collision with the British squadron operating off the Syrian coast. Nevertheless, after the return home of Admiral Hugon’s fleet, reports about the warlike plans of M. Thiers assumed a more concrete form. Lord Granville, on October 12, received information from a person, who stipulated for a special remuneration should his intelligence prove accurate, that the French government had decided to seize one of the Balearic Islands.[650]

The strategic importance of these Spanish islands had been enhanced by the French occupation of Algiers. Situated about midway between Toulon and the African coast, they would, in the hands of France, enable her to control the western Mediterranean. The British Foreign Office and the Admiralty had, in consequence, been always on the alert, lest she should by any means succeed in establishing herself at Port Mahon. It had been ascertained that many of the inhabitants were not at all averse to the idea of a French annexation of Minorca.[651] But, in addition to the military advantages to be derived from the occupation of the Balearic Islands, there were political reasons which made both Palmerston and Bulwer suspect that M. Thiers might regard a coup d’Éclat in Spain as a useful counterstroke to the Treaty of July 15.[652] The struggle between Christina[653] and the Progressistas had been raging for some weeks past, and now appeared certain to terminate in the complete defeat of the Queen Regent. Upon the subject of Spanish affairs the British government held views which were diametrically opposed to those entertained at the absolute Courts. Any stroke directed against Espartero and the Radicals could not fail to be applauded at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. A French intervention in Spain might, therefore, be the means of sowing discord between Great Britain and her continental allies.

Lord Granville at once sent off a special messenger to Madrid to warn the British minister of the blow which was impending, and Palmerston also wrote to Mr. Aston to the same effect. Espartero,[654] when the news was communicated to him, undertook to strengthen the garrison of Port Mahon, and promised to resist manfully any French aggression. Melbourne, at the same time, took the opportunity of remonstrating strongly with Louis Philippe through the King of the Belgians.[655] England, he wrote, could not sit still whilst France continued to arm and to threaten. She must, if the present situation were prolonged, take measures to safeguard her interests. This communication probably reached Louis Philippe on October 19. So long as he had believed that Mehemet Ali was capable of offering a serious resistance to the allied Powers, he had approved of the menacing attitude of his government. But, when the Pasha’s impotence was made manifest, he realized the expediency of adopting different tactics. He understood the difficulties of M. Thiers’ position. Already the more extreme of the various groups composing his parliamentary majority were beginning to testify their displeasure at the pacific tone of his despatch of October 8, which had been published in the English papers. At the approaching meeting of the Chambers heated and violent recriminations were to be apprehended. Louis Philippe, however, had also perceived that, notwithstanding the clamour of the newspapers, a healthy current of public opinion was running in the direction of peace. People were beginning to realize that, under existing conditions, war and revolution were synonymous terms. Some of M. Thiers’ colleagues had, moreover, it is said, privately intimated that, if peace were to be maintained, the King must take upon himself to dismiss his present ministers.[656] But the adoption of this disinterested advice was fraught with certain unpleasant consequences. For the past fortnight the Constitutionel, M. Thiers’ chief organ, had been insinuating that all his efforts to uphold the honour and dignity of France were frustrated by the Sovereign. The King was, therefore, under no illusions as to the manner in which his minister purposed to cover his retreat.

The Chambers were to assemble on October 28. M. Thiers, about a week before, submitted to Louis Philippe a draft of the proposed Speech from the Throne. It contained a distinctly warlike paragraph, and announced that 150,000 more men would be called up for service with the colours. The King objected, and whilst the matter was under discussion, he received Lord Melbourne’s letter. It is very possible that a perusal of its contents may have served to overcome his last hesitations. He refused to employ the language which his minister proposed to place in his mouth. M. Thiers, thereupon, tendered his resignation, which was promptly accepted. Marshal Soult agreed to form a new government, of which the real head was to be M. Guizot, the French ambassador in London, into whose charge the King had confided the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.

