  Aristotle begins the Second Book of the Analytica Posteriora by an enumeration and classification of Problems or Questions suitable for investigation. The matters knowable by us may be distributed into four classes:—
Under the first head come questions of Fact; under the second head, questions of Cause or Reason; under the third, questions of Existence; under the fourth, questions of Essence. Under the first head we enquire, Whether a fact or event is so or so? Whether a given subject possesses this or that attribute, or is in this or that condition? enumerating in the question the various supposable alternatives. Under the second head, we assume the first question to have been affirmatively answered, and we proceed to enquire, What is the cause or reason for such fact, or such conjunction of subject and attribute? Under the third head, we ask, Does a supposed subject exist? And if the answer be in the affirmative, we proceed to enquire, under the fourth head, What is the essence of the subject?1 We have here two distinct pairs of QuÆsita: Obviously the second head presupposes the first, and is consequent thereupon; while the fourth also presupposes the third. But it might seem a more suitable arrangement (as Themistius and other expositors have conceived) that the third and fourth heads should come first in the list, rather than the first and second; since the third and fourth are simpler, and come earlier in the order of philosophical exposition, while the first and second are more complicated, and cannot be expounded philosophically until after Mr. Poste observes upon this quadruple classification by Aristotle (p. 96):— “The two last of these are problems of Inductive, but first principles of Deductive, Science; the one being the hypothesis, the other the definition. The attribute as well as the subject must be defined (I. x.), so that to a certain degree the second problem also is assumed among the principles of Demonstration.” Comparing together these four QuÆsita, it will appear that in the first and third (Quod and An), we seek to find out whether there is or is not any middle term. In the second and fourth (Cur and Quid), we already know or assume that there is a middle term; and we try to ascertain what that middle term is.3 The enquiry Cur, is in the main analogous to the enquiry Quid; in both cases, we aim at ascertaining what the cause or middle term is. But, in the enquiry Cur, what we discover is perhaps some independent fact or event, which is the cause of the event quÆsitum; while, in the enquiry Quid, what we seek is the real That the quÆsitum in all these researches is a middle term or medium, is plain from those cases wherein the medium is perceivable by sense; for then we neither require nor enter upon research. For example, if we were upon the moon, we should see the earth coming between us and the sun, now and in each particular case of eclipse. Accordingly, after many such observations, we should affirm the universal proposition, that such intervention of the earth was the cause of eclipses; the universal becoming known to us through induction of particular cases.5 The middle term, the Cause, the Quid, and the Cur, are thus all the same enquiry, in substance; though sometimes such quÆsitum is the quiddity or essential nature of the thing itself (as the essence of a triangle is the cause or ground of its having its three angles equal to two right angles, as well as of its other properties), sometimes it is an extraneous fact.6 The purport and relation of this quadruple classification of problems is set forth still more clearly in the sixth book of the Metaphysica (Z. p. 1041) with the explanations of Bonitz, Comm. pp. 358, 359. But how or by what process is this quÆsitum obtained and made clear? Is it by Demonstration or by Definition? What is Definition, and what matters admit of Definition?7 Aristotle begins by treating the question dialectically; by setting out a series of doubts and difficulties. First, Is it possible that the same cognition, and in the same relation, can be obtained both by Definition and by Demonstration? No; it is not possible. It is plain that much that is known by Demonstration cannot be known by Definition; for we have seen that conclusions both particular and negative are established by Demonstration (in Again, let us ask, vice versÂ, Can everything that is declared by Definition, or indeed anything that is declared by Definition, be known also by Demonstration? Neither is this possible. One and the same cognitum can be known only by one process of cognition. Definitions are the principia from which Demonstration departs; and we have already shown that in going back upon