CHAPTER VII

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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT

Since both physical and mental attributes are unquestionably inherited, it becomes a matter of importance to inquire into the nature of the entity we call personality. To what extent is human conduct a product of parentage? Although apparently free agents are we in reality only by infinitely subtle indirections making the responses, forming the habits, establishing the characters which result merely from the blind impulsions of an inherent constitution? If so, who is praiseworthy, who blameworthy? Are men

“But helpless pieces of the Game He plays
Upon this chequer-board of Nights and Days.”

All Mental Process Accompanied by Neural Process.—Whatever the ultimate decision of psychologists may be regarding the relation of mind to the sensory and nervous mechanism of man it is certain that there is so close an association between them that the least alteration in the mechanism means a parallel effect in the mind, or in the words of Huxley, “every psychosis is definitely correlated with a neurosis.” The rind or cortex of gray matter which constitutes the surface of the large cerebral hemispheres of the human brain is regarded as the seat of consciousness. The development of the mental powers in the infant is dependent on the development of the elements of this cortical substance and the waning of the mental faculties in old age goes hand in hand with its atrophy. Abnormal arrangements, injuries or omissions in it mean mental unsoundness. How the activity of the structural mechanism gives a reaction in consciousness is not understood, but we know that in the living being the two phenomena are inseparably linked. Whether we accept the hypothesis that consciousness is an actual product of the structural mechanism or the hypothesis that the latter is only an instrument for the manifestations as consciousness of an outside force or entity, just as the telegraphic instrument manifests the existence of electricity, is neither here nor there for our purposes. On either supposition the degree and manner of expression are determined by the structure of the mechanism. Our main problem is to decide as nearly as possible how much of the mechanism is rigidly inherited, how much is at birth largely undestined, so that its ultimate outcome is in part a product of the forces which play upon it, or in other words of education and training.

Gradation in Nervous Response from Lower Organisms to Man.—To comprehend fully the basic nature of human neural responses one must seek the roots in the behavior of lower organisms. For there is found in a simpler form many of the fundamental activities and the first dim gropings which emerge in man as memory, reason and will. As we ascend the scale of animal life we find a continuous advance in neural complexity and nervous response that in many respects grades up closely to the human type.

A windmill or a weather-vane points toward the source of the wind, obviously not because either exercises any special choice in the matter, but because it is constructed on such lines of symmetry that when the wind strikes it, if it slants the slightest to left or right, the more exposed surface receives the greatest pressure and thus swings the body back into the line of least resistance.

Behavior of Many Animals Often an Automatic Adjustment to Simple External Agents.—It is a far cry, of course, from the responses of such a machine as a windmill to the responses of even the simplest living thing, but in spite of the broad gap between the two, there is much reason to believe that the behavior of many living organisms is due in a marked degree to the directive effects of comparatively simple external factors rather than to the complex internal volitions the casual observer is likely to attribute to them.

Tropisms.—It is a marked characteristic of all living protoplasm that it has the power of responding to external stimuli. This power of response is termed excitability or irritability. In describing the motor responses of living organisms to stimuli resulting from a change in surroundings the term tropism (Gr. Trope, turning) is frequently used and the kind of stimulus is indicated by a prefix. Thus the term phototropism means a turning or orientation brought about by means of light. An organism which reacts by a movement toward the source of light is said to be positively phototropic, one which moves away from it, negatively phototropic. By using such a neutral terminology the physiologist avoids implying that necessarily “likes” or “dislikes” or any other psychic reaction enter into the movements.

Several kinds of tropisms are recognized, such as phototropism or heliotropism, reaction to light; thermotropism, reaction to heat; electrotropism or galvanotropism, to electric current; geotropism, to gravity; chemotropism, to a chemical; rheotropism, to current; thigmotropism or stereotropism, to contact; and chromotropism, to color.

Many Animals Show Tropic Responses.—Many of the lower animals seem to have their movements determined more or less mechanically by the action of such external factors, some being positively, others negatively responsive to a given kind of stimulus, or the same individual may be at one time positive, at another negative, according to modifying conditions to be mentioned presently.

In plants and in simpler lower animals there is no special nervous system. The responses of these organisms depend on the general irritability of their constituent protoplasm. In other animals a nervous system is developed, crude and diffuse in lower forms, extremely delicate, complex and definitely ordered in higher forms. But it should be borne in mind that nerve protoplasm possesses only in high degree a capacity for irritability, conduction, etc., that is common to all living substance. In keeping with other “physiological divisions of labor” or specialization which mark the increasing complexity of animals, this enormously enhanced sensitivity and conductivity of certain tissues have come about, and they have become set apart for these special functions. In higher animals, therefore, the tropisms where operative must act more or less through the agency of the nervous system instead of directly through the general protoplasm of the organism.

