  We now enter on the Sixth Book, containing the Loci bearing on Definition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points on any of which the attack and defence may turn:—257 2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that genus to which it rightly and specially belongs. 3. The definition given may not be specially appropriate to the definiend (i.e., it may include, not only that but, other matters besides). 4. The definition, though unobjectionable on any of the above three grounds, may nevertheless not declare the Essence of the definiend. 5. Lastly, the definition may be good in substance, but badly expressed or set out. As to the first of these five heads, the Loci bearing thereupon have already been enumerated in the Third Book, on Accident: in accidental predications the question raised is always about the truth or falsehood of the predication.258 As to the second and third of the five heads, these have been dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth Books, enumerating the Loci on Genus and Proprium.259 There remain the fourth and fifth heads, on which we are about to enter: (1) Whether the definition is well expressed or set out (the fifth head); (2) Whether it has any right to be called a definition at all, i.e., whether it declares the Essence of the subject (the fourth).260 The fifth is taken first, because to do a thing well is always more difficult than to do it simply, and is therefore likely to afford greater opening for argumentative attack. The definition, while unobjectionable in substance, may be badly set out in two ways. First, it may be indistinct in terms — not plain nor clear. Next, it may be redundant: the terms may include more than is required for the definition. Under each of these defects of expression several loci may be indicated.261 1. Indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in the definition. Or it may arise from the term to be defined being itself equivocal; while the definer, taking no notice of such equivocation, has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and the same definition. You may attack him either by denying that the definition as given covers all the different meanings of the definiend; or you may yourself distinguish (which the definer has omitted to do) these different meanings, The term s???fa?te?? surprises us here, because the point under consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real mistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure whereby such mistake is exposed as mere cavil — s???fa?t?a. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says that Aristotle intends to apply the term s???fa?te?? to the respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant who impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with this interpretation. 2. Indistinctness may arise from defining by means of a metaphor; but Aristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as though it were proprio sensu.263 He declares it to be wrong, but he seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a metaphor, without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate. 3. Indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare or far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known.264 Definitions given by Plato are cited to illustrate this. 4. Indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image, which is even worse than a professed metaphor: as where law is defined to be — a measure or image of things by nature just.265 5. The definition is indistinct, if it does not, while making known the definiend, make clear at the same time its contrary.266 6. The definition is also indistinct if it does not, when enunciated, make known what the definiend is, without requiring that the definiend itself shall be expressly enunciated. The definition by itself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend. Otherwise, the definer is no better than those archaic painters, who, when painting a dog or a horse, were compelled to write the name alongside in order that the animal might be recognized.267 Such are the Loci regarding Indistinctness in the setting out of the definition. The second defect is Redundancy. 1. Redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include either all things absolutely, or all things contained in the same genus as the definiend; since the definition ought to consist of a generic term to discriminate the definiend from all 2. Repetition is another fault sometimes committed. The same attribute may be predicated twice over. Or a particular and narrow attribute may be subjoined, in addition to a more general and comprehensive attribute in which it has already been included.271 So much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the definition tendered. Next, as bearing on the matter and substance of the definition, the following loci are distinguishable. 