  The letters written by Messrs. Labouchere, Ellis and Clark, Members of Parliament, found in Pretoria, are not of much importance to my mind. The authors were not branded as traitors by Mr. Chamberlain, he only wanted to place the letters before the public and their electors, who most likely will find these three gentlemen guilty of another offence than that of supporting Mr. Chamberlain's policy with President KrÜger while they made him believe that, as they were fighting against that policy in England, there was no necessity for him to heed their advice. Their attitude in Europe was bound to nullify the effect of the warnings they were sending to Africa. It is astounding to see sedate men contradict themselves in that way. I cannot help wondering at Dr. Clark boasting on the 27th of September that owing to his endeavours Mr. Stead's pamphlet was widely circulated, though, according to his words, "Mr. Stead had to the last moment been our enemy." The fact is that Mr. Stead had met Dr. Leyds (he went on meeting him during the war), and had been persuaded to drop Cecil Rhodes and Jameson in spite of his former praise of them. The publicity given to these letters does evidently not give weight to the opinion of the writers or Mr. Stead either; the interest of the Blue Book on "Correspondence relating to the recent Political Situation in South Africa" does not lie that way, but it lies in the opinion and advice of an Afrikander—to be found in Sir H. de Villiers' letters—he being the Speaker of the House in Cape Colony, Chief Justice, and one of the leaders of the On the 21st of May, he says: "I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my fellow Commissioners that the President would adopt his retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other words, to recommence the war." Here are his views on the actual situation: "On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President as I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on him, but I saw Reitz, Smuts and Schalk Burger, who, I thought, would be amenable to argument, but I fear that either my advice had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with the President. "I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms. "It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily from the Government instead of being gradually forced from them. In the former case they would rally the greater number of the malcontents around "I have always been a well-wisher to the Republic, and if I had any influence with the President I would advise him no longer to sit on the boiler to prevent it from bursting. Some safety-valves are required for the activities of the new population. In their irritation they abuse the Government, often unjustly, in the press, and send petitions to the Queen, but that was only to be expected. Let the Transvaal Legislature give them a liberal franchise and allow them local self-government for their towns and some portion of the discontent will be allayed." This, I beg to observe, is exactly what I said at the time when people in Europe who called themselves friends of the Boers yet are only Dr. Leyds' friends or rather dupes urged upon Mr. KrÜger the expediency of going on with his mistaken and retrograde policy, and continental diplomatists assured him that he might with impunity disregard the claims of the Uitlanders and England's warnings. Those who have never condescended to read the Blue Book or the short chapter in this pamphlet, in which an analysis of this Blue Book is given are never tired of referring to concessions and franchise schemes proffered by Mr. KrÜger. What does Sir Henry de Villiers say about it! "The franchise proposal made by the President seems to be simply ridiculous." To Mr. KrÜger he sent the English Enactment of 1870 on Naturalisation, and urged him to have it adopted. Is not this an answer to those who contended that England "would not be satisfied with what she offered the Transvaal?" At the same time his lack of confidence in the Volksraad's promises is shown here: "I fear there would always still be a danger of the Volksraad revoking the gift before it has come into operation." His second letter is dated 31st of July, more than six weeks after the Bloemfontein Conference. He writes to Mr. Fischer who acted as go-between the Cape Afrikanders and President KrÜger. Mr. Chamberlain had requested that a mixed Commission be appointed to enquire into the merits of the franchise law, passed in accordance with Mr. KrÜger's proposals. Here is Sir Henry de Villiers' judgment upon Mr. KrÜger's and Mr. Chamberlain's proceedings. "I am convinced Mr. KrÜger's friends must now regret they did not recommend to President KrÜger three months ago, as I strongly urged, to offer voluntarily a liberal franchise bill with such safeguards as would prevent the old burghers from being swamped. "Mr. Chamberlain's speech was more moderate than I expected it would be, and as he holds out an olive branch in the form of a joint enquiry into the franchise proposals, would it not be well to meet him in this matter? I know that it might be regarded as a partial surrender." The last sentence runs as follows: "I don't think that President KrÜger and his friends realise the gravity of the situation. Even now the State Secretary is doing things which would be almost farcical if the times were not so serious." According to Sir Henry telegrams were suppressed by Mr. de Villiers added: "The Transvaal will soon not have a single friend left among the cultivated classes." Events have proved he had a better opinion of them than they deserved. He goes on with the following: "The time really has come when the friends of the Transvaal must induce President KrÜger to become perfectly frank and take the new comers into his confidence." And ends with saying again: "As one who signed the Convention in 1881 I can assure you that my fellow Commissioners would not have signed it if they had not been led to believe that President KrÜger's policy towards the Uitlanders would have been very different from what it has been." In a letter written the same day to his brother Melius, one can see in what fool's paradise Dr. Reitz and his colleagues were living: "When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are Ministers of the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions a responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown; at least, if they did not do so, they would be liable to dismissal." Here is his opinion on the proceedings in the House of Commons: "The debate which took place in the House of Commons since I last wrote to you satisfies me that the British nation is now determined to settle the Transvaal business in a manner satisfactory to themselves. "I accordingly begged of KrÜger's friends to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is war with England—on the other side there are concessions which will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now decide at once how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English five years' franchise—offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders—make them your friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will have a majority of the Uitlanders with you when they become Burghers. The answer I got was: 'We have done too much already and cannot do more.'" One is aware of the fact that Mr. KrÜger contended that the non-English Uitlanders would side with him. Sir Henry Villiers writes: "I have never been able to understand why KrÜger never attempted to take the Uitlanders into his confidence. He has always kept them at arm's length with the result that he has entirely alienated them. It is said that there are 21,000 Uitlanders in Johannesburg who support him, and yet no meeting has been held at Johannesburg to compare with the meetings held by his opponents. "Why should he not appoint as one of his nominees an Uitlander of position, whose integrity and judgment he has confidence in? If none such exists, it would only be a proof of his want of tact and statesmanship in not rallying such people to his side." Mr. Melius de Villiers who was in Bloemfontein, while paying due attention to his brother's warnings, wanted only to persuade KrÜger to yield for the time being. Forwarding his brother's letter he wrote to Mr. Fischer: "Please impress upon Oom Paul what I think is an important fact, namely, that the present Ministry in England will not always last. "By giving way now, we do not do so in perpetuity; but I feel assured a Liberal Ministry will be willing to reconsider the relations of the South African Republic to England, and even to revoke the Convention of London." "Africa for the Afrikander, from the Zambezi to Simon's Bay" remained the motto, only Mr. de Villiers looked to the future for its realization. Yet Mr. KrÜger sticks to his policy of deceit taking back what had been already granted. Mr. de Villiers is down upon the summary and arrogant way with which reasonable offers have been rejected, and alluded to the despatch of the 21st of August in which proposals made in the despatch of the 19th are declared to be subordinate to the abandonment of suzeranity rights and acceptance of the principle of arbitration for pending questions. On the 28th of September Mr. de Villiers appeals to Mr. Fischer for the last time:— "Supposing a war does take place, is there any chance of the Transvaal obtaining better terms when the war is over? The war will not cease until the Transvaal is entirely subjugated. What will the position of the Republics then be? "The very best friends of the Transvaal feel that the Bill providing for the seven years' franchise is not a fair or workable measure. "I am assuming, of course, that the proposals are such as can be accepted without dishonour. "I confess I look with horror on a war to be fought by Afrikanders to bolster up President KrÜger's rÉgime. I could understand a war in defence of the South African Republic after it has made reasonable concessions to the He alludes again to the doings of Dr. Reitz and Smuts:— "I have carefully read the latest correspondence, and I am by no means satisfied that the British Resident was guilty of a breach of faith. The utmost I would say is that there was a misunderstanding. The dispatch of the 21st August seems to me to have been wholly unnecessary, unless something happened between the 19th and 21st which led the Transvaal Government to think they had yielded too much. I have heard it said that between those dates a cablegram from Dr. Leyds gave hopes of European intervention...." Does this telegram exist? It is indeed likely. At any rate the responsibility of the war rests upon those who—be they diplomatists or journalists—have deluded Dr. Leyds to that extent. And the blood which is now shed is on the head of those who still try and persuade the Boers that Russia, Germany, or France