Certain Apparently Complex Volitions Probably Only Tropisms.—Where nervous systems enter into tropic responses there must be specific sensibility of certain nerve terminations (i. e., sense organs) at the surface of the body. These sensory or receiving nerves connect through the central system with corresponding motor nerves which in turn supply certain specific muscles through the contraction of which the organism is as surely and as mechanically oriented as in the simpler cases. For example, if light is the stimulating agent, when it strikes a positively phototropic animal, if the latter is not already oriented, the eyes or other nerve terminations sensitive to light transmit an impulse through the central nervous system to certain muscles causing them to increase their tension and thereby swing the animal around with its head toward the light. Progressive movements which the organism then makes must carry it toward the source of light. Thus it is not “love of light” that draws the moth into the flame but the mechanical steering of the body toward the source of light through the stimulations produced by the light waves. It is chemotropism, not solicitude for its offspring, which drives the flesh fly to lay its eggs on decaying meat. And it is stereotropism and not a desire for concealment which impels certain animals such as many worms and insects to get into a close contact with solid bodies, or in other words to “hide” themselves in burrows and crevices.

Complicating Factors.—However, beautifully as these theories of tropisms work out in a broad general way, there are various additional factors entering which must be reckoned with, and these become more numerous and of more consequence as the organism becomes more complex. In the first place certain internal conditions must be considered. Living matter is characterized by its instability. There are continual synthetic and disruptive processes in progress which the physiologist terms metabolic changes. The very “life” of such matter seems to be the manifestation of such changes. Concerning what the ultimate source of these changes is, whether or not indirectly they may be referred to external conditions as seems probable to many biologists, no one so far has ever given a convincing, positive answer. It is sufficient for our purposes to know that they may have set up certain internal stimuli which may modify the behavior of the organism in which they reside, and that the “physiological state” of the organism at the time of external or internal stimulation will condition the response. This physiological condition may be dependent on the general metabolic equilibrium of the animal, or on the extent of previous stimulation by means of the same or different agents. Thus the organism may not always react in the same way to the same stimulus.

The intensity of the stimulation and change in the intensity of the stimulation, are also factors to be reckoned with. Moreover, it must be taken into account that a given organism is often operating under the control of more than one external influence. For example, swarm spores in a dish of water which at a given temperature are positively phototropic, that is, gather at the side of the dish toward the light, may, if the temperature of the water is raised or in case of marine forms if the salinity is increased, become negatively phototropic. Sometimes two or more forms of stimuli may cooperate in bringing about certain behavior as, for instance, in the reaction of the earthworm to a suitable habitat, through a combination of chemical and contact stimuli. On the other hand, two different stimuli may interfere with each other; for example, the usual phototropic responses of certain animals do not manifest themselves when they are mating or feeding. In short, anything that alters the physiological state of the organism may cause it to react in a different manner. And thus with the interplay of shifting external agents and variable internal state the bounds of behavior on these purely mechanical bases become considerably extended.

Many Tropic Responses Apparently Purposeful.—The query arises as to why if these responses are mechanical they are so often apparently purposive; that is, why do they so often subserve some useful end for the animal? While they do not always work out to the animal’s benefit, as for instance in the case of the moth and the light or under many other conditions that can be devised experimentally, as a matter of fact under normal natural conditions they are on the whole useful to the organism, carrying it into suitable surroundings of food, lessened danger, temperature, and the like.

The probabilities are that in their first origin the reactions were not purposive. However, if any proved harmful they would result in the extermination of their possessors and hence of that particular strain of individuals. Those types that happened to have useful reactions would be left and in course of time as the process of eliminating the others went on, would become the prevailing types. Any organism which the useful reaction had preserved would tend to hand it down to the succeeding generation where again it would be the conserver of those individuals which possessed it in sufficient degree.

Authorities Not Agreed on Details of Tropic Responses.—Although all the foremost modern students of animal behavior accept as facts the more or less mechanical orienting effects of external stimuli, there is by no means unanimity of opinion regarding details. Some stress as the directive factor the continuous action of the stimulating agent on sensitive tissues symmetrically situated. Others would maintain that it is the time rate of change in the intensity of the stimulating agent, or that the factor is different in different cases. Some make much of an automatic sort of “trial and error” system by which certain organisms test out an inimical environment until the path of least irritation is hit upon as the way to safety. The field is a broad one and to get at the finer shades of distinction the reader will have to refer to the works of such authorities as Loeb, Jennings, Holmes and Mast.

Tropisms Grade Into Reflex Actions and Instincts.—The tropisms in many cases become indistinguishable from reflex actions and these in turn grade up into the instincts of animals. The latter may be looked on as but subtler and more involved reactions made possible through a more intricate structural organization. As might be expected of instincts, the feature of utility is more in evidence than in simpler tropisms because they have become of proportionately greater magnitude, but the same fundamental mechanism is apparently at bottom of both. It has already been seen how the “instinct” of the blow-fly to lay its egg on meat is interpretable as a chemotropic response. Thus no elaborate psychic mechanism is necessary in such behavior.

