The Cabinets of Lord Grey and of M. Casimir PÉrier had always regarded the execution of the separation treaty as a measure which must necessarily follow its ratification by the five contracting Powers. But, during the spring and early summer of 1832, ministers, both in France and in England, were confronted by an internal situation of exceptional gravity. The Lords, on April 14, had passed the second reading of the third Reform Bill by a narrow majority. On May 7, however, three days after Russia had ratified the Belgian treaty, Lord Lyndhurst successfully carried against the government a motion postponing the clause which disfranchised the boroughs. The Cabinet, therefore, decided to advise the King “to advance to the honour of the peerage such a number of persons as might ensure the success of the Bill in all its essential principles.”[226]

In the early days of the struggle the King had been a keen advocate of parliamentary reform. But the violent opposition which the measure had excited had sensibly altered his feelings. Nor was it only with respect to the Bill that His Majesty was beginning to entertain misgivings. The conduct of foreign affairs had, for some time past, caused him grave anxiety. He perceived, he wrote to Lord Grey, a dangerous tendency on the part of the government to subscribe to all the democratic theories which found favour in Paris. He realized the importance of good relations with France, and he was prepared to admit that it might be due to the existence of such an understanding that war had been avoided in the Belgian question. But he mistrusted France and could not believe that she had abandoned her schemes of conquest and of territorial expansion. He held, therefore, that it was impolitic to “unite too closely with her in the prosecution of measures tending to give umbrage and alarm to other Powers.”[227]

In consequence of these criticisms Lord Grey signified his willingness to resign. But a second letter from the King and a conversation, in which His Majesty assured him that he still enjoyed his full confidence, induced him to remain in office. A fortnight later, however, when the King declined to follow the advice, contained in the Cabinet minute of May 8, to create a sufficient number of peers to enable the Bill to pass, the government resigned. But the excitement throughout the country and the attitude of the House of Commons compelled Lord Lyndhurst and the Duke of Wellington to abandon all hope of forming a ministry. In face of their inability to carry out the task with which he had entrusted them, the King had no alternative but to send for his late ministers and to give them the guarantees, which they made an indispensable condition to their acceptation of office. Lord Grey, however, was spared the necessity of resorting to the powers which the crown had placed at his disposal. In deference to the King’s wishes[228] Wellington and the chief opponents of the measure agreed to stay away from the House, and on June 4, in their absence, the Bill was passed into law.

France was less fortunate. Her domestic difficulties were only temporarily overcome after grave disorder and much bloodshed. The cholera, brought back by the Russian armies from Turkey, had spread westwards. The disease, which made its first appearance in England in the latter months of 1831, did terrible execution in Paris during the spring and summer of 1832. M. Casimir PÉrier, who had been in bad health for some time past, was its most illustrious victim. His death, on May 16, 1832, was the signal for a furious outburst of hostility on the part of the parliamentary opponents of his system. At the same time the avowed enemies of the Orleans monarchy, both Republican and Carlist, actively prepared to take advantage of the situation. The Society of the Friends of the People, in defiance of the police, held meetings at which armed insurrection was preached openly. “I was present at one of them,” wrote Heinrich Heine, “the smell reminded me of an old file of the Moniteur of 1793 grown dirty from too much reading.”[229]

The funeral, on June 5, of General Lamarque, the most prominent advocate in the Chamber of the union of Belgium with France, was chosen by the revolutionary leaders as a favourable occasion for striking their blow. But the authorities were upon the alert and both regular troops and national guards were quickly upon the scene of action. Nevertheless, it was not until artillery had been brought up that, on the following day, June 6, the great barricade at the CloÎtre Saint-Merri was stormed and that this formidable insurrection was finally suppressed. Nor was it only in the streets of Paris that the government had to deal with an armed rising. On June 4 the Duchesse de Berri, the mother of the Duc de Bordeaux, the lawful King of France in the eyes of the Carlists, raised the standard of rebellion in La VendÉe. But her insurrection, which had been undertaken against the advice of the wiser of the Carlists and of the old Royalist leaders in the West, was, in a few days, stamped out completely. The defence of the ChÂteau de la PÉnissiÈre, where a handful of Carlist gentlemen made a brave stand against overwhelming odds, imparted, however, a tinge of heroism to this, the last and the least famous of the Royalist rebellions of La VendÉe.