is going to interfere. In Le SiÈcle of the 3rd September, extracts from the "Blue Book" have been printed. We also find there letters from the 11th of March, 1898, up to the 8th of May, 1899, written by Mr. J.X. Merriman, the Cape Treasurer during the Schreiner Ministry. As he is one of the leaders of the irreconcilable Afrikander group he cannot be suspected of undue sympathy towards England. In his first letter to Mr. Steyn a year before the Uitlanders had petitioned for a redress, fourteen months before the Bloemfontein Conference, eighteen months before the declaration of war, the following passage is to be found:— "Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the future lies in the attitude of President KrÜger and his vain hope of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow unenlightened minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true Republic on a broad liberal basis. The report of recent discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs cannot last, it must break down from inherent rottenness, and it will be well if the fall does not sweep away the freedom of all of us. "I write in no hostility to the Republics: my own feelings are all in the opposite direction; but the foes of that form of government are too often those of their own household. I am quite sure that you have done what you can in modifying the attitude at Pretoria; but I entreat you, for the welfare of South Africa, to persevere, however unsatisfactory it may be to see your advice flouted and your motives so cruelly misrepresented by a section of colonists. "Humanly speaking, the advice and good will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between the South African Republic and a catastrophe." Alluding to the KotzÉ incident, the upshot of which was that KrÜger and the Volksraad claimed the right to overrun judicial decisions, he writes: "The radical fault is the utter incapacity of the body that affects to issue its mandates to the Courts. In England it is a Parliament, but then it represents the intelligence of the country, and in Switzerland the same; in the Transvaal it is a narrow oligarchy." In a letter dated 1st January, 1899, President KrÜger is depicted as follows: "I had the opportunity the other day of a long talk, or rather several talks, with Lippert about the Transvaal. He takes a very sane view of matters there, and is very hopeless. He represents KrÜger—as others describe him—as more dogged and bigoted than ever, and surrounded by a crew of self-seekers who prevent him from seeing straight. He has no one to whom he turns for advice, and he is so inflated as to have the crazy belief that he (KrÜger) is born to bring about peace between Germany and France!" Mr. Merriman is confident that the Orange Free State will interfere (Mr. Steyn was alas, so blind as to fall in with Mr. KrÜger's temper instead of smoothing it down), and says: "Is there no opportunity of bringing about a rapprochement between us, in which the Free State might play the part of honest broker?" "Us" here means Cape Colony and Orange Free State. Having spoken of matters of general interest for South Africa, of uniform custom duties, etc., he ends by saying: "The deplorable confusion and maladministration of his financial arrangements still continue, and are a standing menace to the peace of South Africa. Yet, judging from the utterances of the leading men from the Rand who come down here, a very moderate reform would satisfy all except those who do not want to be satisfied, and, I believe, there is very little sympathy for the mischievous agitation that, rightly or wrongly, is attributed to the designs of Rhodes and Beit." On the 26th of May, 1899, on the eve of the Bloemfontein Conference, he writes to Mr. Fischer, prompter and organiser of the Conference, foreseeing the results of the policy advocated by Dr. Leyds: " ... but there is, of course, an even worse prospect, namely, that misrepresentation may goad Great Britain into a position where, with the concurrence and invitation of the other powers, she might feel obliged, even at the risk of enormous military outlay, to cut the Gordian knot. You will probably say, as I certainly say, 'where is the casus belli,' and refuse to believe it possible to imagine such a contingency. Unfortunately, you and I, who keep our heads, must not ignore the fact that an immense number of people seem to have lost theirs and are ready, without reflection or examination, to accept the highly-coloured statements of a partisan press." He mentions the maladministration in the Transvaal several months before he had written to Mr. Smuts, asking for detailed account of the money granted by the Boer Government to Johannesburg but without getting an answer. "Of course I know from previous correspondence that you and the President are not disposed to minimize the blots on the administration of the South African Republic, the weak points in the Constitution, and the ignorance and laxity that prevails in financial matters. To do so would be to fatally complicate the situation. "I am sure that you will, and I most strongly urge you to use your utmost influence to bear on President KrÜger to concede some colourable measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as in those of his own State. "Granted that he does nothing. What is the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are perishing off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should