Instincts.—In the typical instinct there is a series of “chain reflexes” in which one step determines the next until mechanically the whole gamut of changes is run to the last step. It is characteristic of a purely instinctive act that an animal performs it without practise, without instruction, and without reason. Moreover, all of the same kind of animals tend to perform the act in the same way. But with instincts, as with tropisms, the physiological state of the organism must be regarded. For instance, the instinctive reactions of an animal sated with food or hungry will be different.

Adjustability of Instincts Opens the Way for Intelligent Behavior.—As we progress in the scale of animal life this adjustability of instincts to new conditions comes more into evidence. While prescribed in the main by internal impulse the carrying out of the action is capable of some adaptability to circumstances. And in proportion as this adaptability releases the organism from a blind rigid working-out of a predetermined end, there is opened up the possibility of intelligent behavior; that is, of modification of the instinctive behavior by individually acquired experience.

While the generation of instinctive impulses still occurs it is left more for individual experience to teach discrimination between ends. But we can not escape a fundamental structural mechanism, for with this new capacity of educability must come new structural mechanisms in the nervous system and this must be as faithfully reproduced in each individual as is the basis for any other nervous response. How low in the scale of animal life animals can profit from their experiences to the extent that their future conduct is conditioned thereby is not known. Some would place it as far back as the protozoa, others would not. Where such modification of behavior is possible there must be some mechanism for the storage of impressions in the form of what we term memory.

Modification of Habits Possible in Lower Animals.—Among invertebrates such animals as crayfish will acquire new habits, or rather will modify old ones. Even as lowly an organism as the starfish can have changes of habit thrust on it. When a starfish is placed upon its back it rights itself by means of its arms or rays. Professor Jennings found that in a given individual the tendency was always to employ certain rays for this rather than others. However, by preventing the use of the rays customarily employed, he found that the animal would use a different pair and that ultimately in this way it could be trained into the habit of using this pair of rays even when restrained in no way. One starfish which was given one hundred eighty such lessons in eighteen days after an interval of seven days still retained the new habit; young individuals were found to be more easily trained than old ones.

Some Lower Vertebrates Profit by Experience.—Among vertebrates it is known that those as low in organization as fish will profit by experience. They will learn to come for food at a regular time and apparently learn more or less to appreciate the presence of certain obstacles with which they have had unsatisfactory experiences. Professor Sanford sums up what he believes are the limitations of the piscine mental organization as follows: “No fish is ever conscious of himself; he never thinks of himself as doing this or that, or feeling in this way or that way. The whole direction of the mind is outward. He has no language and so can not think in verbal terms; he never names anything; he never talks to himself; as Huxley says of the crayfish, he ‘has nothing to say to himself or any one else.’ He does not reflect; he makes no generalizations. All his thinking is in the present and in concrete terms. He has no voluntary attention, no volition in the true sense, no self-control.”

Rational Behavior.—Finally, however, out of these first dull glimmerings of intelligence as exemplified in the higher invertebrates and the lower vertebrates, which can modify behavior as the result of experience, come the still higher factors so dominant in man, of rational behavior. This higher mental process can realize the end to be reached and can deliberate on the means to be employed. By means of his reason man can overcome difficulties in advance by “thinking” out suitable schemes of action. Some naturalists believe that man stands alone in possessing the power to reason, although others believe that some of the other mammals, notably the other primates, possess the same attribute although in a much less degree.

Conceptual Thought Probably an Outgrowth of Simpler Psychic States.—Is the capacity for such conceptual thought, however, which appears as the final efflorescence of complex neural activity something entirely new? Most students of comparative psychology maintain that it is not. Just as one kind of an instinct frequently grows out of another, so has this grown out of the complex of psychic states which preceded it. It apparently is the product of the increasing awareness on the part of animals of their neural processes and the outcome of these processes, which becomes more and more prominent as we ascend the scale of animal life. With the advent of associative memory the mind comes more and more to deal with attributes of objects instead of merely with each single concrete object as it presents itself, and these attributes being common to many objects, come to represent definite ideas which can be manipulated by the mind. Language, of course, has been an indispensable aid to man in this regard, for words become descriptions of facts and symbols of concepts, and thereby allow of abstract thought.