1. The first of these loci is, if the matter of the definition is not prius and notius as compared with the definiend. It is one of the canons of Definition, the purpose of which is to impart knowledge of the definiend, to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature and better known than the latter. The essence of each definiend — the being what it is — is one and only one. If a definition be given, other than that by means of what is prius and notius, it would follow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences; which is impossible. Accordingly, any proposition tendered as a definition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better known than the definiend sins against this canon, and is to be held as no true definition at all.272 The locus here indicated by this general feature is one, but it includes a number of varieties.273 More known, or less known, it should first be observed, has two distinct meanings: either more or less known absolutely (by nature); or more or less known to us. Absolutely, or by nature, the point is better known than The general mental fact here noticed by Aristotle may be seen philosophically stated and explained in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and the Will. (Chapter on Consciousness, sect. 19, p. 581, 2nd ed.) “A sensation is, under any view of it, a conscious element of the mind. As pleasure or pain, we are conscious in one way; as discrimination, we are conscious in the other way, namely, in a mode of neutral excitement. — But this is not all. After much contact with the sensible world, a new situation arises, and a new variety of the consciousness, which stands in need of some explanation. When a child experiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet, there is nothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense.… It is very difficult for us to realize or define this original shock, our position in mature life being totally altered. It is the rarest thing for us then to come under a radically new impression; and we can only, by help of imperfect analogies, form an approximate conception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative sensation. The process of engraining these impressions on the mind after repetition, gives to subsequent sensations quite a different character as compared with the first. The second shock of scarlet, if it stood alone, would doubtless resemble the preceding; but such is the nature of the mind, that the new shock will not stand alone, but restores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former. The sensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise, but a coalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous occasions. Hence it may properly be said, when we see, or hear, or touch, or move, that what comes before us is really contributed more by the mind itself than by the object present. The consciousness is complicated by three concurring elements — the new shock, the flash of agreement with the sum total of the past, and the feeling of that past as revived in the present. In truth, the new sensation is apt to be entirely over-ridden by the old; and, in place of discriminating by virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it, our discrimination follows another course. For example, if I have before me two shades of colour, instead of feeling the difference exactly as I am struck at the moment, my judgment resorts to the round-about process of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past impressions; and, having two sum-totals in my mind, the difference that I feel is between those totals. If I made a mistake, it may be attributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination, as to a wrong act of identification. — All sensations, therefore, after the first of each kind, involve a flash of recovery from the past, which is what really determines their character. The present shock is simply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference to all others; the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost insignificant, serving only as the medium of resuscitating the cerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the previous scarlets. — Sensation thus calls into operation the two great intellectual laws, in addition to the primitive sensibility of difference. — When we consider ourselves as performing the most ordinary act of seeing or hearing, we are bringing into play those very functions of the intellect that make its development and its glory in its highest manifestations.” The canon being, That what is posterius must be defined by its prius, — the definer may sin against this in defining the prius by its posterius; e.g., if he defines the stationary and the determinate by means of the moveable and the variable.281 Also, when his definition is neither prius, nor posterius, but of equal position with the definiend, he is at fault. This may happen (1) when he defines by an Opposite (for, according to some, the science of Opposites is one and the same, and it is impossible that either one of a pair can be absolutely more knowable than 2. The second locus (after that bearing on the Prius et Notius) of argument for impugning a definition is, where it does not enunciate the genus in which the definiend is really included. The mention of the genus, as enunciating the fundamental essence of the definiend, ought to stand first in the definition. If your opponent defines body — that which has three dimensions, or man — that which knows how to count, you attack him by asking, What is it that has three dimensions? What is it that knows how to count? No genus has been assigned.284 3. A third locus is, where the definiend is a complex whole having reference to several distinct facts or phenomena, while the definition indicates only one of them. Thus, if grammar be defined — the knowing how to write from dictation, you will object that it is just as much — the knowing how to read. The definition is incomplete unless it includes both.285 4. A fourth locus is, where the definiend admits both of a better and a worse construction, and where the definition enunciates