demonstrations, we must stop somewhere, and must recognize some principia undemonstrable.9 The Definition can never be demonstrated, for it declares only the essence of the subject, and does not predicate anything concerning the subject; whereas Demonstration assumes the essence to be known, and deduces from such assumption an attribute distinct from the essence.10 Themistius (p. 71, Speng.) distinguishes the ???s?? itself from ? p??tas?? ? t?? ???s?? ?at??????e??? ????sa. Prosecuting still farther the dialectical and dubitative treatment,11 Aristotle now proceeds to suggest, that the Essence (that is, the entire Essence or Quiddity), which is declared by Definition, can never be known by Demonstration. To suppose that it could be so known, would be inconsistent with the conditions of the syllogistic proof used in demonstrating. You prove by syllogism, through a middle term, some predicate or attribute; e.g. because A is predicable of all B, and B is predicable of all C, therefore A is predicable of all C. But you cannot prove, through the middle term B, that A is the essence or quiddity M. BarthÉlemy St. Hilaire, notes, p. 205:— “Il faut donc, pour conclure par syllogisme que A est la dÉfinition essentielle de C, que A soit la dÉfinition essentielle de B, et que B soit lui-mÊme la dÉfinition essentielle de C. Mais alors la dÉfinition de la chose sera dans le moyen terme lui-mÊme, avant d’Être dans la conclusion; en effet, la mineure: B est la dÉfinition essentielle de C, donne la dÉfinition essentielle de C, sans qu’il soit besoin d’aller jusqu’À la conclusion. Donc la dÉmonstration de l’essence ainsi entendue est absurde.” If you cannot obtain Definition as the conclusion of syllogistic Demonstration, still less can you obtain it through the method of generic and specific Division; which last method (as has been already shown in the Analytica Priora) is not equal even to the Syllogism in respect of usefulness and efficacy.13 You cannot in this method distinguish between propositions both true and essential, and propositions true but not essential; you never obtain, by asking questions according to the method of generic subdivision, any premisses from which the conclusion follows by necessity. Yet this is what you ought to obtain for the purpose of Demonstration; for you are not allowed to enunciate the full actual conclusion among the premisses, and require assent to it. Division of a genus into its species will often give useful information, as Induction also will;14 but neither the one nor the other will be equivalent to a demonstration. A definition obtained only from subdivisions of a genus, may always be challenged, like a syllogism without its middle term. Again, neither can you arrive at the definition of a given subject, by assuming in general terms what a definition ought to be, and then declaring a given form of words to be conformable to such assumption; because your minor premiss must involve Rassow renders ?? ?p???se?? — “assumpt generali definitionis notione;” and also says: “t? t? ?? e??a? — generalem definitionis notionem; t? t? ?st?? — certam quandam definitionem, significare perspicuum est.” (Aristotelis de Notionis Definitione Doctrina, p. 65). After stating some other additional difficulties which seem to leave the work of Definition inexplicable, Aristotle relinquishes the dubitative treatment, and looks out for some solution of the puzzle: How may it be possible that the Definition shall become known?17 He has already told us that to know the essence of a thing is the same as to know the cause or reason of its existence; but we must first begin by knowing that the definiendum exists; for there can be no definition of a non-entity, except a mere definition of the word, a nominal or verbal definition. Now sometimes we know the existence of the subject by one or other of its accidental attributes; but this gives us no help towards finding the definition.18 Sometimes, however, we obtain a partial knowledge of its essence along with the knowledge of its existence; when we know it along with some constant antecedent, or through some constant, though derivative, consequent. Knowing thus much, we can often discover the cause or fundamental condition thereof, which is the essence or definition of Aristotle has thus shown how the Essence or Quiddity (t? ?st?) may become known in this class of cases. There is neither syllogism nor demonstration thereof, yet it is declared through syllogism and demonstration: though no demonstration thereof is possible, yet you cannot know it without demonstration, wherever there is an extraneous cause.21 Mr. Poste translates an earlier passage (p. 93, a. 5) in this very difficult