The Capacity for Alternative Action in High Animals Renders Possible More Than One Form of Behavior.—With this modification of instinct by experience made possible, there comes at the same time, of course, the capacity for a rational instead of a purely instinctive behavior. This very capacity for alternative action opens up many new possibilities of behavior and together with the well-known fixative effects of habit, also the opportunity of permanently establishing certain ones. Thus it is obvious that a behavior toward which in a strict sense there can not be said to have been an original specific tendency, can be developed. What was present in the first place was only a general possibility of the development of any one of several types of behavior. The final choice of the alternatives together with repetition makes it the habitual behavior of the individual. Of course it can be urged that if the selection of the type of behavior is left to the individual then the latter will operate automatically toward the various impulsions of its neural make-up and one path will be followed because of stronger inclination in that direction, so that the whole procedure is in the end the mere operation of an automaton. But however this may be in the individual left to itself, the fact is in man that the young individual is never left to itself and in the nature of things can not be, so that without entering into this troubled pool of controversy regarding freedom of the will, I wish merely to point out that the possibility of more than one form of behavior exists and that if one is more desirable than the others then this one can be chosen by the ones responsible for the training of the young individual and clenched fast by the agency of habit.

Intelligence, reason and habits, however, no less than instincts and tropism must have neural as well as psychical existence and we can not escape therefore the underlying mechanism.

The Elemental Units of the Nervous System Are the Same in Lower and Higher Animals.—It is interesting to note that the fundamental neural mechanism which underlies the mental processes of higher animals is not essentially different from that which serves in lower forms. Although as animals become more complex their nervous systems have become proportionately larger and incomparably more intricate, still all the changes have been rung on the same basic neural unit, the neuron or nerve-cell (Fig. 32A, p. 209). The higher nervous system differs from the lower in the number, in the specializations and in the associations of these units rather than in possessing something of entirely different elemental structure.

Neuron Theory.—According to the prevailing modern conception the entire nervous system is made up of a series of units called neurons. Each neuron is a single cell with all its processes. The latter consists typically of short branching processes on the one hand, known as dendrites, and of a single process on the other, known as the axon, which extends from the cell to become a nerve fiber (Fig. 32, p. 209). The various neurons, with possibly a few exceptions, are not anatomically continuous but contiguous. They communicate with one another apparently by contact only. The axon of each neuron ends in an elaborate series of fine branchings which lie in contact with the dendrites of another neuron, or in some cases with the body of the other cell (Fig. 32, p. 209). Thus the nervous impulse passes from one neuron to the other at these points of contact. An impulse is supposed to travel normally only in one direction through a neuron, the dendrites being the receiving and the axon the discharging terminals. There are various types of neurons. Some, particularly within the brain, have their main processes so provided with branches and brushes that they may come into physiological connection with a number of other neurons.

Fig. 32

A—Diagram to illustrate neurons and their method of connection; a, axon; d, dendrite; s, synapse. To simplify the diagram the medullary sheathes of such fibers as would have them have been omitted. The arrows indicate the direction in which the impulse travels. The lower series shows diagrammatically how from the same neuron in the cortex two subordinate neurons may be affected, the one excited to cause contraction of a certain group of muscle fibers, the other inhibited so that the antagonistic fibers may relax and thus not hinder the movement of a given part.

B—Section of a region of the cerebral cortex (after Cajal). The cells have been blackened with chrome-silver and are much less highly magnified than the diagrams in A. The numerals refer to certain characteristic layers of the cortex in this region.

Establishment of Pathways Through the Nervous System.—It is believed that more or less resistance to transmission of stimuli prevails at the point of contact (synapse) between two neurons but that this resistance is lessened by repetition of conduction. The frequent traversing of a given pathway by similar impulses finally results in an automatic occurrence of the transmission, or, in other words, the action becomes habitual. Education consists largely in establishing such routes through the nervous tissue. Because of the greater plasticity of the neural mechanism in youth it is easier to open up and fix pathways of conduction than in later years. Moreover the earlier established lines of conduction become the more permanent.

Characteristic Arrangements of Nerve Cells Are as Subject to Inheritance as Other Structures of the Body.—That the main features of the nervous system are inherited becomes obvious when we see that each kind of animal has its own distinctive numbers, arrangements and proportions of the various neural units. In man, for example, there are certain characteristics, types and groupings of nerve-cells which are reproduced generation after generation with remarkable fidelity. This means that in so far as these represent the mental make-up of the individual, his mentality is continuously linked with others which have gone before. The new-born child has all the nerve-cells in its brain that it will ever have but the ultimate linkages of the finer connectives between them, or at least the pathways of travel, remain in large measure to be made.

As we have already seen, the cerebral cortex is the seat of the chief mental faculties of man or at least of the highest of these. Professor Lloyd Morgan, one of our greatest authorities on comparative psychology, is inclined to believe that the instincts are located in the subcortical material. In any event, the inheritance of mental ability resolves itself into the inheritance of a certain cerebral mechanism.

