  For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable Appendix in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, App. 18, vol. ii, p. 313-316. There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at the battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other Egyptians in a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages of Xenophon’s Anabasis, i, 8, 9; ii, 5, 13; Diodor. xiii, 46; and the Dissertation of F. Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio Persarum, p. 20-56 (Cologne, 1830). This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped them at Athens (Thucyd. v, 45). See above, in this History, Vol. VII. ch. lv, p. 47. Compare Xen. CyropÆd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota, c. 30. vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul’s note. It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes (instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors, without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from ?????? to ??ta??????. I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to suppose that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by Klearchus as Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a LacedÆmonian Harmost in that town, named as soon as the town was taken, by Lysander, after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2). This was towards the end of 405 B.C. We know farther, from the Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 B.C. Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 B.C. Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19. For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not merely on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see Quintus Curtius, v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching near to Persepolis, “quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca fortunÆ exempla memorandum, regi occurrit. Captivi erant GrÆci ad quatuor millia ferÈ, quos PersÆ vario suppliciorum modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus auribusque, amputatis, inustisque barbararum literarum notis, in longum sui ludibrium reservaverant,” etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69; and the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix, 112; Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17. It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing in which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the execution took place within the prison by administering a cup of hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of pain, as well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who reads the account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the end of the PhÆdon. It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in England is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens. Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the market-place. Much less could they have borne the sight of the prolonged tortures inflicted on Damiens at Paris in 1757 (a fair parallel to the Persian s??fe?s?? described in Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 16), in the presence of an immense crowd of spectators, when every window commanding a view of the Place de GrÈve was let at a high price, and filled by the best company in Paris. Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or ?ppe?? of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and great skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the duties of its commander, and in all that relates to horses, as manifested in his published works,—but also the fact, that his son Gryllus served afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the combat of cavalry which preceded the great battle of Mantineia (Diogen. LaËrt. ii, 54). Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt it from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But Diodorus on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. Herodotus tells us distinctly what he meant by a parasang, and what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well as in their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute (Herod. v, 53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three and a half English miles, or nearly three geographical miles. The distance between every two successive stations, on the road from Sardis to Susa, (which was “all inhabited and all secure,” d?? ???e????? te ?pasa ?a? ?sf?????), would seem to have been measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that this road passed from Kappadokia and across the river Halys, through KelÆnÆ and KolossÆ to Sardis; and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his march, from Sardis at least as far as KelÆnÆ, must have been so measured and marked. Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii, 8, 26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia, while he gives for the most part, each day’s journey measured in parasangs. Now even at the outset of the march, we have no reason to believe that there was any official measurer of road-progress accompanying the army, like BÆton, ? ??at?st?? ??e???d???, in Alexander’s invasion; see AthenÆus, x, p. 442, and Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor. Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon, throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the day’s march of the army in parasangs; not merely in Asia Minor, where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between Thapsakus and PylÆ,—through the snows of Armenia,—and through the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He tells us that in the desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs in thirteen days, or very nearly seven parasangs per day,—and that too under the extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that in the deep snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory (also covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs in seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches, at thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did Xenophon measure the distance marched over? The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers,—Major Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr. miles; Mr. Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels in Asia Minor, c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a half geogr. miles; Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8, p. 207) at 2.608 geogr. miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at 1.98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kunaxa,—at something less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat. It is evident that there is no certain basis to proceed upon, even for the earlier portion of the route; much more, for the retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calculation; but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the distance between KelÆnÆ and KolossÆ, two places the site of which seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps, fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang of Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that the road between KolossÆ and KelÆnÆ was probably measured and numbered according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the number of parasangs between these two places, would be speaking upon official authority. Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of the country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.) Colonel Chesney remarks,—“From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles for each of the five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by Xenophon between those two places.” As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to KelÆnÆ, he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for four days farther, as far as KeramÔn-Agora, (since I imagine that the road from KelÆnÆ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone through these two places,)—and possibly it may have continued even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches, Xenophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs; and when he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called that length of time by the name of one, two, or three parasangs. Five parasangs seem to have meant with him a full day’s march; three or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long, or very long day. We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had no portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction. The Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were the first to use ??? in the sense of hour (Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i, p. 239.) This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon’s meaning, when he talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep snows of Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this meaning uniformly or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of distance. I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon’s accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium; though the names of several of the places which he mentions are not known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified. There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But we at the present day assign more weight to that circumstance than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads, stretching systematically over a large region of country, are not of that age; the communications were probably all originally made, between one neighboring town and another, without much reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any promotion of traffic between distant places. It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to “cut straight roads” in Macedonia,—which Thucydides seems to note as a remarkable thing (ii, 100). When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy, the shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. Acharn. 1085, 1089-1149); it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Sometimes indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon (Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers, could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2, 20; Aristoph. 1, c.). On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed, and brightened, as before a battle (Xen. Hell. vii, 5, 20); then fastened round the neck or shoulders, and held out upon the left arm, which was passed through the rings or straps attached to its concave or interior side. Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious stratagem of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on march (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 27). It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of the Cyreians, does not mention breastplates; which (though sometimes worn, see Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible that some of the Cyreian infantry may have had breastplates as well as shields, since every soldier provided his own arms; but Xenophon states only what was common to all. Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no shield. Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to find this impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through sheer stupidity or recklessness of the satrap who ought to have defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning it as Syennesis had on the approach of Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii. 4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11). So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in regard to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two sons of Philip II. of Macedon: “Crescente in dies Philippi odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summ ope adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum incauti a fraude fratern juvenis—adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati, fovendamque spem potentioris, Perseo se adjungunt,” etc. (Livy, xl, 5). Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir’s Journey through Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, ii, p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 54. Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and Mr. Ainsworth, however, differ as to the route which they suppose Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus. Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which afterwards appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The various data of ancient history and geography about this region are by no means easy to reconcile; see a valuable note of MÜtzel on Quintus Curtius, iii, 17, 7. An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney’s or Kiepert’s, clears up some of these better than any verbal description. We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates into two branches, one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on its western, the other on its eastern side. There are thus two different passes, each called PylÆ Amanides or Amanian Gates; one having reference to the Western Amanus, the other to the Eastern. The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by Darius, before the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates; though both did not pass the same gates. Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even in the map annexed to Col. Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, and by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde, part x, B. iii; West Asien, p. 14-17, with the elaborate discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is correctly placed in Colonel Chesney’s last work (Euphr. and Tigr. p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of Beilan and Thapsakus. Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a noted point, to which observations and calculations might be conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers (see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude) became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers. The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra to KarrhÆ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc. The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) “is celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on the opposite side.” The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May; the period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November (see Colonel Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September (Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a sort of mean height, when Cyrus passed. Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without difficulty in the month of May. It is in reference to this portion of the course of the Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35½° and 34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:— “The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art and durability are attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers, and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks, and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried various distances towards the interior, from two hundred to one thousand two hundred yards. “But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably, between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons.” The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xenophon; who mentions that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens, either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road along the Euphrates began then to acquire great importance as the means of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus Nikator and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia Minor—Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc. This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsakus. It can hardly be doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100, speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian’s invasion, however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, (Ammian. Marc. xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon’s Anabasis, there was nothing to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of Babylonia. Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the Euphrates, before reaching PylÆ, as being now in the same condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched through it,—“full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across these inhospitable regions; so that he can speak feelingly of the difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter.” (Travels in the Track, etc. p. 81.) Now it appears from Col. Chesney’s survey that this alteration in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit. He observes—(Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—“Three miles below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through a tract of country almost level.” Thereabouts it is that I am inclined to place PylÆ. Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit. Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still. Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as seventy geographical miles lower than Hit (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81); compare Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763. Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the despotism of Hippias (v. 78)—????? d? ?? ?a?? ?? ???? ???? pa?ta???, ? ?s?????? ?? ?st? ???a sp??da???? e? ?a? ????a??? t??a??e??e??? ??, ??da?? t?? sf?a? pe?????e??t?? ?sa? t? p????a ?e?????, ?pa??a????te? d? t???????, a??? p??t?? ??????t?. ????? ?? ta?ta, ?t? ?ate??e??? ?? ??e???a?e???, ?? desp?t? ???a??e???? ??e??e?????t?? d?, a?t?? ??ast?? ???t? p?????et? ?????es?a?. Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm. GrÆc. vol. iv. p. 268— ??e??e??? p?? ??? ded????ta?, ???? ??s?? d? d?????, ?a? ??? ?a? desp?t?. Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all. This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontes, who asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered the treason. Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of Orontes must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time. And the very trial of Orontes appears to have been conducted under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army. Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks to have got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in the three entire days of march. The fourth day they must have got over very little ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus was in momentary expectation of the King’s main army, and of a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the great delay necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than one hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench and the Euphrates. He can hardly have made more than five miles in this whole day’s march, getting at night so far as to encamp two or three miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon the distance marched over between PylÆ and the trench as about thirty-two miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the straight line and the full windings of the river. I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney’s map; so that the triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume, why the trench was cut, was, to defend that portion of the well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very considerable. Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and Assyria, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my next chapter, in reference to that Wall. The distance from PylÆ to the trench having before been stated at thirty-two miles, the whole distance from PylÆ to Kunaxa will be about fifty-four miles. Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah Castle (two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line, and seventy-seven miles, if following the line of the river. Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to PylÆ, and we shall then have between PylÆ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of forty-four miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from PylÆ to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from PylÆ to Kunaxa. ????? d?, ???? t??? ?????a? ?????ta? t? ?a?? a?t??? ?a? d?????ta?, ?d?e??? ?a? p??s?????e??? ?d? ?? as??e?? ?p? t?? ?f? a?t??, ??d? ?? ?????? d???e??, etc. The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of Cyrus. Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many points, partly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon. Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of Justin, v, 11. Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of the king’s army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the loss of Cyrus’s Asiatic army at three thousand men. But as the Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have overtaken the flying Persians. Compare the description of the fate of BerenikÊ of Chios, and MonimÊ of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18). Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper MÉrimÉe, in his life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of Transtamare. At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. MÉrimÉe, “Don PÈdre, qui, pendant le combat, s’Était jÉtÉ au plus fort de la mÊlÉe, s’acharna long temps À la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait galoper dans la plaine, montÉ sur un cheval noir, sa banniÈre armoriÉe de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frÈre partout oÙ l’on combattait encore, et criant, ÉchauffÉ par le carnage—‘OÙ est ce bÂtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?’” (Histoire de Don PÈdre, p. 504.) Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle, in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been partially aided by a bystander. This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is graphically described by M. MÉrimÉe (p. 564-566). Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter, (Erdkunde, part. x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219), understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from which I dissent. “When it was day, the army proceeded onward on their march, having the sun on their right hand,”—these words they understand as meaning that the army marched northward; whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched eastward. To have the sun on the right hand, does not so much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise instant when, the sun rises,—but to his diurnal path through the heavens, and to the general direction of the day’s march. This may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus, iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa, from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Gibraltar, by the Phoenicians under the order of Nekos. These Phoenicians said, “that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea) they had the sun on their right hand”—?? t?? ????? pe??p????te? t?? ?????? ?p? de???. Herodotus rejects this statement as incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar must, in his judgment, have the sun on the left hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See Vol. III. of this History, ch. xviii, p. 282. In addition to this reason, we may remark, that AriÆus and the Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates (the place where they had passed the last night but one before the battle of Kunaxa) and marching northward, could not expect to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so, if they marched eastward, towards the Tigris. Nor would they have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact have been something near to a return upon their own previous steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended Trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to the Euphrates. I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the march of the day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa, the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for defence across their line of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty feet broad close by the Euphrates; through which gut the whole army passed. Xenophon says, “This trench had been carried upwards across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed, the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four canals, one hundred feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the Euphrates, they are distant each from the other by one parasang, and there are bridges over them—?a?et?tat? d? ? t?f??? ??? d?? t?? ped??? ?p? d?de?a pa??sa??a?, ???? t?? ??d?a? te?????, ???a d? (the books print a full stop between te????? and ???a, which appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without interruption) e?s?? a? d?????e?, ?p? t?? ?????t?? p?ta?? ????sa?? e?s? d? t?tta?e?, t? ?? e???? p?e???a?a?, a?e?a? d? ?s?????, ?a? p???a p?e? ?? a?ta?? s?ta????? e?s?????s? d? e?? t?? ??f??t??, d?a?e?p??s? d? ???st? pa?as?????, ??f??a? d? ?pe?s??. The present tense—e?s?? a? d?????e?—seems to mark the local reference of ???a to the Wall of Media, and not to the actual march of the army. Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp. 79-87, etc.), Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider Xenophon to state that the Cyreian army on this day’s march (the day but one before the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They all, indeed, contest the accuracy of this latter statement; Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigris, in this part of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates; and that it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa. It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either the Wall of Media, or these four canals before the battle of Kunaxa, but who says (as KrÜger, De Authenti Anabaseos, p. 12, prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis, rightly explains him), that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near, the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until long after the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them towards the Tigris, two days’ march before they reached SittakÊ (Anab. ii, 4, 12). It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the direction of the Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see journal of the Geographical Society, vol. ix. pp. 447-473, with Captain Lynch’s map annexed) discovered a line of embankment which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3', and stretches towards the Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W. “It is a solitary straight single mound, twenty-five long paces thick, with a bastion on its western face at every fifty-five paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch, twenty-seven paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of the country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from thirty-five to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line as far as the eye can trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes in the same straight line to two mounds called Ramelah on the Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that it is, in places far inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a level with the desert.” (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446). Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now called Sidd Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall of Media reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best recent maps, especially that of Colonel Chesney; and accepted as such by recent inquirers. Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by Colonel Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted the views of Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall of Media, in the line here assigned to it, has no evidence to rest upon. Captain Jones, commander of the steamer at Bagdad, undertook, at the request of Colonel Rawlinson a minute examination of the locality, and ascertained that what had been laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds; no wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or eight miles from the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter torrents and drain off the rain water of the desert into a large reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive valley between the rivers. From this important communication it results, that there is as yet no evidence now remaining for determining what was the line or position of the Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be a datum positively established, serving as premises from whence to deduce other positions mentioned by Xenophon. As our knowledge now stands, there is not a single point mentioned by Xenophon in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except Babylon itself,—and PylÆ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot where Babylonia proper commences. The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very plain and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually saw it, passed through it, and correctly describes it in height as well as breadth. Its entire length he of course only gives from what he was told. His statement appears to me good evidence that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the Tigris to the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates, though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality and direction of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in the expedition of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on the left bank of the Euphrates, the ruins of a wall, “which in ancient times had stretched to a great distance for the defence of Assyria against foreign invasion.” It is fair to presume that this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta cannot be assigned. It is important, however, to remember,—what I have already stated in this note,—that Xenophon did not see, and did not cross either the Wall of Media, or the two canals here mentioned, until many days after the battle of Kunaxa. We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was intersected by canals, and that there was one canal greater than the rest and navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to the Tigris, in a direction to the south of east. This coincides pretty well with the direction assigned in Colonel Chesney’s map to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into which the four great canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris to the Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as it were a branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust itself, when the space between them was covered with a network of canals great and small, and when a vast quantity of the water of both was exhausted in fertilizing the earth, is difficult to say. The island wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near SittakÊ, before crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram formed by the Tigris, the Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel canals joining them. It might well be called a large island, containing many cities and villages, with a large population. Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators, identify this town of ?a??a? or KÆnÆ with the modern town Senn; which latter place Mannert (Geogr. der RÖm. v. p. 333) and Rennell (Illustrations p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser Zab instead of the Greater Zab. To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to ?a??a?, does not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is there much real similarity of name between the two; although our erroneous way of pronouncing the Latin name Caenae, creates a delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth shows that some modern writers have been misled in the same manner by identifying the modern town of Sert with Tigrano-certa. It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon’s work, that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he must have crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on the fact that though distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v, 52). Perhaps in drawing up his narrative after the expedition, Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as to fancy that two synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoranda, were only one. Ktesias (Persica, c. 60; compare Plutarch and Diodorus as referred to in the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon, which he probably derived from the story of Menon himself. Xenophon mentions the ignominious death of Menon, and he probably derived his information from Ktesias (see Anabasis, ii, 6, 29). The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death of Menon, in itself highly probable, renders all the different statements consistent and harmonious. AthenÆus (xi, p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed Menon to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by Tissaphernes. This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of his romance. Homer, Iliad, v, 9— ?? d? t?? ?? ???ess? ?????, ?f?e???, ????, ??e?? ?fa?st???, etc. Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping Agamemnon, at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad. The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the Iliad and Odyssey, wherein the like mental talk is put into language and expanded,—such as Iliad, xi, 403—and several other passages cited or referred to in Colonel Mure’s History of the Language and Literature of Greece, ch. xiv, vol. ii, p. 25 seq. A vision of light shining brightly out of a friendly house, counts for a favorable sign (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 587 C.). “Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utemini.” (Sallust, Bellum Catilinar. c. 20). This helps to explain the contempt and rigor with which Xenophon here treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under the actual circumstances, than for a man “to show his acuteness by summing up the perils around.” See the remarkable speech of Demosthenes at Pylos (Thucyd. iv, 10). ???? ??? d?d???a ? ?? ?pa? ???e? ????? ??? ?a? ?? ?f?????? ??te?e??, ?a? ??d?? d? ?a? ?e?s?? ?a?a?? ?a? e???a?? ???a??? ?a? pa??????? ???e??, ? ?spe? ?? ??t?f????, ?p??a??e?a t?? ???ade ?d??. Hippokrates (De AËre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the physical characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the ample, full-grown, rounded, voluptuous, but inactive forms of the first,—as contrasted with the more compact, muscular, and vigorous type of the second, trained for movement, action, and endurance. Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian preference for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired even in males an approach to the type of feminine beauty,—their eyes and tastes being under the influence only of aphrodisiac ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the constant training and naked exercises of the palÆstra, boys competing with boys and youths with youths, had their associations of the male beauty attracted towards active power and graceful motion. ?? ??? fa?e???, ?t? ?? ???sa? e???????? ?p????? t??? ?a????, ?p?? a?t??? ?? ?????st?? ?s?; ??s??t?? d?af??e?? ???t? p??? ?????? t? ????? s?ed?? ?a? p??te? ?? ??a???, d?? t? ???? t? ?f??d?s?a ????e??. ???e???? ???a???? e?d?? pe??t???as? t??? ???es??, ????? d? ??? ?p?sta?ta? ????? ?s?? d? ?a? ? t??f? a?t?a t??? ???sa??, t? ???? p????? t??fes?a? ?p? te ???a???? ?a? e??????? t?? p?es?t????? pa?da? d? et? pa?d??, ?a? e?????a et? e??a???? ? p??? s??e??a?, ?d? ?????s?a? ?? pa?a?st?a?? ?a? ???as????, etc. (Orat. xxi, p. 270). Compare Euripides, BacchÆ, 447 seq.; and the Epigram of Strato in the Anthologia, xxxiv, vol. ii, p. 367 Brunck. ?? ?? ?e (e?s?), ?e?te??p???? (description of the Athenians by the Corinthian speaker) ?a? ?p????sa? ??e?? ?a? ?p?te??sa? ???? ? ?? ???s??? ?e?? d? (LacedÆmonians), t? ?p?????t? te s??e?? ?a? ?p?????a? ?d??, ?a? ???? ??d? t??a??a?a ?????s?a?. ????? d?, ?? ??, ?a? pa?? d??a?? t???ta? ?a? pa?? ????? ???d??e?ta? ?a? ?p? t??? de????? e???p?de?? t? d? ??te???, t?? ted???e?? ??de? p???a?, t?? te ????? ?d? t??? ea???? p?ste?sa?, t?? te de???? ?d?p?te ??es?a? ?p?????ses?a?. ?a? ?? ?a? ?????? p??? ??? e???ta?, ?a? ?p?d??ta? p??? ??d??t?t???, etc. Again, in the oration of Perikles—?a? a?t?? ?t?? ?????e? ? ??????e?a ????? t? p???ata, ?? t??? ?????? t??? ?????? ???? ????e???, ???? ? p??d?da????a? ????? ????, p??te??? ? ?p? ? de? ???? ???e??. ??afe???t?? ?? d? ?a? t?de ???e?, ?ste t???? te ?? a?t?? ???sta ?a? pe?? ?? ?p??e???s?e? ???????es?a?? ? t??? ?????? ?a??a ?? ???s??, ????s?? d? ?????, f??e?. The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same language. It was the opinion of Sokrates—????? ?????? e??a? t??? t??? e?d?ta? t? d???ta, ?a? ????e?sa? d??a????? (Xenoph. Mem. i, 2, 52). A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii, Epitaph. s. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian democracy—authoritative law, with persuasive and instructive speech, as superseding mutual violence (???? and ?????, as the antithesis of ?a). Compare a similar sentiment in Isokrates (Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 53-56). This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon’s tone. In describing the duties of a Hipparch or commander of the cavalry, Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive speech, as a means of keeping up the active obedience of the soldiers—??? ?e ?? t? e?pe??e?? e??a? t??? ?????????, ??a ?? ?a? t? ???? d?d?s?e??, ?sa ??a?? ??? ?? t? pe??a??e??, etc. (Xen. Mag. Eq. i, 24). Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of Armenia and of the region east of the Tigris, observes truly that the Great Zab is the only point (east of the Tigris) which Xenophon assigns in such a manner as to be capable of distinct local identification. He also observes, here as elsewhere, that the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially delusive as a measure of distance (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 64). I incline to believe that there were six lochi upon each flank—that is, twelve lochi in all; though the words of Xenophon are not quite clear. The Thracian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack, that he and his troops kept their horses bridled all night (Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 21.) Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, etc., p. 481) states that the horses of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in Hindostan, are still kept tied and shackled at night, in the same way as Xenophon describes to have been practised by the Persians. ?a? ?? ?????e? ??ta??a ??epa?sa?t? ?se??? ?d??te? ped???? ?pe??e d? t?? ????? ? p?ta?? ?? ? ?pta st?d?a t?? ?a?d?????. ??te ?? ??? ????s??sa? ??a ?d???, ?a? t? ?p?t?de?a ????te? ?a? p???? t?? pa?e??????t?? p???? ????e???te?. ?pta ??? ???a?, ?saspe? ?p??e???sa? d?? t?? ?a?d?????, p?sa? a??e??? d?et??esa?, ?a? ?pa??? ?a?? ?sa ??d? t? s?pa?ta ?p? as????? ?a? ??ssaf??????. ?? ??? ?p???a????? t??t?? ?d??? ???????sa?. ... ??e?t? t? ?p?a, ?a? a?t?? p??t?? ?e???s?f??, stefa??s?e??? ?a? ?p?d??, ???a?e t? ?p?a, ?a? t??? ?????? p?s? pa????e??e. I apprehend that the words t?? st?fa??? are here to be understood after ?p?d??—not the words t? ?p?a, as KrÜger in his note seems to imagine. It is surely incredible, that in the actual situation of the Grecian army, the soldiers should be ordered first to disarm, and then to resume their arms. I conceive the matter thus:—First, the order is given, to ground arms; so that the shield is let down and drops upon the ground, sustained by the left hand of the soldier upon its upper rim; while the spear, also resting on the ground, is sustained by the shield and by the same left hand. The right hand of the soldier being thus free, he is ordered first to wreath himself (the costume usual in offering sacrifice)—next, to take off his wreath—lastly, to resume his arms. Probably the operations of wreathing and unwreathing, must here have been performed by the soldiers symbolically, or by gesture, raising the hand to the head, as if to crown it. For it seems impossible that they could have been provided generally with actual wreaths, on the banks of the KentritÊs, and just after their painful march through the Karduchian mountains. Cheirisophus himself, however, had doubtless a real wreath, which he put on and took off; so probably had the prophets and certain select officiating persons. The recent editors, Schneider and KrÜger, on the authority of various MSS., read here ?p??e???sa?—?p? t?? ??f??t?? p?ta??. The old reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson’s edition, pa?? t?? ??f??t?? p?ta??. This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too vague to admit of any certainty. See my Appendix annexed to this chapter. ???a d? t?? ??t??? t?? e?pe sfa???sas?a? t? ????? ?a? p?s? d? pe??fa??? ?d??e ???a? t? ?a?ep?? t?? p?e?at??. The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of Armenia are set forth in Diodorus, xiv, 28. This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to which the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies (see KrÜger’s note), illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No. 28, ed. Schneidewin, PoetÆ GrÆc. Minor). ?spe? a??? ??t?? ? T???? ???? ? F??? ????e, etc. The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and Phrygians, is not surprising. ?a? ??? a?s???? e??a?, ???? ?a??? ???pte??, etc. The reading ?a??? is preferred by Schneider to ??a??a???, which has been the vulgar reading, and is still retained by KrÜger. Both are sanctioned by authority of MSS., and either would be admissible; on the whole, I incline to side with Schneider. ???? ??t??, ?f? ? ?e???s?f??, ???? ??? t??? ????a???? ????? de????? e??a? ???pte?? t? d??s?a, ?a? ??a ??t?? de???? t?? ???d???? t? ???pt??t?, ?a? t??? ??at?st??? ??t?? ???sta, e?pe? ??? ?? ???t?st?? ???e?? ??????ta?? ?ste ??a ?a? s?? ?p?de????s?a? t?? pa?de?a?. A curious and interesting anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of Alexander, (c. 41) attests how much these HetÆrÆ accompanying the soldiers (women for the most part free), were esteemed in the Macedonian army, and by Alexander himself among the rest. A Macedonian of ÆgÆ named Eurylochus, had got himself improperly put on a list of veterans and invalids, who were on the point of being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition was detected, and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had practised it in order to be able to follow a free HetÆra named Telesippa, who was about to accompany the departing division. “I sympathize with your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander); let us see whether we cannot prevail upon Telesippa either by persuasion or by presents, since she is of free condition, to stay behind” (??? ??, ? ???????e, s??e???ta? ??e??? ??a d? ?p?? pe???e? ? ?????? ? d????? t?? ?e?es?ppa?, ?pe?d?pe? ?? ??e????a? ?st?). ??? ??? st?at??t?? ?? p?e?st?? ?sa? ?? sp??e? ??? ??pep?e???te? ?p? ta?t?? t?? ?s??f????, ???? t?? ????? ??et?? ??????te?, ?? ?? ?a? ??d?a? ????te?, ?? d? ?a? p??sa??????te? ???ata, ?a? t??t?? ?te??? ?p?ded?a??te? pat??a? ?a? ?t??a?, ?? d? ?a? t???a ?ata??p??te?, ?? ???ata a?t??? ?t?s?e??? ????te? p????, ??????te? ?a? t??? ?????? t??? pa?? ???? p???? ?a? ??a?? p??tte??. ?????t?? ??? ??te? ?p????? e?? t?? ????da s??es?a?. This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers is more authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegyr. s. 170). In another oration, composed about fifty years after the Cyreian expedition, Isokrates notices the large premiums which it had been formerly necessary to give to those who brought together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 seq.) ??? d? ??? p???a p??????? pa?ap????ta, etc. This is a forcible proof how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and region of Phasis, at the eastern extremity of the Euxine. But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (Asia Minor, vol. i, p. 281) and by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv, p. 250), that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon having marched with the army from the one place to the other in three days; or even in less than ten days, in the judgment of Mr. Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond (about long. 39° 20', as it stands in Kiepert’s map of Asia Minor,) near a river now called the Kerasoun Dere SÚ. Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the origin of its name. Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days’ march given by Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and KotyÔra, is more than consists with the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he supposes that the Greeks must have halted somewhere (Zug der Zehn Tausend. p. 115. 116). Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they ascribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of KotyÔra. Compare passages in his CyropÆdia, i, 6, 3; De Officio Magistr. Equit. ix, 9. “The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us wisdom to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary comforts of life; in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are enabled to inform ourselves by looking at the blaze of the fire, or by consulting prophets who understand the livers of sacrificial victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of self-conceit, will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume itself to be wiser, than the gods.” ? d? ?st? ?s?a, ??? saf?, ?????s??e? ??? p?? ??p??te?, ?a? ?at? sp??????? pt??a? ???te?? p??s?a????s?? ?????? t? ?p?. ??? ?? t??f?e?, ?e?? ?atas?e??? ??? ???t?? t??a?t??, ??s?? ??? ???e? t?de; ???? ? f????s?? t?? ?e?? e???? s???e?? ??te?? t? ?a???? d? ?? ?e???? ?e?t????? ?????e? e??a? da????? s?f?te??? (Supplices, 211). It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special revelations, through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of these Sokratic thinkers) an essential part of the divine government; indispensable to satisfy their ideas of the benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific prediction was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the phenomena of the future. I may here note that this Phasis in the Euxine means the town of that name, not the river. ?pe? d? ?s???et? ? ?e??f??, ?d??e? a?t? ?? t???sta s??a?a?e?? a?t?? ??????, ?a? ? ??sa? s???e???a? a?t??t???? ?a? ????e?e t?? ?????a s?????a? ??????. The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is incontestable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers from getting together, and exciting one another to action, without any formal summons. The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens (described in Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p. 133 of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, and the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians; when the invaders were at AcharnÆ, within sight of the walls of Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of the most violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution of going out. And what was much more remarkable—the people even in that state of excitement though all united within the walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would certainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular assembly. The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the extraordinary empire exercised by constitutional forms over the minds of the Athenian citizens. ?a?a?????t?? d? ?e??f??t??, ?a? t?? ??te?? s????e???t??, ?d??e ?a? ?a???a? t? st??te?a? ?a? ????et? ?a?a???? ?d??e d? ?a? t??? st?at????? d???? ?p?s?e?? t?? pa?e??????t?? ??????. In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter the eighth is made to begin at the second ?d??e, which seems to me not convenient for comprehending the full sense. I think that the second ?d??e, as well as the first, is connected with the words pa?a?????t?? ?e??f??t??, and ought to be included not only in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sentence, without an intervening full stop. ?ss?? ?t?, ?st?? d?pa? ??seta? ?f???pe????? ?????? d? ?? f?? t??? ??ee? ????? ??a???, ???? ????sa?t?? ?pe? e???a? e??a? ???st??. ? ??? ????, ?,tt? ???? ?p?de??a?; ??d? ??a p?? ?? ?? p??tess? ?????s? da???a f?ta ?e??s?a?. The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian; the robes sent were probably the produce of the looms of SinÔpÊ and KotyÔra; just as the Thracian princes used to receive fine woven and metallic fabrics from AbdÊra and the other Grecian colonies on their coast—?fa?t? ?a? ?e?a, ?a? ? ???? ?atas?e??, etc. (Thucyd. ii, 96). From the like industry probably proceeded the splendid “regia textilia” and abundance of gold and silver vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with Perseus the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv, 33-35). ??s? ?? ??? ?d? ????? a? ??????de? p??e??? t?? d? ????d?? ?a?eda?????? p??est??as??? ??a??? d? e?s? ?a? e?? ??ast?? ?a?eda?????? ?? ta?? p??es?? ?,t? ?????ta? d?ap??ttes?a?. ?? ??? ??t?? p??t?? ?? ??? ???a?t??? ?p???e?se?, ?pe?ta d? t??? ?????? ???sta?? pa?a??e?e? e?? t?? p??e?? ? d??es?a?, ?? ?p?st???ta? ?a?eda??????? ?a? ?????? ??ta?—?t? d? p??? ??a????? t?? ?a?a???? ??t?? ? ????? pe?? ??? ??e?—?a?ep?? ?sta? ?a? ??e?? ?a? ap?p?e??? ?a? ??? ?? t? ?? ?????s? ?a?eda?????? ?a? ?? t? ?a??tt? t?? ??? ??????. Compare vii, 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment of this promise. ?? t??t?? d? ? ??a?????, ?a??sa? ?e??f??ta, ?e?e?e? p?s? t???? ?a? ??a?? p?e?sa? ?p? t? st??te?a ?? t???sta, ?a? s????e?? te t? st??te?a ?a? s??a?????e?? t?? d?espa????? ?? ?? p?e?st??? d???ta?, ?a? pa?a?a???ta e?? t?? ???????? d?a???e?? e?? t?? ?s?a? ?t? t???sta? ?a? d?d?s?? a?t? t??a???t????, ?a? ?p?st???? ?a? ??d?a s?p?pe? ?e?e?s??ta t??? ?e???????? ?? t???sta ?e??f??ta p??p??a? t??? ?pp??? ?p? t? st??te?a. The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is marked by the strength of Xenophon’s language; extreme celerity is enjoined three several times. ?d? d? ??t?? p??? t? te??e?, ??a?????e? t?? t? ?e??f??t? ?t?, e? e?se?s?, s????f??seta?? ?a? ? a?t?? t? pe?seta?, ? ?a? Fa??a???, pa?ad???seta?. ? d?, ????sa? ta?ta, t??? ?? p??p?peta?, a?t?? d? e?pe?, ?t? ??sa? t? ?????t?.... ?? d? st?at???? ?a? ?? ???a??? ????te? pa?? t?? ???st?????, ?p???e???? ?t? ??? ?? ?p???a? sf?? ?e?e?e?, t?? de???? d? ??e??? ???a ?a? d??? ????? ?d??e? [e??a?] ? ?p?????. Compare vii, 3, 2. The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the person to whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to have been spoken. See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstl. AlterthÜmer der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De GrÆcorum Diebus Festis, p. 5 (Utrecht, 1849). ??ta??a t?? ?e?? ??? ?t??sat? ? ?e??f??? s???p?att?? ??? ?a? ?? ?????e? ?a? ?? ???a??? ?a? ?? ????? st?at???? ?a? ?? st?at??ta?, ?ste ??a??eta ?ae?? ?a? ?pp??? ?a? ?e??? ?a? ???a, ?ste ??a??? e??a? ?a? ????? ?d? e? p??e??. The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1, 11-28) about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in the Troad, seem also to indicate that he was serving there in person. Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as to the time of the banishment. ?d????? d? ? ?e??f?? ?p? ????a???, ?? ?p? as???a t?? ?e?s??, sf?s?? e????? ??ta, st?ate?a? etas??? ???? p??e??t?t? t?? d??? (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not until 396 or 395 B.C., that the Persian king began to manifest the least symptoms of good-will towards Athens; and not until the battle of Knidus (a little before the battle of KorÔneia in the same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous and effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of the king of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have taken place before 395 B.C., and is not likely to have taken place until after 394 B.C.; which is the intimation of Xenophon himself as above. Lastly, Diogenes LaËrtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to be the main truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed against Xenophon by the Athenians on the ground of his attachment to the LacedÆmonians—?p? ?a????s?. KrÜger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished because he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter enemy of Athens. It is true that Sokrates, when first consulted, was apprehensive beforehand that this might bring upon him the displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5). But it is to be remembered that at this time, the king of Persia was just as much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact had made war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king. Artaxerxes and Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of Athens, it was of little consequence to the Athenians whether Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. But when Artaxerxes, six years afterwards, became their friend, their feelings towards his enemies were altered. The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as asserting the main cause of Xenophon’s banishment, is in my judgment inaccurate. Xenophon was banished for Laconism, or attachment to Sparta against his country; the fact of his having served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes counted at best only as a secondary motive. The latter works of Xenophon (De Vectigalibus, De Officio Magistri Equitum, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been restored to citizenship, and had come again to take cognizance of politics at Athens. Schneider in his Epimetrum (ad calcem Anabaseos, p. 573), respecting the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against whom the oration of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon himself, the Cyreian commander and author. But this, I think, is chronologically all but impossible; for Deinarchus was not born till 361 B.C., and composed his first oration in 336 B.C. Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly mentioned several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which implies that the latter was a relative of the person against whom the oration was directed. I venture to set him down as grandson, on that evidence, combined with the identity of name and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be the son of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantineia in 362 B.C. Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration against Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and character of Xenophon the grandfather; see for analogy, the oration of Isokrates, de Bigis; among others. The last chapter of the CyropÆdia of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21-26) expresses strenuously the like conviction, of the military feebleness and disorganization of the Persian empire, not defensible without Grecian aid. ?ata???? d? t??? d???? ?a? t?? ???a? p???te?a?, ??a ?? ???st?? ???st? ?a?eda?????? ?at???pe, d??a d? ?????ta? ?? t?? ?p? a?t?? s???e???t????? ?at? p???? ?ta??e???. ?a? ta?ta p??tt?? ????? ?? te ta?? p??e?a?? ?a? ta?? s?????? ?e?e????a?? p??es?, pa??p?e? s???a??? t??p?? t??a ?atas?e?a??e??? ?a?t? t?? t?? ????d?? ??e???a?. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2-5; Diodor. xiii, 3, 10, 13. Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. ?a? t?? ?? ????? p??e?? ?a??? ?pas?? ?at???e t?? p???te?a? ?a? ?a??st? de?ada???a?? p????? ?? ?? ???st? sfatt?????, p????? d? fe????t??, etc. About the massacre at Thasus, see Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; PolyÆn. i, 45, 4. Compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19; and see Vol. VIII, Ch. lxv, p. 220 of this History. ... ?pe?sa? ??sa?d??? f??????? sf?s? ??p???a? ???e??, ??? d? t??? p??????? ??p?d?? p???s?e??? ?atast?sa??t? t?? p???te?a?, etc. He has been speaking, at some length, and in terms of energetic denunciation, against the enormities of the dekarchies. He concludes by saying—F???? d? ?a? st?se?? ?a? ???? s????se?? ?a? p???te??? eta????, ?t? d? pa?d?? ??e?? ?a? ???a???? a?s???a? ?a? ????t?? ??pa???, t?? ?? d??a?t? d?e?e??e??? p??? t?s??t?? e?pe?? ??? ?a?? ?p??t??, ?t? t? ?? ?f? ??? de??? ??d??? ?? t?? ??? ??f?sat? d????se, t?? d? sfa??? ?a? t?? ????a? t?? ?p? t??t?? ?e????a? ??de?? ?? ??sas?a? d??a?t?. See also, of the same author, Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 110; Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 119-124; Or. xii, (Panath.) s. 58, 60, 106. ... ??d? ??? f??e?? ???? (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19). t?? ?? ?a?????? ??e??pe??? p?s? ?e?ape??, ?? p??ta ?pa?????, ? p??tt??e?, etc. (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). The Thirty seem to have outdone Lysander himself. A young Athenian of rank, distinguished as a victor in the pankratium, Autolykus,—having been insulted by Kallibius, resented it, tripped him up, and threw him down. Lysander, on being appealed to, justified Autolykus, and censured Kallibius, telling him that he did not know how to govern freemen. The Thirty, however, afterwards put Autolykus to death, as a means of courting Kallibius (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). Pausanius mentions Eteonikus (not Kallibius) as the person who struck Autolykus; but he ascribes the same decision to Lysander (ix, 32, 3). After the recall of the regent Pausanias and of Dorkis from the Hellespont (in 477 B.C.), the LacedÆmonians refuse to send out any successor, f???e??? ? sf?s?? ?? ?????te? ?e????? ??????ta?, ?pe? ?a? ?? t? ?a?sa??? ??e?d??, etc. (i, 95.) Compare Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 220 F. To the like purpose the second speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta, c. 122-124—? ???ete ??t?da??ta?? te p??e?s?a? t????a?. ... ?a? t?? ????? ete??e?? t?? ??e??e??a?, etc. Read also the speech of the Theban orator, in reply to the PlatÆan, after the capture of the town by the LacedÆmonians (iii, 63). See also iii, 13, 14—the speech of the envoys from the revolted MitylÊnÊ, to the LacedÆmonians. The LacedÆmonian admiral Alkidas with his fleet, is announced as crossing over the Ægean to Ionia for the purpose of “liberating Greece;” accordingly, the Samian exiles remonstrate with him for killing his prisoners, as in contradiction with that object (iii, 32)—??e??? ?? ?a??? t?? ????da ??e??e???? a?t??, e? ??d?a? d??f?e??e?, etc. Now if any one will read attentively the so-called Fragmentum Spurium as it stands at the end of the collections above referred to, he will see (I think) that it belongs much more naturally to the historian than to the comic writer. It is a strictly historical statement, illustrated by a telling, though coarse, comparison. The Fragment is thus presented by Theodorus Metochita (Fragm. Theopomp. 344, ed. Didot). Te?p?p?? ? ?st?????? ?p?s??pt?? e?? t??? ?a?eda???????, e??a?e? a?t??? ta?? fa??a?? ?ap???s??, a? t??? ???????? ??????sa? t?? ????? ????? ?d?? te ?a? e????st?? s?f?st???? ?p? t? ???e? t?? ????????, e??ste??? fa???? t??a ?a? ??t??p?a? ?a? ?????? ?ata?????s? ?a? pa?????ta?? ?a? t??? ?a?eda??????? t????? ??e?e, t?? a?t?? ??e??a?? t??p??, ?? t? ?at? t?? ????a??? p????, t?? ????? ?d?st? p?at? t?? ?p? ????a??? ??e??e??a? ?a? p?????at? ?a? ?????at? t??? ?????a? de?e?sa?ta?, ?ste??? p????tata sf?s?? ????a? ?a? ??d?stata ???ata ??t?? ?p?d???? ?a? ???se?? p?a??t?? ???e????, p??? t?? ?atat??a?????ta? t?? p??e?? de?a???a?? ?a? ???sta?? a??t?t???, ?a? p?att??????, ? d?s?e??? e??a? sf?d?a ?a? ???p??st?? f??e??, ?a? ?p??t?????a?. Plutarch, ascribing the statement to the comic Theopompus, affirms him to be silly (????e ???e??) in saying that the LacedÆmonian empire began by being sweet and pleasant, and afterwards was corrupted and turned into bitterness and oppression; whereas the fact was, that it was bitterness and oppression from the very first. Now if we read the above citation from Theodorus, we shall see that Theopompus did not really put forth that assertion which Plutarch contradicts as silly and untrue. What Theopompus stated was, that the first LacedÆmonians, during the war against Athens, tempted the Greeks with a most delicious draught and programme and proclamation of freedom from the rule of Athens,—and that they afterwards poured in the most bitter and repulsive mixtures of hard oppression and tyranny, etc. The sweet draught is asserted to consist—not, as Plutarch supposes, in the first taste of the actual LacedÆmonian empire after the war, but—in the seductive promises of freedom held out by them to the allies during the war. Plutarch’s charge of ????e ???e?? has thus no foundation. I have written de?e?sa?ta? instead of de?e?s??ta? which stands in Didot’s Fragment, because it struck me that this correction was required to construe the passage. Lysander accompanied King Agesilaus (when the latter was going to his Asiatic command in 396 B.C.). His purpose was—?p?? t?? de?a???a? t?? ?atasta?e?sa? ?p? ??e???? ?? ta?? p??es??, ??pept????a? d? d?? t??? ?f?????, ?? t?? pat????? p???te?a? pa????e??a?, p???? ?atast?se?e et? ???s?????. It shows the careless construction of Xenophon’s Hellenica, or perhaps his reluctance to set forth the discreditable points of the LacedÆmonian rule, that this is the first mention which he makes (and that too, indirectly) of the dekarchies, nine years after they had been first set up by Lysander. ?te s??teta?a????? ?? ta?? p??es? t?? p???te???, ?a? ??te d????at?a? ?t? ??s??, ?spe? ?p? ????a???, ??te de?a???a?, ?spe? ?p? ??s??d???. But that some of these dekarchies still continued, we know from the subsequent passage. The Theban envoys say to the public assembly at Athens, respecting the Spartans:— ???? ?? ?a? ??? ??? ?p?st?sa? fa?e??? e?s?? ???pat???te?? ?p? te ??? t?? ???st?? t??a?????ta?, ?a? ?p? d??a ??d???, ??? ??sa?d??? ?at?st?se? ?? ???st? p??e?—where the decemvirs are noted as still subsisting, in 395 B.C. See also Xen. Agesilaus, i, 37. The facts, which Plutarch states respecting Lysander, cannot be reconciled with the chronology which he adopts. He represents the recall of Lysander at the instance of Pharnabazus, with all the facts which preceded it, as having occurred prior to the reconstitution of the Athenian democracy, which event we know to have taken place in the summer of 403 B.C. Lysander captured Samos in the latter half of 404 B.C., after the surrender of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in triumph, in the autumn of 404 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9). He was at home, or serving in Attica, in the beginning of 403 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30). Now when Lysander came home at the end of 404 B.C., it was his triumphant return; it was not a recall provoked by complaints of Pharnabazus. Yet there can have been no other return before the restoration of the democracy at Athens. The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of this command, but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems to me necessary, in order to make room for the facts stated respecting Lysander as well as about the dekarchies, that we should suppose him to have been again sent out (after his quarrel with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 B.C., to command in Asia. This is nowhere positively stated, but I find nothing to contradict it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated about Lysander. It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology as to the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He places it in 401 B.C. (Diod. xiv, 33), two years later than its real date, which is 403 B.C.; thus lengthening by two years the interval between the surrender of Athens and the reËstablishment of the democracy. Plutarch also seems to have conceived that interval as much longer than it really was. For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the Grecian despot lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon called Hieron (i, 12; ii, 8-10; vii, 10). He particularly dwells upon the multitude of family crimes which stained the houses of the Grecian despots; murders by fathers, sons, brothers, wives, etc. (iii, 8). The reader will remark here how Xenophon shapes the narrative in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice,—either for action or for inaction. I have already noticed (in my preceding chapters) how often he does this in the Anabasis. Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in Thucydides. Two points are remarkable here. 1. The manner in which Mania, the administratrix of a large district, with a prodigious treasure and a large army in pay, is treated as belonging to Pharnabazus—as the servant or slave of Pharnabazus. 2. The distinction here taken between public property and private property, in reference to the laws of war and the rights of the conqueror. Derkyllidas lays claim to that which had belonged to Mania (or to Pharnabazus); but not to that which had belonged to Meidias. According to the modern rules of international law, this distinction is one allowed and respected, everywhere except at sea. But in the ancient world, it by no means stood out so clearly or prominently; and the observance of it here deserves notice. Thus finishes the interesting narrative about Mania, Meidias, and Derkyllidas. The abundance of detail, and the dramatic manner, in which Xenophon has worked it out, impress me with a belief that he was actually present at the scene. The word ?p?te????e?? is capital and significant, in Grecian warfare. Morus supposes (I think, with much probability) that ? t?? ???e??? p??est???? here means Xenophon himself. He could not with propriety advert to the fact that he himself had not been with the army during the year of Thimbron. It was at Lampsakus that this interview and conversation between Derkyllidas and the commissioners took place. The commissioners were to be sent from Lampsakus to Ephesus through the Grecian cities. The expression ?? e????? e?da??????? d?a???sa? has reference to the foreign relations of the cities, and to their exemption from annoyance by Persian arms,—without implying any internal freedom or good condition. There were LacedÆmonian harmosts in most of them, and dekarchies half broken up or modified in many; see the subsequent passages (iii, 2, 20; iii, 4, 7; iv, 8, 1) In the Anabasis (ii, 3, 3) Xenophon mentions the like care on the part of Klearchus, to have the best armed and most imposing soldiers around him, when he went to his interview with Tissaphernes. Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportunity, to pay an indirect compliment to the Cyreian army. ???t?? d? ?ste???, ?a? ???d?? pef???t?? ??sa? t? ??? ?at? a?te?a? t???, ??????? ?? ??e??? ? p??se??es?a? ????? p?????, ?????te?, ?? ?a? t? ???a??? e?? ??t? ?????, ? ???st?????es?a? t??? ?????a? ?f? ??????? p????? ?ste ???t?? ?p???e?. This canon seems not unnatural, for one of the greatest Pan-hellenic temples and establishments. Yet it was not constantly observed at Olympia (compare another example—Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2); nor yet at Delphi, which was not less Pan-hellenic than Olympia (see Thucyd. i, 118). We are therefore led to imagine that it was a canon which the Eleians invoked only when they were prompted by some special sentiment or aversion. Diodorus introduces in these transactions King Pausanias, not King Agis, as the acting person. Pausanias states (iii, 8, 2) that the Eleians, in returning a negative answer to the requisition of Sparta, added that they would enfranchise their Perioeki, when they saw Sparta enfranchise her own. This answer appears to me highly improbable, under the existing circumstances of Sparta and her relations to the other Grecian states. Allusion to the relations between Sparta and her Perioeki was a novelty, even in 371 B.C., at the congress which preceded the battle of Leuktra. The words of Xenophon are not very clear—?????e??? d? ?? pe?? ?e??a? t?? ?e??e??? ed??? ?p?et??sas?a? t? pa?? t?? pat??? ???????? (t?? p????) d?? a?t?? p??s????sa? ?a?eda???????, ??pes??te? ?? ????a? ??f? ????te? sfa??? p????s?, ?a? ?????? t? t??a? ?te????s?, ?a? ????? t??a T?as?da?? ?p??te??a?te?, t? t?? d??? p??st?t?, ???t? T?as?da??? ?pe?t????a?.... ? d? T?as?da??? ?t? ?a?e?d?? ?t???a?e?, ??pe? ?e??s??. Both the words and the narrative are here very obscure. It seems as if a sentence had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the mention of the drunken state of ThrasydÆus, without having before been told of any circumstance either leading to or implying this condition. This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different years; it began in the first, occupied the whole of the second, and was finished in the third. Which years these three were (out of the seven which separate B.C. 403-396), critics have not been unanimous. Following the chronology of Diodorus, who places the beginning of the war in 402 B.C., I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in 401 B.C. (Fasti Hellen. ad ann.), and from Sievers (Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 382), who places it in 398 B.C. According to Mr. Clinton’s view, the principal year of the war would have been 400 B.C., the year of the Olympic festival. But surely, had such been the fact, the coincidence of war in the country with the Olympic festival, must have raised so many complications, and acted so powerfully on the sentiments of all parties, as to be specifically mentioned. In my judgment, the war was brought to a close in the early part of 400 B.C., before the time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were anxious, on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the festival did arrive. Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date assigned by Diodorus to the Eleian war, squares both with the date which Diodorus gives for the death of Agis, and with that which Plutarch states about the duration of the reign of Agesilaus,—better than the chronology which he himself (Sievers) prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, Hell. iii, 2, 21. ???t?? d? p?att????? ?? t? ?s?? ?p? ?e??????da, ?a?eda?????? ?at? t?? a?t?? ?????? p??a? ??????e??? t??? ??e????, etc. This passage is certainly of some weight; yet I think in the present case it is not to be pressed with rigid accuracy as to date. The whole third Book down to these very words, has been occupied entirely with the course of Asiatic affairs. Not a single proceeding of the LacedÆmonians in Peloponnesus, since the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command of Derkyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic exploits, and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it comprehended the whole. Sievers moreover compresses the whole Eleian war into one year and a fraction; an interval, shorter, I think, than that which is implied in the statements of Xenophon. Both Ephorus and Theopompus recounted the opposition to the introduction of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the name of one of the ephors as taking the lead in it. There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too among high-minded and intelligent men, which regarded gold and silver as a cause of mischief and corruption, and of which the stanza of Horace (Od. iii, 3) is an echo:— Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm Cum terra celat, spernere fortior Quam cogere humanos in usus, Omne sacrum rapiente dextrÂ. ?p????e d? t?????t??? t? ?????t? t?? s?f????t??? t?? ?? ??? p???? pep????e? ????at??, t??? d? ?d??ta? f???????t???. Contrast what Plato says in his dialogue of Alkibiades, i, c. 39, p. 122 E. about the great quantity of gold and silver then at Sparta. The dialogue must bear date at some period between 400-371 B.C. ??da ??? p??te??? ?? ?a?eda??????? a?????????, ????? t? ?t??a ????ta? ???????? s??e??a? ?????, ? ??????ta? ?? ta?? p??es? ?a? ???a?e??????? d?af?e??es?a?. ?a? p??s?e? ?? ??da a?t??? f????????, ???s??? ????ta? fa??es?a?? ??? d? ?st?? ??? ?a? ?a???p???????? ?p? t? ?e?t?s?a?. ?p?staa? d? ?a? p??s?e? t??t?? ??e?a ?e???as?a? ???????a?, ?a? ?p?d?e?? ??? ????, ?p?? ? ??d??????a? ?? p???ta? ?p? t?? ????? ?p?p?a??t?? ??? d? ?p?staa? t??? d?????ta? p??t??? e??a? ?sp??da??ta? ?? ?dep?te pa???ta? ??????te? ?p? ?????. ?a? ?? ??, ?te ?pee????t?, ?p?? ????? e?e? ??e?s?a?? ??? d? p??? ????? p?a?ate???ta?, ?p?? ?????s??, ? ?p?? ????? t??t?? ?s??ta?. ????a???? ?? ?????e? p??te??? ?? ???te? e?? ?a?eda???a ?d???t? a?t??, ??e?s?a? ?p? t??? d?????ta? ?d??e??? ??? d? p????? pa?a?a???s?? ???????? ?p? t? d?a????e?? ???a? p???? a?t???. ??d?? ??t?? de? ?a???e?? t??t?? t?? ?p?????? a?t??? ?????????, ?pe?d? fa?e??? e?s?? ??te t? ?e? pe???e??? ??te t??? ????????? ?????. The expression, “taking measures to hinder the LacedÆmonians from again exercising empire,”—marks this treatise as probably composed some time between their naval defeat at Knidus, and their land-defeat at Leuktra. The former put an end to their maritime empire,—the latter excluded them from all possibility of recovering it; but during the interval between the two, such recovery was by no means impossible. This reflection,—which Aristotle intimates that he has borrowed from some one else, though without saying from whom,—must in all probability have been founded upon the case of Lysander; for never after Lysander, was there any LacedÆmonian admiral enjoying a power which could by possibility be termed exorbitant or dangerous. We know that during the later years of the Peloponnesian war, much censure was cast upon the LacedÆmonian practice of annually changing the admiral (Xen. Hellen. i, 6, 4). The LacedÆmonians seem to have been impressed with these criticisms, for in the year 395 B.C. (the year before the battle of Knidus) they conferred upon King Agesilaus, who was then commanding the land army in Asia Minor, the command of the fleet also—in order to secure unity of operations. This had never been done before (Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28). The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for himself a way to the throne, appears to rest on very sufficient testimony,—that of Ephorus; to whom perhaps the words fas? t??e? in Aristotle may allude, where he mentions this conspiracy as having been narrated (Polit. v, 1, 5). But Plutarch, as well as K. O. MÜller (Hist. of Dorians, iv, 9, 5) and others, erroneously represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to after Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia; which is certainly impossible, since Lysander accompanied Agesilaus out, in the spring of 396 B.C.