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GREAT BRITAIN AND ARMENIA—THE LATE DUKE OF ARGYLL'S VIEWS—AN APPEAL TO BRITAIN

There is no brighter page in the glorious history of the British Empire than the records of the liberties that conduce to the contentment and happiness of peoples—freedom of thought and worship, freedom of speech and association, freedom of movement and habitation, freedom of language, etc.; as well as measures of self-government varying in accordance with local needs and circumstances—granted unstintingly to the great family of nations and races constituting that marvellous commonwealth. This policy of broad, liberal justice has proved, under the stern test of this great war, the highest statesmanship and the strongest bond of empire. Freedom, justice, humanity have proved an infinitely stronger impetus to loyalty than "frightfulness," a stronger cement, a superior and better "paying" stock-in-trade of empire by far than the jack-boot and the yatagan. The conclusive and practical demonstration of this great fact by the British Empire will probably exercise a far-reaching influence for good on the future policies of empires and the liberties of mankind. The British Flag has not only carried security, order and justice wherever it has gone, it has scrupulously respected religious and national sentiment everywhere. It has not denied to the peoples under its sway, or attempted to suppress, the sentiments and allegiances which it has itself held sacred. It has maintained the freedom of the seas as I believe no international device could have achieved it. I do not say this to please British readers. I have lived and travelled among small peoples and subject peoples large and small, and that is the impression I have gathered. Thus the Union Jack has become a symbol of freedom and fairplay the world over, and persecuted peoples have long had the conviction, deep down in their hearts, that British influence is continually at work towards their ultimate liberation. If we were to reverse Mr. Gladstone's famous challenge concerning Austria, and ask, mutatis mutandis: "Can any one put his finger on the map of the world and say, 'Here the British Empire has wrought evil'?" it may be that Count Reventlow himself and the author of the "Hymn of Hate" might find themselves baffled. However opinions may differ as to the justice of some of her wars, the just and liberal treatment of the peoples that have come under British dominion is an indisputable historical fact to which the masses of mankind owe at least as much gratitude as they do to the French Revolution. Ireland may be singled out, and not without reason, if I may say so, as the one shaded spot on this bright page of the story of the spread of British liberty. To the neutral observer it certainly seems strange that Ireland, so near the home of liberty and the stronghold of democratic institutions, should be so long denied the full and free enjoyment of those blessings liberally bestowed upon the more distant parts of the empire. Possibly neutral observers do not and cannot understand the difficulties and obstacles that have hitherto proved insuperable. It is outside the scope of my subject and beyond my competence to enter into a discussion of the Irish question here, but this much I may say, that Ireland should convince rulers in all countries that material prosperity alone "is no remedy." Security, order, prosperity, an efficient and equitable administration may palliate but can never heal a political injustice. They can never satisfy the legitimate aspirations for self-rule of a high-spirited and cultured people conscious of a strong, indestructible will as well as the undoubted capacity to govern itself. On the other hand, to compare the wrongs and sufferings of Ireland (and Poland) with the agony of Armenia, as is sometimes done, is to compare a headache, an acute headache if you will, with the Black Death.

It is in keeping with the ill-fortune that has dogged the footsteps of the Armenian people for five centuries that Armenia should have been the one exception to the rule; the one country which has been denied the blessings and benefits that have accrued to every small people which has come within the sphere of, or whose fortunes have been directly or indirectly affected by, the policy or interests of the British Empire.

One of the most striking features of what has been said and written in this country on the treatment meted out by the Turks to their Armenian subjects during the war has been the paucity of reference to the effect, incidental and indirect no doubt, but the real and disastrous effect, nevertheless, of British policy in Turkey since the Crimean War upon the fate of the Armenian subjects of the Turk. This is in contrast with what was said and written during previous massacres, and is no doubt attributable to the fact of the country being at war. I am not touching this aspect of the question in the way of a grievance. I well know, and most gratefully recognize what the British Government and people have done and are still doing for us during the long and ghastly nightmare through which we are passing. The noble and unremitting efforts of Lord and Lady Bryce, Lady Frederick Cavendish, Mr. Aneurin Williams, Mr. T. P. O'Connor, Miss Robinson, Mrs. and Miss Hickson, Mrs. Cole, Mr. Noel Buxton and his brother the Rev. Harold Buxton, Mr. Arthur G. Symonds, Mr. Llew Williams, the Rev. Greenland, Mr. Arnold J. Toynbee, and so many other friends of Armenia in this country, have placed us under a lasting debt of gratitude to them and to Britain. Lord Bryce's name will live in Armenian history as long as Armenia lasts.