Following quickly upon the defeat of the republicans in Paris and of the Carlists in the West, came the news that the Duc de Reichstadt, the heretofore King of Rome, was dying of consumption at Vienna. But Metternich, in transmitting this information, desired that Louis Philippe’s attention should be especially directed “to his successor in the eyes of the Bonapartists.” The young Louis Bonaparte, he begged him to remember, was not under the safeguard of the Emperor of Austria, but, on the contrary, “was deeply involved in all the machinations of the revolutionary societies.”[230] Few people, however, shared Metternich’s forebodings, and the death of the Duc de Reichstadt, which took place on July 22, 1832, was generally considered, even by staunch Imperialists, to have disposed effectually of the chances of a Bonapartist restoration.[231] But neither the successful suppression of two rebellions, nor the decease of a dangerous pretender to the throne could make up for the loss of the President of the Council. The death of M. Casimir PÉrier had deprived the Cabinet of its strength and prestige. Louis Philippe, whilst doing full justice to the courage and abilities of his late minister, was perhaps not altogether sorry that his masterful personality no longer presided at the council table. The rÔle of a constitutional monarch was never to his taste. He longed always to take a direct part in the management of public affairs, and rather liked his people to think that his was the hand which guided the ship of State. He was, therefore, in no great hurry to appoint a new President of the Council. He soon perceived, however, that a prolongation of this state of affairs would be prejudicial to the best interests of the monarchy both at home and abroad.

For the past two months the London conference had been engaged upon fruitless efforts to induce the King of the Netherlands to agree to the separation treaty. Moreover, His Majesty’s obstinacy was not the only difficulty with which the representatives of the Powers had to deal. The Belgians clamoured loudly for the execution of the treaty, and declared that, so long as the Dutch retained possession of Antwerp, they must decline to discuss any modification of its conditions.[232] Oblivious of their disasters of the year before, they even began to talk of ejecting the Dutch by force, and, as though to prove the seriousness of their intentions, proceeded to enrol Polish officers in their army, and to make other warlike preparations.[233]

Although determined that the main conditions of the treaty must be left untouched, the members of the conference were anxious that the minor points in dispute should form the subject of amicable discussions between the Dutch and Belgian representatives. It was on this principle that all their proposals had been made. But neither at the Hague nor at Brussels was any disposition evinced to listen to reasonable suggestions for a compromise.

At last, on July 10, the plenipotentiaries decided to forward their final proposals to the Hague and to announce, at the same time, that, if they were not accepted, no further modifications of the original treaty would be submitted. Little hope, however, was entertained that the King’s obduracy would be overcome without a resort to force. But before proceeding to adopt more active measures the British government decided to dispatch Lord Durham upon a special mission to St. Petersburg. Ill-health had recently compelled Lord Heytesbury to relinquish his post, and his successor had not as yet been appointed. The King of the Netherlands, it was believed, still trusted that the Tsar would intervene on his behalf, should France and England begin hostilities against him. Lord Durham was therefore charged to endeavour to persuade the Emperor Nicholas “to give immediate instructions to the Russian plenipotentiaries at the conference to co-operate cordially and effectually in whatever measures might appear best calculated to effect an early execution of the treaty.” He was to state most positively that France and England, under any circumstances, were resolved to fulfil the engagements which they had contracted towards Belgium. Lastly, he was to explain the views of His Majesty’s government upon Italian, German and Polish affairs.[234]

Seeing that it was the object of the British government to conciliate the Tsar, in order to induce him to take part in measures which could not be otherwise than extremely distasteful to him, it is strange that this particular minister should have been selected for the mission. As one of the most advanced politicians in the Cabinet Lord Durham would hardly seem to have been the person best qualified to propitiate the Emperor Nicholas. But at the time his suitability was perhaps only a secondary consideration. On the question of the creation of peers to enable the Reform Bill to pass, he had seriously differed from Lord Grey, his own father-in-law, and it may have been the wish to avoid a complete rupture between them that prompted his despatch to St. Petersburg. The Emperor, however, whatever may have been the real nature of his feelings with respect to Durham’s appointment, evinced not the slightest resentment. On the contrary, he appeared to be at pains to pay him the greatest honours and, during the whole period of his six weeks’ stay in the Russian capital, the ambassador was the object of his most flattering attentions. Durham, who was highly gratified by the warmth of the Imperial reception and by the marked deference with which he was treated, was, for his part, no less anxious to create a favourable impression. When removed from the turmoil of party politics he rarely failed to display those statesmanlike qualities which he unquestionably possessed. Yet in spite of all his efforts, on this occasion, his embassy, in so far as its immediate objects were concerned, proved a complete failure. Under no circumstances would the Tsar agree to join in any hostile action against Holland. But, whilst the autocrat assured him that such was his irrevocable determination, he told him that he was equally resolved not to oppose those measures which other Powers might see fit to adopt, in order to obtain the execution of the separation treaty.[235] This categorical statement of Nicholas’ intention not to interpose, should coercion be applied to Holland, was the one satisfactory piece of news which Lord Durham was enabled to transmit. In all his conversations the Tsar manifested his extreme dislike of Louis Philippe and expressed his determination to render military assistance to Austria and Prussia, should France attempt to interfere in German affairs.[236] Lord Durham was not long in discovering that no good purpose would be served by adverting to Poland. The greatest indignation prevailed throughout Russia at the conduct of the Poles, and he quite agreed with Lord Heytesbury that the Tsar dared not disregard the national resentment which their insurrection had provoked. Only force, he saw clearly, would induce him to admit that other Powers had a right to interfere with his treatment of his Polish subjects, and England most certainly had no intention of making the question a case for war. He conceived, therefore, that he might depart from the letter of his instructions and confine his observations upon the subject to a mere informal expression to Count Nesselrode of the interest felt by the British government in the general welfare of Poland.[237]

