III.

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Such are the chief among the thirty-seven Loci which Aristotle indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the predication is only of Accident — not of Genus, or Proprium, or Definition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal separately with one special branch of such theses, respecting Expetenda and Fugienda: where the question put is, Of two or more distinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The cases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the two subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable, but where there is a tolerably near approximation of value between them, so as to warrant doubt and debate.125

125 Ibid. III. i. p. 116, a. 1-12: ??te??? d’ a??et?te??? ? ??t??? d?e?? ? p?e?????, ?? t??de s?ept???. &c.

We must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently among the dialectical debates of Aristotle’s contemporaries; so that he thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in the best manner.

1. Of two good subjects compared, that is better and more desirable which is the more lasting; or which is preferred by the wise and good man; or by the professional artist in his own craft; or by right law; or by the multitude, all or most of them. That is absolutely or simply better and more desirable, which is declared to be such by the better cognition; that is better to any given individual, which is declared to be better by his own cognition.126

126 Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 13-22.

2. That is more desirable which is included in the genus good, than what is not so included; that which is desirable on its own account and per se, is better than what is desirable only on account of something else and per accidens; the cause of what is good in itself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by accident.127

127 Ibid. a. 23-b. 7.

3. What is good absolutely and simply (i.e., to all and at all times) is better than what is good only for a special occasion or individual; thus, to be in good health is better than being cut for the stone. What is good by nature is better than what is good not by nature; e.g., justice (good by nature), than the just individual, whose character must have been acquired.128 What is good, or what is peculiarly appurtenant, to the more elevated of two subjects is better than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated. Good, having its place in the better, prior, and more exalted elements of any subject, is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative, secondary, and less exalted; thus, health, which has its seat in proper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of the body (wet, dry, hot, cold), is better than strength or beauty — strength residing in the bones and muscles, beauty in proper symmetry of the limbs.129 Next, an end is superior to that which is means thereunto; and, in comparing two distinct means, that which is nearer to the end is the better. That which tends to secure the great end of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end; means to happiness is better than means to intelligence; also the possible end, to the impossible. Comparing one subject as means with another subject as end, we must examine whether the second end is more superior to the end produced by the first subject, than the end produced by the first subject is superior to the means or first subject itself. For example, in the two ends, happiness and health, if happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater proportion than health surpasses the means of health, then the means producing happiness is better than the end health.130

128 Topic. III. i. p. 116, b. 7-12.

129 Ibid. b. 12-22: ?a? t? ?? e?t??s?? ? p??t????? ? t???t????? ??t???, ???? ???e?a ?s???? ?a? ???????. ? ?? ??? ?? ?????? ?a? ?????? ?a? ?e???? ?a? ???????, ?p??? d’ e?pe?? ?? ?? p??t?? s???st??e t? ????, t? d’ ?? t??? ?st?????· ? ?? ??? ?s??? ?? t??? ?e????? ?a? ?st???, t? d? ?????? t?? e??? t?? s?et??a d??e? e??a?.

The reason given in this locus for superior estimation is a very curious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the definition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of the face.

130 Ibid. b. 22-36.

Again, that which is more beautiful, honourable, and praiseworthy per se, is better than what possesses these same attributes in equal degree but only on account of some other consequence. Thus, friendship is superior to wealth, justice to strength; for no one values wealth except for its consequences, whereas we esteem friendship per se, even though no consequences ensue from it.131

131 Ibid. b. 33-p. 117, a. 4.

Where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to the antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the consequents; and, according as these exhibit most of good or least of evil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which they respectively belong.132 The larger lot of good things is preferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if cast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to another thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is not per se good, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice and courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with the absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or along with pain.133 Everything is better, at the season when it tells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than in youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required, and therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is useful only now and then; e.g., justice and moderation, as compared with courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other would not be required; e.g., justice is better than courage, for, if every one were just, courage would not be required.134

132 Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.

133 Ibid. a. 16-25.

134 Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.