M. Thiers was not wholly responsible for the position in which France found herself at the time of his downfall. When he took office, the mistakes of his predecessor had already carried the country a great distance upon the road to isolation. Nevertheless, the brief period of his second administration affords an instructive example of the many mistakes which a very able man may commit. The two principal objects which he set himself to achieve were utterly incompatible. He sincerely desired to retain the friendship of Great Britain and, at the same time, he proposed to establish Mehemet Ali as the ruler of an independent State, which was to owe its separate existence to French patronage. But, inasmuch as Lord Palmerston was resolved to drive the Pasha out of Syria and greatly to restrict his power, he was obliged to seek to attain his ends by tortuous methods. Thus, whilst he strove to prolong and to embarrass the negotiations in London, he endeavoured secretly, and in flagrant violation of the collective note of July 27, 1839, to cajole the Porte into conceding the demands of the Pasha. He was able to persuade himself that the young Sultan and his ministers, rather than follow the congenial advice of the Powers which desired to curb the ambition of Mehemet Ali, would listen to the unpalatable counsels of France, the friend of their arch-enemy the Viceroy of Egypt. A policy founded upon so erroneous a conception of human nature was fore-doomed to failure. The intrigues of the French agents at Alexandria and Constantinople[657] were exposed, the correspondence of M. Coste found its way into Lord Palmerston’s drawer at the Foreign Office, and the treaty between the four Powers and the Porte was concluded on July 15.

But M. Thiers was guilty of another error. He, the student of war, the Napoleon civil, as Metternich named him, altogether failed to understand the strategic situation in the East. Unlike Lord Palmerston, who foresaw that the Pasha’s position in Syria would be untenable, from the moment that he was deprived of the command of the sea, Thiers conceived it possible that Ibrahim could assume the offensive in Asia Minor, and at the same time maintain, in the midst of a hostile population and through a most difficult country, his communications with Egypt. His plans were, accordingly, based upon the supposition that the Powers would experience serious difficulty in expelling the Egyptians from Syria. The Pasha’s resistance, he was confident, would not be overcome before the winter, and would, doubtless, necessitate the intervention of a Russian army. But, were the Tsar to despatch a large force to Asia Minor, national jealousies and suspicion would be aroused. Then France, having completed her military preparations, could enter upon the scene and impose her will upon a disunited and disheartened coalition. In pursuance of this plan, M. Thiers made divers attempts to draw the chief Italian States into an alliance with France. But his proposals were unheeded both at Turin and at Naples.[658] In one direction only would his overtures appear to have met with any response. King Otho, the young Bavarian prince whom the protecting Powers had placed upon the throne of Greece, attracted by the prospect of obtaining Crete, seems to have promised to invade Thessaly, whenever France should give the signal for a general outbreak of hostilities.[659]

But all these schemes were rendered abortive by the state of impotence to which Ibrahim was reduced by the arrival of the British fleet in Syrian waters. After the success of Stopford’s operations at Beyrout, M. Thiers was forced either to resign or to plunge France, with King Otho for her only ally, into a war with the whole of Europe. It is impossible to believe that he can ever have thought seriously of adopting this last alternative. But Louis Philippe’s unalterable resolution to maintain the peace made it safe for him to advocate a bellicose policy, seeing that he would never be called upon to carry it out. By proposing certain warlike measures, such as the seizure of the Balearic Islands and a large increase of the army, he intended to compel the King to dismiss him. Thus he would be enabled to escape from the difficulties in which he was involved, whilst upon Louis Philippe would rest the reproach of having tamely submitted to the dictation of Lord Palmerston.

The injury done to the House of Orleans was not, however, the only consequence of M. Thiers’ proceedings in 1840. His warlike declamations and the frequent allusions in his newspapers to the left bank of the Rhine awoke recollections in Germany which had slumbered for a generation. The amazing popularity of Becker’s Song of the Rhine[660] testifies to the strength of the national sentiment which the French threats had aroused. The significance of this, and other manifestations of German feeling, did not escape Prince Metternich. “M. Thiers,” he wrote bitterly, “likes to be compared to Napoleon. With respect to Germany he resembles him closely, indeed, he may justly be said to surpass him. In six weeks he has accomplished as much in that country as the Emperor during ten years of war and oppression.”[661]

