The following pages, extracted from an introduction to a new edition to "Cetywayo and His White Neighbours," written in 1888, are reprinted here, because they contain matter of interest concerning the more recent history of the Transvaal Boers.

Extract from Introduction to New Edition of 1888.

The recent history of the Transvaal, now once more a republic, will fortunately admit of brief treatment. It is, so far as England is concerned, very much a history of concession. For an account of the first Convention I must refer my readers to the remarks which I have made in the chapter of this book headed "The Retrocession of the Transvaal." It will there be seen that the Transvaal Volksraad only ratified the first convention, which was wrung from us (Sir Evelyn Wood, to his honour be it said, dissenting) after our defeats at Lang's Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba, as a favour to the British Government, which in its turn virtually promised to reconsider the convention, if only the Volksraad would be so good as to ratify it. This convention was ratified in October 1881. In June 1883 the Transvaal Government[14] telegraphs briefly to Lord Derby through the High Commissioner that the Volksraad has "resolved that time has come to reconsider convention." Lord Derby quickly telegraphs back that "Her Majesty's Government consent to inquire into the working of convention." Human nature is frail, and it is impossible to help wishing that Lord Palmerston or Disraeli had been appointed by the Fates to answer that telegram. But we have fallen upon different days, and new men have arisen who appear to be suited to them; and so the convention was reconsidered, and on the 27th of February 1884 a new one was signed, which is known as the convention of London. It begins by defining boundaries to which the "Government of the South African Republic will strictly adhere, … and will do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making any encroachments upon the said boundaries." The existence of the New Republic in Zululand is a striking and practical comment on this article. Article ii. also provides for the security of the amended southwest boundary. The proclamation of 16th September 1884 (afterwards disallowed by the English Government), by which the South African Republic practically annexed the territories of Montsioa and Moshette, already for the most part in the possession of its freebooters, very clearly illustrates its anxiety to be bound by this provision. Art xii. provides for the independence of the Swazis; and by way of illustrating the fidelity with which it has been observed, we shall presently have occasion to remark upon the determined attempts that have continually been made by Boer freebooters to obtain possession of Swaziland—and so on.

In order to make these severe restrictions palatable to the burghers of a free and haughty Republic, Lord Derby recommends Her Majesty's Government to remit a trifling sum of £127,000 of their debt due to the Imperial Treasury, which was accordingly done. On the whole, the Transvaal had no reason to be dissatisfied with this new treaty, though really the whole affair is scarcely worth discussing. Convention No. 2 is almost as much a farce and a dead letter as was Convention No. 1. It is, however, impossible to avoid being impressed with the really remarkable tone, not merely of equality, but of superiority, adopted by the South African Republic and its officials towards this country. To take an instance. The Republic had found it convenient to wage a war of extermination upon some Kafir chiefs. Two of these, Mampoer and Njabel, fell into its hands. Her Majesty's Government was, rightly or wrongly, so impressed with the injustice of the sentence of death passed upon these unfortunates, that, acting through Mr. Hudson, the British Resident at Pretoria, it strained every nerve to save them. This was the upshot of it. In a tone of studied sarcasm, His Honour the State President "observes with great satisfaction the great interest in these cases which has been manifested by your Honour and Her Majesty's Government." He then goes on to say that, notwithstanding this interest, Mampoer will be duly and effectually hung, giving the exact time and place of the event, and Njabel imprisoned for life, with hard labour. Finally, he once more conveys "the hearty thanks of the Government and the members of the Executive Council for the interest manifested in these cases,"[15] and remains, &c.

The independence of Swaziland was guaranteed by the convention of 1884. Yet the Blue-books are full of accounts of various attempts made by Boers to obtain a footing in Swaziland. Thus in November 1885 Umbandine, the king of Swaziland, sends messengers to the Governor of Natal through Sir T. Shepstone, in which he states that in the winter Piet Joubert, accompanied by two other Boers and an interpreter, came to his kraal and asked him to sign a paper "to say that he and all the Swazis agreed to go over and recognise the authority of the Boer Government, and have nothing more to do with the English."[16] Umbandine refused, saying that he looked to and recognised the English Government. Thereon the Boers, growing angry, answered, "Those fathers of yours, the English, act very slowly; and if you look to them for help, and refuse to sign this paper, we shall have scattered you and your people, and taken possession of the land before they arrive. Why do you refuse to sign the paper? You know we defeated the English at Majuba." Umbandine's message then goes on to say that he recognises the English Government only, and does not wish to have dealings with the Boers. Also, in the following month, we find him making a direct application to the Colonial Office through Mr. David Forbes,[17] praying that his country may be taken under the protection of Her Majesty's Government.

