Leaving for the moment the narrative form, I devote a chapter to this lamentable struggle, which has entailed such serious consequences on Brazil, and which at the time I am writing is yet undetermined. Writers have differed much as to the origin of the war, but none have shown how it could have been avoided. I may observe en passant that so far from having entertained any prejudices against Paraguay, my sympathies have always been in favour of that country as evinced during my visit to the River Plate in 1853, at which period the elder Lopez was alive, and there appeared to be dawning in the future, not only an era of internal development for a very fine, fertile territory, but also a relaxation of the iron rule under which the people had so long groaned, by encouraging, to a limited extent it might be, commercial relations with other countries. Lopez had joined Brazil in putting down the tyranny of Rozas and in restoring a free government to the Argentine provinces; the rivers were to be opened by treaty to all nations, and an era of peace and prosperity appeared to be the natural result of these arrangements. The visit of the younger Lopez to Europe, it was thought, would have instilled into his mind the fact that all the wealth he saw there emanated from commerce, and that his first object would be to render Paraguay a commercial country. Unfortunately, however, he seems to have become more enamoured with the martial attitude of France than anything else, and determined on his return home to develop the military instead of the commercial resources of Paraguay. His ambition was centered in organizing a large army, fortifying the river approaches to Asuncion, and creating a small but efficient steam fleet. The experience of the past was thrown away, and on succeeding his father in the dictatorship, it became evident that his policy was to be one of aggrandisement, if it meant anything at all, and that, in other respects Paraguay was to continue isolated from her neighbours, and to stand aloof from participation in the business of the world. Paraguay had no enemies, nor was there any desire to trouble her; her territorial position secured her safety from attack, and it is impossible that all this military and naval preparation on the part of Lopez could have been merely intended for purposes of self-defence. The truth is, that Lopez had always coveted that portion of territory called the Missions, formerly a great stronghold of the Jesuits, but now part of the Argentine Confederation; and the possession of this would bring him close upon Uruguay, where the sea port of Monte Video afforded a tempting prize. At the same time, all this involved the prospect of a collision with other Powers, against which it was necessary to provide, and this I believe to be the true reason for the great military preparations of Lopez. I have already said that Paraguay joined with Brazil in putting an end to the tyranny of Rozas, and entered into a treaty by which the navigation of the upper rivers was to be free and the independence of Uruguay to be recognised. If ever Brazil had any sinister design on the latter State this was the time when she would have been most likely to assert it, but no such disposition was evinced. On the contrary, it was the wish as well as the interest of Brazil to keep Monte Video a free port, and the rivers open to the flags of all nations. Unfortunately for the peace of South America, Monte Video has never had a strong and independent Government, and during the presidency of Berro disorders broke out on the frontier. The persons and properties of Brazilian subjects were exposed to the inroads of lawless marauders from Uruguay, until at length the patience of the people of Rio Grande was exhausted, and they threatened to take up arms in their own defence, if the Imperial Government did not at once interfere for their protection. This statement has been personally confirmed to me by large landed proprietors who were themselves on the spot and suffered from the causes here referred to. Brazil was, therefore, compelled to send troops to the frontier and to follow the marauders into Uruguay, until such time as she could obtain fresh guarantees from a Government which had proved itself totally incompetent to deal with the matter. Then came the Colorado movement, headed by Flores, and further complications ensued, which might have been settled by the timely intervention of foreign Governments, but the men in power were quite deaf to all friendly remonstrances. The flag of Brazil was grossly insulted, trampled on in the streets of Monte Video, and the treaty with her publicly burnt. Recent melancholy occurrences in that city have shown what excesses can be committed from party spirit, and how difficult it was at the period I allude to, to avoid an armed intervention. How these acts affected the interests of Paraguay it is not easy to conceive. Brazil agreed to recognise the independence of Uruguay, and she left it in that condition, stronger than it had been for some years previously. It is true that about this time Lopez had given notice to Brazil that any interference in the affairs of Uruguay, or the entry of Brazilian troops into Uruguayan territory, would be considered by him as a casus belli—a piece of impertinence that Brazil might well disregard, as the rights of nations allowed reprisals for injuries received, and this was all Brazil carried into effect. Up to the point mentioned Lopez had, therefore, no real or ostensible cause of war against Brazil, but she stood in the way of the consummation of his ambitious designs, and so he made what he termed an interference in Uruguay the pretext for setting his legions in motion. Without any declaration of war, he seized and took forcible possession of the steamer Marquis de Olinda whilst on a peaceable errand up the River, with Carneiro de Campos, the President of Matto Grosso on board, and has retained him prisoner ever since; he marched a division into Brazil, and occupied the frontier town of Uruguayana, simultaneously sending his fleet down, no doubt to co-operate with his troops, but this was prevented by the gallant action of the Riachuello, in which the Paraguayan navy was nearly destroyed by the Brazilians. The proceedings of Lopez towards Brazil were, therefore, offensive and insulting in the highest degree, and still more so towards the Argentine Republic, which had really given him no cause of offence beyond daring to remain neutral, and consequently refusing to allow the passage of troops through its territory. Upon the refusal of General Mitre to grant such permission, he crossed the Parana and invaded Corrientes, seizing two Argentine vessels as well as the persons and property of Argentine subjects, on whom he levied black mail. These extreme measures taken by Lopez towards both countries were in pigmy imitation of the first Napoleon, whose tactics Lopez affected to follow by seizing the persons, property, and territory of his neighbours before it was possible for them to offer any opposition. Such an offence against the laws of nations could lead only to an alliance against him as a common enemy, with the condition that the aggrieved nations would not lay down their arms until the offender was punished by expulsion from Paraguay. In Europe this course was adopted against Napoleon I. and in South America, under nearly identical circumstances, an equally strong measure was rendered necessary for the future peace and security of the allies. If a case in point was required on the spot, Paraguay itself had joined in the expulsion of Rozas, because no security existed for any one so long as that tyrant dominated at Buenos Ayres. That neither Brazil nor the Argentine Republic anticipated such conduct on the part of Lopez is evident from the unprepared state of both, the latter being at the time literally without army or navy; indeed, the first check given to the advance of Lopez was by the late General Flores, at the head of a gallant little band of Oriental troops in conjunction with those of Brazil. No impartial person can question, therefore, that Lopez has been the sole cause of this long and bloody war, and that he committed a glaring act of violence towards his neighbours, who were compelled in self-defence to enter into a league for the expulsion of so dangerous a character. To have made peace on any other terms would have been only playing with a firebrand.

It is not my purpose in this chapter to criticise the manner in which the war has been conducted, or to point out mistakes which may have been made. Intelligent Brazilians believe that, instead of sending a large army by sea, it would have been better to have made a diversion by marching across the country to the interior of Paraguay, direct to Asuncion, leaving Humaita blockaded. Thus a large amount of money would have been expended in Brazilian territory. Whether this would have hastened the conclusion of the war it is difficult to say, but the direct advantages in other ways would no doubt have been considerable. However, Brazil is not the only country that has blundered in carrying on a distant war, as we know to our cost. That they did not anticipate so vigorous a resistance is certain, nor was it possible to suppose that any section of the Argentine people, whose nationality had been grossly insulted, would have been lukewarm, or have desired to make peace until the object of the struggle was accomplished.