Before the end of July, it was known in London that the King of the Netherlands was determined to reject the proposals which the conference had declared must be the last which could be submitted to him. Nevertheless Palmerston, encouraged seemingly by the language of Van Zuylen, the Dutch plenipotentiary, decided to make a further attempt to avert the necessity of an appeal to force.[238] Accordingly, he drew up a fresh scheme for the settlement of the points in dispute, and showed it confidentially to the Dutch representative. Van Zuylen professed to be on the whole well satisfied with Palmerston’s proposals, and held out distinct hopes that they might serve as the basis of a definite agreement between Holland and Belgium. But, before any progress could be made in the matter, it was necessary to induce the Belgians to abandon their declared intention of refusing to negotiate, until the Dutch should have evacuated the citadel of Antwerp. In order to try to persuade the Belgian government to adopt a less uncompromising attitude, Baron Stockmar, early in August, proceeded to Brussels as the semi-official representative of the conference. King Leopold’s confidential adviser saw clearly that the Belgians must appear in a very unfavourable light should the negotiations break down, owing to their obstinate refusal to recede from the position they had taken up. He had never approved of the policy of the MeulinÄer Cabinet, and had always deprecated the warlike preparations upon which that minister had ostentatiously embarked. As he constantly pointed out to the King, the chances of success in a single-handed contest with Holland were necessarily very doubtful. Moreover, under any circumstances, the Great Powers were pledged to intervene to put an end to the struggle, and, in such a case, Belgium, if the aggressor, would certainly be dealt with very harshly. One measure, however, which Stockmar had constantly advocated, was now an accomplished fact. In the month of May, the Princess Louise, a daughter of the King of the French, had been affianced to Leopold, and the marriage had been duly celebrated on August 9, at the ChÂteau de CompiÈgne. But the newly married king showed as little disposition to adopt the counsels of his father-in-law[239] as he had those of the sagacious Stockmar. Indeed, the language of many leading Belgians at this period suggested that they were encouraged to defy the Powers, from the security which they considered was assured to them by the family ties uniting their sovereign to the reigning House in France.[240] Leopold, without doubt, had no share in so dangerous an illusion, but his ministers had pledged themselves to the Chambers to insist upon the surrender of Antwerp as a preliminary to any fresh negotiations, and he seems to have thought that it would be too unpopular a step to dismiss them on that account. Stockmar returned to London on August 18. His visit to Brussels had failed in its object, but he still continued to press his views upon King Leopold. A prolongation of the status quo constituted, he argued, no disadvantage to Belgium. Although it was the case that the Dutch held the citadel of Antwerp, which, by the terms of the treaty, should have passed out of their possession, their retention of it was counterbalanced by the Belgian occupation of parts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, under the conditions of separation, had been assigned to Holland. Moreover, even the absolute Powers were prepared to admit that a continued refusal on the part of the Court of the Hague to evacuate Antwerp, would justify the Belgians in declining to pay their share of the public debt, jointly contracted by the two countries before their separation. Before long, the force of this reasoning began to be appreciated at Brussels, where both Adair and La Tour-Maubourg, the British and French ministers, were using their best endeavours to persuade the King to conform to the wishes of their respective governments. In diplomatic circles the conviction was gaining ground that the King of the Netherlands was merely trifling with the Powers, and that he had still no intention of bringing the negotiations to a conclusion.[241] Should these suspicions prove correct, Leopold probably realized that it must be to his advantage to display a readiness to meet the wishes of the conference, at a time when the members of it would necessarily be heartily disgusted at the dilatory and evasive attitude adopted by the Cabinet of the Hague.