The Soult-Guizot Cabinet had been formed upon the basis of the maintenance of peace. But innumerable difficulties confronted it. Whilst pursuing a strictly pacific policy, ministers could not afford to disregard the national susceptibilities which the events of the past few months had aroused. Guizot, accordingly, before leaving London, and after his return to France, declared constantly that the fate of the new ministry was in the hands of the British government. If only he could be enabled to state that the Powers were prepared to make concessions to M. Thiers’ successors, which they would not have made to M. Thiers himself, he was confident that he could defeat his opponents. But, if it were resolved rigorously to execute the treaty against Mehemet Ali, he and his colleagues would surely be overwhelmed and the King would be forced to call the war party into his counsels. Without doubt, his friends Reeve and Greville proved most useful in propagating this opinion.[662] Palmerston, however, was quite unmoved. He scouted the notion that France would resort to extreme measures in defence of the Pasha, and he was determined that the British interests, involved in the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Syria, should not be sacrificed in order to strengthen the parliamentary position of a foreign government.

At the time of M. Thiers’ resignation, his despatch of October 8 was still unanswered. But, before M. Guizot had been long installed at the Foreign Office, he received Lord Palmerston’s reply to it. The contents of this document caused him the greatest irritation. After exposing with remorseless logic the fallacies of M. Thiers’ arguments, Palmerston laid down the principle that the future government of Egypt concerned the Porte alone. He has generally been blamed for not employing a more conciliatory tone in this, his first important communication with M. Guizot, who was not responsible for the opinions of his predecessor in office. Palmerston, however, had two distinct objects in view, and it is open to question whether he would have attained his ends, had he employed less uncompromising language. His despatches, both of November 2 and November 20, were clearly written with the purpose of convincing M. Guizot of the necessity of regarding Syria as altogether lost to Mehemet Ali, and of thus putting an end to the efforts which were being made to preserve for him the southern portion of Palestine. Secondly, by intimating that the Pasha’s reinstatement in the government of Egypt would depend upon his prompt compliance with the Sultan’s demands, Palmerston evidently intended to force M. Guizot to exert all his influence over Mehemet Ali in favour of a complete surrender.[663]

Events, meanwhile, had been moving rapidly in Syria. Before the middle of October the Turkish flag waved once more over Beyrout and SaÏda, the ancient Sidon, whilst Napier, at the head of a Turkish division and some detachments of British and Austrian marines, completely defeated and put to flight the redoubtable Ibrahim. As early as October 5, Palmerston had desired the Lords of the Admiralty to advise Sir Robert Stopford of the importance of promptly restoring the fortress of Acre to the Sultan.[664] The allied commanders appear to have been somewhat undecided as to the propriety of attacking this famous stronghold, the key of Syria. In view of the lateness of the season, Stopford himself was very reluctant to embark upon operations against it.[665] But Palmerston’s despatch overcame his irresolution and induced him to listen to the bolder counsels of Napier, Walker, and Jochmus. Acre, which had successfully resisted Bonaparte and which had held Ibrahim in check for six months, surrendered, on November 3, to the British admiral after an engagement of a few hours’ duration. The moment the news reached London, Stopford was directed to send “a competent officer” to Mehemet Ali to signify to him that, provided he would restore the Turkish fleet and give an undertaking in writing to evacuate Syria, Adana, Arabia, the Holy Cities and Crete, the Powers would recommend the Porte to reappoint him to the governorship of Egypt.[666] But, before these instructions could take effect, Napier, who had arrived off Alexandria with his squadron, had seen fit to conclude, upon his own responsibility, an agreement with Mehemet Ali. In this unauthorized convention, which was signed on November 27, it was stipulated that the Pasha should surrender the Turkish fleet and evacuate Syria, on the understanding that the four Powers in return would guarantee to him the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic of Egypt.[667]