Different Parts of the Cortex Yield Different Reactions.—The cerebral cortex, however, is not functionally homogeneous throughout. Certain regions have been shown to be motor, others sensory, and moreover, these regions are apparently further specialized so that a given one of them is associated with a specific type of sensory or motor response, not merely with responses in general. Thus by injuring one of the sensory areas we might destroy vision but not other sensations, or by stimulating one of the motor centers we would get a response in a corresponding motor organ but not in all such organs. Likewise, it is probable that still different areas, the so-called “association areas,” relatively of much greater development in man than in any other animal, are the regions in which various perceptions and conceptions are synthesized and formed into organized knowledge. Here also are engendered the volitions which when flashed through the motor centers become expressed in activity or behavior.

It seems highly probable that just as the sensory and motor areas differ in kind from one another, so we must suppose there are qualitative differences in various parts of the association areas so that the different parts give different reactions in consciousness; that is, each special mental ability of the individual is more or less centered in a special part of the cortex. And just as there may be variations in other structures of the organism so there may be variations in these areas. The “gifted” person in some one direction, whether it be in mathematics, music, painting, or what not, is on this hypothesis one who has that particular area of his brain which forms the basis for the talent in question more highly developed than it is in the average individual. And since such talents are handed down to descendants, this can only mean that a similar grouping of the neurons in the region in question has occurred.

Skill Acquired in One Special Branch of Learning Probably Not Transferred to Another Branch.—Such a differential arrangement of the brain-mechanism which presumably underlies the various mental abilities would lead to the inference that skill in one special branch of learning, in so far as it involves only certain centers of the cortex, would not be transferred to another branch based on different neural pathways and centers. Development of historical knowledge, for example, would not enhance one’s mathematical ability, or vice versa. The testimony of various psychologists bears out this idea. In so far as certain factors of training, such as habits of industry, concentration, etc., are common to the study of either mathematics or history, the good effects of either discipline will probably be much the same, but the identity of effect vanishes as soon as the intrinsic characteristics of the subjects themselves are involved.

Just how far we are warranted, however, in carrying this idea of localized functions as regards the association areas is a moot question. Our present attitude regarding the specificity of such localizations is largely a matter of inference based on analogy to conditions which obtain in other and better known parts of the brain, together with the indubitable differences in inborn abilities which exist between individuals. Some few brain physiologists maintain that the whole cortex operates more or less as a unit in all of the higher psychical activities.

Preponderance of Cortex in Highest Animals.—One of the most interesting conditions in the nervous system of the highest types of animals is the way in which the cortex has outrun the other parts of the brain in size and complexity and has come to dominate the organism more and more both directly and indirectly. Aside from the proportionately greater increase in size of the cortex, there is an abundance of anatomical evidence of this altered and probably altering system of control in man and the higher apes. This is well illustrated in the fiber tracts (nerve bundles) of the spinal cord.

More Long Fiber Tracts in the Spinal Cord of Man.—The spinal cord although having many nerve centers of its own is also in great part a large cable for conducting enormous numbers of fibers from one part of the cord to another, or to and from the brain. In man and the higher apes a considerably larger percentage of the total area of the cord is given up to the long fiber tracts from the brain to the body than in lower vertebrates. This progressive increase in long fiber tracts in the higher anthropoids probably marks more and more domination of the body by the higher brain centers and correspondingly less by the direct activity of the cord and by the lower brain centers. However, even in man, many of the simpler reflexes of the body still have their centers in the spinal cord.

Special Fiber Tracts in the Cord of Man and Higher Apes.—There are certain special tracts of the cord that are particularly interesting in connection with the increasing domination of the brain over the body, namely, the pyramidal tracts. These were the latest tracts to appear in the animal kingdom and are apparently the latest to become functional in the individual. It is believed that the development of the medullary substance (an enveloping sheath) of the common medullated nerve fiber marks the time of entrance of the fiber into activity and it is a significant fact that the formation of this sheath occurs last of all in the fibers of the pyramidal tracts, where it does not appear till after birth. These tracts convey impulses from the brain to the body. They consist of two sets of tracts, in fact, one the crossed, the other the direct. As an anomaly, probably arising most frequently from instrumental injury at birth, the pyramidal tracts fail to develop normally, with the distressing result that the infant, although possessing perfectly normal brain activity and normal spinal cord reflexes, is unable to exercise voluntary control of the body. In other words the condition, like hare-lip, is one of suppressed development. At least this seems to be the most plausible explanation of what is known as Little’s disease. Such unfortunates usually die early although they may survive for a few years.

The direct pyramidal tracts occur only in man and man-like apes. They vary considerably in extent in different individuals. They originate in nests of characteristic large cells located in the cerebral cortex and are regarded as paths, though not the only ones, through which volitional impulses are conveyed from the brain. They seem to control certain of the finer and more delicate movements of the body.