only the worse. You may impugn it, on the ground that every cognition and every power must be understood as tending to its best results.286 6. A fifth locus is, where the definiend is enunciated as ranking, not in the lowest and nearest species to which it belongs but, in some higher and more distinct genus. Here the real essence will not be declared, and the definition will thus be incomplete; unless indeed it includes, along with the highest genus, the superadded mention of all the differentiÆ descending down to the lowest species. It will then be complete, because it will include, in circumlocutory phrase, all that would be declared by enunciating the specific name.287 7. Perhaps the definition may enunciate a differentia which is merely negative; e.g., A line is length without breadth. If you are debating with a respondent who holds the (Platonic) doctrine of Ideas, and who considers each Idea or genus to be something numerically one, distinct from all its participants, you will find here a locus for attacking them.289 He asserts the existence of a Self-long or generical long, a Self-animal or generic animal, each numerically one. Now, upon this hypothesis, since of all long you may predicate either in the affirmative or the negative (i.e., either it is broad or it is not broad), so this alternative may be predicated of the Self-long or generical long; and thus the genus will coincide with, or fall under the definition of, one among its own species. Or, if this be denied, it will follow that the generic long must be both broad and not broad; which is a contradiction still more inadmissible. Accordingly, against one who holds the doctrine of Ideas, declaring the genus to be unum numero, the negative differentia will furnish grounds for attack; but not against any other respondent.290 For there are various cases in which the negative must be employed as a part of the differentia: e.g., in privative terms, blind is one whose nature it is to see but who does not see. And, even when the differentia enunciated is affirmative, it may have for its condivident member only a negative term, e.g., length having-breadth has for its condivident member only the negative, length not-having-breadth.291 8. Perhaps the definition may enunciate as a differentia what is really a subordinate species; or what is really the genus itself under another name; or what is not Quale, but Quid; or what 9. Perhaps also, in the definition given, the differentia or the species may be found predicable of the entire genus; or the genus may be found predicable of the differentia itself, and not of objects under it; or the species (sometimes even one of its sub-species) may be found predicable of the differentia; or perhaps the differentia may not be a prius as regards the species (which it ought to be, while it is a posterius as regards the genus). Arguments against the definition may be drawn from any one of these loci.293 10. Recollect that the same differentia cannot belong to two distinct genera neither of which comprehends the other, unless both are comprehended under some higher genus. Examine whether this is observed in the definition tendered to you.294 11. No genuine differentia can be derived either from the Category Ubi or from the Category Passio; for neither of them furnishes characteristics essential to the subject. All Passio when intensified to a certain degree destroys the essence of the subject and removes it from its own appropriate species; but the differentia is inseparable from its subject; accordingly, nothing by virtue of which the subject is called ??????? can be a true differentia. If the definition sins against this rule, it will be open to question.295 12. If the subject be relative, its true differentia ought to be relative also; thus, science or cognition is a relatum, and accordingly its three differentiÆ — theoretical, practical, constructive — are all relata also.296 The definition must conform to this; and it must also, in cases where the relative subject has more than one correlate, declare that correlate which is the ordinary and natural one, not any other which is rare and realized only on occasion.297 You must watch to see whether this condition is observed; and also whether the correlative enunciated in the definition is the one strictly proximate. Thus, if the definition given of prudence be, It is an excellence of man or an excellence of the soul, this will not be a good definition. It ought to be — an excellence of the rational department of the soul; for it is 13. When the definiend is given as an affection or lasting condition of some subject, you must examine whether it really resides or can reside (as by nature it ought to do) in the subject to which it is referred in the definition. If it cannot, the definition is untenable; and this mistake is sometimes made, the producing conditions of a phenomenon being confounded with the phenomenon itself, or vice versÂ.299 Thus, some persons have defined sleep — incapacity of sensible perception; doubt — equality of contrary reasonings; pain — breach of continuity violently made in parts of the organism which naturally grow together. Now sleep does not reside in perception, nor doubt in reasonings. Sleep is that which produces or occasions incapacity of sensible perception; doubt is a state of mind produced by equality of contrary reasonings.300 This will be a locus for arguing against the definition. 