Napier, who was a strong Radical, appears to have been privately urged by certain members of the Cabinet to seize the first opportunity of concluding a peace with Mehemet Ali.[668] But, whatever his reasons may have been for acting in so irregular a manner, the main provisions of his treaty, unquestionably, accorded with the instructions sent to Stopford on November 14. Palmerston, in consequence, decided to signify his approval of the arrangement, with one important reservation.[669] Under no circumstances “could Great Britain singly, or the four Powers jointly, guarantee to a subject a grant of administrative authority made to him by his Sovereign, within the dominions of that Sovereign.” But at Constantinople Napier’s proceedings aroused the greatest indignation, and the Sublime Porte, with the full concurrence of the ambassadors of the Powers, pronounced the convention null and void.[670] The same course was adopted by Stopford, who sent Captain Fanshawe, his flag captain, to Alexandria to declare that the convention of November 27 could not be ratified, and that Mehemet Ali must submit unconditionally to the terms which the Powers were prepared to offer to him.[671]

Mehemet Ali could not do otherwise than yield. The fall of Acre had decided the fate of Syria. Fanshawe’s task was thus easy of execution, and, on December 16, he arrived at Constantinople bringing with him a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, in which the Pasha conceded every demand and, with regard to Egypt, threw himself upon the generosity of the Sultan.[672] The Turkish ministers, however, were little disposed to show mercy to a fallen enemy who, in the days of his strength, had caused them so much anxiety. Nor were the British ambassador and the Austrian internuncio in favour of treating Mehemet Ali leniently. But Metternich had been terribly alarmed by the French armaments, and had sent strict instructions to his agent at Constantinople to terminate the eastern question with as little delay as possible. Baron StÜrmer was, in consequence, reluctantly obliged to counsel the Porte to confer upon the Pasha the hereditary tenure of Egypt. Ponsonby, however, was more tenacious of his opinions, and, although Palmerston, after the Cabinet Council of October 10, had directed him to advise the Turkish government to grant the heredity to Mehemet Ali,[673] he declined to join with his colleagues in pressing the Porte to adopt this measure. He was doubtful, he declared, whether the Pasha’s letter to the Grand Vizier should be regarded as an act of complete submission. Before pronouncing a decided opinion upon that point, he must wait in order to see whether the Pasha by his actions intended to prove the sincerity of his promises.[674] But, on January 10, 1841, he received Palmerston’s despatch on the subject of Napier’s convention, wherein it was distinctly laid down that Great Britain approved of the principle of conferring the heredity upon Mehemet Ali.[675] This second intimation of the views of his government was too clear for even Ponsonby to venture upon disregarding it. He was, in consequence, obliged to advise the Porte to make the required concession. The Turkish ministers no sooner perceived that the Powers were unanimously in favour of it, than they promised to take the necessary steps for investing Mehemet Ali with the hereditary government of Egypt.[676]

Two days before this concession was extorted from the Porte, Mehemet Ali surrendered the Ottoman fleet to the commissioners sent to receive it. Furthermore, he gave the necessary orders for the evacuation of Crete and the other territories which he had promised to restore to the Sultan. His son Ibrahim, with the remnants of the army of Syria, had by this time arrived at Gaza, on the Egyptian frontier. He had himself been attacked by jaundice, and his troops had suffered cruelly in their retreat.[677] But their losses would have been far heavier, had it not been for the Napier Convention. The British officers employed in Syria had considered themselves in honour bound to observe the armistice, which was one of the conditions of that irregular agreement.[678]

Mehemet Ali having thus made his submission, it remained only to determine the conditions under which the hereditary governorship of Egypt should be conferred upon him. The Porte was very naturally desirous to circumscribe in every possible way, the powers which it had reluctantly consented to delegate. Some weeks, accordingly, were spent in discussing the affair with the ambassadors. But, at last, on February 13, 1841, the Porte issued a firman of investiture, and sent off a special envoy to Egypt to present it to Mehemet Ali.[679]