Under the influence of these various considerations his resolution rose to the required point.[242] The MeulinÄer government was dismissed, General Goblet was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and powers were transmitted to Van de Weyer to enter into negotiations with the Dutch plenipotentiary upon the basis of the new proposals, Le thÈme de Lord Palmerston, as they were called by the diplomatists.

Accordingly, on September 20, M. Van de Weyer officially informed the conference that he was authorized to discuss with the Dutch plenipotentiaries the points in dispute between the two countries. But in a note dated the same day, Van Zuylen, ignoring completely the thÈme de Lord Palmerston, claimed the execution of the treaty on the terms set forth in the Dutch counter proposal of June 30. The conference, thereupon, called upon him definitely to state whether he was empowered to negotiate with Belgium in accordance with the proposals submitted by the British plenipotentiary. To this demand he returned an answer which was unanimously held to be highly unsatisfactory, and, on October 1, in consequence, the representatives of the five Powers met to consider the steps which should now be taken to bring matters to a conclusion. As had been foreseen, it was clear at once that the prospects of arriving at an agreement were hopeless. According to the absolute Powers, coercion must be confined to a declaration authorizing the Belgians to withhold payment of their share of the Dutch-Belgian debt, until the citadel of Antwerp should be handed over to them. France and England, on the other hand, deriding the notion that pressure of this kind would suffice to overcome the obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands, called for the application of sterner measures. To this demand the plenipotentiaries of the northern Powers opposed the irrevocable resolution of their respective Courts not to participate in any hostile acts against Holland. In face of this irreconcilable divergence of opinion, the conference broke up, the representatives of France and England announcing the intention of their governments to take steps to ensure the prompt execution of the terms of the separation treaty.[243]

But, although the concert of the Powers had thus ceased to exist, there was still no distinct understanding between France and England, as to the measures by which the Dutch were to be compelled to evacuate Antwerp. Louis Philippe’s continued inability to reconstruct his Cabinet necessarily increased the reluctance of the British government to agree definitely to combined action with France. When, towards the end of June, the King had become convinced of the necessity of strengthening the ministry his thoughts, in the first place, had turned towards M. Dupin. His oratorical powers, the considerable following which he commanded in the Chamber, and the support which he had given to M. Casimir PÉrier, furnished excellent reasons for his inclusion in a government which was to carry on the policy of the late President of the Council. But insurmountable difficulties had arisen. It is not clear whether M. Dupin’s objections to joining the Cabinet should be ascribed to conscientious doubts about the future policy of the government, or merely to disappointed ambition, because the King was not prepared to confer upon him the Presidency of the Council. According to one account, he is said to have pointed to his hobnailed boots and to have asked insolently whether they were to debar him from transacting business with “Milord Granville.” But, whatever may have been the true cause of his misunderstanding with his royal master, their discussion unquestionably grew very heated and culminated in the King seizing him by the collar and ejecting him from the room.[244] A strong sense of personal dignity, however, was never a characteristic of Louis Philippe, and, notwithstanding this scene, he soon reopened negotiations with M. Dupin. But this second attempt to arrange matters was attended with no better success than the first. Baffled in this direction, Louis Philippe was compelled to make overtures to the Doctrinaires. Under the Restoration this designation had been applied to a small but distinguished group of politicians, of whom the best known were Royer-Collard, Guizot, Broglie and Barante. All were strong advocates of limited monarchy and, generally speaking, fervent admirers of the British constitution. Their system of government was based upon the theory that, in the modern France which the Revolution had created, no rÉgime could endure which did not depend for support upon the middle classes. The political principles which found favour with the bourgeoisie, constituting as they did a juste milieu between the reactionary sentiments of the old aristocracy and the revolutionary tendencies of the labouring classes, were precisely those to which, in the opinion of the Doctrinaires, all future governments would have to conform. Accordingly, they had accepted the Monarchy of July and both Broglie and Guizot had sat in Louis Philippe’s first Cabinet. But, holding that insurrection must be put down with a firm hand, they had always supported Casimir PÉrier.