14. Another locus is, when the definiend has direct bearing and reference to something different from what is enunciated in the definition. Thus, if the respondent defines justice — a power tending to make equal distribution, you may remark hereupon, that the just man is he who is deliberately resolved to make equal distribution, not he who has the power to do so. If this definition were allowed, the justest man would be he who has the greatest power of so distributing.301 15. Again, the definition will be assailable, if the definiend admits graduation of More or Less, while that which is enunciated in the definition does not admit it, or vice versÂ; also, if both of them admit graduation, but the variations of the two are not corresponding and concomitant. The defining phrase ought to be identical in signification with the term defined.302 If both of them agree in reference to some common correlate, but one is to this in the relation of more while the other is in the relation of less, the definition is faulty.303 Here we have a principle of Concomitant Variations analogous to that which is so well unfolded, as one of the Four Inductive Methods, in Mr. J. S. Mill’s ‘System of Logic.’ See Book III. ch. viii. sect. 6. 16. Again, you will be able to object, if the definition enunciate references to two distinct correlates, severally or alternately: e.g., The definition here given of Ens appears in the Sophistes of Plato, p. 247, E. The definition of the beautiful (t? ?a???) appears in the Hippias Major of Plato (p. 298, E, seq.), where it is criticized by Sokrates. 17. When the definition is tendered, you ought to examine and define its own terms, which, of course, profess to enunciate genus and differentia of the definiend.305 You will see whether the definitions of those defining terms are in any way inapplicable to the definiend. 18. If the definiend be a Relatum, the definition ought to enunciate its true correlate, or the true correlate of the genus to which it belongs. You must examine whether this is done, and whether the correlate enunciated be an ultimate end, as it ought to be (i.e. not merely a means towards something ulterior). If the correlate enunciated is a generation or a process, this will afford you an argument against the definition; for all generation or process is a means towards some ulterior end.306 19. The definition ought not to omit any of the differentiÆ of the definiend; if any be omitted, the real essence is not declared. Here then is a defect in the definition, which it is your business always to assail on its defective side.307 Thus, if the definiend be a relatum corresponding, not to some correlate absolutely but, to some correlate specially quantified or qualified, the definition ought to enunciate such quantification or qualification; if it does not, it is open to attack. 20. Suppose that the definiend is one of the appetites, relative to an appetitum as correlate, a mode of the good or agreeable. You will take notice whether the definition given thereof enunciates the correlate as only an apparent mode of good: if it does not, you have a locus for attacking it. But if it does, and if the definer be one who believes in the Platonic Ideas, you may attack him by showing that his definition will not square with that doctrine. For the definition as so given will not suit for the Compare Plato, Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where this doctrine that if the relatum be an Idea (sensu Platonico), the correlatum must also be an Idea, is enunciated and pushed to its consequences: ?sa? t?? ?de?? p??? ?????a? e?s?? a? e?s??, a?ta? p??? a?t?? t?? ??s?a? ????s??, ???’ ?? p??? t? pa?’ ??? e?te ????ata e?te ?p? d? t?? a?t? t??eta?, &c. — a?t? d? desp?te?a a?t?? d???e?a? ?st?? ? ?st?, &c. (133, C-E.) 21. Again, suppose that the definiend is a habit or disposition. You will examine how far the definition fits as applied to the individual person who has the habit; and how far it fits when taken in comparison with subjects contrary or congeneric. Every such definition, if good, implies in a certain way the definition of the contrary: he who defines cognition furnishes by implication the definition of ignorance.309 22. Or suppose the definiend to be a generic relatum, and the definition to enunciate its generic correlate. You must call to mind the specific terms comprehended under these two generic terms, and observe whether they fit on to each other respectively. If they do not, the definition is faulty.310 23. You will farther examine whether the Opposite of the definition will serve as definition to the Opposite of the definiend, as the definition of half is opposite to the definition of double; thus, if double is that which exceeds equality, half is that which is exceeded by equality. The like is true of Contraries: if the profitable be that which is productive of good, the hurtful will be that which is productive of evil or destructive of good. If, on trying the contraries, you find that this will not hold, the definition originally given will be found unsatisfactory.311 In defining the privative contrary of any term, a man cannot avoid enunciating in the definition the term of which it is the privative: but he is not allowed to define the term itself by means of its privative. To define equality — that which is contrary to inequality, is improper. You will require him at once to define inequality; and his definition must be — the privation of equality. We most remember that Aristotle, classifying Relata as one species under the genus Opposita, treats double and half as Opposita, i.e. Relative-Opposita. I have already said that I think this classification improper, and that Opposita ought to be ranked as a species under the genus Relata. 