recruit his Republic with new blood—and the sands are running out. I say this irrespective of Such is the opinion of Mr. Merriman, a friend of the Transvaal, yet every day in Europe one is told that its misfortunes are due to the Uitlanders. Mr. Merriman thought on the contrary that it was necessary to ask them to come forward and help the State out of its ruinous course. "Surely it would be better to come forward now and earn the gratitude of South Africa by a comprehensive and liberal measure than to have the State torn and distracted by constant irritation and bad blood. A moderate franchise reform and municipal privileges would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a maintenance of the oath ought to be a sufficient safeguard against the swamping of the old population. "President KrÜger should reflect that nine out of ten people that receive the franchise will be supporters of the Republic in which they will have an interest, and that he will, by granting liberal reforms, disarm all opposition provoked. "Try and persuade President KrÜger to confer a benefit on the whole of South Africa by granting a broad measure of reform, and you will have done the best day's work any statesman ever did in South Africa." Two months after the declaration of war, while the Boers' military operations were somehow successful he wrote to Mr. Piet de Wet also a member of the Cape Parliament—"it is hopeless...." "If the Republics had not made the fatal mistake of sending the ultimatum when they did, things would have gone differently; but it is of no use going back on what might have been." His letter had no effect upon Mr. de Wet, who now is under trial for high treason along with three other Members of the House. There are other letters, among them one written by Mr. Te Water, who left the Schreiner Ministry. In a speech delivered at Graaff-Reinet some time ago he has declared that the Cape Government ought not to have allowed the railway lines to be used by English troops. Yet in a letter to President Steyn on the 8th of May, 1899, he asked him to put pressure upon "our friends in Pretoria" to adopt conciliatory measures. Alluding to the impending Conference he writes:— "In your position you as go-between can do endless good towards arriving at an understanding at such Conference. I know well that there is a party who will do everything possible to prevent this." Nevertheless he also is in favour of the policy advocated by Mr. Melius de Villiers:— "We must now play to win time. Governments are not perpetual. It is honestly now the time to yield a little, however one may later again tighten the rope." This shows how this former Minister at the Cape meant to abide by Conventions. How Mr. KrÜger did abide by the Conventions of 1881 and 1884 is a well-known fact. No wonder if England was suspicious of the "ridiculous proposals," to use Mr. de Villiers' phrase, offered by President KrÜger. The letters written by Mr. Te Water and Mr. Melius de Villiers show that there was good reason for suspicion. These letters show also what responsibility has been assumed by the members of the Liberal party who sided so eagerly with Mr. KrÜger and by those who, like Mr. Stead, backed at first Mr. Rhodes' policy with all their might (so Mr. Clark wrote to General Joubert, Mr. KrÜger, and President Steyn) Since President KrÜger has left the Transvaal, and Botha is negotiating for a surrender, the pacification of the Transvaal needs no more war operation, it has become a mere question of police arrangements. Nevertheless Dr. Leyds is still as active as ever. He reminds us of the Spanish Ministers who when they got the news that the Spanish fleet had been annihilated by Dewey, manufactured forthwith a report to the effect that Americans had suffered a defeat at the hands of the Spaniards. Le Petit Bleu does the same. The announcement—English troops retreating—appeared in a marginal note the very day that Lydenburg was taken. On Tuesday, 11th September, L'Eclair made the following announcement: "London, 10th September, Prince Henry sails back to Germany. From well-informed quarters I learn that the main object of the German Emperor's brother's visit was to discuss the ways and means of preserving Transvaal independence." Eight days previous to this Dr. Leyds had tried to make the world believe that he had come to an understanding with the Czar. In both cases the object aimed at was obvious. But his work is at an end now. He may have succeeded cleverly in deceiving KrÜger and Steyn what the European Powers really meant to do, or in giving those same Powers garbled accounts of the state of affairs in the Transvaal, and the true bearings of the Bloemfontein negotiation, yet the fact remains that it is mainly through him that the South African Republics have lost their independence. He could not like Mr. KrÜger, excuse himself upon being led astray by blind and ignorant patriotism. He knew well enough how far the very help he depicted as forthcoming could be depended upon, he knew that England was bound to win in the long run, but there was only one thing which he cared for; to make people in Europe believe that he had an important part to play in the political arena. The war came as a welcome diversion to an endurable position. And now that his country's interests have been entirely sacrificed to his own, he may look upon his work with satisfaction. |
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