Louis Philippe had no great liking for the Doctrinaires. As strict constitutionalists they were necessarily opposed to the direct interference of the sovereign with the business of the State. Moreover, they were unquestionably unpopular in the country. On this occasion, however, when compelled by circumstances to seek their assistance, he hoped to overcome this last objection by nominating a popular soldier, in the person of Marshal Soult, to the presidency of the council. All through his reign Louis Philippe was inclined to place a military man at the head of the government. Not only were appointments of this kind invariably well received, but he soon discovered that soldiers, brought up in the school of Bonaparte, were seldom troubled with constitutional scruples about the exact position of the sovereign in a limited monarchy. But, at the same time, he was careful to assure Lord Granville that the Marshal’s duties, as President of the Council, would be purely nominal. “Under any circumstances,” said Louis Philippe, “his appointment need excite no apprehensions abroad, his love of peace is notorious, indeed, his description of himself as l’apÔtre de la paix has almost passed into a byword.”[245] The Duc de Broglie, the son-in-law of Madame de Stael, into whose hands the King proposed to confide the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, was a cultivated man but of reserved and somewhat displeasing manners. He enjoyed, however, a high reputation for honourable dealing and integrity of purpose and was, moreover, on terms of friendship with Lord Lansdowne and other prominent members of the Whig party. His selection, therefore, might be expected to meet with the cordial approval of the British government.

The Duc de Broglie, however, was not prepared to accept unconditionally the task which the King proposed he should undertake. After one of his first interviews with Louis Philippe he met Lord Granville at Talleyrand’s house in the Rue Saint-Florentin and explained the situation to him. The French public, he told the ambassador, were weary of the interminable negotiations about Belgium, and it was only by a military exploit, such as the capture of the citadel of Antwerp, that the Cabinet would be able to obtain the support of the Chamber. It was useless to attempt to disguise the grave character of the situation. Were the government to be overthrown by a parliamentary majority, the King would be forced to depend upon the Left, and be rendered powerless to control the violence of extreme members of the party. The Duke went on to assure him that he was not ignorant of the suspicion with which the entry of a French army into Belgium would be regarded. There was no pledge, no guarantee, however, which he would not be prepared to give that, eight days after the capture of the citadel, every French soldier should be withdrawn from Belgium.[246] This conversation had been regarded by Lord Granville as quite unofficial, but, on the following day, October 5, SÉbastiani informed him that “the King purposed to defer concluding his ministerial arrangements until the British ambassador should be enabled to state the opinion of his government, respecting the conditions under which alone the Duc de Broglie would undertake the direction of foreign affairs.”[247] It is evident, however, that other counsels must have prevailed seeing that, on the morning of October 11, the Moniteur contained the names of the members of the new Cabinet. The despatches of Mareuil, the chargÉ d’affaires in London, respecting the intentions of the British government, were, it may be presumed, considered so satisfactory as to render further assurances unnecessary. The ministry presided over by Marshal Soult, assisted by four such men as Broglie, Guizot, Humann, and Thiers, could almost aspire to the name of “a government of all the talents.”

The British government was in a difficult situation. The elections were impending, and a Reformed Parliament, bent upon retrenchment and the settlement of domestic questions, was little likely to regard with favour any policy which might conceivably lead to serious complications with foreign Powers. The very indifferent display of the Belgians, in their short campaign of the year before, had deprived them of all popular sympathy. In commercial circles, especially, the idea of embarking upon hostilities against England’s old allies, the Dutch, was strongly deprecated.[248] Although the unreasonable attitude of the King of the Netherlands, during the past twelve months, had alienated from him the support of The Times[249] and of many persons who derived their opinions from its columns, there was unquestionably something to be said upon his behalf. He had adhered to the protocols of January 20 and January 27, 1831, which the plenipotentiaries had declared must form the basis of any separation treaty. Nevertheless, in order to conciliate the Belgians, they had gone back upon their decision, and both the convention of the eighteen articles and the separation treaty of November 14, 1831, had been framed upon different conditions.

The Tories had always supported the Dutch, and during the stormy months which had preceded the passing of the Reform Bill, had delivered some damaging attacks upon the foreign policy of the government. It was certain that they would vehemently denounce any combined action with France in the Dutch-Belgian question. Nor would it be politic to disregard their attacks and merely to treat them as the venomous outburst of party animosity. Notwithstanding that the republicans had been crushed in the streets of Paris and that the Carlist rebellion in La VendÉe had been stamped out, the situation in France undoubtedly presented many disquieting symptoms. The hiding place of the Duchesse de Berri was still undiscovered, and her presence in the west prevented the complete restoration of tranquillity. The great difficulty which Louis Philippe was experiencing in forming a government of moderate men afforded food for yet more serious reflection. The possibility could not be ignored that, in the near future, he might be compelled to select his ministers from the Left—from the party, the leading members of which proclaimed unceasingly that the treaties of 1815 must be abrogated and that Belgium must be united to France.