The French government, meanwhile, rigidly abstained from any kind of interference, M. Guizot from the tribune of the Chamber declared his intention of preserving the peace, whilst at the same time maintaining the armaments which, by reason of her isolation, France could not afford to reduce. The Opposition inveighed fiercely against the attitude which the government proposed to adopt. M. Thiers gave his version of the negotiations and protested that, had he been able to remain in office, he would have armed upon a gigantic scale, not only in order to prevent the execution of the Treaty of July, but in order to obtain a revision of the territorial settlement of 1815. To support their statements, he and his former colleagues recklessly divulged the contents of confidential documents, and disclosed military secrets.[680] Nevertheless, ministers obtained a majority in both Chambers on the question of their foreign policy. The attention of the assembly, during the remainder of the session, was chiefly directed to matters connected with the fortification of Paris. The enormous expenditure entailed by that measure, and by the other military preparations of M. Thiers had a very sobering effect upon the popular Chamber. The crisis, it was computed, would cost the country not less than one hundred and fifty millions of francs.[681]

No sooner had M. Guizot emerged successfully from the initial stages of the parliamentary struggle, than he applied himself diligently to the task of bringing back France into the Concert of the Powers. The German Courts, he was well aware, were most anxious to terminate a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities. In the eyes of Metternich and of Baron Werther, the Prussian minister, the isolation of France threatened the peace of Europe, and, in order to put an end to it, they were prepared to settle “tant bien que mal,”[682] the eastern question. Under ordinary circumstances the Tsar Nicholas might have been expected to oppose the resumption by France of her place in the Concert of the Powers. But he had now strong reasons of his own for desiring that her isolation should cease. He had instructed Brunnow to undertake that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi should not be renewed, because experience had proved that it was of no practical value.[683] The Cabinet of St. Petersburg had arrived at the conclusion that, for the better protection of the southern provinces of Russia, the question of the Dardanelles should be regulated by some European agreement. But no compact of that nature would be likely to endure, unless France were to be made a party to it.[684]

Although it suited Nicholas that France should re-enter the European Concert, his dislike of Louis Philippe, and of the rÉgime of July was as strong as ever. Whilst proposing to close the eastern question with some “final transaction to which France might be invited to adhere,”[685] he also suggested that the treaty for the pacification of the Levant should be converted into a quadruple alliance, “providing against the contingency of an attack by France upon the liberties of Europe.” His main reason, he informed Lord Clanricarde, for making this proposal, was to establish a close understanding with Great Britain.[686] Metternich had not “the spirit of a gentleman,” and neither England nor Russia ought to place any confidence in him.[687] The British government, however, was unable to entertain the suggestion. “All formal engagements of the Crown,” Lord Clanricarde was instructed to explain, “must be submitted to Parliament, and Parliament might not approve of an engagement which should bind England prospectively.” Nor was there any way in which this difficulty could be overcome. It would not be removed by the verbal agreement into which the Imperial Cabinet had declared its readiness to enter, should the constitutional obstacles to the conclusion of a more formal compact prove insuperable. “A verbal engagement would bind the ministers who made it, but might be disavowed by their successors, and thus the Russian government might be led to count upon a system of policy which might not eventually be pursued. . . . Under these circumstances,”concluded Lord Palmerston, “it seems to Her Majesty’s government that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg should be satisfied to trust to the general tendency of the policy of Great Britain, which leads her to watch over the maintenance of the balance of power.”[688]

Whether or not M. Guizot obtained any inkling of the Tsar’s proposals, he appears to have ascertained quickly that the three absolute Courts wished to close the eastern question in order that France should resume her place in the Concert. But he was very far from certain whether Lord Palmerston’s views coincided with those of his continental allies. He was not without fear that it might be the secret intention of Great Britain to drive Mehemet Ali out of Egypt. From the moment he had taken office, he had declared that the fate of Syria must be left to the chances of war, but that no French government could acquiesce in the expulsion of the Pasha from his Egyptian governorship. So long, however, as France maintained her armaments Metternich would be most unlikely to consent to any further measures of hostility against Mehemet Ali. Thus by playing upon the fears of the German Courts, he could bring considerable pressure to bear upon Palmerston. Nor was it only in this way that he proposed to counteract the schemes which he suspected the British minister of harbouring. Lord Holland was dead, and the French party was greatly discredited, but he could still depend upon the assistance of “Bear” Ellice,[689] Greville and his other English friends, whenever an opportunity of thwarting Palmerston should arise. For the purpose of organizing as much opposition as possible to the Foreign Secretary, he had, in the month of November, 1840, despatched Baron Mounier upon a special mission to London.[690] At the same time Baron Bourqueney, the French chargÉ d’affaires, was instructed confidentially to discuss the situation with his colleagues, but, under no circumstances, was he to make any direct proposals to Lord Palmerston. He was constantly to declare that the isolation of France must continue, so long as the treaty of July should be in existence.