—did not return to Greece until the spring of 395 B.C.—and was then employed, with an interval not greater than four or five months, on that expedition against Boeotia wherein he was slain. The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have taken place prior to the death of Agis,—at some time between 403 B.C. and 399 B.C. The humiliation which he received in 396 B.C. from Agesilaus might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind the renewal of his former plans; but he can have had no time to do anything towards them. Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2) alludes to the humiliation of Lysander by the kings as an example of incidents tending to raise disturbance in an aristocratical government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 B.C.—which proceeding is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to their jealousy of Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21)—not to the treatment of Lysander by Agesilaus in 396 B.C. The mission of Lysander to the despot Dionysius at Syracuse (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2) must also have taken place prior to the death of Agis in 399 B.C.; whether before or after the failure of the stratagem at Delphi, is uncertain; perhaps after it. It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman, and that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on that especial ground, for marrying her. Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine displeasure, and therefore a disqualification from the throne, as in the case of Battus of KyrÊnÊ above noticed. But the words ???? as??e?a were general enough to cover both the cases,—superinduced as well as congenital lameness. It is upon this that Lysander founds his inference—that the god did not mean to allude to bodily lameness at all. ?d? ????, ? pa?de?, p??s???e? ?fa? ???p?? t? ?e?p??p?? ??? ??? pa?a?f?t?? p?????a?, ? t? ??a?e?, etc. This is a splendid chorus of the TrachiniÆ of Sophokles (822) proclaiming their sentiments on the awful death of HÊraklÊs, in the tunic of Nessus, which has just been announced as about to happen. See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. AthenÆum, xiii, p. 609. The meaning of the term ?? ????? fluctuates in Xenophon; it sometimes, as here, is used to signify the privileged Peers—again De Repub. Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14. Sometimes again it is used agreeably to the Lykurgean theory; whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged his duty in the public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7). There was a variance between the theory and the practice. The expression is Homeric—??? e?????? ???a??, etc. (Iliad. iv, 35). The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain the full expression of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis wishes, “that he may one day come to drink the blood of those who had ill-used him” (v. 349 Gaisf.). The persons called Hippeis at Sparta, were not mounted; they were a select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either on home police or on foreign service. See Herodot. viii, 124; Strabo, x, p. 481; K. O. MÜller, History of the Dorians, B. iii, ch. 12, s. 5, 6. ?e???? d? ?? s???a??te? a?t?? ?? ?at??e??, t??? d? ???e?d?ta? p???e??? a?t?? ????a?te? ?p?p?pe?? t?? ta??st?? t??? ?f?????. ??t? d? e???? ?? ?f???? p??? t? p???a, ?ste ?a? ???? ?pp??? ?pe?a? t??? ?p? ???????. ?pe? d? e??????? t?? ??d??? ??e? ?ppe??, f???? t? ???ata ?? ????d?? ?p???a?e, pa?a???a t?? te ??t?? ??s?e??? ?a? t??? ?p??a????t?t??? ???e??a???. ?? d? ?????? ? ????d??, ?a? ?????et?, ?a? ?????e? p??ta, ?a? t??? ???e?d?ta? ??e?e, t???? a?t?? ????t?, t? ?a? ????e??? ta?ta p??tt??; PolyÆnus (ii, 14, 1) in his account of this transaction, expressly mentions that the Hippeis or guards who accompanied Kinadon, put him to the torture (st?e??sa?te?) when they seized him, in order to extort the names of his accomplices. Even without express testimony, we might pretty confidently have assumed this. From a man of spirit like Kinadon, they were not likely to obtain such betrayal without torture. I had affirmed that in the description of this transaction given by Xenophon, it did not appear whether Kinadon was able to write or not. My assertion was controverted by Colonel Mure (in his Reply to my Appendix), who cited the words f???? t? ???ata ?? ????d?? ?p???a?e, as containing an affirmation from Xenophon that Kinadon could write. In my judgment, these words, taken in conjunction with what precedes, and with the probabilities of the fact described, do not contain such an affirmation. The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after having heard from Kinadon who his accomplices were, to write the names down and send them to the ephors. It is to be presumed that they executed these instructions as given; the more so, as what they were commanded to do, was at once the safest and the most natural proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished for personal stature and courage (t? e?d?? ?a? t?? ????? e???st??, iii, 3, 5) so that those who seized him would find it an indispensable precaution to pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could write,—yet, if he were to write, he must have his right arm free. And why should the guards take this risk, when all which the ephors required was, that Kinadon should pronounce the names, to be written down by others? With a man of the qualities of Kinadon, it probably required the most intense pressure to force him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth; it would probably be more difficult still, to force him to betray them by the more deliberate act of writing. I conceive that ??e? ?ppe??, f???? t? ???ata ?? ? ????d?? ?p???a?e is to be construed with reference to the preceding sentence, and announces the carrying into effect of the instructions then reported as given by the ephors. “A guard came, bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had given in.” It is not necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down these names with his own hand. In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis), Pythonikus gives information of a mock celebration of the mysteries, committed by Alkibiades and others; citing as his witness the slave Andromachus; who is accordingly produced, and states to the assembly viv voce what he had seen and who were the persons present—???t?? ?? ??t?? (Andromachus) ta?ta e???se, ?a? ?p???a?e t??t??? (s. 13). It is not here meant to affirm that the slave Andromachus wrote down the names of these persons, which he had the moment before publicly announced to the assembly. It is by the words ?p???a?e t??t??? that the orator describes the public oral announcement made by Andromachus, which was formally taken note of by a secretary, and which led to legal consequences against the persons whose names were given in. So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makast. p. 1068), ?p???af?t? d? t?? ? p?????ta ta?ta ? ????e??? p??? t?? ?????ta; and in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. ? ?? t?? ???? t? ?d??t? t? ?p????fa?t? ????eta?, t? p??e? ?f???: compare also Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 53; it is not meant to affirm that ? ?p????f?? was required to perform his process in writing, or was necessarily able to write. A citizen who could not write might do this, as well as one who could. He informed against a certain person as delinquent; he informed of certain articles of property, as belonging to the estate of one whose property had been confiscated to the city. The information, as well as the name of the informer, was taken down by the official person,—whether the informer could himself write or not. It appears to me that Kinadon, having been interrogated, told to the guards who first seized him, the names of his accomplices,—just as he told these names afterwards to the ephors (?a? t??? ???e?d?ta? ??e?e); and this, whether he was, or was not, able to write; a point, which the passage of Xenophon noway determines. We cannot make out these circumstances with any distinctness; but the general fact is plainly testified, and is besides very probable. Another Grecian surgeon (besides Ktesias) is mentioned as concerned,—Polykritus of MendÊ; and a Kretan dancer named Zeno,—both established at the Persian court. There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which is so much to be regretted as this; relating transactions, in which he was himself concerned, and seemingly giving original letters. Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. ?p????? ?a? ??p???? ?ata??se?? t?? ?p? t?? ????da st?ate?sasa? p??te??? ?????, etc. The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage. The former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when Agesilaus first arrived. It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special Panegyric called Agesilaus, not a word is said about this highly characteristic proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander at Ephesus; nor indeed is the name of Lysander once mentioned. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9. These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in the early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus. So the word ??st??, used in reference to the fleet, means the commander of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 30). Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for exportation,—p??e?s? t? t???a ?p? ??a???? (Herod. v, 6): compare Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. viii, 7-12, p. 346; and Ch. xvi, Vol. III, p. 216 of this History. Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the “MitylenÆus mango” in Martial,—“Sed MitylenÆi roseus mangonis ephebus” Martial, vii, 79)—as having conducted on a large scale the trade of purchasing boys, looking out for such as were handsome, to supply the great demand in the East for eunuchs, who were supposed to make better and more attached servants. Herodot. viii, 105. ???? ??? ?t?sa?t? (Panionius) pa?da? e?de?? ?pa?????, ??t???? ??????? ?p??ee ?? S??d?? te ?a? ?fes?? ????t?? e?????? pa?? ??? t??s? a?????s? t???te??? e?s? ?? e???????, p?st??? e??e?a t?? p?s??, t?? ????????. Boys were necessary, as the operation was performed in childhood or youth,—pa?de? ??t??a? (Herodot. vi, 6-32: compare iii, 48). The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary tribute, had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred pa?da? ??t??a? (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the preference of the Persians both for the persons and the services of e???????, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270; Xenoph. CyropÆd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus (Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed that the Persians had derived both the persons so employed, and the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians. When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the Kalmucks, little children of two or three vears of age, were often tendered to him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway’s Travels, ch. xvi, pp. 65, 66). Xen. Agesil. i, 28—where he has it—p???a? d? ?a? ?p?????, d?? t? ?e? ?p? ????t?? e??a? (PolyÆnus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9). Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the part of Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in Sicily:—“Gelo Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus Poenos suscepto, cum multos cepisset, infirmissimum quemque prÆcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi erant, nudatum in conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contemnendos.” Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his description is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon, which is better authority. Among other points of difference, Diodorus affirms that the Persians had fifty thousand infantry; and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number of Persian infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got together since the times of Darius and Xerxes Whereas, Xenophon expressly states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and took no part in the battle. Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2. It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships coming from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont. Dionysodor p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182). Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part of the Syracusan assembly, towards the Sikel prince Duketius (Diodor. xi, 92). The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a curious and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation with Otys took place in the presence of the thirty Spartan counsellors, and probably in the presence of Xenophon himself. The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabazus or Megabates, is marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28)—but is more strongly brought out in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before) along the southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince named Korylas is mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8). Whether there was more than one Paphlagonian prince—or whether Otys was successor of Korylas—we cannot tell. Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night, the scene which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between Agesilaus and Megabazus cannot have occurred on the departure of the latter, but must belong to some other occasion; as, indeed, it seems to be represented by Xenophon (Agesil. v, 4). Compare about f???t??a, Herodot. iii, 53. Probably Dennis, the son of PyrilampÊs, an eminent citizen and trierarch of Athens, must have been one of the companions of Konon in this mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias as having received from the Great King a present of a golden drinking-bowl or f????; and I do not know on what other occasion he can have received it, except in this embassy (Lysias, Or. xix, De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27). Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix, (Euagor.) s. 77) speaks loosely as to the duration of time that the Persian fleet remained blocked up by the LacedÆmonians before Konon obtained his final and vigorous orders from Artaxerxes, unless we are to understand his three years as referring to the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phoenicia, brought to Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them; and even then the statement that the Persian fleet remained p????????e??? for all this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for exaggeration, however, Isokrates coincides generally with the authorities above noticed. It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this time permission to quit the court of Persia and come back to Greece. Perhaps he may have been induced (like DemokÊdes of Kroton, one hundred and twenty years before) to promote the views of Konon in order to get for himself this permission. In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63) mention is made of some LacedÆmonian envoys who were now going up to the Persian court, and were watched or detained on the way. This mission can hardly have taken place before the battle of Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the full tide of success, and contemplating the largest plans of aggression against Persia. It must have taken place, I presume, after the battle. It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word Chersonesus here (and in xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace commonly known by that name, forming the European side of the Hellespont,—but the peninsula on which Knidus is situated. Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but only on a certain condition, in case he should find that such condition could be realized; that is, if by giving it he could procure from various leading Greeks sufficient assurances and guarantees that they would raise war against Sparta. As this was a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is ordered to try to give the money for this purpose. Though the construction of pe???s?a? couples it with d?d??a?, the sense of the word more properly belongs to ????se??—which designates the purpose to be accomplished. Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received part of the money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c. 15). Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the presents of Timokrates. The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show that the Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but eager in regard to will, to go to war with the Thebans; while the latter were not at all ready to go to war with Sparta. They had not a single ally; for their application to Athens, in itself doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared war against them. The description here given by Xenophon himself,—of the past dealing and established sentiment between Sparta and Thebes,—refutes his allegation, that it was the bribes brought by Timokrates to the leading Thebans which first blew up the hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that Sparta did not need any circuitous manoeuvres of the Thebans, to furnish her with a pretext for going to war. The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute the assertion of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of Timokrates. ???? d? ?t? ????? ?????e?, ?s?? t?? ?? ?ste? ????es?e, p?????? ?p? t??? ?a?eda??????? ???a?. ??e???? ???, ?atast?sa?te? ??? ?? ????a???a? ?a? ?? ????a? t? d??, ?f???e??? p???? d???e?, ?? ??? s?a???, pa??d?sa? ??? t? p???e?? ?ste t? ?? ?p? ??e????? e??a?, ?p????ate, ? d? d??? ??t?s? ??? ?s?se. Pausanias (iii, 9, 6) says that the Athenians sent envoys to the Spartans to entreat them not to act aggressively against Thebes, but to submit their complaint to equitable adjustment. This seems to me improbable. Diodorus (xiv, 81) briefly states the general fact in conformity with Xenophon. The two last differ in various matters from Xenophon, whose account, however, though brief, seems to me to deserve the preference. But the matter of fact, on which this justification rests, is contradicted by Xenophon, who says that the Athenians had actually joined the Thebans, and were in the same ranks—?????te? ??pa?et??a?t? (Hellen. iii, 5, 22). It is difficult to make out anything from the two allusions in Plato, except that Ismenias was a wealthy and powerful man (Plato, Menon, p. 90 B; Republ. i. p. 336 A.). In the passage,—?a? ?? ?te??? ??t?? ?????te? ?atest?at?pede?sa?t?, ?p??s?e? p???s?e??? t?? ?a??d?a?,—I apprehend that ?pe????te? (which is sanctioned by four MSS., and preferred by Leunclavius) is the proper reading, in place of ?????te?. For it seems certain that the march of the confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops sought shelter within the town, and the LacedÆmonian pursuers were so close upon them, that the Corinthians within were afraid to keep open the gates. Hence we must reject the statement of Diodorus,—that the battle was fought on the banks of the river Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous. There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description which Xenophon gives of the LacedÆmonian march. His words run—?? t??t? ?? ?a?eda??????, ?a? d? ?e?e?ta? pa?e???f?te? ?a? ?a?t???a?, ???esa? t?? ?f?a???. These last three words are not satisfactorily explained. Weiske and Schneider construe t?? ?f?a??? (very justly) as indicating the region lying immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of Corinth and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would not be correct to say, that “the LacedÆmonians had gone out by the bimarine way.” On the contrary, the truth is, that “they had gone out into the bimarine road or region,—which meaning however would require a preposition—???esa? e?? t?? ?f?a???. Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ?????a?) renders t?? ?f?a???—viam ad mare—which seems an extraordinary sense of the word, unless instances were produced to support it; and even if instances were produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon should be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos. Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or district called t?? ?p?e???a? (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But it is certain from the map, that when the confederates were at Nemea, and the LacedÆmonians at Sikyon,—the former must have been exactly placed so as to intercept the junction of the contingents from Epidaurus, Troezen, and HermionÊ, with the LacedÆmonian army. To secure this junction, the LacedÆmonians were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region which lies near KleÔnÆ and Nemea, and to march in a line pointing from Sikyon down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached the other side of these mountains near the sea, they would be in communication with Epidaurus and the other towns of the Argolic peninsula. The line of march which the LacedÆmonians would naturally take from Sparta to Sikyon and LechÆum, by Tegea, Mantineia, Orchomenus, etc., is described two years afterwards in the case of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19). So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by the Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more,—the Thebans made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his own account, that no mischievous consequences turned upon this greater depth. The allusion to this incident in Demosthenes (adv. Leptinem, c. 13, p. 472) is interesting, though indistinct. Plato in his panegyrical discourse (Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245 E.) ascribes the defeat and loss of the Athenians to “bad ground”—???sa???? d?s?????. The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. vii, 5) that near ten thousand men were slain on the side of the confederates, is a manifest exaggeration; if indeed the reading be correct. ? ?? ??? ???s??a?? p???e??? ta?ta, t? ?? p??t?? ?a?ep?? ?fe?e?? ?pe? ??t?? ??e?????, ?t? t?? st?ate?at?? t? p?e?st?? e?? a?t?, ???? ??a??? ?? ????????? ?d??? et??e??, e? d? t? ?a?ep?? ???e?, ??? ??????? e??a? ??????e?? a?t???, etc. These indirect intimations of the real temper even of the philo-Spartan allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming from Xenophon, as they contradict all his partialities, and are dropped here almost reluctantly, from the necessity of justifying the conduct of Agesilaus in publishing a false proclamation to his army. ?????s?a? d? ?a? t?? ????? ?a? ??? ????et? ??a ??? ???? t?? ?? ?f? ???. ?a? s?a???te? t?? ?sp?da? ??????t?, ?????t?, ?p??te????, ?p????s???. ?a? ??a??? ?? ??de?a pa???, ?? ?? ??d? s???? f??? d? t?? ?? t??a?t?, ??a? ???? te ?a? ??? pa??s???t? ??. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 18. Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as ad. Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21—condemns the expression t?? p??e??? as spurious and unintelligible. But in my judgment, these words hear a plain and appropriate meaning, which I have endeavored to give in the text. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. Compare also the speech of Derkyllidas to the Abydenes (Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4)—?s? d? ????? a? ???a? p??e?? ??? t? t??? ?pest??f?sa? ???, t?s??t? ??t?? ? ?et??a p?st?t?? e???? fa?e?? ??, etc. Cornelius Nepos (Conon, c. 4) mentions fifty talents as a sum received by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by him to this public work. This is not improbable; but the total sum contributed by the satrap towards the fortifications must, probably, have been much greater. They place the battle fought by Praxitas within the Long Walls of Corinth in 393 B.C., and the destruction of the LacedÆmonian mora or division by Iphikrates (the monthly date of which is marked by its having immediately succeeded the Isthmian games), in 392 B.C. I place the former event in 392 B.C.; the latter in 390 B.C., immediately after the Isthmian games of 390 B.C. If we study the narrative of Xenophon, we shall find, that after describing (iv, 3) the battle of KorÔneia (August 394 B.C.) with its immediate consequences, and the return of Agesilaus home,—he goes on in the next chapter to narrate the land-war about or near Corinth, which he carries down without interruption (through Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 B.C. But in Chapter 8 of Book iv, he leaves the land-war, and takes up the naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug. 394 B.C.). He recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the Ægean with a powerful fleet in the spring of 393 B.C., and how after various proceedings, they brought the fleet to the Saronic Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where they must have arrived at or near midsummer 393 B.C. Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of Pharnabazus with the fleet, recounted in the eighth chapter, come, in point of date, before the seditious movements and the coup d’État at Corinth, which are recounted in the fourth chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in midsummer 393 B.C., the narrative of Xenophon (iv, 8, 8-10) leads us to believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously, and without discontent: the money and encouragement which Pharnabazus gave them was calculated to strengthen such ardor. It was by aid of this money that the Corinthians fitted out their fleet under Agathinus, and acquired for a time the maritime command of the Gulf. The discontents against the war (recounted in chap. 4 seq.) could not have commenced until a considerable time after the departure of Pharnabazus. They arose out of causes which only took effect after a long continuance,—the hardships of the land-war, the losses of property and slaves, the jealousy towards Attica and Boeotia as being undisturbed, etc. The LacedÆmonian and Peloponnesian aggressive force at Sikyon cannot possibly have been established before the autumn of 394 B.C., and was most probably placed there early in the spring of 393 B.C. Its effects were brought about, not by one great blow, but by repetition of ravages and destructive annoyance; and all the effects which it produced previous to midsummer 393 B.C. would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts, and the encouragement of Pharnabazus with his powerful fleet. Moreover, after his departure, too, the Corinthians were at first successful at sea, and acquired the command of the Gulf, which, however, they did not retain for more than a year, if so much. Hence, it is not likely that any strong discontent against the war began before the early part of 392 B.C. Considering all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to believe that the coup d’État and massacre at Corinth took place (not in 393 B.C., as Mr. Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but) in 392 B.C.; and the battle within the Long Walls rather later in the same year. Next, the opinion of the same two authors, as well as of Dodwell,—that the destruction of the LacedÆmonian mora by Iphicrates took place in the spring of 392 B.C.,—is also, in my view, erroneous. If this were true, it would be necessary to pack all the events mentioned in Xenophon, iv, 4, into the year 393 B.C.; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction of the mora did not occur in the spring of 393 B.C., we know that it could not have occurred until the spring of 390 B.C.; that is, the next ensuing Isthmian games, two years afterwards. And this last will be found to be its true date; thus leaving full time, but not too much time, for the antecedent occurrences. iv, 4, 4. ?? d? ?e?te???, ?p?pte?sa?t?? ?as????? t? ????? ?ses?a?, ?s???a? ?s??? ?? t? ??a???? ?? d? t?? ??a???? ?s???t?, ?a? fe????t?? t??e? ?? t?? p???at?? ?f????t? p??? a?t???, ?? t??t?? ??ad?a??te? ?at? t?? ????????????, p??sa???ta? ?? ???e???? ?a? t??? ?????? ?pe????sa?t?, etc. At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were precisely the same causes at work, and precisely the same marked antithesis of parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth. There was first, a considerable Athenian minority who opposed the war with Sparta from the first; next, when the war began, the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined, and were compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and cattle, so that they obtained no returns. The intense discontent, the angry complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which these circumstances raised among the Athenian citizens,—not to mention the aggravation of all these symptoms by the terrible epidemic,—are marked out in Thucydides, and have been recorded in the fifth volume of this history. Not only the positive loss and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a higher pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian war, than at Corinth in 392 B.C. Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority resort to a conspiracy,—or the majority to a coup d’État—or either of them to invitation of foreign aid against the other? Nothing of the kind. The minority had always open to them the road of pacific opposition, and the chance of obtaining a majority in the Senate or in the public assembly, which was practically identical with the totality of the citizens. Their opposition, though pacific as to acts, was sufficiently animated and violent in words and propositions, to serve as a real discharge for imprisoned angry passion. If they could not carry the adoption of their general policy, they had the opportunity of gaining partial victories which took off the edge of a fierce discontent; witness the fine imposed upon Perikles (Thucyd. ii, 65) in the year before his death, which both gratified and mollified the antipathy against him, and brought about shortly afterwards a strong reaction in his favor. The majority, on the other hand, knew that the predominance of its policy depended upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public assembly, against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain forms and rules prescribed by the constitution; attachment to the latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in both parties. It was this system which excluded on both sides the thought of armed violence. It produced among the democratical citizens of Athens that characteristic insisted upon by Kleon in Thucydides,—“constant and fearless security and absence of treacherous hostility among one another” (d?? ??? t? ?a?? ???a? ?de?? ?a? ??ep????e?t?? p??? ????????, ?a? ?? t??? ??????? t? a?t? ??ete—Thuc. iii, 37), the entire absence of which stands so prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the oligarchical Corinth. PasimÊlus and his Corinthian minority had no assemblies, dikasteries, annual Senate, or constant habit of free debate and accusation, to appeal to; their only available weapon was armed violence, or treacherous correspondence with a foreign enemy. On the part of the Corinthian government, superior or more skilfully used force, or superior alliance abroad, was the only weapon of defence, in like manner. I shall return to this subject in a future chapter, where I enter more at large into the character of the Athenians. It would appear from hence that there must have been an open portion of LechÆum, or a space apart from (but adjoining to) the wall which encircled LechÆum, yet still within the Long Walls. Otherwise the fugitive Sikyonians could hardly have got down to the sea. A singular form of speech. Xenophon gives us plainly to understand, that LechÆum was not captured by the LacedÆmonians until the following year, by Agesilaus and Teleutias. It is to be recollected that Xenophon had particular means of knowing what was done by Agesilaus, and therefore deserves credit on that head,—always allowing for partiality. Diodorus does not mention Agesilaus in connection with the proceedings at LechÆum. In describing the improvements made by Iphikrates in the armature of his peltasts, I have not exactly copied either Nepos or Diodorus, who both appear to me confused in their statements. You would imagine, in reading their account (and so it has been stated by Weber, Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. xxxv.), that there were no peltasts in Greece prior to Iphikrates; that he was the first to transform heavy-armed hoplites into light-armed peltasts, and to introduce from Thrace the light shield or pelta, not only smaller in size than the round ?sp?? carried by the hoplite, but also without the ?t?? (or surrounding metallic rim of the ?sp??) seemingly connected by outside bars or spokes of metal with the exterior central knob or projection (umbo) which the hoplite pushed before him in close combat. The pelta, smaller and lighter than the ?sp??, was seemingly square or oblong and not round; though it had no ?t??, it often had thin plates of brass, as we may see by Xenophon, Anab. v, 2, 29, so that the explanation of it given in the Scholia ad Platon. Legg. vii, p. 813 must be taken with reserve. But Grecian peltasts existed before the time of Iphikrates (Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 1 and elsewhere); he did not first introduce them; he found them already there, and improved their armature. Both Diodorus and Nepos affirm that he lengthened the spears of the peltasts to a measure half as long again as those of the hoplites (or twice as long, if we believe Nepos), and the swords in proportion—“????se ?? t? d??ata ?????? e???e?