chapter as follows (p. 107): “If one cause is demonstrable, another indemonstrable cause must be the intermediate; and the proof is in the first figure, and the conclusion affirmative and universal. In this mode of demonstrating the essence, we prove one definition by another, for the intermediate that proves an essence or a peculiar predicate must itself be an essence or a peculiar predicate. Of two definitions, then, one is proved and the other assumed; and, as we said before, this is not a demonstration but a dialectical proof of the essence.” Mr. Poste here translates ??????? s??????s?? “dialectical proof.” I understand it rather as meaning a syllogism, t?? ?p???e?? simply (Top. I. v. p. 102, b. 5), in which all that you really know is that the predicate belongs to the subject, but in which you assume besides that it belongs to the subject essentially. It is not a demonstration because, in order to obtain Essence in the conclusion, you are obliged to postulate Essence in your premiss. (See Alexander ad Topic. I. p. 263, Br.). You have therefore postulated a premiss which required proof as much as the conclusion. But the above doctrine will hold only in cases where there is a distinct or extraneous cause; it will not hold in cases where there is none. It is only in the former (as has been said) that a middle term can be shown; rendering it possible that Quiddity or Essence should be declared by a valid formal syllogism, though it cannot be demonstrated by syllogism. In the latter, where there is no distinct cause, no such middle term can be enunciated: the Quiddity or Essence must be assumed as an Themistius, p. 80: ? ?a? e??a? ?a? t? ?st?? ?p???s?a? de?, ? ????? t??p?? fa?e?? p???sa? ?? ?pa????? ? p?ste?? ? ?pe???a?. Rassow, De Notionis Definitione, pp. 18-22. We may distinguish three varieties of Definition. 1. Sometimes it is the mere explanation what a word signifies; in this sense, it has nothing to do with essence or existence; it is a nominal definition and nothing more.23 2. Sometimes it enunciates the Essence, cause, or reason of the definitum; this will happen where the cause is distinct or extraneous, and where there is accordingly an intervening middle term: the definition will then differ from a demonstration only by condensing into one enunciation the two premisses and the conclusion which together constitute the demonstration.24 3. Sometimes it is an immediate proposition, an indemonstrable hypothesis, assuming Essence or Quiddity; the essence itself being cause, and no extraneous cause — no intervening middle term — being obtainable.25 To know or cognize is, to know the Cause; when we know the Cause, we are satisfied with our cognition. Now there are four Causes, or varieties of Cause:— 1. The Essence or Quiddity (Form) — t? t? ?? e??a?. 2. The necessitating conditions (Matter) — t? t???? ??t?? ?????? t??t’ e??a?. 3. The proximate mover or stimulator of change (Efficient) — ? t? p??t?? ?????se. 4. That for the sake of which (Final Cause or End) — t? t???? ??e?a. All these four Causes (Formal, Material, Efficient, Final) appear as middle terms in demonstrating. We can proceed through the medium either of Form, or of Matter, or of Efficient, or of End. The first of the four has already been exemplified — the demonstration The Final Cause or End is prior in the order of nature, but posterior to the terms of the conclusion in the order of time or generation; while the Efficient is prior in the order of time or generation. The Formal and Material are simultaneous with the effect, neither prior nor posterior.28 Sometimes the same fact may proceed both from a Final cause, and from a cause of Material Necessity; thus the light passes through our lantern for the purpose of guiding us in the dark, but also by reason that the particles of light are smaller than the pores in the glass. Nature produces effects of finality, or with a view to some given end; and also effects by necessity, the necessity being either inherent in the substance itself, or imposed by extraneous force. Thus a stone falls to the ground by necessity of the first kind, but ascends by necessity of the second kind. Among products of human intelligence some spring wholly from design without necessity; but others arise by accident or chance and have no final cause.29 That the middle term is the Cause, is equally true in respect to Entia, Fientia, PrÆterita, and Futura; only that in respect to Entia, the middle term or Cause must be an Ens; in respect to Fientia it must be a Fiens; in respect to PrÆterita, a PrÆteritum; and in respect to Futura, a Futurum; that is, in each case, it must be generated at the corresponding time How are we to proceed