More than one such attempt to secure informal rights of occupation in Swaziland appears to have been made by the Transvaal Boers. Mr. T. Shepstone, C.M.G., is at present acting as Resident to Umbandine, though he has not, it would seem, any regular commission from the Home Government authorising him to do so, probably because it does not consider that its rights in Swaziland are such as to justify such an assumption of formal authority over the Swazis. However this may be, Umbandine could not have found a better man to protect his interests. Of course, when acts like that of Piet Joubert are reported to the Government of the South African Republic and made the subject of a remonstrance by this country, all knowledge of them is repudiated, as it was repudiated in the case of the invasion of Zululand.

It is part of the policy of the Transvaal only to become an accessory after the fact. Its subjects go forth and stir up trouble among the natives, and then probably the Boer Government intervenes "in the interests of humanity," and takes, or tries to take, the country. This process is always going on, and, unless the British Government puts a stop to it, always will go on. We shall probably soon hear that it is developing itself in the direction of Matabeleland. A country the size of France, which could without difficulty accommodate a population of from eight to ten millions of industrious folk, is not large enough for the wants of a Boer people, numbering something under fifty thousand souls. Every young Boer must have his six or more thousand acres of land on which to lord it. It is his birthright, and if it is not forthcoming he goes and takes it by force from the nearest native tribe. Hence these continual complaints. Of course, there are two ways of looking at the matter. There is a party that does not hesitate to say that the true policy of this country is to let the Boers work their will upon the natives, and then, as they in turn fly from civilisation towards the far interior, to follow on their path and occupy the lands that they have swept. This plan is supported by arguments about the superiority of the white races and their obvious destiny of rule. It is, I confess, one that I look upon as little short of wicked. I could never discern a superiority so great in ourselves as to authorise us, by right divine as it were, to destroy the coloured man and take his lands. It is difficult to see why a Zulu, for instance, has not as much right to live in his own way as a Boer or an Englishman. Of course, there is another extreme. Nothing is more ridiculous than the length to which the black brother theory is sometimes driven by enthusiasts. A savage is one thing, and a civilised man is another; and though civilised men may and do become savages, I personally doubt if the converse is even possible. But whether the civilised man, with his gin, his greed, and his dynamite, is really so very superior to the savage is another question, and one which would bear argument, although this is not the place to argue it. My point is, that his superiority is not at any rate so absolutely overwhelming as to justify him in the wholesale destruction of the savage and the occupation of his lands, or even in allowing others to do the work for him if he can prevent it. The principle might conceivably be pushed to inconvenient and indecent lengths. Savagery is only a question of degree. When all true savages have been wiped out, the most civilised and self-righteous among the nations may begin to give the term to those whom they consider to be on a lower scale than themselves, and apply the argument also. Thus there are "cultured" people in another land who do not hesitate to say that the humble writers of these islands are rank and rude barbarians not to be endured. Supposing that, being the stronger, they also applied the argument, it would be inconvenient for some of us, and perhaps the world would not gain so very much after all. But this is a digression, only excusable, if excusable at all, in one who has endured a three weeks' course of unmitigated Blue-book. To return.