Among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation or acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or the loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to the Summum Bonum or to that which is better than itself (unless indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of a caricature, as the ape is to man135); that which is the more conspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and peculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that which we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our friends, rather than to ordinary strangers (e.g., doing justice or conferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we prefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer seeming to do so136); that which we cannot obtain from others, as compared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally desirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have something else along with it; that of which the absence is a ground of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;137 that which does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the proprietor (to his mind rather than his body);138 that which is eligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that which is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.139 Acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are sometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life simply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes necessaries are more eligible, as, e.g., to a starving man. Speaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are better.140

135 Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. s??pe?? d? ?a? e? ?p? t? ?e????te?a e?? ?????, ?a??pe? ? p?????? t? ?????p?, t?? ?pp?? ? ??t?? ?????· ?? ??? ??????? ? p??????, ????te??? d? t? ?????p?.

136 Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. ? p??? t?? f???? p???a? ????? ????e?a ? ? p??? t?? t????ta, ta?ta a??et?te?a, ???? t? d??a??p?a?e?? ?a? e? p??e?? ????? ? t? d??e??· t??? ??? f????? e? p??e?? ????e?a ????? ? d??e??, t??? d? t????ta? ???pa???.

137 Topic. III. ii. p. 118, a. 16-26.

138 Ibid. iii. p. 118, a. 29.

139 Ibid. b. 20. The definition of this last condition is — that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that we possessed it: ???? d? t?? p??? d??a?, t? ?de??? s??e?d?t?? ? ?? sp??d?sa? ?p???e??.

140 Ibid. p. 118, a. 6-14. ?? ??? e? e?t??, ??a??a??? ?a? a??et?te?a· t? ???? f???s?fe?? ??t??? t?? ???at??es?a?, ???’ ??? a??et?te??? t? ??dee? t?? ??a??a???. t? d’ ?? pe????s?a? ?st??, ?ta? ?pa????t?? t?? ??a??a??? ???a t??? p??s?atas?e????ta? t?? t?? ?a???. s?ed?? d’ ?s?? a??et?te??? t? ??a??a??? ?st?, ??t??? d? t? ?? pe????s?a?.

Among many other loci, applicable to this same question of comparative excellence between two different subjects, one more will suffice here. You must distinguish the various ends in relation to which any given subject is declared to be eligible: the advantageous, the beautiful, the agreeable. That which conduces to all the three is more eligible than that which conduces to one or two of them only. If there be two subjects, both of them conducive to the same end among the three, you must examine which of them conduces to it most. Again, that which conduces to the better end (e.g., to virtue rather than to pleasure) is the more eligible. The like comparison may be applied to the Fugienda as well as to the Expetenda. That is most to be avoided which shuts us out most from the desirable acquisitions: e.g., sickness is more to be avoided than ungraceful form; for sickness shuts us out more completely both from virtue and from pleasure.141

141 Ibid. iii. p. 118, b. 27-36.

The same loci which are available for the question of comparison will also be available in the question of positive eligibility or positive ineligibility.142 Further, it holds for all cases of the kind that you should enunciate the argument in the most general terms that each case admits: in this way it will cover a greater number of particulars. Slight mutations of language will often here strengthen your case: that which is (good) by nature is more (good) than that which is (good) not by nature; that which makes the subject to which it is better than that which does not make the subject good.143

142 Ibid. iv. p. 119, a. 1.

143 Topic. III. v. p. 119, a. 12: ??pt??? d’ ?t? ???sta ?a????? t??? t?p??? pe?? t?? ????? ?a? t?? e??????· ??f???te? ??? ??t?? p??? p?e?? ???s??? ?? e??sa?.

The loci just enumerated are Universal, and applicable to the debate of theses propounded in universal terms; but they will also be applicable, if the thesis propounded be a Particular proposition.

