| 79 |
Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient: Thought, genuine knowledge — absolute, or object per se | 80 |
Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c. | 81 |
Universality of Demokritus — his ethical views | 82 |
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CHAPTER II. |
General Remarks on the Earlier Philosophers — Growth of Dialectic — Zeno and Gorgias. |
Variety of sects and theories — multiplicity of individual authorities is the characteristic of Greek philosophy | 84 |
These early theorists are not known from their own writings, which have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about them | 85 |
Abundance of speculative genius and invention — a memorable fact in the Hellenic mind | 86 |
Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to overcome — prevalent view of Nature, established, impressive, and misleading | ib. |
Views of the Ionic philosophers — compared with the more recent abstractions of Plato and Aristotle | 87 |
Parmenides and Pythagoras — more nearly akin to Plato and Aristotle | 89 |
Advantage derived from this variety of constructive imagination among the Greeks | 90 |
All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato, and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of negative Dialectic | 91 |
The early theorists were studied, along with Plato and Aristotle, in the third and second centuries B.C. | 92 |
Negative attribute common to all the early theorists — little or no dialectic | 93 |
Zeno of Elea — Melissus | ib. |
Zeno’s Dialectic — he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, by showing that their assumptions led to contradictions and absurdities | 93 |
Consequences of their assumption of Entia Plura Discontinua. Reductiones ad absurdum | 94 |
Each thing must exist in its own place — Grain of millet not sonorous | 95 |
Zenonian arguments in regard to motion | 97 |
General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is knowable except the relative | 98 |
Mistake of supposing Zeno’s reductiones ad absurdum of an op
435@40435-h@40435-h-18.htm.html#Sidenotev1_3_51" class="pginternal">Doctrine of Antisthenes about predication — He admits no other predication but identical | 165 |
The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of Aristotle | 166 |
Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication | 167 |
Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to more than one subject | 169 |
Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenides | ib. |
MenedÊmus disallowed all negative predications | 170 |
Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and complex objects. Simple objects undefinable | 171 |
Remarks of Plato on this doctrine | 172 |
Remarks of Aristotle upon the same | ib. |
Later Grecian Cynics — Monimus — Krates — Hipparchia | 173 |
Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus | 174 |
Aristippus — life, character, and doctrine | 175 |
Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus | ib. |
Choice of HÊraklÊs | 177 |
Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting Good and Evil | ib. |
Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates | 178 |
Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus — KalliklÊs in Platonic Gorgias | 179 |
Language held by Aristippus — his scheme of life | 181 |
Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the character of the hearer | 182 |
Conversation between Sokrates and Aristippus about the Good and Beautiful | 184 |
Remarks on the conversation — Theory of Good | 185 |
Good is relative to human beings and wants in the view of Sokrates | ib. |
Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates | 186 |
Life and dicta of Aristippus — His type of character | ib. |
Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates | 311 |
Views of Ueberweg — attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and Hermann — admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the earlier | 313 |
His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues, He rejects Hippias Major, ErastÆ, TheagÊs, Kleitophon, ParmenidÊs: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus | 314 |
Other Platonic critics — great dissensions about scheme and order of the dialogues | 316 |
Contrast of different points of view instructive — but no solution has been obtained | ib. |
The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory propounded by Schleiermacher — slenderness of his proofs | 317 |
Schleiermacher’s hypothesis includes a preconceived scheme, and a peremptory order of interdependence among the dialogues | 318 |
Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the PhÆdrus inadmissible | 319 |
Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet produced any tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic dialogues | ib. |
Munk’s theory is the most ambitious, and the most gratuitous, next to Schleiermacher’s | 320 |
The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a circumstance of little moment | ib. |
No intentional sequence or interdependence of the dialogues can be made out | 322 |
Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is reasonable — successive changes in Plato’s point of view: but we cannot explain either the order or the causes of these changes | ib. |
Hermann’s view more tenable than Schleiermacher’s | 323 |
Small number of certainties, or even reasonable presumptions, as to date or order of the dialogues | 324 |
Trilogies indicated by Plato himself | 325 |
Positive dates of all the dialogues — unknown | 326 |
When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death of Sokrates | ib. |
Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition — does not consist with youth of the author | 327 |
Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his relations with Plato | 328 |
Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and position of Plato | 330 |
Plato’s early life — active by necessity, and to some extent ambitious | 331 |
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his extreme publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of knowledge is universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating Plato’s Dialogues of Search | 393 |
Result called Knowledge, which Plato aspires to. Power of going through a Sokratic cross-examination; not attainable except through the Platonic process and method | 396 |
Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics — man and society | 397 |
Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him completely distinct. His dogmas are enunciations À priori of some impressive sentiment | 399 |
Hypothesis — that Plato had solved all his own difficulties for himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few select auditors in oral lectures — Untenable | 401 |
Characteristic of the oral lectures — that they were delivered in Plato’s own name. In what other respects they departed from the dialogues, we cannot say | 402 |
Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search and debate per se. Protracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a tiresome obligation | 403 |
Plato has done more than any one else to make the process of enquiry interesting to others, as it was to himself | 405 |
Process of generalisation always kept in view and illustrated throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search — general terms and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis | 406 |
The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable inter-dependence | 407 |
Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under separate review. Apology will come first; TimÆus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis last | ib. |
Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determinate order | 408 |
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CHAPTER IX. |
Apology of Sokrates. |
The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates before the Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional transformation | 410 |
Even if it be Plato’s own composition, it comes naturally first in the review of his dialogues | 411 |
General character of the Apology — Sentiments entertained towards Sokrates at Athens | 412 |
Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom of Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the citizens generally — The oracle is proved to be true | 413 |
False persuasion of wisdom is universal — the God alone is wise | 414 |
Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining mission imposed upon him by the God | ib. |
He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, and he intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger | 416 |
PLATO.
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