Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3

CONTENTS.

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Dilemma put by Parmenides — Acuteness of his objections	68
The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of the Platonic dialogues	ib.
Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authenticity of the ParmenidÊs	69
Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of his own	70
Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search	ib.
The ParmenidÊs is the extreme manifestation of the negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural	71
Force of the negative case in the ParmenidÊs. Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas	ib.
Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura	72
Answer of Sokrates — That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped	73
Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times to the present day — Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it	76
Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded	78
Continuation of the Dialogue — Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient preliminary exercise	79
What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the consequences of each	ib.
Impossible to do this before a numerous audience — Parmenides is entreated to give a specimen — After much solicitation he agrees	80
Parmenides elects his own theory of the Unum, as the topic for exhibition — Aristoteles becomes respondent	ib.
Exhibition of Parmenides — Nine distinct deductions or Demonstrations, first from Unum Est — next from Unum non Est	81
The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any explanation	ib.
Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies and the dialogue generally	82
No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the difficulties of theorising	85
This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared	87
The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained perplexities or ???????	88
Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward affirmative aspirant	89
Plato’s examination of the other doctrine — That knowledge is Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are different with different Percipients	153
Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense — weighing, measuring, &c.	154
Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence between one man and another arises, not merely from different sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference	155
Argument — That sensible Perception does not include memory — Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include memory	157
Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time	ib.
Sokrates maintains that we do not see with our eyes, but that the mind sees through the eyes: that the mind often conceives and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ	159
Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself — It perceives Existence, Difference, &c.	160
Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add computations of the mind respecting them	161
Examination of this view — Distinction from the views of modern philosophers	162
Different views given by Plato in other dialogues	163
Plato’s discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition	164
Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from facts of sense, as either necessary or possible	168
Second definition given by TheÆtÊtus — That Cognition consists in right or true opinion	ib.
Objection by Sokrates — This definition assumes that there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities?	ib.
Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present sensations with past impressions	169
Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know	170
He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons turned into it and flying about	ib.
Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of TheÆtÊtus — That there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this	171
He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but they do not teach or communicate knowledge	172
New answer of TheÆtÊtus — Cognition is true opinion, coupled with rational explanation	173
Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained: compounds alone can be explained	ib.
Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable, the compound must be unknowable also	Purpose of the difficulties in Plato’s Dialogues of Search — To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions	284



CHAPTER XXXI.
KRATYLUS.
Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus — Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others	285
Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes — all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws — speaking and naming among the rest	286
The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher	287
Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another	289
Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable — essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum	ib.
Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly	290
Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns — the Protagorean doctrine — Homo Mensura	291
Objection by Sokrates — That Protagoras puts all men on a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance	292
Objection unfounded — What the Protagorean theory really affirms — Belief always relative to the believer’s mind	ib.
Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than himself — Belief on authority — not inconsistent with the affirmation of Protagoras	293
Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by Sokrates — does not sustain his inference against Protagoras	294
Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections	295
Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all men — Grounds of belief and disbelief, different with different men and different ages	295
Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind	297
Facts of sense — some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity	298
Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transitions	299
These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists	302
Dissent from this theory — No proof that the Sophists ever proposed etymologies	304
Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature	306
Plato intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications as admissible guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proo ate of health	356
Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge	ib.
Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion	357
Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means towards substance — Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good	ib.
Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good	358
Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation	ib.
Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan	359
Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity	360
Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth	ib.
Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained	361
Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two — Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed?	ib.
We must include all Cognitions — not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both	362
But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence — especially the intense sexual pleasures	ib.
What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure	363
Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures	364
Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy	365
Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine	ib.
Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics	366
Comparison of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion) is unnecessary and confusing	367
Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification	368
Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended — yet feebly applied — in this dialogue	369
What is the Good? Discussed both in PhilÊbus and in Republic. Comparison	370
Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently	ib.
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