in hunting out those attributes that are predicated in Quid,36 as belonging to the Essence of the subject? The subject being a lowest species, we must look out for such attributes as belong to all individuals thereof, but which belong Where the matter that we study is the entire genus, we must begin by distributing it into its lowest species; e.g. number into dyad, triad, &c.; in like manner, taking straight line, circle, right angle, &c.38 We must first search out the definitions of each of these lowest species; and these having been ascertained, we must next look above the genus, to the Category in which it is itself comprised, whether Quantum, Quale, &c. Having done thus much we must study the derivative attributes or propria of the lowest species through the common generalities true respecting the larger. We must recollect that these derivative attributes are derived from the essence and definition of the lowest species, the complex flowing from the simple as its principium: they belong per se only to the lowest species thus Themistius illustrates this obscure passage, p. 89. The definitions of e??e?a ??a?, ?e??as??? ??a?, pe??fe??? ??a?, must each of them contain the definition of ??a? (= ???? ?p?at??), since it is in the Category ??s?? (p?s?? ???? ?p?at??). But the derivative properties of the circle (pe??fe??? ??a?) are deduced from the definition of a circle, and belong to it in the first instance qu pe??fe??? ??a?, in a secondary way qu ??a?. Some contemporaries of Aristotle, and among them Speusippus, maintained that it was impossible either to define, or to divide logically, unless you knew all particulars without exception. You cannot (they said) know any one thing, except by knowing its differences from all other things; which would imply that you knew also all these other things.41 To these reasoners Aristotle replies: It is not necessary to know all the differences of every thing; you know a thing as soon as you know its essence, with the properties per se which are derivative therefrom. There are many differences not belonging to the essence, but distinguishing from each other two things having the same essence: you may know the thing, without knowing these accidental To obtain or put together a definition through logical Division, three points are to be attended to.44 Collect the predicates in Quid; range them in the proper order; make sure that there are no more, or that you have collected all. The essential predicates are genera, to be obtained not otherwise than by the method (dialectical) used in concluding accidents. As regards order, you begin with the highest genus, that which is predicable of all the others, while none of these is predicable of it, determining in like fashion the succession of the rest respectively. The collection will be complete, if you divide the highest genus by an exhaustive specific difference, such that every thing must be included in one or other of the two proximate and opposed portions; and then taking the species thus found as your dividendum, subdivide it until no lower specific difference can be found, or you obtain from the elements an exact equivalent to the subject.45 When the investigation must proceed by getting together a group of similar particulars, you compare them, and note what is the same in all; then turn to another group which are the same in genere yet differ in specie from the first group, and have a different point of community among themselves. You next compare the point of community among the members of the first group, and that among the members of the second group. If the two points of community can be brought under one
Aristotle says that there will be two species of magnanimity. But surely if the two so-called species connote nothing in common they are not rightly called species, nor is magnanimity rightly called a genus. Equanimity would be distinct from magnanimity; Sokrates and Lysander would not properly be magnanimous but equanimous. Every definition must be an universal proposition, applicable, not exclusively to one particular object, but to a class of greater or less extent. The lowest species is easier to define than the higher genus; this is one reason why we must begin with particulars, and ascend to universals. It is in the higher genera that equivocal terms most frequently escape detection.49 When you are demonstrating, what you have first to attend to is, the completeness of the form of syllogizing: when you are defining, By t? saf??, he evidently means the avoidance of equivocal or metaphorical terms, and the adherence to true genera and species. Compare Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristot. pp. 308-310. The treatment of this portion of the Aristotelian doctrine by Prantl (Geschichte der Logik, vol. I. ch. iv. pp. 246, 247, 338), is instructive. He brings out, in peculiar but forcible terms, the idea of “notional causality” which underlies Aristotle’s Logic. “So also ist die Definition das Aussprechen des schÖpferischen Wesensbegriffes.