The process of absorption attempted in Swaziland, and brought to a successful issue in Zululand, also went forward merrily in Bechuanaland, till recently, under the rule of Mankorane, chief of the Batlapins, and Montsioa, chief of the Baralongs. These two chiefs have always been devoted friends and adherents of the English Government, and consequently are not regarded with favour by the Boers. Shortly after the retrocession of the Transvaal, a rival to Mankorane rose up in the person of a certain Massou, and a rival to Montsioa named Moshette. Both Massou and Moshette were supported by Boer fillibusters, and what happened to Usibepu in Zululand happened to these unfortunate chiefs in Bechuanaland. They were defeated after a gallant struggle, and two Republics called Stellaland and Goschen were carved out of their territories and occupied by the fillibusters. Fortunately for them, however, they had a friend in the person of the Rev. John Mackenzie, to whose valuable work, "Austral Africa," I beg to refer the reader for a fuller account of these events. Mr. Mackenzie, who had for many years lived as a missionary among the Bechuanas, had also mastered the fact that it is very difficult to do anything for South Africa in this country unless you can make it a question of votes, or, in other words, unless you can bring pressure to bear upon the Government. Accordingly he commenced an agitation on behalf of Mankorane and Montsioa, in which he was supported by various religious bodies, and also by the late Mr. Forster and the Aborigines Protection Society. As a result of this agitation he was appointed Deputy to the High Commissioner for Bechuanaland, whither he proceeded early in 1884 to establish a British protectorate. He was gladly welcomed by the unfortunate chiefs, who were now almost at their last gasp, and who both of them ceded their rights of government to the Queen. Hostilities did not, however, cease, for on the 31st July 1884 the fillibusters again attacked Montsioa, routed him, and cruelly murdered Mr. Bethell, his English adviser. Meanwhile Mr. Mackenzie's success was viewed with very mixed feelings at the Cape. To the English party it was most acceptable, but the Dutch,[18] and more numerous party, looked on it with alarm and disgust. They did not at all wish to see the Imperial power established in Bechuanaland; so pressure was put upon Sir Hercules Robinson, and through him on Mr. Mackenzie, to such an extent indeed as to necessitate the resignation of the latter. Thereon the High Commissioner despatched a Cape politician, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and his own private secretary, Captain Bower, R.N., to Bechuanaland. These gentlemen at once set to work to undo most of what Mr. Mackenzie had done, and, generally speaking, did not advance either British or native interests in Bechuanaland. At this point, taking advantage of the general confusion, the Government of the South African Republic issued a proclamation placing both Montsioa and Moshette under its protection, as usual "in the interests of humanity."

But the agitation in England had, fortunately for what remained of the Bechuana people, not been allowed to drop. Her Majesty's Government disallowed the Boer proclamation, under Article iv. of the convention of London, and despatched an armed force to Bechuanaland, commanded by Sir Charles Warren. This good act, I believe I am right in saying, we owe entirely to the firmness of Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Chamberlain, who insisted upon its being done. Meanwhile Messrs. Upington and Sprigg, members of the Cape Government, hastened to Bechuanaland to effect a settlement before the arrival of Sir Charles Warren's force. This settlement, though it might have been agreeable to the fillibusters and the anti-Imperialists generally, was disallowed by Her Majesty's Government as unsatisfactory, and Sir Charles Warren was ordered to occupy Bechuanaland. This he accordingly did, taking Mr. Mackenzie with him, very much against the will of the anti-English party, and, be it added, of Sir Hercules Robinson. Indeed, if we may accept Mr. Mackenzie's version of these occurrences, which seems to be a fair one, and adequately supported by documentary evidence, the conduct of Sir Hercules Robinson towards Mr. Mackenzie would really admit of explanation. As soon as the freebooters saw that the Imperial Government was really in earnest, of course there was no more trouble. They went away, and Sir Charles Warren took possession of Bechuanaland without striking a single blow. He remained in the country for nearly a year arranging for its permanent pacification and government, and as a result of his occupation, on the 30th September 1885, all the territory south of the Molopo River was declared to be British territory, and made into a quasi crown colony, the entire extent of land, including the districts ruled over by Khama, Sechele, and Gasitsive, being about 160,000 square miles in area. I believe that the new colony of British Bechuanaland is proving a very considerable success. Every provision has been made for native wants, and its settlement goes on apace. There is no reason why, with its remarkable natural advantages, it should not one day become a great country, with a prosperous white, and a loyal and contented native population. When this comes about it is to be hoped that it will remember that it owes its existence to the energy and firmness of Mr. Mackenzie, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Chamberlain, and Sir Charles Warren.