King William IV., moreover, was strongly opposed to hostile action against Holland. The “Jack Tar animosity”[250] which he always entertained for the French blazed up afresh at the notion of England and France engaging upon joint operations in the Low Countries. The King’s dislike to the policy of his ministers was encouraged by the Howes and the Fitzclarences,[251] who used their best endeavours to persuade him to refuse his consent to all measures of coercion. In view of the little sympathy which the cause of Belgium evoked in the country, and of the many difficulties by which they were beset, Lords Grey and Palmerston might not improbably have felt disposed to adopt some middle course, more in harmony with the views of the Court and of the absolute Powers. But a refusal on their part to resort to force, in order to obtain the execution of the treaty, would not have restrained the French from beginning hostilities. “I should deceive your Lordship,”wrote Granville on October 19, “were I to hold out any expectation that the British government, by withholding its concurrence, could prevent a French army from entering Belgium.”[252] It was to be apprehended, however, that a refusal of the English Cabinet to join with France in the application of coercion to Holland might lead to the resignation of the Duc de Broglie. In that case it was more than probable that the direction of French policy, at a most important moment, might pass from the hands of a statesman of moderate views into those of some politician of advanced opinions, in whom it would be impossible to feel the same confidence. This was a consideration which, without doubt, carried the greatest weight with the English ministers and exercised a deciding influence over their resolutions.

It was soon apparent that the withdrawal of their plenipotentiaries from the conference would be the extent of the support which the Northern Courts purposed to give to the King of the Netherlands. The neutral attitude, which the Tsar had promised Lord Durham he should adopt, rendered it certain that Austria would not move a man to the assistance of Holland. Metternich was much concerned at the recrudescence of a demand for more Liberal institutions in Germany, a state of affairs which had called forth from the Diet fresh decrees of a repressive character. The prevailing unrest, however, made it the more desirable that the Dutch-Belgian question, with all the possibilities of danger attaching to it, should be promptly settled. Furthermore, the burden of military establishments was already grievously straining the Imperial exchequer.[253] But, although Metternich had no thought of opposing the action of the constitutional Powers in the Low Countries, he chafed bitterly at the undignified attitude which his Court was compelled to adopt. At one time he would impute the whole blame for the situation which had arisen to the plenipotentiaries at the conference who, by manifesting too plainly their dread of war, had allowed Palmerston to see that he might, without danger, conduct matters as he chose.[254] At other times the Cabinet of Berlin was the object of his fretful complaints. Had Prussia on the first outbreak of the insurrection at Brussels marched an army into the Low Countries, the revolution would have been stamped out, and all the subsequent trouble would have been avoided. France, in that case, he professed to believe, might have threatened, but would never have dared to intervene.[255]

The break-up of the conference and the intention avowed by the two constitutional Powers of expelling the Dutch from Antwerp, although not unexpected, caused considerable perturbation at Berlin. Ancillon, the chief minister, declared that Prussia would agree to the weekly deduction of a million florins from Belgium’s share of the debt due to Holland, for so long a period as the Dutch should retain possession of the citadel of Antwerp. Nor would his Court be prepared seriously to oppose a blockade of the Scheldt by the two maritime Powers. The entry of a French army into the Low Countries, however, was a different matter, and one which would compel Prussia to take steps to safeguard her interests. But, neither the angry language of M. Ancillon at Berlin nor the veiled threats indulged in by Baron Werther in Paris, excited any real apprehension. Nevertheless, as both the French and English governments were sincerely desirous of conciliating the absolute Powers, it was resolved to propose that, pending the settlement of the Dutch-Belgian question, Prussia should occupy Venlo and that part of Limburg which the treaty had assigned to Holland.[256]

It was not until October 22 that the convention, to regulate the conditions under which France and England were to apply coercion to Holland, was signed in London. The French government chafed impatiently at this delay, for which King William’s reluctance to agree to the measures advocated by his ministers was chiefly responsible. Notwithstanding Talleyrand’s[257] explanations of the delicate situation in which Lord Grey was placed, the Duc de Broglie, on October 21, informed Lord Granville that his government could wait no longer. The very existence of the Cabinet, he assured him, was at stake. Unless he were to be in a position to announce to the Chambers, which were about to reassemble, that definite steps were to be taken in order to expel the Dutch from Antwerp, he and his colleagues would assuredly be driven from office. If no news were received from London within the next twenty-four hours, the Cabinet, he had no doubt, would resolve to march an army against Antwerp, in the event of the King of the Netherlands refusing to comply with a summons to evacuate the citadel. This resolution would, however, be at once transmitted to London, and would be kept entirely secret until the British government should have had time to reply to it. But, to the great joy of Louis Philippe and his ministers, the arrival, on October 29, of the convention signed in London relieved them from the necessity of deciding upon their course of action, without having previously obtained the concurrence of the English government.[258]