… Soweit der schÖpferische Wesensbegriff erreicht werden kann, ist durch denselben die begriffliche CausalitÄt erkannt; und die Einsicht in diese primitive UrsÄchlichkeit wird in dem Syllogismus vermittelst des Mittelbegriffes erreicht. Ueber den schÖpferischen Wesensbegriff hinauszugehen, ist nicht mÖglich.… Sobald die Definition mehr als eine blosse NamenserklÄrung ist — und sie muss mehr seyn — erkennt sie den Mittelbegriff als schÖpferische CausalitÄt.… Die ontologische Bedeutung des Mittelbegriffes ist, dass er schÖpferischer Wesensbegriff ist.” Rassow (pp. 51, 63, &c.) adopts a like metaphorical phrase:— “Definitionem est, explicare notionem; quÆ quidem est creatrix rerum causa.” To obtain and enunciate correctly the problems suitable for discussion in each branch of science, you must have before you tables of dissection and logical division, and take them as guides;52 beginning with the highest genus and proceeding downward Themistius (pp. 94-95) explains t?? ??at??? to be anatomical drawings or exercises prepared by Aristotle for teaching: ?a? t?? ??at??? ??e?? de? p???e????, ?sa? pep????ta? ???st?t??e?. The collection of Problems or questions for investigation was much prosecuted, not merely by Aristotle but by Theophrastus (Schol. p. 249, a. 12, Br.). Problems must be considered to be the same, when the middle term of the demonstration is the same for each, or when the middle term in the one is a subordinate or corollary to that in the other. Thus, the cause of echo, the cause of images in a mirror, the cause of the rainbow, all come under the same general head or middle term (refraction), though with a specific difference in each case. Again, when we investigate the problem, Why does the Nile flow with a more powerful current in the last half of the (lunar) month? the reason is that the month is then more wintry. But why is the month then more wintry? Because the light of the moon is then diminishing. Here are Respecting Causa and Causatum question may be made whether it is necessary that when the causatum exists, the causa must exist also? The answer must be in the affirmative, if you include the cause in the definition of causatum. Thus, if you include in the definition of a lunar eclipse, the cause thereof, viz., intervention of the earth between moon and sun — then, whenever an eclipse occurs, such intervention must occur also. But it must not be supposed that there is here a perfect reciprocation, and that as the causatum is in this case demonstrable from the cause, so there is the like demonstration of the cause from the causatum. Such a demonstration is never a demonstration of d??t?; it is only a demonstration of ?t?. The causatum is not included in the definition of the cause; if you demonstrate that because the moon is eclipsed, therefore the earth is interposed between the moon and the sun, you prove the fact of the interposition, but you learn nothing about the cause thereof. Again, in a syllogism the middle term is the cause of the conclusion (i.e., it is the reason why the major term is predicated of the minor, which predication is the conclusion); and in this sense the cause and causatum may sometimes reciprocate, so that either may be proved by means of the other. But the causatum here reciprocates with the causa only as premiss and conclusion (i.e., we may know either by means of the other), not as cause and effect; the causatum is not cause of the causa as a fact and reality, as the causa is cause of the causatum.57 The question then arises, Can there be more than one cause of the same causatum? Is it necessary that the same effect should be produced in all cases by the same cause? In other words, “Veluti si probemus grammaticum esse aptum ad ridendum, quia homo est aptus ad ridendum.” (Julius Pacius, p. 514.) The major term of the syllogism will in point of extension be larger than any particular minor, but equal or co-extensive with the sum total of the particulars. Thus the predicate deciduous, affirmable of all plants with broad leaves, is greater in extension than the subject vines, also than the subject fig-trees; but it is equal in extension to the sum total of vines and fig-trees (the other particular broad-leaved plant). The middle also, in an universal demonstration, reciprocates with the major, being its definition. Here the true middle or cause of the effect