—hastÆ modum duplicavit.” Now this I apprehend to be not exact; nor is it true (as Nepos asserts) that the Grecian hoplites carried “short spears”—“brevibus hastis.” The spear of the Grecian hoplite was long (though not so long as that of the heavy and compact Macedonian phalanx afterwards became), and it appears to me incredible that Iphikrates should have given to his light and active peltast a spear twice as long, or half as long again, as that of the hoplite. Both Diodorus and Nepos have mistaken by making their comparison with the arms of the hoplite, to which the changes of Iphikrates had no reference. The peltast both before and after Iphikrates did not carry a spear, but a javelin, which he employed as a missile, to hurl, not to thrust; he was essentially an ????t?st?? or javelin-shooter (See Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 14; vi, 1, 9). Of course the javelin might, in case of need, serve to thrust, but this was not its appropriate employment; e converso, the spear might be hurled (under advantageous circumstances, from the higher ground against an enemy below—Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 15; v, 4, 52), but its proper employment was, to be held and thrust forward. What Iphikrates really did, was, to lengthen both the two offensive weapons which the peltast carried, before his time,—the javelin, and the sword. He made the javelin a longer and heavier weapon, requiring a more practised hand to throw—but also competent to inflict more serious wounds, and capable of being used with more deadly effect if the peltasts saw an opportunity of coming to close fight on advantageous terms. Possibly Iphikrates not only lengthened the weapon, but also improved its point and efficacy in other ways; making it more analogous to the formidable Roman pilum. Whether he made any alteration in the pelta itself, we do not know. The name Iphikratides, given to these new-fashioned leggings or boots, proves to us that Wellington and Blucher are not the first eminent generals who have lent an honorable denomination to boots and shoes. ???? ??t?? ?a?eda??????? ??t?? a? ?? pe?tasta? ?d?d?sa?, ?? ??t?? ????t?sat?? ?? p??s?esa? t??? ?p??ta??, etc. Compare the sentiment of the light troops in the attack of Sphakteria, when they were awe-struck and afraid at first to approach the LacedÆmonian hoplites—t? ???? ded???????? ?? ?p? ?a?eda???????, etc. (Thucyd. iv, 34). This is a camp-jest of the time, which we have to thank Xenophon for preserving. Respecting the Long Walls of Corinth, as part of a line of defence which barred ingress to, or egress from, Peloponnesus,—Colonel Leake remarks,—“The narrative of Xenophon shows the great importance of the Corinthian Long Walls in time of war. They completed a line of fortification from the summit of the Acro-Corinthus to the sea, and thus intercepted the most direct and easy communication from the Isthmus into Peloponnesus. For the rugged mountain, which borders the southern side of the Isthmian plain, has only two passes,—one, by the opening on the eastern side of Acro-Corinthus, which obliged an enemy to pass under the eastern side of Corinth, and was, moreover, defended by a particular kind of fortification, as some remains of walls still testify,—the other, along the shore at CenchreiÆ, which was also a fortified place in the hands of the Corinthians. Hence the importance of the pass of CenchreiÆ, in all operations between the Peloponnesians, and an enemy without the Isthmus.” (Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxviii, p. 254). Compare Plutarch, Aratus, c. 16; and the operations of Epaminondas as described by Diodorus, xv, 68. About the probable situation of Tenea, see Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, p. 321; also his Peloponnesiaca, p. 400. It was rather late in the autumn of 393 B.C. that the LacedÆmonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf began, against the fleet recently equipped by the Corinthians out of the funds lent by Pharnabazus. First, the LacedÆmonian Polemarchus was named admiral; he was slain,—and his secretary Pollis, who succeeded to his command, retired afterwards wounded. Next came Herippidas to the command, who was succeeded by Teleutias. Now if we allow to Herippidas a year of command (the ordinary duration of a LacedÆmonian admiral’s appointment), and to the other two something less than a year, since their time was brought to an end by accidents,—we shall find that the appointment of Teleutias will fall in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C., the year of this expedition of Agesilaus. This last passage indicates decidedly that LechÆum was not taken until this joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias. And the authority of Xenophon on the point is superior, in my judgment, to that of Diodorus (xiv, 86), who represents LechÆum to have been taken in the year before, on the occasion when the LacedÆmonians were first admitted by treachery within the Long Walls. The passage from Aristeides the rhetor, referred to by Wesseling, Mr. Clinton, and others, only mentions the battle at LechÆum—not the capture of the port. Xenophon also mentions a battle as having taken place close to LechÆum, between the two long walls, on the occasion when Diodorus talks of the capture of LechÆum; so that Aristeides is more in harmony with Xenophon than with Diodorus. A few months prior to this joint attack of Agesilaus and Teleutias, the Athenians had come with an army, and with masons and carpenters, for the express purpose of rebuilding the Long Walls which Praxitas had in part broken down. This step would have been both impracticable and useless, if the LacedÆmonians had stood then in possession of LechÆum. There is one passage of Xenophon, indeed, which looks as if the LacedÆmonians had been in possession of LechÆum before this expedition of the Athenians to reËstablish the Long Walls,—??t?? (the LacedÆmonians) d? ?? t?? ?e?a??? ???e??? s?? ??? ?a? t??? t?? ????????? f???s?, ????? pe?? t? ?st? t?? ????????? ?st?ate???t? (iv, 4, 17). But whoever reads attentively the sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I think) that this affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before, the capture of LechÆum by Agesilaus; for it has reference to the general contempt shown by the LacedÆmonians for the peltasts of Iphikrates, as contrasted with the terror displayed by the Mantineians and others, of these same peltasts. Even if this were otherwise, however, I should still say that the passages which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly that he represents LechÆum to have been captured by Agesilaus and Teleutias; and that the other words, ?? t?? ?e?a??? ???e???, if they really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be regarded as an inaccuracy. I will add that the chapter of Diodorus, xiv, 86, puts into one year events which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in that same year. Had LechÆum been in possession and occupation by the LacedÆmonians in the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias, Xenophon would surely have mentioned it in iv, 4, 14; for it was a more important post than Sikyon, for acting against Corinth. Whether Philochorus had any additional grounds to rest upon, other than this very oration itself, may appear doubtful. But at any rate, this important fragment (which I do not see noticed among the fragments of Philochorus in M. Didot’s collection) counts for some farther evidence as to the reality of the peace proposed and discussed, but not concluded. Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention of such mission to Sparta, or discussion at Athens, as that which forms the subject of the Andokidean oration. But on the other hand, neither of them says anything which goes to contradict the reality of the event; nor can we in this case found any strong negative inference on the mere silence of Xenophon, in the case of a pacific proposition which ultimately came to nothing. If indeed we could be certain that the oration of Andokides was genuine it would of itself be sufficient to establish the reality of the mission to which it relates. It would be sufficient evidence, not only without corroboration from Xenophon, but even against any contradictory statement proceeding from Xenophon. But unfortunately, the rhetor Dionysius pronounced this oration to be spurious; which introduces a doubt and throws us upon the investigation of collateral probabilities. I have myself a decided opinion (already stated more than once), that another out of the four orations ascribed to Andokides (I mean the fourth oration, entitled against Alkibiades) is spurious; and I was inclined to the same suspicion with respect to this present oration De Pace; a suspicion which I expressed in a former volume (Vol. V, Ch. xlv, p. 334). But on studying over again with attention this oration De Pace, I find reason to retract my suspicion, and to believe that the oration may be genuine. It has plenty of erroneous allegations as to matter of fact, especially in reference to times prior to the battle of Ægospotami; but not one, so far as I can detect, which conflicts with the situation to which the orator addresses himself,—nor which requires us to pronounce it spurious. Indeed, in considering this situation (which is the most important point to be studied when we are examining the genuineness of an oration), we find a partial coincidence in Xenophon, which goes to strengthen our affirmative confidence. One point much insisted upon in the oration is, that the Boeotians were anxious to make peace with Sparta, and were willing to relinquish Orchomenus (s. 13-20). Now Xenophon also mentions, three or four months afterwards, the Boeotians as being anxious for peace, and as sending envoys to Agesilaus to ask on what terms it would be granted to them (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6). This coincidence is of some value in reference to the authenticity of the oration. Assuming the oration to be genuine, its date is pretty clearly marked, and is rightly placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 391 B.C. It was in the autumn or winter of that year, four years after the commencement of the war in Boeotia which began in 395 B.C. (s. 20). It was after the capture of LechÆum, which took place in the summer of 391 B.C.—and before the destruction of the LacedÆmonian mora by Iphikrates, which took place in the spring of 390 B.C. For Andokides emphatically intimates, that at the moment when he spoke, not one military success had yet been obtained against the LacedÆmonians—?a?t?? p??a? t???? ?? ??e???? pa?? ??? e?????? ?t????, e? ?a? ???? ???? ?tt???sa?; (s. 19). This could never have been said after the destruction of the LacedÆmonian mora, which made so profound a sensation throughout Greece, and so greatly altered the temper of the contending parties. And it seems to me one proof (among others) that Mr. Fynes Clinton has not placed correctly the events subsequent to the battle of Corinth, when I observe that he assigns the destruction of the mora to the year 392 B.C., a year before the date which he rightly allots to the Andokidean oration. I have placed (though upon other grounds) the destruction of the mora in the spring of 390 B.C., which receives additional confirmation from this passage of Andokides. Both Valckenaer and Sluiter (Lect. Andocid. c. x,) consider the oration of Andokides de Pace as genuine; Taylor and other critics hold the contrary opinion. Xenophon, who writes his history in the style and language of a partisan, says that “the Argeians celebrated the festival, Corinth having now become Argos.” But it seems plain that the truth was as I have stated in the text,—and that the Argeians stood by (with others of the confederates probably also) to protect the Corinthians of the city in the exercise of their usual privilege; just as Agesilaus, immediately afterwards, stood by to protect the Corinthian exiles while they were doing the same thing. The Isthmian games were trietÊric, that is, celebrated in every alternate year; in one of the spring months, about April or perhaps the beginning of May (the Greek months being lunar, no one of them would coincide regularly with any one of our calendar months, year after year); and in the second and fourth Olympic years. From Thucydides, viii, 9, 10, we know that this festival was celebrated in April 412 B.C.; that is, towards the end of the fourth year of Olympiad 91, about two or three months before the festival of Olympiad 92. Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi, 2, just cited), Corsini, (Diss. Agonistic. iv, 3), and Schneider in his note to this passage of Xenophon,—all state the Isthmian games to have been celebrated in the first and third Olympic years; which is, in my judgment, a mistake. Dodwell erroneously states the Isthmian games mentioned in Thucydides, viii, 9, to have been celebrated at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter of the fourth year of Olympiad 91; a mistake pointed out by KrÜger (ad loc.) as well as by Poppo and Dr. Arnold; although the argumentation of the latter, founded upon the time of the LacedÆmonian festival of the Hyakinthia, is extremely uncertain. It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games (Annal. Xenoph. ad ann. 392). Xenophon here recounts how Agesilaus sent up ten men with fire in pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm themselves; the night being very cold and rainy, the situation very high, and the troops not having come out with blankets or warm covering to protect them. They kindled large fires, and the neighboring temple of Poseidon was accidentally burnt. This ŒnoÊ must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that name, which lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Boeotia. So also the town of PeirÆum here noticed must not be confounded with another PeirÆum, which was also in the Corinthian territory, but on the Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus (Thucyd. viii, 10). The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the encomiums of his biographers (Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornel. Nep. Agesil. c. 5). The story of PolyÆnus (iii, 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this point of time. But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or those of the other Tactic writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to find proper places for the sixty-three different stratagems which PolyÆnus ascribes to Iphikrates. ??? d? ?a?eda?????? ?p? t?? ?p??? s?? t??? d??as? pa??????????? f??a?e? t?? a??a??t??, ??a ?p? t?? pa???t?? ?e????e???? ?? ??? e?t?????te? ?a? ??at???te? ?e? p?? ??????at?? d????s?? e??a?. ?t? d? ?a?????? t?? ???s?????, ?a? ?????t?? ??a?????? t??? pep?a??????, ?ppe?? t?? p??s??a??e, ?a? ??a ?s????? ?d???t? t? ?pp?? ?p? p????? d? ???t?e??? ?,t? ????????, ??de?? ?pe????at?, etc. It is interesting to mark in Xenophon the mixture of Philo-Laconian complacency,—of philosophical reflection,—and of that care in bringing out the contrast of good fortune, with sudden reverse instantly following upon it, which forms so constant a point of effect with Grecian poets and historians. We have here a remarkable expression of Xenophon,—“These were the only men in the mora who were really and truly saved.” He means, I presume, that they were the only men who were saved without the smallest loss of honor; being carried off wounded from the field of battle, and not having fled or deserted their posts. The others who survived, preserved themselves by flight; and we know that the treatment of those LacedÆmonians who ran away from the field (?? t??sa?te?), on their return to Sparta, was insupportably humiliating. See Xenoph. Rep. Laced. ix, 4; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of Xenophon, that a distinction was really made at Sparta between the treatment of these wounded men here carried off, and that of the other survivors of the beaten mora. The ?pasp?sta?, or shield-bearers, were, probably, a certain number of attendants, who habitually carried the shields of the officers (compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39; Anab. iv, 2, 20), persons of importance, and rich hoplites. It seems hardly to be presumed that every hoplite had an ?pasp?st??, in spite of what we read about the attendant Helots at the battle of PlatÆa (Herod. ix, 10-29) and in other places. Xenophon affirms the number of slain to have been about two hundred and fifty—?? p?sa?? d? ta?? ??a?? ?a? t? f??? ?p??a??? pe?? pe?t????ta ?a? d?a??s????. But he had before distinctly stated that the whole mora marching back to LechÆum under the polemarch, was six hundred in number—? ?? p???a???? s?? t??? ?p??ta??, ??s?? ?? ??a??s????, ?p?e? p???? ?p? t? ???a??? (iv, 5, 12). And it is plain, from several different expressions, that all of them were slain, excepting a very few survivors. I think it certain, therefore, that one or other of these two numbers is erroneous; either the original aggregate of six hundred is above the truth,—or the total of slain, two hundred and fifty, is below the truth. Now the latter supposition appears to me by far the more probable of the two. The LacedÆmonians, habitually secret and misleading in their returns of their own numbers (see Thucyd. v, 74), probably did not choose to admit publicly a greater total of slain than two hundred and fifty. Xenophon has inserted this in his history, forgetting that his own details of the battle refuted the numerical statement. The total of six hundred is more probable, than any smaller number, for the entire mora; and it is impossible to assign any reasons why Xenophon should overstate it. If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the text I request him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were masters of the Acro-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as their own, but that they generously refused to do so. I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of the words ?p?f??e?? t??? ??a?,—upon which Schneider has a long and not very instructive note, adopting an untenable hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians on this occasion appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce; which is not countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged to the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural t??? ??a? indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that the Argeians sometimes put forward the name of one festival, sometimes of another. We may be pretty sure that the Karneian festival was one of them; but what the others were, we cannot tell. It is very probable that there were several festivals of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between Sparta and Argos—pat????? t??a? sp??d?? ?? pa?a??? ?a?est?sa? t??? ????e?s? p??? ????????,—to use the language of Pausanias (iii, 5, 6). The language of Xenophon implies that the demand made by the Argeians, for observance of the Holy Truce, was in itself rightful, or rather, that it would have been rightful at a different season; but that they put themselves in the wrong by making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political purpose. For some remarks on other fraudulent manoeuvres of the Argeians, respecting the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of this History, Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb ?p?f??e?? t??? ??a? seems to imply the underhand purpose with which the Argeians preferred their demand of the truce. What were the previous occasions on which they had preferred a similar demand, we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus had invaded and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud. It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or. iii, De Pace, s. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though strenuous in insisting that Athens should help them to carry on the war for the possession of Corinth against the LacedÆmonians, had nevertheless made a separate peace with the latter, covering their own Argeian territory from invasion—a?t?? d? ?d?? e?????? p???s?e??? t?? ???a? ?? pa?????s?? ?p??ee??. Of this obscure passage I can give no better explanation. A similar story about the manner of putting the question to Apollo at Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at Dodona, is told about Agesilaus on another occasion (Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.). It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they look upon the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced to depart, as marks of some displeasure of the gods against his expedition. Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to it during the earlier discussions, when it was first broached by Antalkidas; and that their objections to it were in part the cause why the discussions reported in the text broke off without result. It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the last years of the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this concession, and even to greater, without doing herself any good (Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was not now placed in circumstances so imperious as to force her to be equally yielding. Plato, in the Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the allies of Athens—Boeotians, Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were willing to surrender the Asiatic Greeks at the requisition of Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone resolutely stood out, and were in consequence left without any allies. The latter part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her allies, is certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies took essentially different views from Athens on the point. The Menexenus, eloquent and complimentary to Athens, must be followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato goes the length of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of Antalkidas. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 172) says that they were forced to subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them. Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven triremes, and in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos, which island was persuaded to detach itself from Athens. But he recounts the circumstances in a very different manner. He represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes as having risen in insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does not name Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?), and Philodikus, as commanders. The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my judgment. His means of information, as well as his interest, about Teleutias (the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable. Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus) had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years before into the great city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and celebrated,—yet they still continued to exist, and apparently as fortified places. For Xenophon speaks of the democrats in Rhodes as t?? te p??e?? ????ta?, etc. Whether the Philokrates here named as Philokrates son of Ephialtes, is the same person as the Philokrates accused in the Thirtieth oration of Lysias—cannot be certainly made out. It is possible enough that there might be two contemporary Athenians bearing this name, which would explain the circumstance that Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes—a practice occasional with him, but not common. Polybius (iv, 38-47) gives instructive remarks and information about the importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position, in the ancient world,—as well as about the dues charged on the merchant vessels going into, or coming out of, the Euxine,—and the manner in which these dues pressed upon general trade. The latter states that Thrasybulus lost twenty-three triremes by a storm near Lesbos,—which Xenophon does not notice, and which seems improbable. Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power, oppression towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation for his own profit, during the course of the expedition of Thrasybulus; who is indirectly accused of conniving at such misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as soon as they were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the Bosphorus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home of all moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the colleagues of Thrasybulus should come home to go through the audit (s. 5); implying (so far as we can understand what is thus briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself should not be obliged to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or Asiatic command. Ergokles, however, probably one of these colleagues, resented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to seize Byzantium, to retain the fleet, and to marry the daughter of the Thracian prince Seuthes. It is also affirmed in the oration that the fleet had come home in very bad condition (s. 2-4), and that the money, levied with so much criminal abuse, had been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated. We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to death. His property was confiscated, and was said to amount to thirty talents, though he had been poor before the expedition; but nothing like that amount was discovered after the sentence of confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Philokrat. s. 3). The meaning of the word p???? here is not easy to determine, since (as Schneider remarks) not a word had been said before about the presence of Eteonikus at Ægina. Perhaps we may explain it by supposing that Eteonikus found the Æginetans reluctant to engage in the war, and that he did not like to involve them in it without first going to Sparta to consult the ephors. It was on coming back to Ægina (p????) from Sparta, after having obtained the consent of the ephors (???d??a? ?a? t??? ?f?????), that he issued the letters of marque. Schneider’s note explains t?? p??s?e? ?????? incorrectly, in my judgment. This description of the scene at the departure of Teleutias (for whom, as well as for his brother Agesilaus, Xenophon always manifests a marked sympathy) is extremely interesting. The reflection, too, with which Xenophon follows it up, deserves notice,—“I know well that in these incidents I am not recounting any outlay of money, or danger incurred, or memorable stratagem. But by Zeus, it does seem to me worth a man’s while to reflect, by what sort of conduct Teleutias created such dispositions in his soldiers. This is a true man’s achievement, more precious than any outlay or any danger.” What Xenophon here glances at in the case of Teleutias, is the scheme worked out in detail in the romance of the CyropÆdia (t? ??e???t?? ???e??—the exercising command in such manner as to have willing and obedient subjects)—and touched upon indirectly in various of his other compositions,—the Hiero, the Œconomicus, and portions of the Memorabilia. The idÉal of government, as it presented itself to Xenophon, was the paternal despotism, or something like it. Schneider doubts whether the words p??pa??s?ete d? ?? are correct. But they seem to me to bear a very pertinent meaning. Teleutias had no money; yet it was necessary for his purpose that the seamen should come furnished with one day’s provision beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged to ask them to get provision for themselves, or to lend it, as it were, to him; though they were already so dissatisfied from not having received their pay. Even ten years after this, however, when the LacedÆmonian harmost Sphodrias marched from ThespiÆ by night to surprise PeirÆus, it was without gates on the land-side—?p???t??—or at least without any such gates as would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 20). I trust this Oration so far as the matter of fact, that in the preceding year, some ancient sacrifices had been omitted from state-poverty; but the manner in which the speaker makes this fact tell against Nikomachus, may or may not be just. Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv, 4, p. 493, Engl. transl., which passage stands unaltered in the second edition of the German original recently published, p. 642) affirms that a proposition for the assessment of a direct property-tax of one-fortieth, or two and a half per cent., was made about this time by a citizen named Euripides, who announced it as intended to produce five hundred talents; that the proposition was at first enthusiastically welcomed by the Athenians, and procured for its author unbounded popularity; but that he was presently cried down and disgraced, because on farther examination the measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk. Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that this was a real proposition of a property tax of two and a half per cent., made by Euripides. After having alleged that the Athenians in these times supplied their treasury by the most unscrupulous injustice in confiscating the property of rich citizens,—referring as proof to passages in the orators, none of which establishes his conclusion,—Sievers goes on to say,—“But that these violences did not suffice, is shown by the fact that the people caught with greedy impatience at other measures. Thus a new scheme of finance, which however was presently discovered to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at first the most extravagant joy.” He adds in a note: “The scheme proceeded from Euripides; it was a property-tax of two and a half per cent. See Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 823; Boeckh, Staatshaush. ii, p. 27.” In my judgment, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers rests upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does not warrant us in concluding anything at all about a proposition for a property-tax. It is as follows:— ?? d? ??a???? ??? ?pa?te? ?e?? ???e? ???a?t? ?ses?a? pe?ta??s?a t? p??e? ??? tessa?a??st??, ?? ?p???s? ????p?d??; ?e???? ?ate???s?? p?? ???? ????p?d??? ?te d? d? ??as??p??????? ?fa??et? ? ???? ????????, ?a? t? p???? ??? ???ese?, ????? ?atep?tt?? p?? ???? ????p?d??. What this “new financial scheme” (so Sievers properly calls it) was, which the poet here alludes to,—we have no means of determining. But I venture to express my decided conviction that it cannot have been a property-tax. The terms in which it is described forbid that supposition. It was a scheme which seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainful to the city, and procured for its author very great popularity; but which, on farther examination, proved to be mere empty boasting (? ???? ????????) How can this be said about any motion for a property-tax? That any financier should ever have gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a property-tax, is altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the immense sum of five hundred talents (which SchÖmann estimates as the probable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of Athens, Antiq. Jur. Public. GrÆc. s. 73, p. 313) at one blow by an assessment upon property! It would be as much as any financier could do to bear up against the tremendous unpopularity of such a proposition; and to induce the assembly even to listen to him, were the necessity ever so pressing. How odious are propositions for direct taxation, we may know without recurring to the specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such specific evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Philippics and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. On one occasion (De Symmoriis, Or. xiv. s. 33, p. 185) that orator alludes to a proposition for raising five hundred talents by direct property-tax as something extravagant, which the Athenians would not endure to hear mentioned. Moreover,—unpopularity apart,—the motion for a property-tax could scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of all ideas the most simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a scheme. But to pass for an acceptable financier, you must propose some measure which promises gain to the state without such undisguised pressure upon individuals. Lastly, there is nothing delusive in a property-tax,—nothing which looks gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther examination (??as??p???????) to be false or uncertain. It may, indeed, be more or less evaded; but this can only be known after it has been assessed, and when payment is actually called for. Upon these grounds I maintain that the tessa?a??st? proposed by Euripides was not a property-tax. What it was I do not pretend to say; but tessa?a??st? may have many other meanings; it might mean a duty of two and a half per cent. upon imports or exports, or upon the produce of the mines of Laureion; or it might mean a cheap coinage or base money, something in the nature of the Chian tessa?a??sta? (Thucyd. viii, 100). All that the passage really teaches us is, that some financial proposition was made by Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would not stand an attentive examination. It is not even certain that Euripides promised a receipt of five hundred talents; this sum is only given to us as a comic exaggeration of that which foolish men at first fancied. Boeckh in more than one place reasons (erroneously, in my judgment) as if this five hundred talents was a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to two and a half per cent. upon the taxable property of the Athenians. He says (iv, 8, p. 520, Engl. transl.) that “Euripides assumed as the basis of his proposal for levying a property-tax, a taxable capital of twenty thousand talents,”—and that “his proposition of one-fortieth was calculated to produce five hundred talents.” No such conclusion can be fairly drawn from Aristophanes. Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play of the same author, that a small direct property-tax of one five-hundredth part had been recently imposed. After a speech from one of the old women, calling upon a young man to follow her, he replies (v. 1006):— ???? ??? ?????? ??st??, e? ? t?? ??? ??? pe?ta??s??st?? ?at????a? t? p??e?. Boeckh himself admits (iv, 8, p. 520) that this passage is very obscure, and so I think every one will find it. Tyrwhitt was so perplexed by it that he altered ??? into ?t??. Without presuming to assign the meaning of the passage, I merely contend that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation, as a matter of historical fact, that a property-tax of one-five-hundredth had been levied at Athens, shortly before the representation of EkklesiazusÆ. I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by Sievers from a third passage in this same play,—the EkklesiazusÆ (Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des Pelop. Kriegs bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 101.) He says,—“How melancholy is the picture of Athenian popular life, which is presented to us by the EkklesiazusÆ and the second Plutus, ten or twelve years after the restoration of the democracy! What an impressive seriousness (welch ein erschÜtternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech of Praxagora!” (v. 174 seqq.). I confess that I find neither seriousness, nor genuine and trustworthy coloring, in this speech of Praxagora. It was a comic case made out for the purpose of showing that the women were more fit to govern Athens than the men, and setting forth the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad and general disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce and full of Aristophanic humor. And it is surely preposterous to treat what is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading feminine character, as if it were historical evidence as to the actual condition or management of Athens. Let any one follow the speech of Praxagora into the proposition of reform which she is made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of citing her discourse as if it were an harangue in Thucydides. History is indeed strangely transformed by thus turning comic wit into serious matter of evidence; and no history has suffered so much from the proceeding as that of Athens. In this document there is the same introduction of the first person immediately following the third, as in the correspondence between Pausanias and Xerxes (Thucyd. i, 128, 129). Transcriber's note
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