By the terms of the convention of October 22, 1832, the King of the Netherlands was to be summoned to enter into an engagement by November 2 to withdraw his troops, before the 12th of the same month, from the territory which the separation treaty had adjudged to Belgium. Should he refuse to comply, France and England agreed to lay an embargo upon the Dutch shipping within their respective harbours, to order their cruisers to seize all Dutch vessels at sea, and to blockade the coast of Holland with their combined fleets. If, by November 15, the required evacuation should not yet have taken place, a French army would enter Belgium. But its operations were to be limited strictly to the capture of the citadel of Antwerp and the forts dependent upon it, and, when this result should have been attained, it was to withdraw immediately. At the same time, a note was to be addressed to the government at Brussels calling for the evacuation of Venlo and those places still occupied by Belgium, which, under the provisions of the separation treaty, had been assigned to Holland.[259] This demand, however, would be of a purely formal character, and was to be made upon the understanding that it need only be complied with, should the King of the Netherlands agree to the concessions required of him.[260]

Immediately upon receipt of the convention in Paris, the French fleet at Cherbourg was ordered to unite with the British squadron at Spithead. This junction was duly effected, and, on November 4, the King of the Netherlands having declined to comply with the demand which had been presented to him, the combined fleets set sail for the mouth of the Scheldt, whilst, two days later, both governments laid an embargo upon the Dutch shipping within their ports. The Duc de Broglie, in the meanwhile, had instructed La Tour-Maubourg, the French minister at Brussels, to negotiate a convention for the entry of a French army into Belgium. The French government had always insisted that the operations, for the reduction of the citadel of Antwerp, must be carried out exclusively by its own troops. The Belgian army was to be entirely separated from them, and was to do no more than hold itself in readiness to repel an invasion, should the Dutch make an incursion across their frontiers. King Leopold reluctantly assented to these conditions, which necessarily deprived his people of an excellent opportunity of wiping out their humiliations of the year before. It came, therefore, as a disagreeable surprise when, on the occasion of the exchange of the ratifications of the convention, La Tour-Maubourg handed in a statement reserving to the French government the right of demanding payment for the expenses of the expedition. This claim, it was afterwards explained, would not be enforced immediately, but would be allowed to stand over until some future occasion. In Palmerston’s opinion, however, the fact that payment was to be deferred made the demand no less objectionable. Were it to be admitted, Belgium must necessarily be placed in a position of dangerous dependence upon France. His vigorous protests achieved the desired result. After some discussion the French government agreed to abandon its claim for the repayment of its expenses.[261] In all other respects matters proceeded with perfect smoothness. In accordance with the terms of the convention, on November 16th, a French force of 60,000 men, under the command of Marshal GÉrard, crossed the Belgian frontier and laid siege to the citadel of Antwerp, the Duc d’OrlÉans and the Duc de Nemours, the two eldest sons of Louis Philippe, accompanying the headquarters staff of the army of operations.

In London the application of coercion of so vigorous a nature was far from evoking the universal applause which it called forth in Paris. Among the general public the entry of Marshal GÉrard’s army into Belgium was regarded with suspicion, and a meeting of London merchants was held, and a petition was forwarded to the King, praying that hostile measures might not be taken against the Dutch. The Tories openly declared that they placed all their hopes in General ChassÉ, the commandant of the citadel of Antwerp. If only that gallant officer could contrive to repel the French, the Grey Cabinet, they conceived, might be forced to resign. Possibly there were sanguine members of the party who fancied that the prowess of a Dutch general might pave the way to the repeal of the Reform Act. In the meantime all their sympathies went out to a drunken sailor who, from the dock in the police-court, proclaimed the union of the British flag with the tricolour to be a national disgrace.[262]

The proposal that Prussia should occupy Venlo and parts of Limburg, and the limitations which the convention of October 22 set upon the scope of the French operations, somewhat reconciled the German Powers to the forcible ejection of the Dutch from Antwerp.[263] Nevertheless, after having in the first instance declared its readiness to take temporary possession of portions of the disputed territory, the Court of Berlin, at the instigation, it was suspected, of the Tsar, declined to entertain the suggestion. Inasmuch as the acquisition of the citadel of Antwerp by the Belgians depended upon the success of the French arms, they could not reasonably be expected to yield up, even to a third party, any territory which they actually occupied, before the operations under Marshal GÉrard should have achieved their desired result. Accordingly, in the formal proposal of Talleyrand and Palmerston, which was submitted to BÜlow on October 30, it was provided that the Prussian occupation of Venlo and parts of Limburg and Luxemburg should begin, only when the French expedition should have accomplished its object. Ancillon, however, declared that this suggestion was altogether inadmissible. Prussia, it was true, had signified her willingness to hold certain districts of the Low Countries. But she had only consented to take temporary possession of them for the security of her own interests during the French operations against Antwerp. To occupy any portion of Holland, after the withdrawal of Marshal GÉrard’s army, would amount, in effect, to the application of military pressure to the King of the Netherlands to compel him to accept the conditions of the separation treaty. Such a proceeding would be wholly inconsistent with the policy which the Court of Berlin had invariably pursued, and to which it was resolved to adhere. Prussia, therefore, would content herself with the concentration of an army of observation upon the Meuse, for so long a period as the French might see fit to remain in Belgium.[264]