It is probably by now dawning upon the mind of the British public that when we gave up the Transvaal we not only did a cowardly thing and sowed a plentiful crop of future troubles, we also abandoned one of the richest, if not the richest, country in the world. The great gold-fields which exist all over the surface of the land are being opened up and pouring out their treasures so fast that it is said that the Transvaal Government, hitherto remarkable for its impecuniosity, does not know what to do with its superfluous cash. To what extent this will continue it is impossible to say, but I for one shall not be surprised if the output should prove to be absolutely unprecedented. And with gold in vast quantities, with iron in mountains, and coal-beds to be measured by the scores of square miles, with lead and copper and cobalt, a fertile soil, water, and one of the most lovely climates in the world, what more is required to make a country rich and great? Only one thing, an Anglo-Saxon Government, and that we have taken away from the Transvaal. Whether the English flag has vanished for ever from its borders is, however, still an open question. The discovery of gold in such quantities is destined to exercise a very remarkable influence upon the future of the Transvaal. Where gold is to be found, there the hardy, enterprising, English-speaking diggers flock together, and before them and their energy the Boer retreats, as the native retreats and vanishes before the rifle of the Boer. Already there are many thousands of diggers in the Transvaal; if the discoveries of gold go on and prove as remunerative as they promise to be, in a few more years their number will be vastly increased. Supposing that another five years sees sixty or seventy thousand English diggers at work in the Transvaal, is it to be believed that these men will in that event allow themselves to be ruled by eight or nine thousand hostile-hearted Boers? Is it to be believed, too, that the Boers will stop to try and rule them? From such knowledge as I have of their character I should say certainly not. They will trek, anywhere out of the way of the Englishman and his English ways, and those who do not trek will be absorbed.[19] Should this happen, it is, of course, possible, and even probable, that for some time the diggers, fearing the vacillations of Imperial policy, would prefer to remain independent with a Republican form of Government. But the Englishman is a law-abiding and patriotic creature, and as society settled itself in the new community, it would almost certainly desire to be united to the Empire and acknowledge the sovereignty of the Queen. So far as a judgment can be formed, if only the gold holds out the Transvaal will as certainly fall into the lap of the Empire as a green apple will one day drop from the tree—that is, if it is not gathered.

Now it is quite possible that the Germans, or some other power, may try to gather the Transvaal apple. The Boers are not blind to the march of events, and they dislike us and our rule. Perhaps they might think it worth their while to seek German protection, and unless we are prepared to say "no" very firmly indeed—and who knows, in the present condition of Home politics, what we are prepared to do from one day to another?—Germany would in such a case almost certainly think it worth her while to give it. Very likely the protection, when granted, would in some ways resemble that which the Boer himself, his breast aglow with love of peace and the "interests of humanity," is so anxious to extend to the misguided native possessor of desirable and well-watered lands. Very likely, in the end, the Boer would be sorry that he did not accept the ills he knew of. But that is neither here nor there. So far as we are concerned, the mischief would be done. In short, should the position arise, everything will depend upon our capacity of saying "no," and the tone in which we say it. It will not do to rely upon our London convention, by which the Transvaal is forbidden to conclude treaties with outside powers without the consent of this Government. The convention has been broken before now, and will be broken again, if the Boers find it convenient to break it, and know that they can do so with impunity. Meanwhile we must rest on our oars and watch events. One thing, however, might and should be done. Some person having weight and real authority—if he were quite new to South Africa so much the better—should be appointed as our Consul to watch over the welfare of Englishmen and our Imperial interests at Pretoria, and properly paid for doing so. It is difficult to find a suitable man unless he is adequately salaried and supported.