Great Complexity in Associations and More Neurons in the Brain of Man Than of Other Animals.—It has already been noted that as animals stand higher in the scale of life while the general plan of their neural elements remain the same, there is increasing complexity in the number and connections of the neurons. The number of processes on individual nerve-cells is also greater. There is in fact much greater complexity in the number of processes and the inter-connections of the neural cells than in the numbers of the cells themselves. This would seem to indicate that the greater mental activities of higher animals depend more on richness in complex associations than on mere increase in number of neurons. The latter, however, is by no means unimportant as may be seen in man, for instance, in whom it is estimated that the cerebral cortex, that is, that part of his brain in which his more complex mental processes transpire, contains some nine billion more nerve cells than does the corresponding region of the brain of an anthropoid ape.

Of especial significance in the psychic make-up of man is his vastly increased capacity for inhibition. Although not possessed by all men in equal measure and not entirely wanting in lower animals it is a distinctive feature in all human conduct. Much of any child’s education, particularly as it pertains to behavior, must be concerned with training in the exercise of proper inhibitions. He must learn to suppress certain primitive types of reaction in favor of higher ones. This applies not only to motor activities but to trains of thought as well. The essence of self-control consists mainly in ability to substitute for one impulse or idea other compensating ones. And the secret of concentration lies in being able to banish irrelevant ideas and focus on the central thought.

The Nervous System in the Main Already Staged at the Time of Birth for the Part It Must Play.—It is clear from what is known of its anatomy that in the main the central nervous system is framed to respond in certain set ways, that there are determinative elements in it which control or determine the responses, and therefore the behavior of the body. The same evidence shows also, however, in the incompleteness of many of the associations, that while the stage is all set and some of the main features of the performance are determined at the time of birth, considerable yet remains to be done toward fitting the parts together and working up the detail. Just exactly what and how much is rigidly determined no one knows.

Many Pathways of Conduction Not Established at Birth.—As we have already seen the evidence is that many of the neural pathways are not yet fully established at birth, and there is some indication that routes once opened may be altered. To what degree this has bearing on behavior is still unknown, but since neurologists attribute so much importance to the richness and the associations of the cell-outgrowths, it is evident that this increase in the number of pathways after birth with possible alternatives of connections may be a very important factor in the modification of behavior. Yet, on the other hand, we are completely in the dark as to what extent these later associations are predetermined in the earlier cells.

The Extent of the Zone That Can Be Modified Is Unknown.—There is little doubt that many of the paths of action are already firmly established. Others, although not irrevocably fixed, offer the least resistance and would “naturally” be taken if not counteracted or modified by the more or less artificial development and fixation of other paths through cultivation and habit. Yet others perhaps are largely neutral; they still await the initial decisive push which “choice” or external environment may mete out to them. As trainers of youth all that is left that we can do is to attempt to develop in certain ways the elements of this indefinite, impressible zone. Unfortunately, we must labor in the dark to a great extent as we have all too little indication of which the malleable factors of intellect and conduct are. We can only infer from long, intelligent and sympathetic observation of children in successive stages of their development. It is only by having clearly in mind the nature of our problem that our conclusions will finally come to be of enhanced practical value in the training of children. Observation to the present time clearly indicates that many children are strongly predisposed this way or that “as the sparks fly upward.”

This is a point too frequently overlooked by educators. They are often unduly actuated by the other piece of the truth that, “as the twig is bent the tree inclines.” They sometimes fail to realize that after all the tree remains the same kind of a tree. If an apple tree, while it may be bent from the normal path of development, it can not produce other fruit than apples. Just how much the destiny of man can be influenced by training and the exercise of his own will power is the fundamental question not only of pedagogy but of ethics as well. For if man’s rational judgments are markedly conditioned by his neural make-up then the volitional judgments which underlie conduct are likewise conditioned since they are inextricably intermingled with his reason. We must believe that to a considerable extent emotional expression, as well as other mental functions, is due to hereditary dispositions of the neurons in the various parts of the brain.

Various Possibilities of Reaction in the Child.—Despite the innate predeterminations of the tree, it is nevertheless our province to see that the twig is bent, but our work can only be done with due intelligence when we recognize something of the limitations of our material. Of the various possibilities of reaction we must see that certain desirable ones are realized, even, in some cases, if only to have others thereby excluded. It is a commonplace of psychology that all cerebral excitations, no matter what the origin, must vent themselves in some way and if this expression is not directed into proper channels it will very likely find improper ones. We must see that the young wearer of the coat of undetermined capacities gets it set by repeated performance into the habitual wrinkles of normal social conduct. For it is a trite observation that when habits are once well established it requires tremendous efforts to do otherwise than as they dictate. There is not the least doubt that some of our subjects will respond much more readily to training in certain directions of habitual reactions than others, but we have always the consolatory knowledge that no matter how difficult the art may be at first, repetition reduces the difficulty.