M. Guizot had made no mistake in supposing that Palmerston would rather have seen Mehemet Ali deposed than invested with the hereditary tenure of Egypt. But, as he pointed out to the Ottoman ambassador, it was his rule in all affairs “to be content with what was practical,”[691] and Lord Beauvale’s despatches from Vienna made it clear that Metternich would never consent to take part in expelling the Pasha from Egypt.[692] Palmerston, therefore, accepted the situation and was prepared to be satisfied with an arrangement which restricted the authority of Mehemet Ali to his Egyptian Pashalic. He was opposed to the plan, which had been proposed at one time, of inviting France to participate in the final settling between the Sultan and the Pasha. As the avowed protector of Mehemet Ali she could not, he contended, fail to bring a dangerous element of discord into the conference.[693] Nevertheless, at the beginning of January, 1841, Baron Bourqueney, after having been his guest for a few days at Broadlands, felt convinced that “he was really anxious to discover some way of bringing back France into the concert, although he was still undecided as to the manner in which it should be effected.”[694] The correctness of this surmise was before long confirmed by the event. After the decision of the four Powers to press the Porte to confer the heredity upon Mehemet Ali had been embodied in the collective note of January 30, 1841, Palmerston himself took the initiative and invited Baron Bourqueney to call upon him at the Foreign Office, in order to discuss future arrangements.

The conferences which were thus begun on February 18 continued until March 5, and resulted in the framing of two diplomatic instruments. The first, termed the protocol, was only to be signed by the representatives of the Powers which were parties to the Treaty of July 15, 1840. The difficulties which had induced the Porte to invoke the assistance of the four Courts being now at an end, the wish was recorded “of expressing in the most formal manner the respect due to the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has, at all times, been prohibited for ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.” With this principle, which was of general and permanent application, France was to be formally invited to concur. The second document consisted of a treaty, known as The Convention of the Straits, according to which the Sultan undertook to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the warships of all foreign nations, and the Sovereigns of Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia pledged themselves to uphold this ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire.[695]

M. Guizot, after the plenipotentiaries had agreed to certain small verbal alterations, pronounced himself satisfied with both documents. Nevertheless, the full powers to sign, which Baron Bourqueney was expecting to receive, were not transmitted. For the present, he was merely authorized to initial the convention.[696] The news had reached Paris that Mehemet Ali was greatly displeased with the conditions attached to his firman of investiture, and that he had, in consequence, refused to accept it. The decree in question had never been submitted to the approval of the ambassadors at Constantinople, and it now appeared that the heredity, which it professed to confer, was of an entirely fictitious nature. At the death of Mehemet Ali, it was provided that his successor was to be chosen by the Sultan from among any of his descendants. Furthermore, the appointment of all officers of the Egyptian army, above the rank of captain, was to be regulated by the Porte. Lastly, the Pasha complained that the amount of the tribute imposed upon him was far too heavy. Rather than submit to conditions so humiliating he would once more appeal to arms.[697]

Three months elapsed before the points in dispute could be settled. Meanwhile, the French government resumed its attitude of complete aloofness, and M. Guizot declared that no powers to sign could be sent to London, so long as the possibility existed that coercion might once more be applied to the Pasha under the terms of the Treaty of July. To the great annoyance of the German Courts, Palmerston was resolutely opposed to any declaration that the objects of that treaty had been attained. A premature dissolution of the alliance, he maintained, would only encourage Mehemet Ali to adopt a more defiant attitude, and must increase the difficulties of adjusting his relations with the Sultan.[698] “A question,” he insisted, “could not be really finished merely by saying that it was so.”[699] Metternich was compelled reluctantly to admit the force of this argument.[700] But, whilst he acknowledged the necessity of maintaining the alliance, his agents insinuated freely that Palmerston desired to embarrass the negotiations, in order to drive Mehemet Ali to commit some act of violence.