But quite recently this country has awakened to the knowledge that Delagoa Bay is important to its South African interests, though how important it perhaps does not altogether realise. For years and years the colony of Natal has been employed in the intermittent construction of a railway with a very narrow gauge, which is now open as far as Ladysmith, or to within a hundred miles of the Transvaal border. Natal is very poor, and in common with the rest of South Africa, and indeed of the world, has lately been passing through a period of great commercial depression. The Home Government has refused to help it to construct its railways (if it had done so, how many hundreds of thousand pounds would have been saved to the British taxpayer during the Zulu and Boer wars!), and has equally refused to allow it to borrow sufficient money to get them constructed, with the result that a large amount of the interior trade has already been deflected into other channels. And now a fresh and very real danger, not only to Natal, but to all Imperial interests in South Africa, has sprung into sudden prominence, that is, in this country, for in Africa it has been foreseen for many years. Above Zululand is situated Amatongaland, which reaches to the southern shore of one of the finest harbours in the world, Delagoa Bay. This great bight, in which half a dozen navies could ride at anchor, the only really good haven on the coasts of South Africa, is fifty-five miles in width and twenty in depth, that is, from east to west It is separated from the Transvaal, of which it is the natural port, by about ninety miles of wild and sparsely inhabited country.

The ownership of this splendid port was for many years in dispute between this country and the Portuguese, with whose dominions of Mozambique it is connected by a strip of coast, and who have a small fort upon it. This dispute was finally referred by Lord Granville in 1872 to the decision of Marshal MacMahon, and on this occasion, as on every other in which this country has been weak enough to go to arbitration, that decision was given against us. Into the merits of the case it is not necessary to enter, further than to say, as has already been recently pointed out by a very able and well-informed correspondent of the Morning Post, that it is by no means clear by what right the matter was referred to arbitration at all. The Amatongas are in possession of the southern shore of the bay, including, I believe, the Inyack Peninsula and Inyack Island, and they are an independent people. The Swazis also abut on it, and they are independent. What warrant had we to refer their rights to the arbitration of Marshal MacMahon? The evidence of the exercise of any Portuguese sovereignty over these countries is so shadowy that it may be said never to have existed; certainly it does not exist now. This is a point, but it is nothing more. We must take things as we find them, and we find that the Portuguese have been formally declared and admitted by us to be the owners of Delagoa Bay.

Now, so long as we held the Transvaal it did not so much matter who had the sovereignty of the Bay, since a railway constructed from there could only run to British territory. But we gave up the Transvaal, which is now virtually a hostile state, and the contingency which has been so long foreseen in South Africa, and so blindly overlooked at home, has come to pass—the railway is in course of rapid completion. What does this mean to us? At the best, it means that we lose the greater part of the trade of South-eastern Africa; at the worst, that we lose it all. In other words, it means, putting aside the question of our Imperial needs and status in Africa, a great many millions a year in hard cash out of the national pocket. Let us suppose that the worst happens, and that the Germans get a footing either in the Transvaal or Delagoa Bay. Obviously they will stop our trade in favour of their own. Or let us suppose that the Transvaal takes advantage of one of our spasms of Imperial paralysis, such as afflicted us during the rÉgime of Lord Derby, and defies the provision in the convention which forbids them to put a heavier tax upon our goods than upon those of any other nation. In either event our case would be a bad one, for our road from the eastern coast to the vast interior is blocked. But it is of little use crying over spilt milk, or anticipating evils which it is our duty to try to avert, and which in all probability still could be averted by a sound and consistent policy.

To begin with, both Swaziland and Amatongaland can be annexed to the Empire. It is true that the independence of the first of these countries is guaranteed by Article xii. of the convention of London of 1884. Here is the exact wording:—"The independence of the Swazis within the boundary-line of Swaziland, as indicated in the first article of this convention, will be fully recognised." But England has for years exercised a kind of protective right over Swaziland—a right, as I have already shown, fully acknowledged and frequently appealed to by the Swazis themselves. And for the rest, what is the obvious meaning of this provision? It means that the independence of Swaziland is guaranteed against Boer encroachments; its object was to protect the Swazis from extermination at the hands of the Boers. Further, the Boers have again and again broken this article of the convention in their repeated attempts to get a foothold in Swaziland. It has now become necessary to our interests that the Swazis should come under our rule, as indeed they are most anxious to do, and a way should be found by which this end can be accomplished.