that vines and fig-trees shed their leaves, is not that they are broad-leaved plants, but rather a coagulation of sap or some such fact.61 The last chapter of the present treatise is announced by Bekker and Waitz, in their editions, include all these words in ch. xix.: the older editions placed the words preceding pe?? d? in ch. xviii. Zabarella observes the transition to a new subject (Comm. ad Analyt. Post. II. ch. xv. p. 640):— “Postremum hoc caput (beginning at pe?? d?) extra primariam tractationem positum esse manifestum est: quum prÆcesserit epilogus respondens prooemio quod legitur in initio primi libri Priorum Analyticorum.” Aristotle has already laid down that there can be no Demonstration without certain prÆcognita to start from; and that these prÆcognita must, in the last resort, be principia undemonstrable, immediately known, and known even more accurately than the conclusions deduced from them. Are they then cognitions, or cognizant habits and possessions, born along with us, and complete from the first? This is impossible (Aristotle declares); we cannot have such valuable and accurate cognitions from the first moments of childhood, and yet not be at all aware of them. They must therefore be acquired; yet how is it possible for us to acquire them?63 The fact is, that, though we do not from the first possess any such complete and accurate cognitions as these, we have from the first an inborn capacity or potentiality of arriving at them. And something of the same kind belongs to all animals.64 All of them possess an apprehending and discriminating power born with them, called Sensible Perception; but, though all possess such power, there is this difference, that with some the act of perception dwells for a longer or shorter time in the mind; with others it does not. In animals with whom it does not dwell, there can be no knowledge beyond perception, at least as to all those matters wherein perception is evanescent; but with those that both perceive and retain perceptions A theory very analogous to this (respecting the gradual generation of scientific universal notions in the mind out of the particulars of sense) is stated in the PhÆdon of Plato, ch. xlv. p. 96, B., where Sokrates reckons up the unsuccessful tentatives which he had made in philosophy: ?a? p?te??? t? a?? ?st?? ? f?????e?, ? ? ???, ? t? p??, ? t??t?? ?? ??d??, ? d? ????fa??? ?st?? ? t?? a?s??se?? pa????? t?? ????e?? ?a? ?p?? ?a? ?sf?a??es?a?, ?? t??t?? d? ??????t? ??? ?a? d??a, ?? d? ???? ?a? d????, ?a??s?? t? ??ee??, ?at? ta?ta ????es?a? ?p?st???. Boethius says, Comm. in Ciceronis Topica, p. 805:— “Plato ideas quasdam esse ponebat, id est, species incorporeas, substantiasque constantes et per se ab aliis naturÆ ratione separatas, ut hoc ipsum homo, quibus participantes cÆterÆ res homines vel animalia fierent. At vero Aristoteles nullas putat extra esse substantias; sed intellectam similitudinem plurimorum inter se differentium substantialem, genus putat esse vel speciem. Nam cum homo et equus differunt rationabilitate et irrationabilitate, horum intellecta similitudo efficit genus. Ergo communitas quÆdam et plurimorum inter se differentium similitudo notio est; cujus notionis aliud genus est, aliud forma. Sed quoniam similium intelligentia est omnis notio, in rebus vero similibus necessaria est differentiarum discretio, idcirco indiget notio quadam enodatione ac divisione; velut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipsi non sufficit,” &c. The phrase intellecta similitudo plurimorum embodies both Induction and Intellection in one. A like doctrine appears in the obscure passages of Aristotle, De AnimÂ, III. viii. p. 429, b. 10; also p. 432, a. 3: ? ????, e?d?? e?d??, ?a? ? a?s??s??, e?d?? a?s??t??. ?pe? d? ??d? p???a ????? ?st? pa?? t? e????, ?? d??e?, t? a?s??t? ?e????s????, ?? t??? e?des? t??? a?s??t??? t? ???t? ?st??. The varieties of intellectual ??e?? enumerated by Aristotle in the sixth book of the Nikomachean Ethica, are elucidated by Alexander in his Comment. on the Metaphysica, (A. p. 981) pp. 7, 8, Bonitz. The difference of ???? and d???es??, the durable condition as contrasted with the transient, is noted in CategoriÆ, pp. 8, 9. See also Eth. Nikom. II. i. ii. pp 1103, 4. Aristotle proceeds to repeat the illustration in clearer terms — at least in terms which he thinks clearer.68 We perceive the particular individual; yet sensible perception is of the universal in the particular (as, for example, when Kallias is before us, we perceive man, not the man Kallias). Now, when one of a set of particulars dwells some time in the mind, first an universal notion arises; next, more particulars are perceived and detained, and universal