But I do think it is fair, in justice to the people of this great and righteous empire, to one-half of the Armenian nation who have fallen as heroes and heroines both in war and martyrdom, and to "the little blood" that is left to the Armenian people, that the facts in this connection should be placed frankly and fully before the British public at this juncture, so that it may be able to form an equitable estimate of the reparation due to the Armenians, not only for the crimes and ravages committed by the enemy during the war, but also in the light of the obligations and responsibilities incurred by Europe in general and Great Britain in particular for the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire by Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention.

I have said "Great Britain," but it would be more accurate to say "the British Government of the day," for I firmly believe—in fact, who will doubt?—that if the British people had had the slightest suspicion that the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention had in them the germs of the disaster that has since overtaken the Christian subjects of the Porte, they would never have ratified those treaties. Nor do I suggest, I need hardly say, that the statesmen who are responsible for these diplomatic instruments consciously and deliberately jeopardized the existence of an ancient Christian people. Lord Salisbury's sympathetic utterances in 1895-96 show unmistakably how deeply distressed he was at the grievous turn events had taken, and still more at the powerlessness of the Concert of Europe to save the Armenians from the position of extreme peril in which the Concert had placed them in 1878.

Successive British Governments have made frequent attempts to improve the lot of the Armenians; but the more they tried the more the Turks massacred. There is no fairer-minded public than the British, whose hospitality and the blessings of whose rule I have gratefully enjoyed for many years, as have some thousands of my compatriots in almost every part of the empire. There is also no one more ready and anxious to pay his debt than the Briton when he knows what he owes. I have therefore no fear whatever of arousing any resentment by calling the attention of the British public to the existence of this old liability. On the contrary, I am convinced that the fact will be taken note of in good part, and by most even thankfully. I read a Press article not long ago—it was, if I remember rightly, a review of Mr. Llew Williams's book, Armenia Past and Present in The Court Journal—which ended with the following question: "If these terrible things are true and we have any responsibility, why are we not told so?"

As regards the nature of the responsibilities and obligations, I refer my readers to the Appendix, where will be found the texts of Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, Art. 18 of the Treaty of San Stefano—which was torn up and superseded by the Treaty of Berlin—the full text of the Cyprus Convention, and Lord Salisbury's Dispatch to Sir Henry Layard containing instructions for the negotiation of that Convention.

I may here point out that though at first sight there appears to be little difference between the wording of Art. 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano and Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, there is this fundamental difference between the application of the two clauses that, while the former left the Russian Army in occupation of the Armenian provinces until the reforms should be an accomplished fact, the latter was a mere Turkish promise to be performed after their evacuation by the Russian forces. How the Turk performed his promise is well enough known, and forms the darkest page of modern history—probably of all history.

Those who have the interest and the time for fuller information on the subject I recommend to refer to Mr. Gladstone's famous speeches on the Eastern Question and the Treaty of Berlin, the debates in both Houses of Parliament on the massacres of 1895-96, Canon Maccoll's "The Sultan and the Powers," Mr. W. Llew Williams's "Armenia Past and Present," and last but not least, "Our Responsibilities for Turkey," by the late Duke of Argyll. This frank and admirable commentary on the bearing of British policy upon the Armenian question is now unfortunately out of print. I therefore quote, with apologies, the following lengthy extract for the convenience of those who may have difficulty in procuring a copy. It is an authority that will command general and respectful attention.[26] (The italics are mine.)