Then as to Amatongaland, or Maputaland, as it is sometimes called, only a month or two ago an embassy from the Queen of that country waited on the Colonial Office, praying for British protection. It is not known what answer they received; let us trust that it was a favourable one.[20] The protection that should be accorded to the Amatongas, both in their interests and our own, is annexation to the British Empire upon such terms as might be satisfactory to them. The management of their country might be left to them, subject to the advice of a Resident, and the enforcement of the ordinary laws respecting life and property common to civilised states. Drink and white men might be strictly excluded from it, unless the Amatongas should wish to welcome the latter. But the country, with its valuable but undefined rights over Delagoa Bay, should belong to England, for whoever owns Swaziland and Amatongaland will in course of time be almost certain to own the Bay also. It must further be remembered that circumstances have already given us certain rights over the Amatongas. They regarded Cetywayo as their suzerain, and it was, I believe, at his instance that Zambila was appointed regent during the minority of her son. As we have annexed what remains of Zululand, Cetywayo's suzerainty has consequently passed to us.

Meanwhile, can nothing be done by direct treaty with the Portuguese? A little while ago the Bay could no doubt have been acquired for a very moderate consideration, but those golden opportunities have been allowed to slip from hands busy weaving the web of party politics. Now it is a different affair. Delagoa Bay is of no direct value to Portugal except for the honour and glory of the thing. Portugal has never done anything with it, any more than she has with her other African possessions, and never will do anything with it. But it has become very valuable, indeed, so far as its South African interests are concerned, almost vital, to this country, and of that fact Portugal is perfectly well aware. Consequently, if we want the Bay we must pay for it, if not in cash, at the offer of which the Portuguese national pride might be revolted, then in some other equivalent. Surely a power like England could find a way of obliging one like Portugal in return for this small concession. Or an exchange of territory might be effected. Perhaps Portugal might be inclined to accept of some of our possessions on the West Coast or an island or two in the West Indies. It is hard to suppose that there is no way out of the trouble; but if indeed there is none, why, then, one must be found, or we must be content to lose a great part of our African trade.

The reader who has followed me through this brief and imperfect summary of recent events in South Africa will see how varied are its interests, how enormous its areas, and how vast its wealth. In that great country England is still the paramount power. Her prestige has, indeed, been greatly shaken, and she is sadly fallen from her estate of eight or nine years gone. But she is still paramount; and if she has to face the animosity of a section of the Boers, she can, notwithstanding her many crimes against them, set against it the love and respect of every native in the land, with the exception, perhaps, of a few self-seekers and intriguers. The history of the next twenty years, and perhaps of the next ten, will decide whether this country is to remain paramount or whether South Africa is to become a great Dutch, English-hating Republic. There are some who call themselves Englishmen, and who possessed by that strange itch which prompts them to desire any evil that can humble their country in the face of her enemies, or can bring about the advantage of the rebel to the injury of the loyal subject, to whom this last event would be most welcome, and who have not hesitated to say that it would be welcome. To such there is nothing to be said. Let them follow their false lights and earn the wonder of true-hearted men and the maledictions of posterity.

But, addressing those of other and older doctrines, I would ask what such an event would mean? It would mean nothing less than a great national calamity; it would mean the utter ruin of the native tribes; and, to come to a reason which has a wider popularity, for as I think Mr. S. Little says in his work on South Africa, "the argument to the pocket is the best argument to the man," it would mean the loss of a vast trade, which, if properly protected, will be growing while we are sleeping. And this calamity can yet be averted; the mistakes and cowardice of the past can still be remedied, at any rate to a great extent; the door is yet open. We have many difficulties to face, among the chief of which are the Transvaal, the question of Delagoa Bay, and last, but not least, the question of the Dutch party at the Cape, which may be numerically the strongest party. When, in our mania for representative institutions, we thrust responsible government upon the Cape, we placed ourselves practically at the mercy of any chance anti-English majority. It is possible that in the future we may find some such majority urging upon an English Ministry the desirability of the separation of the Cape Colony from the Empire, and may find also that the prayer meets with favourable attention from those to whom there is but one thing sacred, the rights of a majority, and especially of an agitating majority.

