Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2

CONTENTS.

George Grote 36-h-8.htm.html#Sidenotev2_13_37" class="pginternal">Dissent and repugnance of Hippias	ib.
Conclusion — That none but the good man can do evil wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion — Sokrates confesses his perplexity	61
Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of the Sophists	62
Polemical purpose of the dialogue — Hippias humiliated by Sokrates	63
Philosophical purpose of the dialogue — theory of the Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by Plato	ib.
The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory — Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias — Error in the Greater	64
The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia	66
Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it	67
Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct	ib.
They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts — they take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame	68
Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question under review	69
Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic	70



CHAPTER XIV.
HIPPARCHUS — MINOS.
Hipparchus — Question — What is the definition of Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain	71
Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are lovers of gain	72
Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him — accusation is retorted upon Sokrates	73
Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid — never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates	ib.
Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil	74
Questions by Sokrates — bad gain is gain, as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections — the acquisition may be evil — embarrassment confessed	ib.
It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. The valuable is the profitable — the profitable is the good. Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good	75
Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain — all men are lovers of gain — no man ought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded	ib.
Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, quatenus law: what is the common constituent attribute?	76

CHAPTER XVII.
ION.
Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among modern critics as to its genuineness	124
Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant	124
Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation — exposition of the poets — arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent	125
The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation — powerful effect which they produced	ib.
Ion both reciter and expositor — Homer was considered more as an instructor than as a poet	126
Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working	ib.
Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of Sokrates to him — How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets? The poetic art is one	127
Explanation given by Sokrates — both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration — fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from some God	ib.
Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then act through him and through Ion upon the auditors	128
This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology	129
Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad	129
Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life — privileged communications from the Gods to Sokrates — his firm belief in them	130
Condition of the inspired person — his reason is for the time withdrawn	131
Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind	132
Homer talks upon all subjects — Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its province?	ib.
The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having learnt it from Homer	133
Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration	134
The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional experience — Homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers — Plato’s view of the poet, as pretending to know everything, but really knowing nothing	ib.
Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge	136
Illustration of Plato’s opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises	ib.



CHAPTER XVIII.
LACHES.
LachÊs. Subject and persons of the dialogue — whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms. Nikias and LachÊs differ in opinion	1 the guidance of knowledge	ib.
Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No teachers of it can be found	239
Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue	240
Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown	ib.
Sokrates modifies his premisses — knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results — right opinion will do the same	ib.
Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others — good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods	241
All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from the Gods	242
But what virtue itself is, remains unknown	ib.
Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates	ib.
Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled	ib.
Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon — desire of good alleged to be universally felt — in what sense this is true	243
Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what ?	244
Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras — diversity of handling — Plato is not anxious to settle a question and get rid of it	245
Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research	246
Great question discussed among the Grecian philosophers — criterion of truth — Wherein consists the process of verification?	ib.
None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by Plato — that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience	247
Plato’s view of the immortality of the soul — difference between the Menon, PhÆdrus, and PhÆdon	249
Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind — how far correct ?	ib.
Plato’s doctrine about À priori reasonings — different from the modern doctrine	251
Plato’s theory about pre-natal experience. He took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience	252
Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic Ideas or Forms	253
What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning — his distinction between knowledge and right opinion	ib.
This distinction compared with modern philosophical views	254
Manifestation of Anytus — intense antipathy to the Sophists and to philosophy generally	255
The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the sophists — practical statesmen	256
304
Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides	305
Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent	ib.
Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory	306
Reasoning of Sokrates	307
Application of that reasoning to the case of courage	ib.
The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues	308
Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential	309
Comparison with the Republic	310
The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates	311
The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the agent himself	312
Plato’s reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage	313
Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists	314
Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency	315
Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue	316



CHAPTER XXIV.
GORGIAS.
Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias	317
Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and KalliklÊs	318
Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition	ib.
Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion	319
The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise?	319
The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant	320
Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates	321
Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery	ib.
Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind — and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure	Clyx.com