"Nothing can be more childish than to suppose that the significance and effect of such a change as this[27] can be measured or appreciated by looking at the mere grammatical meaning of the words. The words seemed harmless enough. They may even seem to be most benevolent and most wise in the interests of the Christian subjects of the Porte in Armenia. But when we look at the facts which lay behind the words, and at the motives which were at work among the contracting parties, we must see that nothing could have been devised more fatal to their interests. The change which the new words affected in the Treaty of San Stefano wounded the pride and the most justifiable ambition of Russia to be the protector of her co-religionists in provinces with which no other Christian Power had any natural connection. On the other hand, it delighted the low cunning of the Turk, in constituting another 'rift within the lute' which by and by would be quite sure to make the 'music mute' of any effective concert between the Powers of Europe. The Turk could see at a glance that, whilst it relieved him of the dangerous pressure of Russia, it substituted no other pressure which his own infinite dexterity in delays could not easily make abortive. As for the unfortunate Armenians, the change was simply one which must tend to expose them to the increased enmity of their tyrants, whilst it damaged and discouraged the only protection which was possible under the inexorable conditions of the physical geography of the country.[28]

"But this is not the whole of the responsibility which falls on us out of the international transactions connected with the Treaty of Berlin. After that treaty had been concluded, we entered by ourselves into a separate, and for a while a secret, convention with Turkey, by which we undertook to defend her Asiatic provinces by force of arms from any further conquests on the part of Russia, and in return we asked for nothing more than a lease of Cyprus, and a new crop of Turkish promises that she would introduce reforms in her administration of Armenia. No security whatever was asked or offered for the execution of those promises. We simply repeated the old mistake of 1856, of trusting entirely to the good faith of Turkey, or to her gratitude. But this time the mistake was repeated after twenty-two years' continued experience of the futility of such a trust. As to gratitude, it must have been quite clear to the Turks that we were acting in our own supposed interests in resisting the advance of Russia at any cost.

"No doubt we had occasion to remember, with some natural bitterness, the sacrifice to Russia of all that the gallant General Williams had done for Turkey in his splendid defence of Kars. But we ought to have remembered, also, how dreadful had been the account given by that able and gallant man of the detestable Government which he was defending. We ought to have remembered how easy were the reforms which he had recommended, if the Turkish Government had been honest; and how they had all been systematically evaded. We ought, above all, to have considered the inevitable effect of this new treaty of guarantee upon the sharp cunning of the Turks. They saw how eagerly it was sought by us, and they must have concluded that, whilst we were clearly not only earnest, but excited, in our opposition to Russia, we were comparatively careless and lukewarm about any changes in their own system of government. They must have seen that the new convention[29] practically superseded even the slightest restraints put upon them by the Treaty of Berlin, and that the Christian population of Armenia were practically left entirely at their mercy.

"Let us look back upon all these transactions as a whole, and try to form some estimate of the position of responsibility in which they have placed us towards the Christian populations subject to the Ottoman dominion. In 1854-56 we had saved that dominion from destruction by defeating, and locally disarming, its great natural enemy. We had set up that dominion with new immunities from attack, and we had choked off from any protectorate over the Christians the only Power which would or could exert any such influence with effect. We had done this without providing any substitute of our own, except a recorded promise from the Turks. We had provided no machinery whereby bad faith on the part of Turkey could be proved and punished. Then, twenty years later, in 1876, we had obstinately refused to join the other Powers of Europe in remedying this great defect, by putting a combined pressure on Turkey to compel her to establish effective guarantee for the future. In 1878 we had denounced the treaty in which Russia, by her own expenditure of blood and treasure, had imposed on Turkey the obligations which we had admitted to be needful, but which we had ourselves declined to do anything to enforce. Then, in the same year, at Berlin, we had again done all we could to choke off the only Power which had the means and the disposition to secure the fulfilment of any promises at all. Particularly in Armenia we had substituted for a promise to Russia which her power, her geographical position, and her pride might have really led her to enforce, another promise to all the Powers which, on the face of it, was absurd—namely, a promise to let all the Powers 'superintend the execution' of domestic reforms in a remote and very inaccessible country. Lastly, in the same year, as we had already choked off Russia, we now proceeded by a separate Convention to choke off also all the other Powers collectively, by inducing Turkey to give a special promise to ourselves, apart from them altogether. For the performance of this special promise we provided no security whatever, but trusted entirely, as we had done in 1856, to the good faith of a Power which we knew had none. With Russia deeply offended and estranged, and the rest of Europe set aside or superseded—such were the conditions under which we abandoned the Christian subjects of the Porte in Asia to a Government incurably barbarous and corrupt.