24. When the definiend is a Privative Term, the definition given ought to enunciate that which it is, and that of which it is the privation; also that subject in which it resides naturally and in the first instance. In defining ignorance, the definition must enunciate not privation only, but privation of knowledge; nor will this be sufficient unless it be added that the privation of knowledge is in the rational department of the soul (?? t? ????st???). Privation of knowledge in the soul or in the man, will not suffice; because neither of these subjects is that in which the attribute resides in the first instance: the rational department of the soul must be named by itself, as being the primary subject of the attribute. If the definition be wanting in any of these conditions, you will have an argument for impeaching it.313 25. A term that is privative in form may sometimes be used in the sense of mere negation, not in that of privation. If this term be defined generally by privation, the definition will not include the merely negative sense, and will therefore be impeachable. The only general explanation attainable is that by pure negation, which is common both to the negative and the privative. Thus, if the respondent defines ignorance — privation of knowledge, such privation can be predicated only of subjects whose nature it is to have knowledge or who might be expected to have it: such privation cannot be predicated of infants, or of inanimate objects like stones. To include these, ignorance must be explained as the mere negation or non-existence of knowledge; the definition thereof by privation is inadequate.314 Waitz says in note, p. 503:— “Sensus loci hic est. Peccant qui per privationem ignorantiam definientes non eam ignorantiam definire voluerunt quÆ est ?at’ ?p?fas??, sed eam quÆ est ?at? d???es??.” Compare Analyt. Poster. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23. 26. If you are debating with one who holds the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, you will note whether any definition that he may give fits not only the definiend itself but also the Idea of the definiend. Thus, Plato in defining animal introduces mortality This may perhaps allude to Plato’s manner of speaking of ??a in Sophistes, p. 246, E., p. 265, C.; TimÆus, p. 69, C. 27. Another locus for counter-argument is, where the definiend is Equivocal or Analogous, while one and the same definition is made to apply to all its distinct meanings. Such a definition, pretending to fit all, will in reality fit none; nothing but an univocal term can come under one and the same definition. It is wrong to attempt to define an equivocal term.317 When its equivocation is not obvious, the respondent will put it forward confidently as univocal; while you as assailant will expose the equivocation. Sometimes, indeed, a respondent may pretend that an univocal word is equivocal, or that an equivocal word is univocal, in the course of the debate. To obviate such misconception, you will do well to come to an agreement with him prior to the debate, or to determine by special antecedent reasonings what terms are univocal or equivocal; for at that early stage, when he does not foresee the consequence of your questions, he is more likely to concede what will facilitate your attack. In the absence of such preliminary agreement, if the respondent, when you have shown that his bad definition will Aristotle here cites and censures the definition of life given by a philosopher named Dionysius; he remarks that life is an equivocal term, having one meaning in animals, another and a different one in plants. Dr. Whewell has remarked that even at the present day a good definition of life is matter of dispute, and still a desideratum with philosophers. Mr. John S. Mill adverts, in more than one portion of his ‘System of Logic’ (Bk. IV. ch. iii. s. 5, p. 222, seq.; Bk. V. ch. v. s. 8, p. 371), to the mistake and confusion arising from attempts to define Equivocal Terms. “The inquiries of Plato into the definitions of some of the most general terms of moral speculation, are characterized by Bacon as a far nearer approach to a true inductive method than is elsewhere to be found among the ancients, and are, indeed, almost perfect examples of the preparatory process of comparison and abstraction; but, from being unaware of the law just mentioned, he often wasted the powers of this great logical instrument on inquiries in which it could realize no result, since the phenomena, whose common properties he so elaborately endeavoured to detect, had not really any common properties. Bacon himself fell into the same error in his speculations on the nature of heat, in which he evidently confounded, under the name hot, classes of phenomena which had no property in common.” — “He occasionally proceeds like one who seeking for the cause of hardness, after examining that quality in iron, flint, and diamond, should expect to find that it is something that can be traced also in hard water, a hard knot, and a hard heart.” These counsels of Aristotle are remarkable, as bearing on the details, and even the artifices, of dialectical debate. 