The conduct of Lord Ponsonby, it must be admitted, suggested that his chief had no great wish to discover a peaceful solution of the Egyptian question. When the news arrived at Constantinople that Mehemet Ali had refused to accept the firman, he at once advised the Porte to hold no further communication with him. The Sublime Porte, he declared, need no longer fear the military power of Mehemet Ali. “His destruction might be the consequence[701] of his again venturing to defy the Sultan.” The patience with which Lord Palmerston submitted to Ponsonby’s deviations from his instructions is undeniably suspicious. It is practically certain, however, that no secret understanding existed between them. Palmerston’s personal views with regard to Mehemet Ali accorded so completely with those of his agent, that he was induced to regard with a lenient eye his reluctance to carry out a distasteful task. But, whilst treating him with great forbearance, he never allowed Lord Ponsonby to impose his opinions upon him. On January 26, 1841, in a despatch endorsed by Queen Victoria with the significant words “highly approved,”[702] he told him plainly that his counsels to the Porte were not in harmony with his instructions. Again, on March 16, he prescribed the necessity of overcoming the obstacles to a settlement so emphatically, that Ponsonby wrote in reply, that he perceived that “the end which he was expected to attain was the arrangement of this affair with Mehemet Ali at any rate” (sic).[703] Nor can it reasonably be contended that his tone changed after the Pasha’s refusal to accept the conditions of the firman of investiture. On the contrary, in his instructions of April 10, he laid stress upon the necessity of adjusting the points in dispute with as little delay as possible, and absolutely dissented from Ponsonby’s view that the Sultan should hold no direct communication with Mehemet Ali.[704]

Ponsonby was, therefore, obliged to join with his colleagues in advising the Porte to modify the firman of February 13. Their representations, combined with an intimation from Baron StÜrmer that Austria[705] would withdraw from the alliance if her counsels were disregarded, soon produced the desired effect. On April 14, Ponsonby was able to report that the Divan had decided that the succession of Mehemet Ali should be regulated in accordance with the principle of primogeniture, that he should have the power of dealing with the promotion of all officers below the rank of brigadier-general, and that the amount of his tribute should be reduced.[706] Nevertheless, some weeks elapsed before the Porte could be induced to embody these concessions in a new firman. For this delay Ponsonby was in no way responsible. On the contrary, he appears to have entered a vigorous protest against the procrastinating policy of the Turkish ministers.[707] Greatly to Metternich’s annoyance, however, Palmerston persisted in refusing to declare that the objects of the Treaty of July had been fully achieved. The French government, therefore, continued to withhold from Baron Bourqueney the authority to sign the Convention of the Straits. But M. Guizot was consumed with anxiety to conclude the affair, and in consequence of Palmerston’s attitude he was now compelled to instruct his agents in Egypt to urge Mehemet Ali to accept the amended firman, which they were to declare was no longer open to any reasonable objections.[708]

Mehemet Ali was too astute to offer any further resistance. On July 8, 1841, Ponsonby’s singularly laconic despatch reached London, announcing “the satisfactory intelligence”[709] that the Pasha had accepted the new firman, and had made a complete submission to the Sultan. The representatives of the Powers which were parties to the Treaty of July, thereupon, affixed their signatures to the protocol, which they had initialed four months before, announcing that the objects of their alliance had been fully attained. Three days later the isolation of France was formally terminated. On July 13, the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and France signed the Convention of the Straits by which their respective Sovereigns pledged themselves to uphold the principle of the closure of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the warships of the Powers.