"And now, we are astonished and disgusted by finding that the terrible consequences of all this selfish folly have fallen on those whom we had professed, and whom we were bound by every consideration of honour, to protect. Surely these years might have brought us a reconsideration of our position. The fever of our popular Russophobia had sensibly abated. We had secured our "scientific frontier" in India, and Russian expansion had taken a new direction in the Far East. New combinations—and some new disseverments—had taken place in Europe. The whole position of affairs was favourable to a policy of escape from bad traditions—from obsolete doctrines—and from duties which it was impossible we could discharge. Surely we might have asked ourselves, What had we been doing all these years to fulfil those duties? Nothing. And yet all along we were not ignorant that the vicious Government which we had so long helped to sustain against all the natural agencies that would have brought it to an end long ago was getting no better, but rather worse. We knew this perfectly well, and we have recorded our knowledge of it in a document of unimpeachable authority. In the second year after the Treaty of Berlin, when the obligations we had undertaken under it were still fresh in our recollection, we had made one more endeavour to recall the Ottoman Power to some sense of shame, if not to some sense of duty. In 1880 we had a special Envoy at the Porte, one of our most distinguished public men—Mr. Goschen; and we had called together at Constantinople a meeting of all the Ambassadors of the six Powers of Europe who were signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. They drew up an Identic Note, which they all signed and presented to the Porte. In that Note they declared that no reforms had been, or were even on the way to being, adopted, and that so desperate was the misgovernment of the country, that 'it would lead in all probability to the destruction of the Christian population of vast districts.' Could a more dreadful confession have been made in respect to the conduct and policy of any Christian Government?

"This Identic Note commented severely on the calculated falsehoods of all kinds, and on the cunning procrastinations, which characterized the conduct and language of the Porte. It concluded by reminding that Government, as an essential fact, 'that by treaty engagements Turkey was bound to introduce the reforms which had been often indicated,' and that these reforms were to be 'carried out under the supervision of the Powers.'

"We might as well have addressed our representations to a convict just released from a long sentence, and determined at once to renew his career of crime. And so we had gone on for fifteen more years since 1880, failing to take, or even attempt taking, any effectual measures to protect the helpless populations subject to a Government which we knew to be so cruel and oppressive—populations towards whom we lay under so many responsibilities, from our persistent protection of their oppressors. At last comes, in 1894, one of those appalling outbreaks of brutality on the part of the Turks which always horrify, but need never astonish, the world. They are all according to what Bishop Butler would have called the 'natural constitution and course of things,' that is to say, they are the natural results of the nature and government of the Ottoman Turks."

Such is the nature of Great Britain's debt to us. It was rashly incurred by her statesmen. Successive British Governments have made strenuous efforts and run great risks to discharge it. But it has proved undischargeable for forty years, with consequences to us which are well known. This terrible war and the ensuing peace will give Great Britain both the power and the opportunity to discharge that obligation, and our weapons for enforcing our claim are the honour, the conscience and the never-failing sense of justice of England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland and the British Empire. I appeal to these in the name of my sorely-stricken nation, pale, prostrate and bleeding almost to death, to stand by us and fight our battle at the Peace Conference. And if my appeal reaches a wide enough circle of British and Irish men and women, I am confident that my nation will not die, but will live and prosper, and carve out a future that will amply compensate her for the past.

FOOTNOTES:

[26] Our Responsibilities for Turkey, by the Duke of Argyll, K.G., K.T., John Murray, 1896, p. 72.

[27] The supersession of Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano by Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin.

[28] Town Topics of February 10, 1917, had the following: "The idiotic and ignorant criticism of the Navy one hears occasionally, recalls an immortal answer by a harassed First Lord, during an earlier Armenian atrocity (1895-96)—

"'Will the right honourable gentleman tell the House definitely whether it is proposed to send a British battleship to Armenia?' asked the bore who worried about every country but his own.

"'It is not proposed to send any ships there,' replied the Minister gravely. 'Navigation, I am informed by expert advisers at the Admiralty, has not been good in the vicinity of Ararat since the cruise of the Ark.'"

Would to God that this intelligence had reached the Foreign Offices of Europe twenty years earlier, before the signing of the Treaty of Berlin.

[29] The Cyprus Convention.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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