[The following Abstract — when not translation — of six books (?, E, Z, ?, ?, ?) out of the fourteen included under the title ‘Metaphysica,’ may be said to cover the whole of Aristotle’s dogmatic exposition of First Philosophy. According to the view of Brandis, now in its main features generally accepted, the exposition continued through Books ?, E, Z, ?, reaches back to Books A and B, and comes to an end with Book ?. Still it is only with Book ? that the properly didactic treatment begins, Book A being a historical review of previous opinion, and Book B a mere collection of ??????? subjected to a preliminary dialectical handling; while, at the other end, Book ?, though it has no direct connection with Book ?, is, especially in its latter part, of undeniable importance for Aristotle's metaphysical doctrine.

The remaining books are known as ?, ?, I, K, M, N. The short Book ? is entirely unconnected with any of the others, and most probably is not the work of Aristotle. Book ? (???? ??? ??????? ?????????) — a vocabulary of philosophical terms — is Aristotelian beyond question, being referred to occasionally in the chief books; but it lies quite apart from the exposition proper. Book I — dealing with Unity and Opposites — though it also has no place in the actual line of treatment, is truly ontological in character, and probably was intended to fall within some larger scheme of metaphysical doctrine; the like, as far as can be judged, being true of Books M and N, containing together a criticism of Pythagorean and Platonic theories. Finally, Book K, consisting in part of an epitomized excerpt from the Physica — hardly from the hand of Aristotle, gives otherwise only a sketch in outline of the argument of Books B, ?, E, and thus, although Aristotelian, is to be discounted.

The author nowhere states the principle upon which he selected the six books for a preliminary Abstract; but the actual selection, joined to various indications in the Abstract and marginal notes in his copies of the Metaphysica, leaves no doubt that he accepted the view of Brandis, more especially as set forth by Bonitz. On the whole question of the Canon of the Metaphysica, Bonitz’s Introduction to his Commentary may with advantage be consulted.]