The conclusion of the Convention of the Straits was the last important act of the Melbourne government. After sustaining a defeat on the sugar question, on May 18, ministers, in the subsequent motion of want of confidence brought forward by Sir Robert Peel, found themselves in a minority of one. At the general elections which followed, the Conservatives obtained a decisive victory. The Whigs, in consequence, retired from office, and Lord Palmerston was replaced at the Foreign Office by Lord Aberdeen.

Palmerston’s conduct of the Turco-Egyptian affair has been the subject of much adverse criticism. M. Thureau-Dangin and other French writers have asserted that his eastern policy, in 1840, was based upon the desire deliberately to injure France. The Treaty of July, they contend, was simply a retaliation upon Louis Philippe, because he had declined to interfere more actively in the civil war in Spain. Nor does Palmerston escape censure at the hands of the chief English historian of this period. Sir Spencer Walpole,[710] re-echoing the views of Lord Holland and the French party, charges him with having sacrificed the greater to the lesser object. The good understanding with France, which Palmerston compromised so recklessly, was a matter, he argues, of far more importance to England than any question connected with the rule of the Sultan or of the Pasha over Syria and Arabia. Furthermore, he accuses him of inconsistency. His alliance with the absolute Courts, in 1840, was a complete negation of the policy which, in 1834, had led him to conclude the Quadruple Treaty with Liberal France for the maintenance of constitutionalism in Spain and Portugal.

To these different charges there are certain obvious answers. It has been shown that Palmerston, far from maliciously desiring to exclude France from the treaty for the pacification of the Levant, honestly endeavoured to persuade her to combine with Great Britain, and the other Powers in the affair. It was only when he perceived that M. Thiers was secretly working to establish conditions in the Mediterranean, which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect upon his country’s highest interests, that he decided to act without her. He by no means undervalued the importance of good relations with France, but, in order to preserve them, he was not prepared to shut his eyes to proceedings which might some day imperil the safety of British India. The public statements of M. Thiers and of certain of his colleagues are alone sufficient to justify Lord Palmerston’s policy in 1840. Under the question as to whether Syria and Arabia should be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan, which Sir Spencer Walpole dismisses as a secondary consideration, lay the question as to whether a great naval Power should gain a footing upon the shores of the Persian Gulf.

The reasoning by which the same writer seeks to justify his accusation of inconsistency is still more unconvincing. The Treaty of July was concluded for a definite purpose which involved no repudiation of the principles underlying the Quadruple Treaty of 1834. Yet Sir Spencer Walpole, apparently, regards it as a betrayal of Liberalism that England, in a question of eastern policy, should have separated herself from a constitutional Power and have allied herself with the absolute Courts of Russia, Austria and Prussia. Under any circumstances such a contention would be difficult to uphold, but when applied to France, in 1840, it becomes altogether inadmissible. Neither Louis Philippe nor his principal ministers were Liberals in the proper sense of the word. Treaty engagements notwithstanding, their attitude towards the cause of liberty in Spain, although not so openly proclaimed, was almost as unsympathetic as that of the Cabinets of the autocratic monarchies. Louis Philippe, MolÉ, Guizot and even Thiers, when they did not actively oppose it, did nothing to assist the development of popular government in Europe.

But whatever verdict may be passed upon Palmerston’s Egyptian policy, his rare skill and determination in carrying it out must command universal admiration. Although ruin, disgrace and perhaps impeachment must have been the penalty of failure, he never wavered in his resolution to execute his treaty in all its details. His indomitable spirit stimulated the courage of his allies abroad and triumphed over the opposition of his fellow-ministers at home. When he quitted the Foreign Office British prestige stood at a height which it had not reached since the Battle of Waterloo. His most persistent detractors had been forced to admit the correctness of his military judgment and his prescience in treating as of no account the warlike threats of Louis Philippe and of M. Thiers.

“Palmerston,” wrote Reeve regretfully, “has bowled out every one.”[711] Charles Greville was moved to enthusiasm. “The elder Pitt,” he records, “could not have manifested more decision and resource. Success is much more attributable to Palmerston than to our naval and military commanders, and, probably, solely to him.”[712]