While much of any youth’s character must be determined by external forces brought to bear upon it, the ultimate climax of our effort and measure of our success will be the extent to which we have engendered in him the capacity for initiating and carrying out through his own volition those impulsions and inhibitions which tend to the highest good of humanity.

Probable Origin of Altruistic Human Conduct.—Those phases of human conduct which find expression in consideration for others seem no less than other mental attributes to have their origin in certain fundamental instincts. Altruistic conduct, in last analysis, apparently resolves itself back largely to certain very fundamental impulsions, namely those which arise out of certain obligations for the welfare of others which are necessarily associated with the marital, parental and filial relations that must exist where the young require post-natal care. Looked at from the standpoint of natural selection, this would come about as a mere matter of survival value. Where the young, as in man, are helpless for a long period of time, more opportunity would be afforded for the development of both conjugal and filial affection. The sympathetic emotions once established in such family relations would partly through habit, partly through community of interest, readily become extended to clan or tribe and as a final consummation to all mankind.

Training in Motive Necessary.—In the training of children, then, we must recognize first of all that there are decided inclinations or bents which, as long as they are not anti-social in nature, must be respected if not always encouraged. While it is necessary to utilize these as much as possible in their training still we must bear in mind that although it is natural for a child to follow certain interests, the fact remains that as regards social worth these natural interests may not be the most valuable. When this is true we must strive to develop others which will compel attention and thus become impelling factors in conduct. Where certain fundamental impulsions run contrary to the common welfare it is necessary to practise the child in the setting up of inhibitions or counter-impulses until this becomes habitual. He must be led to construct a protective mantle of appropriate scruples, doubts and fears. It is all important to get the proper motives for action to prevail in his mind.

Actual Practise in Carrying Out Projects Is All Important.—But on the other hand it is equally important to see that the action is effectively carried out. In the matter of self-discipline, particularly, we may have many ideal impulses and realize that they should prevail over certain of our natural propensities, but unless we put forth effort to overcome the propensities our ideal impulses are of no avail. The world has many such moral paralytics to-day who can not seize their “languor as it were a curling snake and cast it off.” It is training in this very overcoming of reluctance, in this putting forth of actual effort toward worthy ends instead of merely memorizing precepts about the desirability of such accomplishments, that is so sadly lacking in our school and home life to-day. We prate of the importance of self-control, we say with our lips that the way to learn to do is by doing, we proclaim that it is more vital to instil good mental and physical habits into our pupils than to stock them with information, we preach that mere fact training is as conducive to making a first-class rascal as an upright man, yet we jog on complacently in the well-beaten ruts of memory routine which require the memorizing of symbols rather than real understanding. We seldom require that our protÉgÉs make intelligent judgments based on evidence, we rarely exact of them decisions in matters of ethics, and almost never demand that they put their knowledge into efficient accomplishment. It can not be too strongly urged that we need less of formulÆ learned by heart, less dead erudition pigeonholed in the brain like so many foreign bodies, and vastly more assimilation of knowledge into the living personality of the individual.

Where in school or home to-day do we find provision for such training? Our tendency is, in fact, just the opposite. According to the modern code, as it works out in many instances at least, the child must be taught through play. Though it is a truism that he who has not learned obedience can never be master of himself, the child of to-day must not be made to obey but be wheedled into changing his mind. If a given subject of study proves distasteful to him, the fault is the teacher’s for not making it interesting, for he must always be led on by the thrill of fascination. In other words, the child must not only be allowed but be encouraged to take the path of least resistance. His own pleasure is to be the standard of his actions. Let no stern demands of duty interfere!

Is it any wonder that the products of such tutelage come into the activities of life self-indulgent and undisciplined, and although often recognizing our private and public shame in business, politics and conduct, still remain supine, evasive of the unpleasantness or hardships of reform, or inefficient or unwilling in accomplishing unselfish ends?Interest and Difficulty Both Essential.—The writer does not wish to be understood as minimizing the importance of interest on the part of the child in what he is doing. Interest is undeniably the open sesame to desirable mental development; but what he does protest against is that not uncommon interpretation of interest which deems it necessary to eschew most serious consideration of a subject and evade such parts as present difficulties. Certainly if there is any fact that stands out prominently in human experience it is the fact that nothing conduces to the development of moral stamina so much as the overcoming of difficulties, particularly distasteful difficulties.

Conduct Developed Through Actual Performance.—Self-control and the will to do can be trained and crystallized into habit as well as can any other activity. It is a fact that one well grounded in morals by habit will successfully resist subconscious impulsions to wrongdoing even when suggested in the hypnotic state. Conduct is largely a matter of growth through actual performance. For proper guidance of this growth there must, of course, be high ideals around which the feelings are led to cluster and by which they gradually come to be controlled.