28. If the definiend, of which a definition is tendered to you, is a compound, you may subtract from this definition the definition of one of the parts of the definiend, and then examine whether the remainder will suit as a definition of the remaining part of the definiend. If the remainder should not suit, this will show that the entire definition tendered is not tenable. Thus, if the definiend be a finite straight line, and if the definition tendered be, It is the boundary of a finite plane, of which (boundary) the middle covers or stands in the way of the extremities; you may subtract from this definition the definition of a finite line, viz., the boundary of a plane surface having boundaries, and the remainder of the definition ought then to suit for the remainder of the definiend. Now the remainder of the definiend is — straight; and the remainder of the definition is — that of which the middle covers or stands in the way of the extremities. But these two will not suit; for a line may be straight, yet infinite, in which case it will have neither middle nor extremities. Accordingly, since the remainder of the definition If the definiend be a compound, and if the definition contain no greater number of words than the definiend, the definition must be faulty; it will be nothing better than a substitution of words. Still more faulty will it be, if it substitutes rare and strange words in place of others which are known and familiar; or if it introduces a new word which signifies something different from that which it replaces.321 The definiend, being compound, will contain both a generic and a differential term. In general, the generic term will be the better known of the two; yet sometimes the other is the better known. Whichever of the two is the better known, the definer ought to choose that, if all that he aims at is a mere substitution of one name in place of another. But, if he aims at something more or at the substitution of an explanatory proposition in place of a name (without which there can be no true definition), he ought then to choose the differentia in preference to the genus; for the definition is produced for the purpose of imparting knowledge, and the differentia, being usually less known than the genus, stands most in need of extraneous help to cognition.322 When the definition of the differentia has thus been tendered, you will examine whether it will be equally suitable for any other definiend also. If it be, you have an argument against the goodness of the definition. For example, the definition of odd number tendered to you may be — number having a middle. Here, since number is common both to the definiend and to the definition, having-a-middle is evidently put forward as the equivalent of odd. But this cannot stand as equivalent to odd; since various other subjects which are not odd (such, for example, as a body or a line), nevertheless have a middle. Since, then, we see that having-a-middle would be suitable in defining definiends which are not odd, it cannot be admitted, without some qualifying adjunct, as a good definition of odd. The adjunct annexed must declare in what sense middle is intended, since it is an equivocal phrase.323 29. If the definiend be a something really existent, the definition given of it ought not to be a proposition declaring an incompatible combination, such as neither does nor can exist. Some, for example, define white — colour mingled with fire; which is 30. Again, suppose the definiend to be a Relatum: the correlate thereof must of course be declared in the definition. Care, however, must be taken that it shall be declared, not in vague generality but, distinctly and with proper specialization; otherwise, the definition will be incorrect either entirely or partially. Thus, if the respondent defines medicine — the science of the really existent, he is incorrect either wholly or partially. The relatum ought to reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its correlate.325 When the correlate, however, is properly specialized in the definition, it may be declared under several different descriptions; for the same real thing may be at once ens, album, bonum. None of these descriptions will be incorrect. Yet, if the correlate is thus described in the definition of a relatum, the definition cannot be considered good or sufficient. For it applies to more things besides the definiend; and a good definition ought to reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its definiend.326 31. Another mistake in defining is committed, when a man defines, not the subject purely and simply but, the subject in a high measure of excellence. Sometimes the rhetor (e.g.) is defined — one who can perceive and produce without omission all that there is plausible in any cause; the thief is defined — one who takes away secretly what belongs to another. But these are the definitions, not of a rhetor and a thief generally but, of a skilful rhetor and skilful thief. The thief is one who is bent on taking away secretly, not one who does take away secretly.327 32. Again, another error consists in defining what is desirable in itself and on its own account, as if it were desirable as a means towards some other end — as productive or preservative thereof. For example, if a man defines justice — that which is preservative of the laws; or wisdom — that which is productive of happiness, he presents them as if they were desirable, not for themselves but, with reference to something different from themselves. This is a mistake; and it is not less a mistake, though very possibly the same subject may be desirable both for 33. Perhaps the definition tendered may be a complex proposition, enunciating two terms either jointly or severally, in one or other of three combinations. Either the definiend is A and B; or it is that which springs out of A and