notions arise upon them more and more comprehensive, until at last we reach the highest stage — the most universal and simple. From Kallias we rise to man; from such and such an animal, to animal in genere; from animal in genere, still higher, until we reach the highest or indivisible genus.69 Hence it is plain that the first and highest principia can become known to us only by Induction; for it is by this process that sensible perception builds up in us the Universal.70 Now among Waitz supposes that Aristotle here refers to a passage in the first book of the Analytica Posteriora, c. xxxi. p. 87, b. 30. M. BarthÉlemy St. Hilaire thinks (p. 290) that reference is intended to an earlier sentence of this same chapter. Neither of these suppositions seems to suit (least of all the last) with the meaning of p??a?. But whichever he meant, Aristotle has not done much to clear up what was obscure in the antecedent statements. These words are obscure: t? ?e?? must mean the highest genera; indivisible, i.e. being a minimum in respect of comprehension. Instead of t? ?a?????, we might have expected t? ???sta ?a?????, or, perhaps, that ?a? should be omitted. Trendelenburg comments at length on this passage, Arist. De Anim Comment. pp. 170-174. To the same purpose Zabarella expresses himself in an earlier portion of his Commentary on the Analyt. Post., where he lays it down that the truth of the proposition, Every whole is greater than its part, is known from antecedent knowledge of particulars by way of Induction. Compare the Scholion of Philoponus, ad Analyt. Post. p. 225, a. 32, Brand., where the same is said about the Axiom, Things equal to the same are equal to each other. The manner in which Aristotle here describes how the principia of Syllogism become known to the mind deserves particular attention. The march up to principia is not only different from, but the reverse of, the march down from principia; like the athlete who runs first to the end of the stadium, and then back.73 Generalizing or universalizing is an acquired intellectual habit or permanent endowment; growing out of numerous particular acts or judgments of sense, remembered, compared, and coalescing into one mental group through associating resemblance. As the ethical, moral, practical habits, are acquirements growing out of a repetition of particular acts, so also the intellectual, The principia, from which the conclusions of Syllogism are deduced, being thus obtained by Induction, are, in Aristotle's view, appreciated by, or correlated with, the infallible and unerring NoÛs or Intellect.74 He conceives repeated and uncontradicted Induction as carrying with it the maximum of certainty and necessity: the syllogistic deductions constituting Science he regards as also certain; but their certainty is only derivative, and the principia from which they flow he ranks still higher, as being still more certain.75 Both the one and the other he pointedly contrasts with Opinion and Calculation, which he declares to be liable to error. Compare Eth. Nik. VI. iii. p. 1139, b. 25, where the Analytica is cited by name — ? ?? d? ?pa???? ???? ?st? ?a? t?? ?a?????, ? d? s??????s?? ?? t?? ?a?????· e?s?? ??a ???a? ?? ?? ? s??????s??, ?? ??? ?st? s??????s??· ?pa???? ??a. — ib. p. 1141, a. 7: ?e?peta? ???? e??a? t?? ?????. — p. 1142, a. 25: ? ?? ??? ???? t?? ????, ?? ??? ?st? ?????. — p. 1143, b. 1. Aristotle had inherited from Plato this doctrine of an infallible NoÛs or Intellect, enjoying complete immunity from error. But, instead of connecting it (as Plato had done) with reminiscences of an anterior life among the Ideas, he assigned to it a position as terminus and correlate to the process of Induction.76 The like postulate and pretension passed afterwards to the Stoics, and Themistius, p. 14: ?? d? ???e? p???? ? ???? ? t??? ????? ???e??e?, ?? ?? s???e?ta? t? ????ata. The Paraphrase of Themistius (pp. 100-104) is clear and instructive, where he amplifies the last chapter, and explains ???? as the generalizing or universalizing aptitude of the soul, growing up gradually out of the particulars furnished by Sense and Induction. It is to be regretted that Aristotle should have contented himself with proclaiming this Inductive process as an ideal, culminating in the infallible NoÛs; and that he should only have superficially noticed those conditions under which it must be conducted in reality, in order to avoid erroneous or uncertified results. This is a deficiency however which has remained unsupplied until the present century.77 (Hamilton, in this passage, considers the Logic of Induction to be the same as the Logic of Comprehension.) |
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