Construction of Ideals.—The construction of such ideals through example, through precept, through appeal and through actual practise in self-denial and self-control on the part of the child, should be the foremost duty of the parent or teacher. Above all it should be remembered that imitation of teacher, of parents, of companions, is more of a factor than intellect in the moral action of children. At present educationally we are in a fever for vocational training, for “practical” work, and in general for all things conducive to coaching our pupils in how to make a living, yet commendable as all this may be, is it not of even more fundamental importance to train them how to live?

The Realization of Certain Possibilities of the Germ Rather Than Others Is Subject to Control.—It may be said in a sense that there exists potentially in any germ all the things that can possibly come out of it under any obtainable conditions of environment. The very initiation of a given mode of expression by some environmental factor, however, often mutually excludes many of the others. We get a given average result ordinarily because development normally takes place in a given average environment.

As may be easily shown by experiment, this is manifest even in the instincts of lower animals. In the young the various instincts do not come into expression at the same time, and it not infrequently happens that if one of the earlier instincts becomes operative toward certain objects or situations, later instincts will have a wholly different relation toward these objects or situations than they would otherwise have had. As a result the whole life conduct of the animal is markedly modified. For example, young animals immediately after birth have no instinct of fear. They do, however, have a strong instinct to attach themselves to some moving thing and follow it. The utility of such an instinct, as for instance in the case of young chickens, is obvious. The object of attachment is usually the parent, but man may take the place of a parent and the young animal will fearlessly follow him about. However if the young animal has had no experience with man during its earliest infancy a later instinct, that of fear or wildness, will have come into play and it will flee from him. It is clear, therefore, that by familiarizing the young animal with man before its instinct of fear has come to expression, certain habitual reactions are set up in it which inhibit or limit the application of its instinct of wildness as regards man. In other words, the whole course of its life has been altered by this simple experience. The same principle applies in even greater degree to the young of man.

We have seen in a former chapter that what in the ordinary course of nature was “predestined” to become one individual nevertheless contained the possibility of becoming four or more if the environing conditions were made such as to bring about a separation of the cleavage blastomeres. Or a fish egg that contained the possibility of becoming a normal two-eyed form also contained the possibility of becoming a one-eyed form and could be made to do so by certain unusual modifications of the conditions under which it develops. However we must not be led so far by the plausibility of this comparison that we are misled, for the fact is that we are not creating anything new by these environmental upheavals, but are mainly altering features that already exist. Beyond doubt the nature of the material is of greater import in the specificity of the outcome than are the external forces brought to play on it. The only point I wish to make is that even what seem ordinarily to be predestined ends can be altered by environment, and that the probabilities are that certain features are relatively indifferent at their inception, the environmental factor adding the final touch of specificity. And our common experience in education would indicate that the same is true of mental conditions, including behavior. The actual appearance of a particular trait is not necessarily always a matter of an initial trend, but may be due merely to the fact that its development is possible under certain conditions of environment and that these conditions have prevailed in the given instance. And even where there is a specific bent it may be arrested through the awakening of a contrary impulse, or, on the other hand, its exercise may prevent the engendering of the opposite impulse.

Our Duty to Afford the Opportunity and Provide the Proper Stimuli for the Development of Good Traits.—It is clearly our duty to see that the expression of good traits is made possible. We must throw a sheltering screen of social environment around the young individual which will fend off wrong forms of incitement and chances for harmful expression, and we must provide proper stimuli and afford opportunity for development of proper modes of expression. We must not forget that a normal instinct denied a legitimate outlet will not infrequently find an illegitimate one. Above all we must not forget the vital importance of establishing correct habits nor the possibility of even replacing undesirable ones by good ones. If training can redirect the machine-like behavior of as lowly a creature as the starfish into new courses, why should we be so willing as some of our genetists would seem to be to throw up our hands and admit failure in the case of man before we have even made a rational attempt to correct the evils in question? Even in lowly organisms we have seen that behavior is not only the result of an innate constitution but also of the degree and kind of stimulations to which it has been subjected.

If the individual himself has not the initiative or will to make the attempt to set up proper or corrective habits, or to cultivate the necessary specific inhibitors, then all the more is it our duty to see that he is led by suggestion and drill into the proper routine of activities for their establishment. For if the individual with propensities toward moral obliquity is to be saved to society it must be through the stereotyping effects of good habits.

Moral Responsibility.—Beyond question different men have different degrees of capacity for mental and moral training. All can not be held equally responsible ethically, but the lowermost limit of obligatory response to social and ethical demands necessary to rank one as within the pale of normal conduct is at such a level that any one not an actual defective can in a reasonably wholesome environment surmount it. All normal men are responsible for their conduct.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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