If you prove the universal affirmative, you will at the same time prove the particular; if you prove the universal negative, you prove the particular negative also. The universal loci from Opposites, from Conjugates, from Inflections, will be alike applicable to particular propositions. Thus, if we look at the universal locus from Contraries, If all pleasure is good, then all pain is evil, — this will apply also to the particular, If some pleasure is good, then some pain is evil: in the particular as in the universal form the proposition is alike an Endox or conformable to common received opinion. The like may be said about the loci from Habitus and Privatio; also about those from Generation and Destruction;144 again, from More, Less, and Equally — this last, however, with some restriction, for the locus from Less will serve only for proving an affirmative. Thus, if some capacity is a less good than science, while yet some capacity is a good, then, À fortiori, some science is a good. But, if you take the same locus in the negative and say that the capacity is a good, you will not be warranted in saying, for that reason, that no science is a good.145 You may apply this same locus from Less to compare, not merely two subjects in different genera, but also two subjects of different degrees under the same genus. Thus, let the thesis be, Some science or cognition is a good. You will disprove this thesis, if you can show that prudence (f????s??) is not a good; for, if prudence, which in common opinion is most confidently held to be a good, be really not so, you may argue that, À fortiori no other science can be so. Again, let the thesis be propounded with the assumption that, if it can be proved true or false in any one case, it shall be accepted as true or false in all universally (for example, that, if the human soul is immortal, all other souls are immortal also; or if not that, then none of the others): evidently, the propounder of such a thesis extends the particular into an universal. If he propounds his thesis affirmatively, you must try to prove the negative in some particular case; for this, under the conditions supposed, will be equivalent to proving an universal negative. If, on the other hand, he puts his thesis negatively, you will try to prove some particular affirmative; which (always under the given conditions) will carry the universal affirmative also.146

144 Ibid. vi. p. 119, a. 32-b. 16. ????? ??? ??d???? t? ????sa?, e? p?sa ?d??? ??a???, ?a? ??p?? p?sa? e??a? ?a???, t? e? t?? ?d??? ??a???, ?a? ??p?? e??a? t??a ?a??? — ?? ?pas? ??? ????? t? ??d????.

145 Ibid. b. 17-30. d???? ??? ?t? ?atas?e???e?? ???? ?? t?? ?tt?? ?st??.

146 Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 31-p. 120, a. 5.

Suppose the respondent to propound his thesis indefinitely, not carrying the indication either of universal or particular; e.g., Pleasure is good. This can be proved by showing either that all pleasure is good, or that some pleasure is good; while it can be refuted only through the universal negative — by showing that no pleasure is good.147 But, if the thesis be divested of its indefinite character and propounded either as universal or as particular, there will then be two distinct ways of refuting it. If it be farther specialized — e.g., One pleasure only is good — there will be three ways of refuting: you may show either that all pleasures are good; or that no pleasure is good; or that more pleasures than one are good. If the proposition be specialized farther still — e.g., Prudence alone among all the virtues is science, — there are four lines of argument open for refuting it: you may prove either that all virtue is science; or that no virtue is science; or that some other virtue (such as justice) is science; or that prudence is not science.148

147 Ibid. p. 120, a. 6-20: ?d????st?? ?? ??? ??t?? t?? p????at?? ??a??? ??as?e???e?? ??d??eta? — ??a??e?? ?? ??a??? ??d??eta?, ?atas?e???e?? d? d????. &c.

148 Ibid. a. 15-31.

In dealing with a particular proposition as thesis, still other loci already indicated for dealing with universal propositions will be available. You will run through the particulars comprised in the subject, distributed into genera and species. When you have produced a number of particulars successively to establish the universal, affirmative or negative, you are warranted in calling on the respondent either to admit the universal, or to produce on his side some adverse particular.149 You will also (as was before recommended) distribute the predicate of the thesis into the various species which it comprehends. If no one of these species be truly affirmable of the subject, then neither can the genus be truly affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to be affirmative. If, on the contrary, any one of the species be truly affirmable of the subject, then the genus will also be truly affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to be negative. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The soul is a number: you divide number into its two species, odd and even, and prove that the soul is neither odd nor even; wherefore, it is not a number.150

149 Ibid. a. 32-38: ?? te ??? pa?t? fa???ta? ?p????? ?? te ?de??, p???? p??e????a?t? ????t??? ?a????? ?????e??, ? f??e?? ??stas?? ?p? t???? ??? ??t??.

150 Topic. III. vi. p. 120, a. 37-b. 6. It would appear from the examples here given by Aristotle — ? ?????? ?? ???e?ta?, ? ?????? ??? ?st? ????s??, ? ???? ??? ?st?? ??????, that he considers these propositions as either indefinite or particular.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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