In the meantime the siege of the citadel of Antwerp had been proceeding steadily, although hardly with the rapidity which the British government, in its impatience to see the affair concluded, could have wished.[265] At last, after having sustained a very heavy bombardment and having done all that honour required, General ChassÉ, on December 22, agreed to surrender. But the two detached forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek, which, owing to the opening of the dykes, could only have been reduced by a long blockade, were not included in the capitulation. The arrangements connected with the transference of the fortress to the Belgian military authorities were quickly carried out, and, on December 27, the French army began its homeward march.

The operations of Marshal GÉrard had placed the Belgians in possession of the citadel of Antwerp, and had infused vitality into the Soult government, but they had not succeeded in overcoming the reluctance of the King of the Netherlands to adhere to the separation treaty. It remained to be seen whether the embargo which France and England continued to maintain, and the loss entailed by the non-payment of the Belgian share of the Netherlands debt, would suffice to break down his obstinacy. After this state of affairs had continued for some four months distinct symptoms began to manifest themselves in Dutch commercial circles of discontent at the prolongation of the crisis. About this same time also the Russian and Prussian Cabinets became imbued with the notion that the conclusion of the Dutch-Belgian affair might lead to a separation between France and England. Their intimate union had grown up in the course of the negotiations, the final settlement of the question, it was hoped, might cause them to drift asunder. The agents of the northern Courts at the Hague were, accordingly, instructed to urge the King to terminate definitely his troublesome quarrel with Belgium and the maritime Powers.[266]

This combination of internal and external pressure was more than the Dutch Cabinet could withstand. On May 21, 1833 a convention was signed in London by the plenipotentiaries of Holland, on the one side, and those of Great Britain and France, on the other, stipulating that, so long as the relations between Holland and Belgium should not be settled by a definite treaty, His Netherlands Majesty would never begin hostilities against Belgium, and would leave the navigation of the Scheldt entirely free. France and England in return engaged to remove the embargo, immediately upon the ratification of this convention.[267]

The convention of May 21, 1833, was, in effect, an agreement for the maintenance of the status quo. It constituted, however, a condition of affairs very favourable to the Belgians. The retention of the districts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, according to the twenty-four articles, should have formed part of Holland, compensated them amply for the small inconveniences imposed upon them by the refusal of the Court of the Hague to acknowledge their independence and the sovereignty of their King. Five years later, in 1838, this fact was brought home to them when, the King of the Netherlands having announced his intention of adhering to the separation treaty, the Powers insisted upon the surrender to him of those territories. By that time, however, Leopold had obtained the recognition of all the great European Courts with the exception of that of Russia, whilst, relieved from the fear of aggression on the part of the Dutch, his kingdom had already begun to thrive and to prosper greatly.

It was the firm and skilful hand of Palmerston which had guided the conference through a sea of dangers to the creation of a free and independent Belgium. But if the chief credit for the successful termination of these protracted negotiations should be given to the English statesman, second honours, without doubt, should be assigned to Talleyrand. The veteran diplomatist was no friend to Belgium, but he was a consistent supporter of the British alliance. The exceptional position, which his age and his reputation permitted him to assume, enabled him on many occasions to uphold successfully the English policy against his own sovereign and his government. In 1814, at the Congress of Vienna, friendship with England had been the object of his untiring efforts. But, if he looked upon a close understanding with that Power as highly advantageous to the restored Bourbons, he regarded it as a matter of vital necessity to the Monarchy of July. An intimate union with England, he was convinced, was Louis Philippe’s best security against the malevolent hostility of the Northern Courts.

The Belgian conference had shown that, in the person of Lord Palmerston, a worthy successor to Canning had entered the arena of European politics. As was the case with that statesman, Palmerston soon came to be regarded with the bitterest dislike in the Courts and Cabinets of the absolute Powers. Metternich hoped devoutly that the Tories might soon be back in office, and, not without good reason, expressed a pious wish that never again might a conference take place in London.[268] The real weakness of the absolute Courts had transpired all too clearly in the course of the negotiations.