B; or it is A with B.329 In each of these three cases you may find arguments for impugning the definition. a. Thus, take the first of the three. Suppose the respondent to define justice by saying, It is temperance and courage. You may urge against him, that two men, one of whom is temperate without being courageous, while the other is courageous without being temperate, will be just together, though neither of them separately is just; nay, that each of them separately (the one being temperate and cowardly, the other courageous and intemperate), will be both just and unjust; since, if justice is temperance and courage, injustice will be intemperance and cowardice.330 The definer is open to the farther objection that he treats enumeration of parts as identical with the whole; as if he defined a house — bricks and mortar, forgetting the peculiar mode of putting them together. Bricks and mortar may exist, and yet there may be no house.331 b. Next, suppose the definition to declare, that the definiend is that which springs from A and B — is a result or compound of A and B. You will then examine whether A and B are such as to yield any result; for some couples (as a line and a number) yield no result. Or, perhaps, the definiend may by its own nature inhere in some first subject, while A and B do not inhere in any one first subject, but one in the other; in which case the definition is assailable.332 Or, even granting that it is the nature of A and B to inhere in the same first subject, you may find that that first subject is not the same as the one in which the definiend inheres. Now the whole cannot thus inhere in one, and the parts in another: you will here have a good objection. c. Lastly, suppose the definition to declare that the definiend is A along with B. You will note, first, that this third head must be identical either with the first or with the second (e.g., honey with water means either honey and water, or the compound of honey with water); it will therefore be open to impeachment on one or other of the above-named grounds of objection, according as the respondent may admit.335 You may also distinguish all the different senses in which one thing may be said to be with another (e.g., when the two are in the same recipient, justice and courage together in the soul; or in the same place; or in the same time), and you may be able to show that in none of these senses can the two parts of the definition be truly said to be one along with the other.336 Or, if it be true that these two parts are co-existent in time, you may enquire whether they are not affirmed with relation to different correlates. E.g., The definition of courage may be tendered thus: Courage is daring along with right intelligence; upon which you may remark that daring may have reference to an act of spoliation, and that right intelligence may have reference to the preservation of health. Now a man who has both daring and right intelligence in these senses, cannot be termed courageous, and thus you will have an argument against the definition. And, even if they be affirmed with reference to the same correlate (e.g., the duties of a physician), a man who has both daring and right intelligence 34. Perhaps the definition, while including two or more distinct parts, may be tendered in this form: The definiend is the composition of A and B; e.g., animal is the composition of soul and body. You will first note that the definer has not declared what sort of composition. There is a great difference between one mode of composition and another; the mode must be specialized. Both flesh and bone may be defined — a composition of fire, earth, and water; but one mode of composition makes flesh, another makes bone, out of these same elements. You may also take the farther objection that to define a compound as composition is erroneous; the two are essentially disparate, one of them being abstract, the other concrete.339 35. If the definiend be in its nature capable of receiving two contrary attributes, and if the respondent define it by one or other of them, you have an argument against him. If one of them is admissible, the other must be equally so; and upon this supposition there would be two distinct definitions of the same subject; which has been already declared impossible. Thus, it is wrong to define the soul as a substance which is recipient of knowledge; the soul is also recipient of ignorance.340 36. Perhaps the definiend is not sufficiently well known to enable you to attack the definition as a whole, but you may find arguments against one or other of its parts; this is sufficient to upset it. If it be obscure and unintelligible, you should help to correct and re-model it until it becomes clear; you will then see what are the really assailable points in it. When you indicate and expose the obscurity, the respondent must either substitute some clearer exposition of his own meaning, or else he must acquiesce in that which you propose To conclude, one suggestion may be given bearing upon all the arguments that you have to carry on against definitions tendered by respondents:— Reflect on the definiend, and frame a definition of it for yourself, as cleverly as you can at the moment; or call to mind any good definition of it which you may have heard before. This will serve you as a standard with which to compare the definition tendered, so that you will see at once what there is in it either defective or redundant, and where you can find arguments against it.343 |
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