But let not the country be deceived by any such representations. The natives too have a right to a voice in the disposal of their fortunes and their lands. They are the majority in the proportion of three to one, and let any doubter go and ask of them, anywhere from the Zambesi to Cape Agulhas, whether they would rather be ruled by the Queen or by a Boer Republic, and hear the answer. When it was a question of surrendering the Transvaal we heard a great deal of the rights of some thirty thousand Boers, and very little, or rather nothing, of the rights of the million natives who lived in the country with them, and to whom that country originally belonged. And yet, if the reader will turn to that part of this book which deals with the question, he will find that they had an opinion, and a strong one. No settlement of South African questions that does not receive adequate consideration from a native point of view can be a just settlement, or one which the Home Government should sanction. Moreover, the Cape is not by any means entirely anti-English at heart, as was shown clearly enough by the number and enthusiasm of the loyalist meetings when its Ministry was attempting to undo Mr. Mackenzie's work in Bechuanaland in the interests of the Patriot-party.

Still, it is possible that movements may arise under the fostering care of the Africander Bond and its sympathisers, having for object the separation of the colony from the Empire, or other ends fatal to Imperial interests; and in this case the Home Government should be prepared to disallow and put a final stop to them. We cannot afford to lose our alternative route to India and to throw these great territories into the hands of enemies, from which they would very probably pass into those of commercial rivals. In such an event all that would be required is a show of firmness. If once it was known that an English Ministry really meant what it said, and that its promises made in the Queen's name were not liable to be given the lie by a succeeding set of politicians elected on another platform, there would be an end to disloyalty and agitation in South Africa. As it is, loyalists, remembering the experiences of the last few years, are faint-hearted, never knowing if they will meet with support at home, while agitators and enemies wax exceeding bold.

Our system of party government, whatever may be its merits, if any, as applied to Home politics, is a great enemy to the welfare and progress of our Colonies, the affairs of which are, especially of late years, frequently used as stalking-horses to cover an attack upon the other side. Could not the two great parties agree to rule Colonial affairs, and especially South African affairs, out of the party game? Could not the policy of the Colonial Office be guided by a Commission composed of members of different political opinions, and responsible not to party, but to Parliament and the country, instead of by a succession of Ministers as variable and as transitory as shadows? Lord Rosebery and Mr. Chamberlain, for instance, are Radicals; but, putting aside party tactics and exigencies, are their views upon Colonial matters so widely different from those of, let us say, Sir Michael Hicks Beach and Lord Carnarvon that it would be impossible for these four gentlemen to act together on such a Commission? Surely they are not; and perhaps a day may come when the common-sense of the country will lead it to adopt some such system which would give to the Colonies a fixed and intelligent control aiming at the furtherance of the joint interests of the Empire and its dependencies. If it ever does, that day will be a happy one for all concerned.

Meanwhile, there is, so far as South Africa is concerned, a step that might be taken to the great benefit of that country, and also of our Imperial aims, and that is the appointment of a High Commissioner who would have charge of all Imperial as distinguished from the various Colonial interests. This appointment has already been advocated with ability by Mr. Mackenzie in the last chapter of his book, "Austral Africa," and it is undoubtedly one that should receive the consideration of the Government. Such an officer would not supersede the Governors of the various colonies or the administrators of the native territories, although, so far as Imperial interests were concerned, they would be primarily responsible to him. At present there is no central authority except the Colonial Office, and Downing Street is a long way off and somewhat overworked. Each Governor must necessarily look at South African affairs from his own standpoint and through local glasses. What is wanted is a man of the first ability, whose name would command respect abroad and support at home; and several such men could be found, who would study South African politics as a whole as an engineer studies a map, and who would set himself to conciliate and reconcile all interests for the common welfare and the welfare of the mother-country. Such a man, or rather a succession of such men, might, if properly supported, succeed in bringing about a very different state of affairs from that which has been briefly reviewed and considered in these pages. They might, little by little, build up a South African Confederation, strong in itself and loyal to England, that shall in time become a great empire. For my part, notwithstanding the difficulties and dangers which we have brought upon ourselves, and upon the various South African territories and their inhabitants, I believe that such an empire is destined to arise, and that it will not take the form of a Dutch Republic.